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ABSTRACT
The thesis traces post-war political development in Guinea leading to 
the independence of the territory in 1958. The particular focus is on 
the history of the Parti D&mocratigue da Gui.n£e (PDG) , chapter party of 
the interterritorial federal movement the Rassemblement Democratique 
Africainr and its relations with the French colonial government.
Founded in 1946, the KDA was initially suppressed by the French 
administration due to its affiliation with the Communist Party. Although 
the FDA severed its ties with the Communists in 1950, in Guinea the PDG 
suffered from enduring suspicion because of its links with the 
Communist-dominated French trade union movement. Finally in 1955 the PDG 
and union leader S6kou Tourd formally announced the party's disaffilia­
tion from the Communists and his intention to create an autonomous 
African trade union. Subsequently the local authorities ceased the 
repression of the PDG and Toure was elected deputy to the National 
Assembly in Paris.
Reforms introduced in French West Africa under the 1956 Loi-Cadre 
increasingly accorded territorial administration to elected African 
bodies. In 1957 the PDG swept local elections and gained control of the 
Territorial Assembly, municipal communes., and town councils in Guinea. 
Henceforth the PDG effectively governed the territory, wiping out the 
opposition parties and abolishing the institution of the chieftaincy.
In May 1958 General Charles de Gaulle was called back to power in 
France and proceeded to form the Fifth Republic. The new Constitution 
created the French-Afr ican Community and suppressed the former Federa­
tion of West Africa. Despite repeated warnings of the consequences of 
"secession," Guinea was the sole territory to reject the Constitutional 
referendum of 28 September 1958, opting for immediate independence.
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INTRODUCTION
Pre-war colonial records commonly referred to French Guinea as "la Belle 
an hols dormant" (Sleeping Beauty). The present study covers the politi­
cal awakening of the territory, the rapid developments of which
culminated in the abrupt achievement of Guinean independence in 1958.
Drawing mainly on archival sources, the aim of the thesis is to 
reconstruct Guinean post-war political history, with the dual focus on 
the growth of the predominant political party— the Par.tl D&nnm-aHgne da 
Guin&e, and the significant role played by the colonial administration 
in shaping the political events in the territory.
By rejecting the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic in a 
referendum on 28 September 1958, Guinea opted out of the proposed
French-African Community and became a sovereign nation. The 
"consequences" of such defiance included the immediate cutting off of
all French aid and assistance to the former colony. The French pull-out 
was ruthless, and much of what could not be carried away was destroyed. 
Fortunately for this research, strict orders were issued concerning the 
removal of the colonial archives, which were relocated to Paris and 
Dakar. The bulk of the "sensitive" (i.e. "secret" or "confidential") 
archives were sent to France and rendered incommunicado for 30 years.
I began my research in 1988, gaining access to hundreds of files 
that had been untouched since the independence of Guinea. The archives 
reveal a hitherto untold political history of Guinea. The French 
interpretation and handling of events can hence be accurately recounted. 
Previous accounts of the relations between the PDG and the French admin­
istration were normally in the form of uncorroborated stories. The 
factual evidence contained in the archives is striking, and will no
9
doubt contribute to a better understanding of some of the many "myths" 
surrounding the PDG and the Guinean ascension to independence.
Although it was my initial intention to carry the subject matter of 
the thesis beyond independence, several factors influenced my decision 
to limit the scope of the study to the time frame 1944-1958. First, 
after many months trying, I was denied a visa to enter Guinea for 
research. Secondly, most of the existing literature on Guinea focuses on 
the post-independence era, drawing on sometimes questionable (in light 
of recently consulted archival records) foundations to explain political 
events during the colonial era. Thirdly, on a subsequent trip in the 
summer of 1989 to the French archives in Aix-en-Provence, I found a new 
policy under enforcement whereby files had to be re-checked for 
political sensitivity before being handed out to researchers. After 
waiting for countless dossiers on Guinea, that I had seen before, to be 
re-evaluated, I stood and watched the staff repeatedly mark the files 
"incommunicado juaqn1 a 2010."— sealed for another 30 years. The realisa­
tion that the vast information I had already accumulated would not be 
available in the near future convinced me that I ought to use it in as 
much detail as possible in the present work.
Although the French authorities acquired a good deal of letters, 
circulars, newspapers, and reports written by the various political 
associations in the overseas territories, I am very grateful to the 
Centre, de. Recherche et de Documentation Africaine (predominantly 
archives of the PDA) for balancing what would have been a strong French 
bias to the interpretation of political events in Guinea in this study. 
French authorities routinely reported administrative interference in 
local politics such as rigging elections and transferring undesirable 
political agitators around West Africa; nonetheless I have tried to
10
present the RDA (and PDG) point of view wherever possible. All of the 
archival records used are in French, and the translations, often rough 
as I tried to keep them literal, are mine.
Hie thesis is organised chronologically, with certain deviations 
allowing for background information on particular subjects. Chapter I 
sets the stage by briefly outlining the ethnic and geographical 
conposition of the territory of French Guinea, then traces the institu­
tion, inplantation, and administration of French colonialism in West 
Africa. Also included in the chapter are sections on the use and role of 
the chiefs in the French colonial system, obligations placed on colonial 
subjects, military conscription and the war effort in the overseas 
territories.
Chapter II begins with the Brazzaville Conference of 1944, which 
heralded a shift in post-war French colonial theory and practice. 
Reforms pertaining to the overseas territories included the legalisation 
of political parties and trade unions, and the introduction of elections 
and representation in the metropolitan government. Such radical reform 
caught many of the territories by surprise, and hence rapid political 
organisation ensued. In September 1946 African deputies in Paris, repre­
senting various territorial political associations, called for the 
creation of a mass African political movement. A congress to this effect 
was held in October in Bamako, the outcome of which was the formation of 
the interterritorial RaaHpymb lament Democratique Africain (FDA) . The 
chapter concludes with the creation of the Guinean chapter of the FDA 
which took place in May 1947.
Due to its affiliation with the Communist Party in the French 
government, the early history of the FDA is fraught with administrative 
repression in the overseas territories, which is the subject of Chapter
11
III. Archival records clearly illustrate the extent to which the 
official policy to suppress the movement was carried out by local 
authorities. In Guinea the nascent RDA was near to collapse, while trade 
unionism in the territory was making inportant strides under increasing 
suspicion from the colonial government.
The focus of Chapter IV is the decision of top RDA leaders to 
disaffiliate from the Communist Party, and the subsequent reconciliation 
with the metropolitan government. Under serious threat of dissolution by 
the French government, the dSsapparentement was seen as a necessary 
tactical move to safeguard the future of the African movement. Members 
of the Guinean section of the RDA were slow in accepting the new RDA 
orientation, as dictated by the central directing committee of the 
organisation, and this is the focus of Chapter V. Reluctant conformity 
in Guinea led to increased persecution of the PDG. Nevertheless in 1952 
changes were introduced to strengthen the party, including a reshuffling 
of power in which Sekou Tour6 emerged as Secretary-General of the Parti 
Democratique de. Guinee (PDG), while at the same time becoming the hero 
of trade unionism in Guinea.
Chapters VI and VII depict the rise to power of the PDG in Guinea. 
Initially through trade union successes, the PDG grew rapidly in menber- 
ship, and Tour6 wielded increasing influence throughout the Federation 
of French West Africa. Pressured by both the central leadership of the 
RDA and the French administration, in July 1955 Toure finally formally 
announced PDG disaffiliation from the Communists, and proposed the 
creation of an autonomous African trade union movement. Reconciliation 
with the local French authorities was far from smooth, however, as the 
process was repeatedly marred by violent incidents occurring in the 
territory. Particularly around election time, coirpetition between rival
12
political parties in Guinea often turned violent; on several occasions 
the territory was reportedly on the brink of civil war. Aided by 
decentralising reforms and institutions introduced under the Loi-Cadre, 
in 1957 the PDG emerged triumphant in its quest for ultimate political 
control over Guinea.
Proof of PDG supremacy is illustrated by an important event in 
Guinean political history discussed in Chapter VIII. In a skilful legal 
manoeuvre, one of the first acts of the PDG government installed in 1957 
was the suppression of the chieftaincy. According to the PDG platform, 
the chieftaincy represented not only the last bastion of feudalism and 
slavery in the territory, but also administered the abuses of colonial­
ism on the subject population. The abolition of the chieftaincy 
signalled the end to any remaining opposition to PDG rule, and in fact 
foreshadowed the end to colonial rule in Guinea.
Finally, Chapter IX covers the significant events leading to 
the critical "no" vote of 28 September 1958 which brought immediate 
independence to Guinea. Topics covered include the third RDA congress 
held in Bamako, the debate over the proposed French Fifth Republic, 
controversial issues of federalism and territorial autonomy, African 
positions concerning the constitutional referendum, the decision in 
Guinea to reject the proposed French-African Community, the vote, and 
consequences. The conclusions which follow further discuss the motiva­
tions behind the Guinean decision to vote "no," the remarkable political 
mobilisation which carried the vote, and general findings of the thesis.
A noticeable fact of the present study is its relatively minor use 
of secondary sources. As aforementioned, most of the published work on 
Guinea concentrates on the post-independence era. References and summa­
ries of the colonial period, particularly concerning the PDG and its
13
relations with the French authorities, are lacking in detail and often 
incorrect. Nonetheless there are a few sources on Guinea that were 
useful to this research. In particular Ruth Schachter Morgenthau's 
Political Parties in French speaking. West, Africa (1964) gives an overall 
history of the RDA and chapter parties, with added insight from knowing 
personally the "founding fathers" of the new African states. The PhD 
thesis by Victor D. DuBois entitled "The Independence Movement in 
Guinea: A Study in African Nationalism" (1962) outlines in great detail
the organisation of the PDG and branches of the party (i.e. women, 
youth, peasants, etc.)— topics which are only briefly covered herein. 
Both of the above authors relied heavily on oral sources, and were 
without access to French records. Now with archival evidence many of the 
PDG claims have either been validated or refuted in the present study. 
Finally, compiled from secondary sources, Edward Mortimer's France, and. 
the Afr leans 1944-1960: A Pol ifinal History. (1969) was helpful as an
overview of French politics and legislation during this period. Several 
of the main political currents covered in this thesis, for example the 
repeated outbreaks of considerable violence in Guinea, are not dealt 
with at all in the existing literature. I realise, however, that in 
detailed usage of original sources I have somewhat neglected to 
incorporate comparative analysis and recent theoretical debate into the 
present work, leaving these topics to future study.
14
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CHAPTER I
Historic and Colonial Setting
The Territory of La Guin6e Frangaise, as demarcated by French colonisers
in the late 1800s, arbitrarily cut across numerous ethnic groups and
political boundaries, as well as geographical regions, historic
commercial routes, and traditional socio-religious relationships.
Roughly twenty-four ethnic groups are found within the Guinean
frontiers, three of which constitute about 75 percent of the estimated
1
total population of 2.57 million in 1955. The predominant ethno-
linguistic groups in Guinea broadly correspond to its four major
geographical regions. In Lower Guinea, the Soussou are dominant and
have largely assimilated a nuirber of coastal peoples, including the
Landoma, Baga, and Nalou. The highlands of the Fouta Djalon in Middle
2
Guinea are home to Guinea's largest ethnic group— the Fulani, who are 
spread over much of West Africa. Additionally, in the North of this 
area along the Guinea-Senegal border there are five ethnic groups, 
referred to collectively as Tenda, including the Coniagui and Bassari. 
Upper Guinea is characterised by savanna grasslands inhabited mainly by 
the Malink6, a branch of the culturally related West African people 
called Manding. Finally, while no single group predominates in the 
Forest region, where traditionally the terrain, including the Guinea
1
Harold C. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Guinea, Washington DC, 
1975, p. 55.
2
Also commonly referred to in the literature as Peul, Foulah or 
Fulbe, and their language being either Poular or Fulfulde. For further 
information see Victor Azarya, Aristocrats Facing Change; The. Fulbe in 
Guinea,.. Nigeria, and Cameroon, Chicago, 1978.
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Highlands and dense rain forest, discouraged larger settlement patterns, 
there nevertheless remain three distinct minor ethnic groups, namely the 
Kissi, Toma, and Guerz6.
By the early 1950s French Guinea was recognised as the territory
most richly endowed in the West African Federation in agricultural,
3
mineral, and hydroelectric potential. The tropical climate along the 
Guinea Coast favoured the development of banana and pineapple 
plantations, while oil palm and Kola trees contributed to the increasing 
export figures from the territory. Each geographical region added 
variety to the export economy, as coffee and animal hides were furnished 
from the Fouta Djalon, rice and peanuts from Upper Guinea, and timbers 
from the Forest. In mineral prospects, Guinea has great economic 
potential through its vast reserves of Bauxite, iron ore, and alumina. 
A3ditionally, diamonds are mined in the Forest region; however during 
colonial times much was lost through smuggling into neighbouring 
Liberia. Finally, Guinea is the source of over one-half of the principal 
rivers as well as many other tributaries in West Africa, making the 
territory capable of producing enough hydroelectric power to supply the 
entire area. Thus although Guinea was often deemed politically 
"backward" until the very end of the colonial era, economically the 
territory proved to be potentially the richest in the Federation of 
French West Africa.
There no doubt exists much greater diversity than similarity among 
the wide array of historical political systems in the area. Socio­
political structures existing at the time of European penetration
Roland Pre, L 1 Avenir Hp b  Guin6e Frangaise, Conakry, 1951.
18
included remnants of ancient empires, small chieftaincies, Islamic 
states, and nomadic as well as segmentary societies. In pre-colonial 
Guinea, social organisation ranged from the highly stratified class and 
caste systems of the Fulani cattle-herders to the numerous simple 
cultivating communities along the coast. Regarding the nature of 
political domination at the time of colonisation, complex hierarchies of 
hereditary rule dating from the early enpires and later Islamic states 
of the Western Sudan remained among the Maiink§ and Fulbe. Islam was 
professed by three-fourths of the Guinean population at this time. In 
the Coastal and Forest regions, social units were small, dispersed, 
often economically oriented, and presided over by local chiefs or 
wealthy traders. As often was the case upon the demarcation of inperial 
boundaries and imposition of foreign rule, vastly different societies 
and ethnic groups in Guinea were divided, amalgamated, and reorganised 
to suit the administrative preferences of the colonial government.
Peaceful Penetration in Coastal and Middle Guinea
Much of Guinea's pre-colonial history is tied to the successive states
in the Western Sudan— Ghana, Mali, and Songhai, spanning the eleventh to
mid-sixteenth centuries. One of the most celebrated figures in Guinean
oral history is Sundiata Keita, the founder of the Mali enpire, who
4
reigned from approximately 1230 to 1255. The decline and eventual 
disintegration of Songhai in the sixteenth century coincided with a 
marked increase in tribal warfare and the development of new commercial 
routes, mainly the traffic of slaves and gold directed towards the
-
For an interesting oral history of Sundiata, see D.T. Niane's 
Sundiatai An Epic of. old Mali, London, 1965. For details of the Mali 
enpire see Nehemia Levtzion, Ancient Ghana and Malir London, 1973.
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Atlantic coast.
Walter Rodney in his study entitled A History of. tho Upper Guinea 
Coast traced the migrations, as well as the social and political activi­
ties in the littoral region from approximately 1545 to 1800. While it 
was held that the early peopling of the coastal area was in large part
due to expansionary pressure and resulting emigration from the politics
5
in the Western Sudan, Rodney claimed that the European presence on the
Guinea coast from the seventeenth century onwards motivated further
relocation and an overall reorganisation of African society in order to
6
cater to the European market. The Portuguese were actually the first
Europeans to land on the Guinea coast, where the first shipment of
7
slaves from the area dates back to the mid-sixteenth century? nearly
four hundred years passed before this trade was effectively abolished.
According to Rodney the greatest inpact of the slave trade in this area
was the impetus it had in escalating tribal warfare for the purpose of
procuring captives, and the degradation of the ruling classes in their
8
victimisation of their indigenous subjects. Alternatively, A.G. Hopkins 
has refuted the notion of "merrie Africa" which depicts pre-colonial 
society as egalitarian, arguing that "the existence of slave labour
5
Jaques Richard-Molard, Afrique Occidentale Frangaise, Paris, 1949,
p. 108.
6
Walter Rodney, A  History of. tha Upper Guinea Coast, 1545-1800, 
Oxford, 1970, p. 80.
7
In 1513 over 500 slaves were transported from Guinea to Portugal, 
and nearly 1,000 the following year. Hiis figure increased to over 3,000 
annually from the mid-seventeenth century, and accounted for only the 
Portuguese trade from the region. The estimated total contribution from 
coastal Guinea is over half a million slaves, not including the great 
loss of life unrecorded in passage. Andre Lewin, La Gn.in&e, Paris, 
1984, pp. 32-3.
8
W. Rodney, A  History of. the Upper, Guinea Coast, p. 258.
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9
provides evidence of the inequalities which were present." Hopkins
claimed that there was a long-established labour market in Africa based
on slavery, by which conquerers such as the Fulani achieved wealth, and
1°
subsequently lived "la vie de chateau." In any case, slavery was a 
long-standing institution among the Fulani, which continued throughout 
the colonial period in Guinea with tacit approval of the French 
administration.
Although the seventeenth century was a period of fierce commercial
11
rivalry in West Africa between the French, British, and Dutch, the 
Guinean coast was deliberately side-stepped. Mainly due to the naviga­
tional hazards of the area, the coastal and river trade in Guinea was 
left almost completely in the hands of private merchants of Portuguese 
or afro-Portuguese origin, referred to locally as laneados.. As French 
commercial interest expanded outwardly from Senegal in the eighteenth 
century, gradually trading practices were established along the coastal 
area of Guinea.
In competition with the British, whose economic influence was 
dominant in neighbouring Sierra Leone and growing throughout the region, 
the French in the mid-nineteenth century embarked on a campaign of 
drawing up trade agreements with local chiefs. Competition among coastal 
societies for trading monopolies facilitated European interference and 
increasing influence in the region. The colonial power easily inter-
9
A.G. Hopkins, An. Economic History of West Africa, London, 1973,
p. 26.
10
Ibid., p. 27.
11
By this time Portuguese influence in the area had vastly decreased, 
and likewise the Dutch were eliminated from local competition towards 
the end of the century.
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vened in local rivalries, was often responsible for the rise and fall of
coastal chiefs with whom protectorates were then devised, and in at
least one case brutally decided an outcome of rivalry between chiefs
12
where both proclaimed French allegiance. The usual stipulations of
the agreements were that French sovereignty was accepted in the region,
and in return French recognition, modest payment, and protection were
accorded to the local chief or "king." Additionally included were the
promises of free trade, and respect of local customs and systems of
government, provided that they did not violate (European) humanitarian
13
and moral standards. Between 1845 and 1897, more than thirty
"friendship and protectorate" treaties were concluded between France and
14
tribal rulers along the Guinea coast. These internal or colonial 
protectorates, as they were called, seemingly alluded to a system of 
indirect administration whereby indigenous leadership was left largely 
to function autonomously and according to custom. This, however, was 
clearly not the direction to be pursued in instituting local government 
administration in the colony.
Another example of the successful strategy pursued by the French 
colonisers of first peacefully signing protectorate agreements, 
promising the respect of local authority, then proceeding to gradually
12
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dismantle the undersigned political systems, is the case of the Fouta
Djalon. The migration of the Fulani into Middle Guinea occurred during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Moving southward from Macina
in present Mali, the Fulani conquered the local populations in the name
of Islam, and then lived as cattle herders in the area in a character-
15
istically "feudal" society. In 1725 a jihad was launched in the Fouta 
by the Fulbe cleric Ibrahim Musa. By the late 1770s his successor 
Ibrahim Sori had militarily secured control over the region and estab­
lished a theocratic state.
Ruled by a Muslim aristocracy, the Fulani state was divided into 
semi-autonomous provinces. The top of the highly stratified political 
system was an almamy acting as military, religious and spiritual leader, 
elected by the council of elders at the political capital of Timbo, then 
ceremonially installed at the religious capital of Fougouirba. The 
families of both heroes of the holy war could claim legitimate right to 
rule. Eventually an agreement of hereditary succession was established 
whereby the almamys of the two branches, Alfaya and Soriya, alterna­
tively ruled for two year periods.
Power struggles between the two leading families wrought instabil­
ity and weakness in the imamate, facilitating French interference in its 
16
internal affairs. In 1897 a protectorate was signed whereby the 
French agreed that they would respect the Constitution of the Fouta 
Djalon, including the practice of alternating rulers. Shortly after­
wards the French reneged on their promise and intervened to depose the
aimaniy and install their choice as successor. The next step in the 
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process was to greatly reduce the territory under the authority of the 
imamate, incorporating the newly liberated areas into the French admini­
stration. The Fouta Djalon was again parcelled after the death of the 
almanry in 1906, this time divided between the two leading families. 
Furthermore, the almamye were stripped of their status of paramount 
chiefs and demoted to provincial chiefs. Finally, a decree of 1912 
reduced the almamys in the hierarchy of the French administration to the 
mere status of canton chiefs.
While in general the colonisation of the Coastal area and the Fouta 
Djalon in Middle Guinea was accomplished with little military might, 
much of Guinea was in fact "conquered" by the French in a state of 
outright war with African resisters. In particular the canpaigns against 
the Islamic empires of Al-Haj Umar and Samory Tourd devastated much of 
the Upper Guinea region before final capitulation in the 1890s. Likewise 
heavy military raids were required to "pacify" pockets of the Forest 
region and the area near the Senegalese border, where resistance to 
colonial administration, ending in French military reprisals, was 
reported as late as 1911.
Conquest and Pacification in Upper Guinea and Forest Region
Two Islamic empires expanding in the nineteenth century controlled Upper
Guinea and extended both into the Fouta Djalon and the Forest region.
The first was founded by Al-Haj Umar Tal, originally from the Fouta Toro
in Senegal, who by 1850 had established the Tukulor enpire based in 
17
Dinguiraye. Spreading north and eastward in Bambara territory, Umar 
—
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initially seemed willing to negotiate with the French. Nevertheless
the European conquerors proved to be wary of militant Islam, and
ignored Umar's propositions of co-operation. Although a commercial
treaty promising respect for Tukulor sovereignty was signed with Umar's
son and successor Ahmad in 1881, the French immediately began building
military forts in the area and set out on a cairpaign to "liberate the
19
oppressed Bambara." By this time, however, the French were also
involved in skirmishes with Samory Tour6 on the borders of his Mandinka
empire to the South. In 1883 Samory proposed to unite the Tukulor and
Manding armies to oppose the French. The final destruction of Ahmad's
empire in 1893 was attributed to his rejection of this offered alliance 
20
with Samory.
The greatest resistance to French military conquest came from the
enpire of (Xiassoulou, the second Islamic state in Upper Guinea, founded
by Samory Tour6 between 1870 and 1875. Uniting the remaining
independent states after the disintegration of ancient Mali, Samory's
enpire covered the Manding territory between Siguiri in Guinea and
Bamako in Mali, and later shifted east and far south into the Forest
region while fighting and retreating from the French.
Samory's goals were the political reunification and renaissance of
former Malink6 glory, adding later the cause of Islam, all for which "he
21
had the gift of inspiring the most fanatical devotion." In comparison
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to the Tukulor eirpire, Samory's state was both considerably more united 
22
and centralised. Regarding Islam, however, whilst it was the 
motivating factor of Umar's state-building, in Samory's case it was seen 
as rather the justifying and unifying principles invoked only after 
initial conquest. It was not until 1886 that Samory adopted the title of 
a l r proclaiming theocracy and demanding conversion of infidels in 
his empire.
A brilliant strategist, in his seventeen years of dealing with the
French, Samory employed numerous tactics including the signing and
breaking of commercial and political treaties with France, repeated
patterns of ambush and surprise attacks followed by mass retreat, and
attempting to ally first with the Tukulor enpire and finally with the
British to stave off inpending French military victory and control of
the region. Fully aware that his forces were not strong enough to
decisively defeat the French army, Samory nevertheless decided to make
a final stand and spent many months in preparation for battle. Once
engaged in combat, Samory and his army made intermittent raids on enemy
forces, all the while retreating south-eastwardly in the vain hope that
23
the French would let him retire and settle in peace. The almamy left a 
trail of complete destruction behind him, employing a "scorched-earth" 
policy whereby he instructed all local populations to evacuate their 
homes while the soldiers burned villages, fields, and anything of 
possible value to the approaching army and future colonisers. The seven 
year campaign to destroy Samory ended with his capitulation in 1898.
For details of the organisation of the state and army see J. Suret- 
Canale, "Guinea under the Colonial System," pp. 34-6.
23
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In the process of drawing up a peace treaty, however, Samory was
deported to Gabon, where he died in captivity in 1900, Despite the
24
incredible hardship he inposed on his followers and subjects, Samory
Tour6 has become a Guinean and indeed African nationalist legendary
hero. As summarised by Yves Person, the leading authority on Samory:
Samori arouses the highest passions because more than any 
other leader in pre-colonial Africa he symbolises heroic and 
determined resistance to the European conqueror. (25)
Although in 1892 a frontier agreement was concluded between France 
and Liberia, it was in the pursuit of Samory that the French first 
entered the Forest region. The geography of the area and its ethnic 
composition historically favoured independent village settlements, 
politically loosely organised, and in 1899 it was divided and
administered strictly as a military outpost. Even so, villagers fierce­
ly resisted the imposition of French rule, as illustrated in the Report 
on the General Situation in French Guinea in 1903:
"The natives have a very great spirit of independence. They 
live in villages which are independent of each other. The 
authority of the village chiefs is very slight and that of 
the canton chiefs which it had been thought fit to install 
in the military Circles is absolutely nil." (26)
Violent and sporadic revolts by the Kissi, Toma, Guerz£ and Manon
peoples of the Forest occurred before the region was finally subdued in
1911.
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Similarly historically independent were the Coniagui and Bassari
ethnic minorities situated on the Senegalese border. So long as the
French did not interfere with local activities, their presence was
nominally tolerated. Once, however, the local administrator began
demanding taxes payable in money, social unrest erupted. The area war
chief, denying the knowledge or use of money in the region, acquiesced
to the submitting of taxes in the form of millet or groundnuts. In 1902
a French military contingent appeared to enforce the payment of taxes in
currency? when the chief refused to capitulate a skirmish ensued in
which a small French force was utterly destroyed. Itoo years later the
French losses were avenged as a troop of 500 soldiers arrived, burning
27
villages and massacring the local populations.
Overall the imposition of colonial rule in the territory of Guinea 
proved difficult and costly for the French, as the greater part of the 
colony was acquired by military conquest. Moreover, it took the French 
over sixty years after the signing of the first coastal protectorates to 
secure the hinterland, hence installing their colonial administration. 
Before turning to the actual structure of the territorial government, 
therefore, a brief look is appropriate into the motivations for the
colonisation of West Africa and the theories developed to support and 
justify its existence.
The Colonial Impetus
Explanations of imperialism often take the form of after-the-fact 
justification, and normally are quite different even than the pretexts 
adopted for initial expansion. Moreover the interests and motivations of 
—
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the French government were not necessarily the same as the military 
officers who carried out the occupation, and indeed wielded considerable 
power and influence in the type and running of the administrations they 
installed.
It is widely held that the fundamental reason for the inposition of
28
colonial rule was economic in nature. Certainly the pretext most
often cited warranting interference and later penetration into the
29
interior was to protect the trading interest in the region. The 
logical extension of this principle included the suppression of "tribal 
wars," internal slavery, religious fanaticism, struggles of succession, 
and powerful local merchants, all of which could potentially cause 
instability and threaten European commercial routes and monopoly of 
trade. Michael Crowder furthered this argument and claimed that 
throughout the colonial era the economic consideration was supreme, 
summarising:
For all the talk of a mission civilisatrice., the overriding 
motive for the European occupation in Africa was economic, 
whether it was to avoid a rival European power establishing 
a monopoly in one trading area, or to reduce an African 
ruler who was inimical to European trading ambitions. The 
administrative systems...were intended to facilitate trade 
with and the opening up of the resources of their African 
colonies. For the Europeans to successfully administer and 
exploit their African colonies, railways, roads, bridges 
and harbours had to be built and telegraph lines laid....The 
alternative to bringing out Europeans to provide these 
facilities and staff the commercial and governmental admini­
strations even at the most junior levels, was to train 
Africans to assist them. (30)
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Apart from the economic factor were visions of grandeur of the
French Enpire, and the missions to spread superior culture, language,
education, and Christianity in Africa. According to the administrator
Hubert Deschairps, "Waterloo, and later Sedan, were, in the opinion of
31
the French, the most powerful stimuli for the overseas conquests." In
his recent book entitled French Power in. Africa, John Chipman argues
that "all acquisitions made overseas were intended to enhance French
prestige," and that sustaining French influence in Africa (even through
the process of decolonisation) was paramount to France’s self-estimation
32
as an important world power. Despite claims to the contrary, Chipman
holds that Black Africa was never an inportant trading area for France,
and in fact the most tangible contribution made to French power by the
33
Africans was their participation in French war efforts. Finally, 
although the first French Catholic mission was established in Guinea in 
1877, the religious and social elements of colonial theory were intro­
duced much later, and more in respect to doctrine and policy than 
motivating factors for colonisation.
In sum, whether as impetus or justification, the reasons behind 
French expansionism in Africa were several, and critically dependent 
upon the various people and interests involved. As concluded by Maurice 
Delafosse:
31
Hubert Deschairps, Les M&-hndes e±. les Doctrines. Cnlonialas de. la. 
France, Paris, 1953, p. 99.
32
John Chipman, French Power in Africa. Oxford, 1989, p. 34 and 
throughout. See also Jean-Frangois Bayart, "France-Afrique: La fin du 
pacte colonial," Pol i1i gne Afrioainef 39, 1990, 47-53.
33
Ibid., p . 3.
30
If we condescend to be frank with ourselves, we are forced 
to admit that it is not altruism that leads us to Africa, at 
least not as a nation. Granted that pious missionaries, 
having vowed to devote their lives to save the souls of 
their fellow-men, have gone there with the sole aim of being 
useful to their black brothers, in the next life if not in 
this. But these were not the motives that led us to raise 
our flags in Senegal or on the shores of Guinea, or to fight
the natives in order to make them accept our authority.
At times we wished to ensure outlets for our trade, and 
sources of raw materials for our industry, at others we felt 
the need to protect the security of our nationals or the 
need not to be outdone by foreign rivals? sometimes we were 
moved by the obscure and unconscious desire to procure a 
little glory or grandeur for our country, at others we 
simply followed hazardous caprices or the tracks of an 
explorer, believing that we could do nothing different. In 
no case do I find as the motive force of our colonial 
expansion in Africa the real and reasoned wish to contribute 
to the welfare of our subjugated peoples. That is an excuse 
that we are all too ready to give after the event, but it 
was never our intention.... (34)
If social and moral obligations did not play a determinate role in the
decision to colonise West Africa, however, they certainly did attract
much debate in Paris when doctrine and policy were devised.
Methodology in Theory and Practice
Considerable attention has focused on colonial ideology in French and
35
British West Africa, and the differences in administrative procedures. 
The differences in philosophies of direct and indirect rule, or assimi­
lation and association, are drawn in theory while circumstances in the
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colonies more often blurred than illustrated their relative
distinctions. In the end, it becomes obvious that "the French Enpire in
36
Africa was constructed by adventurers and justified by propagandists."
Assimilation, or direct rule, was considered the traditional French
colonial doctrine, as opposed to the British who theoretically followed
the policy of indirect rule. The concept of assimilation was founded on
the belief that all men were created equal, and that the duty of France
was to aid the backward peoples to evolve to a higher civilisation.
Raymond Betts referred to assimilation as a form of cultural imperialism
whereby a "superior" society had the inherent right to dominate and
instruct a "lesser" one, and the "conquered were to absorb the customs
37
and institutions of the conquerors." Ihis doctrine was useful as a 
legitimising explanation both to French nationals and within the govern­
ment itself. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the 
mounting financial burden of the Enpire and the difficulties of its 
administration, along with a new trend in social theory that attacked 
the foundations of assimilation, brought about a change in colonial 
thinking and a revised policy, "association."
The doctrine of evolution had a significant impact on French 
38
colonial thought. The new theory stressed fundamental differences 
between races and cultures, and denied the earlier belief that all men 
were alike based on their power of reason, thus rendering the goal of 
assimilation unattainable. Furthermore new enphasis was placed on
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economic self-sufficiency of the territories, and the idea that tradi­
tional political and social institutions should be respected. Although 
never clearly defined, the understanding of the doctrine in 1909 was 
offered by the prominent intellectual Chailley Bert:
"This policy of association rests on the idea that the 
natives are, at least provisionally, inferior to the 
Europeans, or at least different, that they have their past, 
their customs, their institutions and a religion to which 
they adhere. Even with the aid of education their minds 
cannot understand and accept our concepts any more rapidly.
But it is the duty of the stronger people to guide the 
weaker people, to aid them in the evolution of their own 
civilisation, until that day when they are close enough to 
ours so that they may fake from it what they deem good.
While awaiting this result of education and of time, we must 
respect their ideas, their customs, religion and 
civilisation." (40)
The greatest advantage to the doctrine of association was the
flexibility it allowed in local situations. Henceforth the particular
characteristics of ethnicity, custom, and stage of development were to
be considered in the determination of regional policy. It may be
suggested that the policy of association was sinply a codification of
the existing state of affairs in the overseas territories. As consisely
stated by Chipman:
Assimilation was the doctrine preferred by those who felt a 
public need to justify colonialism; association was adopted 
by those who had actually to administer the colonies, for 
whom the high ideals of assimilation were both dostract and 
dangerous. (41)
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There is no doubt that within the colonies local circumstances as
dealt with by resident administrators consistently prevailed over 
ideology and doctrine emanating from the metropole. A.E. Afigbo has 
concluded that "strictly speaking there was no French or British style
of Indirect Rule if we consider not the theory but practice of admini­
stration/" and that the "departures from the so-called British and
French styles were too many to be regarded as mere local or temporary 
42
aberrations." In short/ to understand French colonial policy in West
Africa it is vital to focus attention on the individual colonies and
local administrative methods and practices, as pointed out by Crowder:
There seems never to have been in the early years of 
colonial rule a sense of strong central direction in the 
administration of the eight colonies, so that actual formu­
lation of policy lay with the Commandant ds. Corclo rather 
than the Lieutenant-Governors and the Governor-General who 
were meant to be responsible for it. Whilst there was no
generally accepted "native policy," partly because of the 
lack of ability of the central powers to impose their wills 
effectively on their subordinates and partly because of the
failure of any one of the advocates of assimilation,
association (paternalism) or indirect rule, to make his
particular policy prevail, there nevertheless emerged a
general approach to the government of the peoples of West
Africa: the replacement of the traditional chiefs by a new
group who it was felt would be loyal to the French; and the 
break-up of traditional political units into smaller units, 
or the amalgamation of disparate smaller units into large 
groups so that there was some uniformity in the political 
units to be administered. (43)
Territorial Administration
In 1891 the territory previously referred to as Rivieres dll find was 
officially designated French Guinea and Dependencies; two years later 
the dependencies were dropped and the colony hence assumed its
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contemporary frontiers. The internal administration of La Guin6e
Frangaiae was similar to that of the other colonies which together
formed the federal entity of French West Africa.
Located in Dakar, the headquarters of the Federation functioned
under the leadership of the Governor-General of French West Africa. The
role of the Government-General was to coordinate economic development of
the colonies, including public works and communications, and to oversee
interterritorial matters such as justice, the military, and medical
services. Two crucial aspects of the centralising power in Dakar were
the control of customs throughout the Federation, and the reallocation
of monies from a central budget to which all the colonies contributed.
A3ditionally, the Governor-General was considered "the depository of the
Republic's powers," ruled by decree, and had the sole right to corre-
44
spond with the Minister of Colonies in Paris. Notwithstanding the
considerable powers embodied in Federation headquarters, in practice the
internal affairs of the colonies were left largely in the hands of the
45
respective Lieutenant-Governors and their subordinates.
The West African territories were divided into administrative 
districts (cercles), each headed by a French officer (Commandant da 
Cercle) who, wielding considerable personal power, was directly respon­
sible to the Lieutenant-Governor. Normally districts were divided into 
subdivisions (o irconscript i nns) headed by assistant administrators. 
Beneath the districts and subdivisions directly administered by French 
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officials were the cantons and villages, which were under the direction 
of African chiefs serving as native authorities in the colonial govern­
ment. Indigenous chiefs were initially appointed directly by the 
Lieutenant-Governor, however after 1921 the Commandant- de. Cer.de. was 
enpowered to name the canton and village chiefs, albeit subject to the 
Governor's approval. The Federation of French West Africa, encompassing 
an area eight times that of France with an estimated population of 15
million, was divided into 118 cerdes, 2,200 cantons and 48,000 
46
villages.
It is interesting to note the eminent influence that the military
officers enjoyed during the establishment and implementation of colonial
rule. Clearly the officers of the Troupes de Marine who carried out the
conquest and the pacification were later the promoters of the admini-
47
strative organisation. Their inherent preoccupation with strict
hierarchy was reflected in the official positions which paralleled naval
organisation, for example commandant meaning skipper, patron
(boatswain), and perivain referring to a native clerk modelled after a 
48
ship's clerk. Many of the first civil administrators came from the 
ranks of the navy, and as they were accustomed to a pyramid of authori­
tative power, naturally they proceeded to install a centralised and 
hierarchical administrative structure.
The historical period in Africa from 1885 to 1914 has been referred
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to as the time of the "Great Bachelors/" single men who invented 
colonial rule. Limited contact from "bush" stations to central govern­
ment meant that administrative practices in rural areas were largely 
subject to the personality of the Commandant. Indeed, according to
Robert Delavignette, the commandant-s de. Cerda became the "true chiefs 
49
of the Empire." Deschairps aptly depicted the role of the Commandant 
as such:
Responsible for the maintenance of order, head of the 
police, judge, tax collector, architect, he is in charge of 
the opening of markets, the development of agriculture and 
livestock, of education and medical assistance; he is the 
leader of the Eurqpeans, but especially the chief and 
protector of the indigenous populations, the successor of 
local kings, the "ml da la broussa," tied to his work and 
his district like the French peasant to his field. (50)
In recognition of the immense power concentrated in the hands of
one administrator, and the frequency with which it resulted in
excessive behaviour and abuse, the rouage or "turn-table" policy was
introduced in 1924 by the Government-General. Designed to thwart
corruption, the new policy stipulated that henceforth it was forbidden
51
for an administrator to serve two consecutive tours in a given colony. 
Even within an average two-year stay, an official may have held as many 
as four to five different administrative posts. As calculated by Suret- 
Canale, over a sixty year period the average nunfoer of Command an t-s da
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Cercle in a Guinean district was eighty. Thus there was great
inconsistency in administrative practice, as illustrated by a French
administrator following a tour of the Federation:
"Ihe most obvious characteristic of our colonial administra­
tion is the instability at every stage of both men and 
matters....In the Colonies Lieutenant-Governors succeed 
each other with a disconcerting rapidity, each one bringing 
his own ideas and his methods of administration and coloni­
sation. . .each Commandant- da Cerclft has his own policy, his 
chiefs, his projects for roads and agricultural development.
This all passes before the eyes of the native like a 
kaleidoscope of which each new image is accompanied by 
additional burdens and tribulations." (53)
Chiefs in the Colonial System
It is nearly impossible to speak of "legitimate chiefs" existing and 
operating within the colonial framework. Historically chieftain author­
ity or right to govern derived from various sources, including descent 
from the founding father of a village or state, right of conquest, 
primogeniture, membership in a ruling clan, religious leadership, etc. 
Regarding the nature of the chieftaincy in Guinea at the time of coloni­
sation, complex hierarchies of hereditary chiefs dating from the early 
enpires and kingdoms of the Western Sudan remained among the Mai ink 6 and 
Fulani. In the Coastal and Forest regions, however, social units were 
small, the authority of the chief rarely extended beyond a village or 
cluster of settlements, and within his domain he was expected to act in 
coordination with the consensus of a council of elders representing the 
will of the people. In fact the majority of the inhabitants of Guinea at 
the time of European expansion were living in small communities of 10 to 
100 families. Normally the traditional societies were patrilineal
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(except the Coniagui and Bassari and other minor ethnic groups on the 
Senegalese border, which were matrilineal) and were made up of families 
of the male descendants of the founding father of the village or common 
ancestor.
Lack of understanding, appreciation or relative concern for the 
idiosyncrasies and differentiation of constitution and tradition of 
particular chieftaincies, led the French on a canpaign to normalise 
these differences by defining the official position and adherent 
responsibilities of administrative chiefs. Additionally, for the purpose 
of bureaucratic ease, the colonial authorities set about revising the 
institution of the chieftaincy by reorganising its internal structure 
and territorial jurisdiction, creating hierarchical chieftaincies 
wherever they previously did not exist, and interfering when the rules 
of succession pointed to an unfavourable chief, in the opinion of the 
French administration.
In these circumstances, consequently, whether or not a chief can be 
said to have fulfilled all of the traditional qualifications for the 
assuirption of the title, the fundamental transformation of the position 
rested upon the fact that the right to rule depended upon the colonial 
administration's delegation of power, acceptance, and lordship over the 
indigenous authorities subsequently referred to as "chiefs." In this 
context, therefore, following the period of conquest, the term "chief" 
used here will refer to the definition prescribed by the colonial power, 
designating and recognising chiefs as indigenous administrative 
authorities, arranged hierarchically with specific duties and functions, 
and integrated into the system of territorial government.
Once the colonial foundation was established, the French officials
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were free to concentrate on the "steady suppression of the great chiefs
and the destruction of their authority until the village becomes an
54
administrative unit." This was facilitated by the unilateral Land
Decree of 23 October 1904 by which recognised land rights were annulled;
the remaining sovereignty of the African chiefs thereby effectively
abolished. The official doctrine of French policy from 1904 to 1914,
succeeding that of the protectorate, was the policy of "direct
administration." Raymond Buell, in his 1928 work The. Native, Problem in
Africa, rationalised the motives behind the subsequent shift in policy:
When the French undertook the occupation of West Africa they 
were confronted with a nuirber of native tyrants who cruelly 
exploited their subjects. Life and property were insecure; 
slavery and human sacrifice prevailed in many areas. In a 
few cases, local Almamys had imposed a form of discipline, 
maintained by terrorism, upon thousands of unwilling sub­
jects. But in other cases, sinple anarchy prevailed because 
of the want of any social organisation. The French authori­
ties negotiated treaties with chiefs whenever they found 
them, originally out of regard for their "rights," and later 
in order to obtain a pacific hold upon territory until it 
could be more firmly occupied. But in view of the habitual 
abuses committed by these chiefs which, in the opinion of 
many Frenchmen, became greater when these chiefs could 
shelter themselves behind European authority, the French 
administration in Africa has gradually curtailed the powers 
of the chiefs, especially over judicial matters, land, and 
tribute.
Confronted with the question whether it was simpler to 
control the native kingdoms or to abolish them outright, the 
French, in contrast to the British, who follow the policy of 
control, chose the other alternative. Administrative con­
venience and the desire to suppress abuse have thus combined 
to end these treaties. But probably an equally strong 
reason had been the conviction that the institutions of 
Africa are not worth preserving and developing and that the 
boon of French civilisation should be bestowed on the native 
population. (55)
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Itie lack of sufficient competent personnel, however, forced the 
colonialists to rely to a great degree upon African intermediaries—  
chiefs, clerks, and interpreters— to fulfill their administrative 
duties. Due to this predicament one of the colonial government's first 
priorities was to secure African collaborators within their 
administrative ranks.
Although theoretically preference was given to existing notables in 
the designation of positions of native authority, a nuirber of 
difficulties confounded the operation and success of this practice. 
First of all, the parcelling of the territory into cantons rarely 
adequately corresponded to traditional boundaries and dominions of 
authority. Secondly, historical socio-political entities varied widely 
in geographic shape and size, nevertheless each maintained its indepen­
dent and distinct identity. For this reason several ethnic groups 
defiantly resented being grouped together with, or administratively 
dominated by, neighbouring tribes in the region. Finally, for the sake 
of administrative simplicity and territorial conformity, the French 
attempted to inpose uniformity among radically diverse traditional 
cultural norms, rites of succession, and systems of justice. Claude 
Riviere summarised the diversity of political systems to be incorporated 
into the colonial system of government:
In the Peul (Fulani) kingdom of the almami of Fouta, the 
chieftaincies were united and powerful; in the kafu and 
settlements of the Manding, they were based on lineage; in 
the forest zone they were limited to villages; and in 
coastal Guinea they were of recent date and acculturated.
Despite these differences, the colonial power delegated its 
authority only to those who, after being chosen by the 
Notables from among rival contenders, were officially 
registered as chiefs in the territorial units that it had 
itself created. Its first step was to take away from the
41
people their right to choose chiefs, who henceforth were 
appointed and dismissed solely by the administration. (56)
Ihe steady political reorganisation of the Fouta Djalon exemplifies 
the colonial government’s determination first to divide and conquer 
traditional power sources, and secondly to replace them with administra­
tive appointees conducive to French control. Piece by piece the once 
great state of the Fouta was dismembered, its symbols of authority 
dissolved. In 1912 the premier title of almamy was abolished. French 
interference was commonplace, deciding victors in power struggles, 
displacing rebellious chiefs, and dividing up traditional jurisdictions.
Elsewhere in regions without centralised political systems the 
colonial administration freely set up local government authorities 
amenable to their wishes. This occurred particularly in the Forest 
region, as Riviere described:
The chieftaincy problem was resolved there either by choos­
ing individuals for investiture as chiefs from among the 
masters of the land and warrior or religious chiefs those 
who appeared to the authorities to be Notables, or by naming 
as "straw chiefs" men who had been useful to the colonial 
cause, who possessed no traditional influence...Hiis new 
method of selecting individuals for the chieftaincy ignored 
the hierarchical order, the rights of certain families, the 
qualifications required by tradition, and the support of the 
elders. (57)
It is often argued that the French administration nominated chiefs 
more out of regard for civil service qualifications, such as literacy in 
French and knowledge of administrative detail, than respect for 
traditional right to rule. These preferences, especially for chiefs with 
knowledge of French, may be explained in part by the nature of the
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French colonial service. As aforementioned, the rouage policy meant that
administrators were constantly on the move, and were therefore usually
ignorant both of local languages and custom in their brief official
encounters. This situation led to isolated cases of interpreters, office
clerks, war veterans, educated young men, and even a Commandant's former
58
cook being appointed to the position of native chief.
In order to avoid being incorporated into the colonial system, in 
many cases legitimate village headmen actually disguised themselves in 
the presence of French officers seeking local chiefs to fulfill their 
administrative functions. A former administrator in French West Africa, 
Robert Delavignette recited an experience of visiting a village in Upper 
Volta where he was introduced to a young chief; in a later encounter he 
discovered the young man standing behind what was obviously the real 
chief. Thus he coined the term "straw chiefs," the usage of which became 
common to denote chiefs of such stature in the French colonies. In his 
explanation, Delavignette also shed light upon the tiresome administra­
tive duties imposed upon the native authorities:
Chiefs like the one I saw the first time in the village 
where I learned my lesson are, so to speak, more or less men 
of straw.....At any demand from the administrative— tax, 
labour service, recruiting, census, new crops to be tried—  
the fake chief is put forward. On him will fall the wrath of 
a hoodwinked administration. The reason for this is that the 
administration bothers the chiefs too much; it harasses them 
by perpetually summoning them for meetings; it hustles them 
with constant demands, exhausts them with requisitions, 
holds them responsible, on pain of forfeiting their property 
or even their liberty, for the carrying on of all the orders 
which it pours out at random. Is it any wonder that the 
chiefs take refuge in tricks and stratagems? (59)
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While the duping of the French authorities in the setting up of
straw chiefs occasionally succeeded on the village level, according to
Delavignette the problem of the Chefs de. canton was more acute, for they
were purely administrative officers whose position was rebuked both by
the colonial governors and the subject populations. Whereas the village
chiefs could more easily retain the spiritual and sacral nature of their
traditional power, the canton chiefs under strict colonial supervision
were in a much more difficult position. Delavignette accused his
colleagues of creating the following plight of the canton chief:
Instead of entrusting to him certain important tasks— a tax, 
a main road, a new crop— and judging his achievement on the 
spot in our tours, we make his authority a travesty by using 
him as an intermediary in small affairs— provisioning a 
camp, receiving a vaccinator, collecting witnesses for a 
petty court case, providing a supply of chickens. We think 
that because he is a native, we are carrying out a native 
policy with his assistance, while in fact by putting menial 
tasks on him we treat him as sub-European. And we tolerate a 
hypocritical manoeuver: in theory, the canton chief executes 
administrative orders; in practice, he resorts to feudal 
methods to get them carried out. He turns the tax into 
feudal tribute, the labour service into a corvee (forced 
labour) and cultivation into requisitioning. (60)
Thus as intermediaries between the French and resident Africans, the
chiefs played a crucial role in the colonial administration. Iheir
position in society became increasingly unpopular, however, as demands
placed on the subject population were filtered through government-
appointed "chiefs"— a term which later became symbolic of colonial
oppression.
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Obligations of Colonial Subjects
Guineans under the colonial system were subject to a great nuirber of
harsh requirements and conditions; among the most significant were
direct taxation, two types of requisitioned labour, the native code of
law known as the lndig£natr and military conscription. The imposition of
these measures brought about great changes to traditional patterns of
agriculture, commerce, migration, and familial and political unity.
Monetary taxation on the local level was one of the first and most
disruptive policies introduced by the colonial administration.
Instituted in 1897, a head tax-of two francs was required of all Guinean
subjects above the age of eight. The sums realised by direct taxation
were considerable; by 1900 the head tax was the largest contributor to
the territorial budget, at 70.8 per cent of government revenue. Ihis
percentage fell during the Second World War when produce was demanded to
aid the war effort, but nevertheless remained substantial at approxi-
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mately 46 per cent.
Supplementary to taxes proper, and customary dues and requisitions,
West Africans under French rule were subject to an annual labour tax
referred to as the prestation. The tax involved a fixed nuirber of days
per year of unpaid labour performed by male subjects in territorial
projects, mainly public works and the maintenance of communications such
as roads, bridges, and telegraph lines. The frequency with which the
prestation was used is demonstrated by the fact that in the Federation
nearly all of the roads were built by regional administrators drawing on
62
local labour, although construction work of this nature was forbidden.
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Apart from the prestation, the second form of forced labour was the 
corvee, which was requisitioned paid labour at the disposition of the 
colonial government and most often used in the territories for larger 
construction projects, examples being railways and ports. Further­
more, it was common administrative practice in the cercles to draft 
subjects as porters. And finally, a host of statutes enabled the 
Commandants da. Cercle. to forcefully enploy labourers, including tax 
evaders, vagrants, and those imprisoned for the multitude of crimes 
punishable under the native system of justice.
The code of law often arbitrarily inflicted upon the colonial
subjects of French West Africa until the end of the Second World War was
known as the indig£nat. First decreed in 1887, the indig&nat aimed to
speed up the conquest where judicial powers were regarded as too slow in
terminating African resistance and interference to the inposition of 
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colonial rule. The common penalty for an offense was up to two weeks 
inprisonment and a fine of one hundred francs, imposed by the Command an t 
de. Corc.lo without trial. The sentence could be revoked by the 
Lieutenant-Governor; in practice this was rarely done, and time would 
normally be already served well before cases could be reviewed. Thus the 
Commandant de. Corel e had considerable means to imprison subjects at 
will, and it was possible to inflict consecutive and repeated sentences 
for different or multiple offenses. Included in the broad specifica­
tions laid out in 1907, to insult the government was a criminal act; 
however, the definition of "insult" was left to be determined by the 
administrator.
The indig^nat was again codified in 1924, whereby the number of
Ibid.., p . 1016.
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offenses was reduced from approximately fifty to twelve. Neverthe­
less, through this system of native justice the colonial government 
legally prevented public meetings and discussions, forbade publication 
of any kind, checked movements of the population, and benefited from the 
prisoner labour force. It was reported that the apogee of abuses 
associated with the indig£nat was reached during the Second World War
under the Vichy regime, and was subsequently abolished as an integral
65
part of the post-war reforms.
Military Conscription and the War Effort
As well as in France, wartime in Europe brought particular hardship
to the French West African colonies. Military conscription, first
introduced in 1912, not only caused great depopulation in certain 
66
areas, but more importantly deprived the economy of its primary 
source of manpower capable of meeting the increased production demands 
of the war effort. Thus the burdens of forced cultivation, selling of 
agricultural produce below market value to fill requisitions, and 
shortages and rationing of staple products and imported goods, were
64
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borne mainly by the elderly/ women and children.
The request for large numbers of military conscripts led the French
officials to depend heavily upon the native authorities to meet the
demand. Chiefs were thus actively encouraged to fill their division
quotas/ and it was hinted that their positions of power would be
strengthened in return for soldiers supplied. Similarly the conscripts
were tempted with an advance cash payment of 200 francs, and promises of
rewards in the form of higher political and social status, including
exemption from preatations. Whether forcefully seized or attracted by
the idea of future liberated status, the great majority of the 20,000 to
30,000 soldiers enlisted in Guinea for the First World War were in fact
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slaves. The contradictory nature of conscription at this time was
described by Summers and Johnson:
In a sense, any World War I conscript was a man who had been 
positively induced not to run away. Any chief, moreover, who 
had furnished the quota of eligible males for his district, 
had been given strong incentives to part with the labour
power of his locality. The respective inducements held out 
to conscripts and the agents of conscription were, necessar­
ily, very different, and not always compatible; they 
highlighted the contradiction between the long-term hopes 
and short-term needs of colonial policy in this sphere. (68)
Returning home after their service abroad, the war veterans
(annipna oonhaH-ante) were a source of great instability during the
interwar period in French Guinea. Cognisant of the liberties enjoyed by
French citizens in contrast to their colonial subjects, the anciens
nrmihattantR led demonstrations and strikes demanding better wages and
working conditions throughout the territory. Furthermore, expectations
67
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of civil service enployment and the upgrading of their social status
were dashed, eirbittering the veterans and inciting demonstrations of
protest and insubordination. As reported by the Governor in 1917:
"They come back demanding a job as an agent or guard. They 
are always hanging about the Baste., always wearing their 
military uniforms. They are parasites and get angry when one 
cannot give them all jobs, claiming that they were promised 
jobs like this before they left France....Their indiscipline 
is notorious and we have to intervene continually to restore 
order." (69)
Territorial police often intervened to quell the disturbances,
recalcitrant anniens nnTrbattani-a were arrested, and colonial rule
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accordingly was "tightened up" after 1920. The situation of unrest 
worsened under the subsequent Vichy regime and Free French administra­
tion during the Second World War.
Both wartime eras were characterised by excessive demands and 
consequent suffering imposed upon the colonial subjects of West Africa. 
Production targets were set higher than pre-war levels in each district, 
canton and village, despite the fact that military conscription deprived 
villages of the mainstay of their labour force. Henceforth draconian 
measures were introduced to ensure the fulfillment of quotas, 
accompanied by a marked increase in forced labour. A popular illustra­
tion of the absurdity of requisitioning for the Second World War effort 
was depicted by Richard-Mol ard:
Che district is required to produce so many tons of liana 
rubber, even though no liana grows in the territory. The 
native is therefore forced to travel on foot, sometimes over 
long distances, to buy rubber elsewhere, regardless of cost.
He must sell this to the Commandant de. Cercle at the
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official price, which is several times lower than the 
purchasing price, in order to escape the hand of "justice."
Another district is ordered to produce honey. None is avail­
able. The Commandant, is punished for telegraphing his
superiors "AGREE TO HONEY. STOP. SEND BEES." (71)
The fall of France and installation of the Vichy regime in 1940 was
generally accepted by the colonial administration serving in the West
African territories. In Equatorial Africa, however, the Governor of
Chad, Felix Eboue, rallied to General Charles de Gaulle and the cause of
the Free French, and within a few weeks of minimal fighting the Free
French "re-took" possession of these tropical colonies and established
Brazzaville as the capital of the French Empire. A similar but
unsuccessful attempt was made to oust Vichy loyalists from West Africa,
bombarding the Dakar harbour in September 1940. Governor-General
Boisson of the West African Federation remained in the Vichy camp until
the Anglo-American landing in North Africa in November 1942, when he
proclaimed his allegiance to the Allies, the Free French and de
72
Gaulle.
While discrimination and arbitrary punitive justice were rampant
under the Vichy regime in West Africa, the Free French movement brought
the Federation into the war, intensifying economic hardship. The French
73
National Liberation Committee (CFLN) believed that France’s honour was 
tied to her contribution of raw materials and provisions as well as 
armed forces. Hence further requisitioning of strategic raw materials
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(such as rubber) and foodstuffs was introduced as part of the "war
effort" in West Africa.
Along with the increased demands to fuel the war effort, the
changeover from Vichy to Free French control in West Africa brought new
administrators, and subsequently a re-evaluation of policy and colonial
doctrine. In consideration of the confusion and suffering experienced
in the empire during the war, and grateful for its support, as well as
the growing American influence and that of the Atlantic Charter, the
French Provisonal Government at Algiers convoked a Consultative
Assembly, and convened two conferences to discuss a new colonial policy
74
and the future of the French Empire. The recommendations emanating 
from the Brazzaville Conference were the basis of fundamental post-war 
reform and signalled a new era of colonialism in the Federation of West 
Africa.
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CHAPTER II
Post-War Reforms and the Emergence of Political Parties
The Conference. Africaine Frangaise, which met in Brazzaville from 20 
January to 8 February 1944, heralded a turning-point in French colonial 
history. Motivating forces behind the conference were many, including 
sincere gratitude for the African commitment to the Free French move­
ment; fear of a disintegrating Enpire at the loss of Syria and Lebanon, 
and revolt in Indochina; the perceived necessity to reunite the Empire 
in order for France to reclaim the status of a world power; growing 
international pressure in reference to the inalienable right of mankind 
to self-determination embodied in the Atlantic Charter war aims; and the 
potential economic threat of capitalist expansion into former French 
strongholds. The defined objective of the Brazzaville conference was 
"to determine on what practical bases it would be possible progressively
to found a French community, incorporating the territories of Black 
1
Africa."
Presided by Commissioner Rene Pleven, the French African Conference 
gathered together 70 colonial administrators, trade unionists, and poli­
ticians in order to map out post-war reform and policy in the overseas 
2
territories. It is noteworthy that despite the recurrent theme of
increased participation by Africans in the management of their internal
affairs, there were no African delegates present at the conference. The 
-
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French Guinea was not represented as the post of Governor was vacant 
until the arrival of Jacques Foumeau on 25 March 1944.
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first resolution (unanimously passed) stated clearly the extent to which
this liberalisation of policy could be conceived:
The aims of the civilising mission achieved by France in the 
colonies exclude any idea of autonomy, any possibility of 
development outside of the French Empire; the eventual con­
stitution, even in the distant future, of self-governments 
in the colonies is to be rejected. (3)
Within the boundaries of the Empire, however, far-reaching social and
economic reforms were proposed, the most salient being the suppression
of the indig&nat-f the eventual cessation of forced labour, and the
establishment of a code of workers' rights including the freedom to form
trade unions. Additionally outlined in detail were reforms pertaining to
education, the justice system, medical assistance, and even the rights
of women. Finally, the conference recommended a policy of increased
Africanisation in the organisation and administration of agriculture,
industry, public works, and civil service.
Politically there was disagreement on whether the new Republic
should be federal or centralised in form. The resultant resolution
called for the creation of a federal parliament, "guaranteeing the
4
intangible unity of the French world." On the local level the terri­
tories were to evolve politically through administrative decentralisa­
tion, aided by the proposed creation of district and regional native 
councils, as well as representative assemblies conprised of both 
Africans and Europeans elected by universal suffrage. While the local 
councils were to function as consultative bodies, the territorial
3
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assemblies were also eventually to be deliberative over matters such as 
new services and the budget. Furthermore it was recognised that the 
colonies should be granted representation in the forthcoming Constituent 
Assembly. These last two recommendations underline the real signifi­
cance of the Brazzaville conference; firstly the democratisation of 
local political institutions marking the initial step towards the 
management of internal affairs; and secondly, parliamentary representa­
tion in the metropole brought emergent African politicians directly into 
the French government.
Preceding the liberation of Paris and the reconstitution of the 
French government, the Provisional Government in Algiers began inple- 
menting a nunber of the intended post-war reforms. Between February and 
August a series of decrees applied a nunber of the Brazzaville recommen­
dations, among which were the reorganisation of agricultural and medical 
services, revision of the colonial administrative and taxation systems, 
reform of the native penal code, and finally authorisation for the 
formation of trade unions in the overseas territories. The interim 
government, headed by General Charles de Gaulle from the liberation of 
Paris in August 1944 until the election of the first Constituent
Asseirbly in October 1945, functioned essentially as a "dictatorship by 
5
consent."
The First Constituent Asseirbly 
In accordance with the Brazzaville recommendation, overseas representa­
tives were elected to the Constitutional Commission. With the exception 
_
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of Senegal and to a certain extent the Ivory Coast, the French African
colonies were politically largely unprepared for the October elections.
Apart from Senegal, a double-college system was instituted in all the
African colonies, whereby French "citizens” and colonial "subjects"
voted on separate polls, electing their respective candidates. Six West
African deputies made the journey to Paris to participate in a total 
6
Assembly of 586.
During the resistance years the French Communist Party had made a
dramatic political comeback, registering almost a million members at the
close of the war. Three main political parties dominated the first
Constituent Assembly— the Communists, Socialists, and Mouvement
7
Pepib 1 icain Popilaire (MRP). Apart from these main blocs there were the
Radicals, the Conservatives (sometimes loosely organised as Independent
Republicans), and two former Resistance groups— the Union Democrat iqiie
at Social g da la Resistance (UDSR) and the Mouvement Uni fie da la
8
Resistance (MUR) . Although the Communists numerically were the
6
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predominant force in the Assembly, any coalition between two of the main
parties would form a majority, and therefore it was the Socialists who
actually held the controlling influence on the outcome of deliberation.
It was held that de Gaulle's realisation, that the Socialists were not
prepared to help the MRP build the kind of Fourth Republic that he
envisioned, was the reason behind his decision to relinquish power in 
9
January 1946. Throughout the remainder of the first Constituent
Assembly the Provisional Government was made up of a broad left-wing
coalition cabinet headed by the Socialist Felix Gouin. Former chairman
of the Colonial Commission in the Asseirbly, Marius Moutet became
Minister of la. France d 'Out.re-Mer (FCM) as the term "colonial" was
10
henceforth discarded from government vocabulary.
The undisputed doyen of the West African deputies was Lamine Gueye,
who hoped that he would be able to unite the others in a bloc affiliated
to the SFIO, of which he was a long-time member. His efforts were
somewhat fruitful, as fellow Senegalese Leopold Senghor, Guinean Yacine
Diallo, and Sourou Migan Apithy from Dahomey-Togo joined the Socialist
group. Historically the prestigious position and privileges bestowed
upon the Federation's capital were resented by its richest territory,
the Ivory Coast. Not wanting to play second fiddle to Gueye, plus the
consideration of the aid he had received from Communist administrators
and teachers in the Ivory Coast, led Felix Houphouet-Boigny to join the
11
MUR in the Constituent Asseirbly. The remaining deputy, Fily Dabo
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influential trade union fiyndicat Agricole Africain, in 1944. Ruth 
Schachter Morgenthau, Pol it-icai Parties in. French speaking West. Africa, 
Oxford, 1964, p. 166.
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Sissoko representing Soudan-Niger, also joined the MUR.
Although active in the overseas colonies, the PCF did not attempt
to recruit African members directly, instead it encouraged them to vote
12
with the Communist bloc in affiliated organisations. It is true, how­
ever, that the French Communists or their sympathisers welcomed the 
African deputies in Paris and offered them a wide variety of services
and advice, ranging from sight-seeing tours to lessons in parliamentary 
13
punctuation. Apart from the hospitality and good will displayed by 
the Communists to the newcomers, a parliamentary alliance with the 
dominant political party in France seemed strategically desirable to the 
African deputies at this time.
Despite the fact that the first Assembly was constituent in nature, 
it did have legislative powers and passed a number of notable laws 
reforming colonial policy. One of Moutet's first projects as Overseas 
Minister was the abolition of the native justice system (indigenat), 
which was finalised by decree on 20 February 1946. Forced labour was 
terminated by a law of 11 April named the Lol Honphoii et-Boigny after its 
sponsor, who henceforth gained enormous prestige throughout the Federa­
tion. Freedom of assembly and association were granted in French West 
Africa by decrees in March and April. Economic policy was significantly
12
At no time did the Communist Party create sections in the West 
African territories. For more information on the PCF doctrine on colon­
ial questions see: Frangois Fejto, The French Communist Party and the
Crisis o£ International Communism, Cambridge Mass., 1967; Gr^goire 
Madjarian, La question coloniale et la politique du parti, communiste. 
frangais 1944-1947, Paris, 1977; and Jacob Moneta, La politique du. parti 
cammunista frangais dans la question coloniale 1920-1963 r Paris, 1971.
13
Edward Mortimer, France and- the. Africans 1944-1960; A Political 
History, London, 1969, p. 73.
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altered with the creation of the Fonds d 1 Invest issemeni- pour le. 
D&veloppement Economd gne e±_ Social (FIDES) on 12 April. The Provisional 
Government under de Gaulle had previously created an African currency, 
the franc CFA (Colonies PrannaiRPR d'Afrignt^ worth 1.7 and later 2 
French francs. FIDES operated essentially as an investment fund in the 
form of long-term development loans with an interest rate of one 
percent. The inportance of this act was twofold: firstly it demonstrated 
benevolence and gratitude of France toward her colonies, and recognition 
of the need for massive investments and coordinated planning; and 
secondly the investments not only contributed to the rapid advancement
of infrastructure and communication networks, medical and educational
services, and local industrialisation, but increasingly trained and
employed Africans in the economic sector.
The Constitution that emerged from the first Assembly reflected the 
liberal tradition behind the prevailing coalition. The main dispute 
centred upon whether the Fourth Republic should be governed by a single- 
chairber legislature and minimal executive branch, as favoured by the 
Communists and Socialists, or a two-chamber legislature and strong 
executive as desired by the MRP. Similarly the major issue of debate 
concerning the new French Union was whether its Council would be a 
consultative body, as proposed by the Left, or a true legislative 
chamber as hoped by the Right. In both cases the Leftist majority 
carried the vote, leaving the MRP and Conservatives dissatisfied with 
the final text of the April Constitution.
Embodied in the text that was narrowly approved by the Constitu­
tional Commission were clauses that would have radically transformed
French colonial policy under the proposed Fourth Republic. The draft
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Constitution declared that all inhabitants of the French Union were 
citizens and would eventually be entitled to vote. It also began with a 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, whereby citizens of the Union were to 
enjoy equal political, economic and social freedoms and benefits. 
Furthermore, although the federal nature of the African colonies was not 
specifically dealt with, territorial asseirblies elected by direct 
universal suffrage were to be created, and African representation in the 
single-chamber legislature was assured. Finally, and most surprising, 
contained in Article 41 of the April Constitution was the following 
provision:
France forms with the overseas territories on the one hand, 
and with the associated states on the other, a Union freely 
consented to. (14)
The concept of free consent begged the question whether a territory
might conceivably refuse to enter the Union or possibly later secede.
The April Constitution was presented to the French citizens by way
of a referendum scheduled for 5 May 1946, African "subjects" were not
yet "citizens" and therefore not entitled to vote. Acting on Pierre
Cot's suggestion that the Assembly pre-empt the Constitutional
referendum by an ordinary law granting citizenship to the colonial
subjects, Lamine Gudye quickly drew up the bill proposal which became
known as the Loi Lamina Gueye which was passed on 7 May, just two days
after the key vote. The MRP had already decided to lead the fight for
the rejection of the Constitution, and it was clear that overseas
participation was likely to sway the vote in its favour. The referendum
15
of 5 May rejected the April Constitution by 10.5 to 9.5 million votes; 
consequently registered voters were called back to the polls in June to 
—
Cited in R. Schachter Morgenthau, Polifrical Partip s f p. 42.
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elect the second French Constituent Asseirbly of 1946.
The Second Constituent Assembly 
The defeat of the April Constitution marked a resurgence of conservatism 
in metropolitan politics and opinion. Ihe elections of 2 June not only 
registered the largest voter turnout on record, but also moved the MRP 
into the position of France’s leading political party, with the Right- 
wing bloc controlling an outright majority of seats in the second 
Asseirbly. The Communists were placed second, while the Socialists were 
the biggest losers; this time an alliance of the two blocs would not 
automatically produce a majority vote. In the light of the shift in 
balance of power the government was re-shuffled, and MRP nationalist 
Georges Bidault replaced Gouin as Prime Minister.
The elections in the overseas territories reflected to what extent
the inhabitants approved of the proceedings of the first Assembly. As a
general rule, wherever the European voters held the electoral majority
the April Constitution was rejected; where the native franchise
dominated, the vote was in its favour. The elections to the second
Assembly were a testimony to this difference of opinion: three out of
the five first-college delegates from the West African territories were
replaced, while all of the second-college representatives were re-
16
elected with overwhelming majorities. Additionally, whereas the bulk
15
E. Mortimer, France and the Africans, p. 82.
16
Lamine Gu&ye retained his seat as did the MRP candidate in Dahomey. 
The Ivory Coast-Upper Volta representative changed from a Radical to an 
affiliated MRP. The Soudan-Niger seat went from UDSR to MRP, and in 
Guinea from UDSR to SFIO. All first-college shifts were toward the 
political Right. By contrast the African delegates gained immense 
popularity in the TCM, enjoying full credit for colonial reforms passed 
by the first Assenbly.
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of the colonial delegates had occupied a rather weak position, aligned
to the Leftist coalition in the first Asseirbly, they were split in the
second. The African representatives remained on the Left (now in the 
minority), while the European overseas deputies became a necessary and 
thus powerful contingent of the conservative majority.
The clauses pertaining to the French Union were passed unanimously 
in the first Constituent Assenbly. The rejection of the April Constitu­
tion was interpreted as a reaction against a strong single-chanber 
parliament, motivated by fear of Communist domination, and therefore it
was initially assumed that the outline of the Union would remain intact
17
in the second draft. The colonialists, however, in a group known as
18
the Etats G£neraux de. la. Colnn-isaHcn Frangaise, joined together to 
oppose the liberal concessions granted to the overseas territories by 
the first Asseirbly. The main arguments of the Etats Generaux were that 
steps toward local autonomy would foster nationalism and lead to 
separatism, and given the fact that the population of France was 40 
million, compared to 60 million overseas inhabitants, equal voting 
rights and parliamentary representation would render France essentially 
a "colony of her own colonies." In consideration of these grievances 
the MRP motioned to discard the April texts on the French Union and to 
begin preparation of a new project.
In the face of a consolidating Right, threatening the retraction of
liberal measures designed and envisioned by the first Assenbly in regard
__
G. Wright, The Reshaping nf French Democracyr pp. 183, 200.
18
Founded in Douala in September 1945, the group was reunited in 
Paris in well-publicised meetings during July-August 1946.
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to the French Union, the African delegates attempted to form an
19
independent "intergroup" to defend their interests. Initiated by 
Lamine Gueye, this non-European group for non-European concerns 
concentrated its efforts and wielded influence particularly within the 
Overseas Commission in the Assembly. Both the MRP and the intergroup 
submitted projects for the framework of the French Union. The funda­
mental differences between the two proposals were the source of bitter
debate among the African delegates, the European colonial deputies, and
20
the leading government officials of the second Constituent Assenbly.
The text which eventually emerged from these negotiations was said to
21
have "pleased neither European overseas nor African deputies."
The proposals for the French Union were contained in Title VIII of 
the constitutional draft. The African delegates had reduced their 
minimum demands to two: full French citizenship and the adoption of a
single electoral college in the overseas territories. When the debate 
of Title VTII opened in the Assembly, the non-European deputies walked 
out in protest, and later offered their collective resignations to the 
government. Last minute concessions were made, whereby citizenship was 
obscurely granted to inhabitants of the overseas territories "on the 
same basis as French nationals," and the design of the electoral system
19
"They were firmly decided to fight for the maintenance of the 
rights already acquired by the inhabitants of the overseas territories 
in the Constitution of 19 April 1946, which represent in their opinion a 
minimum." Lamine Gu6ye, Ttin6raire Africain. Paris, 1966, pp. 159-60.
20
The President of the Commission was Vincent Auriol (SFIO), the 
Reporter Paul Coste-Floret (MRP), and the Overseas Minister remained 
Marius Moutet (SFIO).
21
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was omitted from the Constitution, leaving it under organic law and
22
therefore adjustable. Although the disgruntled deputies did return to 
their seats, satisfaction was far from achieved.
The French Union, as depicted by the October draft of the second 
Asseirbly's Constitution, consisted of the Republic on one hand, and the 
Associated States and Territories on the other. Overseas departments 
and territories (including AOF) were included in the Republic, while the 
Associated States (such as Morocco and Hinisia) and Associated Terri­
tories (the trusteeship territories such as Togo) were part of the 
French Union but not Republic. Furthermore the citizenship granted to 
former subjects was to the French Union, not to the Republic, which
meant the retention of customary versus French private law and differing 
23
voter franchise. Nevertheless representation was granted to the 
overseas territories in nearly all levels of French government. Within 
the West African territories Conseils Gen£ranx were created, however the 
clause in the April Constitution stating that the asseirblies were to be 
elected by universal suffrage was deleted. The General Councils in turn 
sent representatives to the federal Grand Consei.1 located in Dakar. 
Finally, the overseas territories elected deputies to the French 
National Asseirbly (parliament) , senators to the Council of the Republic 
(senate), and assenblymen to the newly created Assembly of the French 
Union.
22Yves Bdnot, Les d£put&s africains an Palais Bonrhon de. 1914 a_ 19511, 
Paris, 1989, p. 71.
23
With the exception of Senegal, the double-college electoral system 
was maintained in local elections, except for deputies to the National 
Assenbly, who were elected from a single-college electorate throughout 
ACF.
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The referendum for the draft Constitution of the second Constituent
Asseirbly took place on 13 Cctober 1946. Voter turnout epitomised the
disillusionment felt by Frenchmen and former "subjects" alike. Nine
million citizens voted in favour of the new draft, eight million against
it, and eight million registered voters did not even go to the polls,
24
recording the highest abstention rate since 1881. In the West African
territories the abstention rate was slightly higher than that of the May
referendum, but the actual vote was quite similar, with Senegal's
largest (and predominantly African) electorate carrying a landslide
"yes" vote, overshadowing the slight European majorities rejecting the
25
Constitution in the rest of the Federation.
Organs of the Fourth Republic and Overseas Representation
As previously stated, the October Constitution divided the former French 
Empire into the Republic on the one hand and the Associated States and 
Territories on the other, all together forming the French Union. The 
former African colonies were renamed overseas territories and included 
within the statutes of the Republic. Representation of the overseas 
territories was therefore allotted in the elected bodies of both the 
French Republic and Union. The citizenship bestowed on the former 
African subjects, however, was to the French Union rather than the 
Republic, as differentiated by the term c.itoyens de. statut lnnal versus 
citoyens de. statut Frangais.
The law of 5 October 1946 conferred electoral rights on citoyens de. 
statut innal who met specific qualifications, including: chiefs,
G. Wright, The Reshaping, of. French Democracy, p. 227.
25
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notables £vq!u£s (as defined locally), ex-servicemen, holders of decora­
tions, government employees and those possessing work-permits of 
authorised establishments, licensed traders and planters, property 
owners, holders of hunting and driving licenses, literates in French or
Arabic, and members and former members of native tribunals, local
26
assemblies, trade unions, and co-operatives. Overall the franchise in 
French West Africa thus represented a very small fraction and 
predominantly urban sector of the population, as depicted in Table 1.
Table 1: AOF Po p ul a ti o n and Franchise, 1946.
Terr 1tory P o p u la t io n  1946 Franchise N ovenber 1946* 
African N o n - A f r i c a n  Registered \ pop. Voting \
Daho«ey 1,454,600 2, 2 0 0 57,355 3.9 34,535 60
Guinea 2,117,100 6,900 131,309 6 . 2 96,102 73
Ivory Coast 4,044,500 10,500 187,904 4 . 6 127,670 68
Niger 2,166,470 1,530 43,760 2 . 0 21,288 49
Soudan 3,791,200 5, 800 160,464 4 . 2 95,162 59
Upper Volta# 3,067,700 2,300 140,339 4 . 6 87,318 62
Mauritania 495,230 700 16,271 3 . 3 9,611 59
Senegal 1,856,900 33,100 192,681 10 . 2 131,167 67
Total A O F 6 15,926,900 63,100 789,744 4 . 9 515,535 65
•Election date to National Asseably 10 November 1946.
•Figures for Upper Volta are after its reconstitution in 1948, prior to which it 
vas divided between the Ivory Coast, Niger, and Soudan and reflected In their 
respective totals. Franchise and election data are fro* 27 June 19 4 &.
•Totals excluding figures for Upper Volta,
The only occurrence of Union and Republic citizens voting on a 
common roll was for deputies to the National Assembly in Paris. Other­
wise the double-college electoral system was enforced, although indirect 
voting in lesser assemblies for representatives in higher bodies was
Kenneth Robinson, "Political Development in French West Africa," in 
Calvin W. Stillman, ed., Africa in the Mrrtern World f Chicago, 1955, pp. 
161-3.
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sometimes by a single electorate. Figure 1 depicts the different levels 
of overseas representation and the way in which candidates were elected. 
Elections to the territorial Consul1 General were by the double-college 
system. From the General Council representatives were elected to the 
federal Grand Cnnaeii and the Union Assembly by way of a single-college 
vote. To ensure European representation in the Council of the Republic, 
the double-college was maintained for the election of senators by the 
territorial assenbly.
Figure 1: Levels of and E l e c t i o n  to Representative Bodies
Terr itor ial
Federal 
French Union 
Republic
U n i o n  Citizens
 r ~
Republic C i ti z en s
Conse i1 G £ n £ r a 1
Single College Double College
Grand Conseil
V
AsseablCe de l'Union Frangaise
C o ns e il  de la R£publique Assemblte Rationale
Between 20 and 50 councillors were elected to the local assemblies
27
on separate polls for first and second-college voters. Presided by the 
colonial Governor, the main powers of the Cnnspil G£n£ral centred upon 
the territorial budget, first contributing to its proposal and second 
overseeing its allocation and disposal. Matters under the Council's 
jurisdiction included the territorial funding of public works, infra- 
—
Refer to Table 2.
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structure, health, education, the allocation of scholarships, and the 
regulation of taxation rates and standards of collection. Moreover, the 
Council had to be consulted about a host of territorial concerns, such 
as the organisation of local administration and education, development 
plans, land concessions, and regulations concerning hunting, fishing, 
mining and forestry. Ch the federal level the Grand Conpu=>il functioned 
with similar powers to those of the territorial bodies, albeit with a 
wider scope and a coordinating function in matters which involved more 
than one territory or French West Africa as a whole. The President of 
the Grand Council was the former Governor-General, renamed High- 
Commissioner. Five representatives from each territorial assembly were 
elected to the Grand Council at Federation headquarters in Dakar.
Representation in the Assembly of the French Union was also via
indirect elections held on a common roll in the General Councils.
However, as shown in Table 2, the nunber of Assenblymen allotted varied
among the territories. Although initially envisioned to function as a
federal parliament, and composed equally of metropolitan and overseas 
28
representatives, the Union Assembly, located at Versailles, operated 
purely as an advisory body whose resolutions were for the most part 
ignored by the stronger organs of the Fourth Republic in Paris.
28
Membership fluctuated between 150 and 240, depending upon whether 
the Associated States optionally chose to participate.
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Table 2: Territorial Representation in Assemblies.
Territory
Conseil
G6n£ral
Grand
Conseil
Assembl&e
Nationale
Conseil de 
R£publique
la Assemble e 
de 1 'Union 
Franga ise
1946 1948 1946 1948 1946 1948
* 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Dahomey 12 16 12 18 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Guinea 16 24 16 24 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 4
Ivory Coast 20 30 18 *27 5 3 2 2 3 1 2 4
Niger 10 20 10 20 5 1 2 1 1 1 1 3
Soudan 20 30 20 30 5 3 3 1 3 1 3 5
Upper Volta 10 40 5 •* 3 1 2 5
Mauritania 6 14 6 14 5 1 1 1 1 1
Senegal 50 50 5 2 2 3 3 3
Total AOF 40 13 16 19 20 27
•Denotes double-college electoral system,
•The Ivory Coast temporarily lost 5 representatives to the Upper Volta.
Sources: J.-R, de Benoist, Afrloue Occldentale _Fr_anc;alge , Annex pp. 520-45;
K. Robinson, "Political Developaent in French West Africa," p. 162.
The two main bodies of the French Republic were the AsRpmhlfee 
Nationals and the Contrail de. la R£publique, otherwise referred to as 
parliament and senate. The National Asseirbly, composed of 618 members, 
had sole legislative sovereignty, including the powers to overthrow the 
cabinet and to initiate constitutional reform. Made up of 315 senators 
elected by indirect suffrage, the Council of the Republic could 
introduce bills for discussion in the National Assembly. However its 
only real power in legislative matters was the suspensive veto 
(filibuster) over laws with the exception of the budget. Apart from 
these institutions the executive branch consisted of the President of 
the Republic (equally ex officio President of the French Union), and his 
appointed cabinet who together formed the Council of Ministers.
The overseas territories including the West African Federation were 
placed under the Ministry of la. Erance d 'Qitre-Mer (FCM). While the 
parliament had supreme legislative authority in the Fourth Republic,
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usually the laws passed pertaining to the French Union were purposely
broad to allow for application by decree either by the Overseas
Ministry, or orders of the federal High-Commissioner and territorial
Governors. With the power to rule by decree, aided by the tendency of
Fourth Republic governments to be of short duration, the Overseas
29
Ministry operated with a relatively free hand in colonial government.
Political and Trade Union Development in French West Africa 
A nunber of concurrent factors contributed to the growth of political 
consciousness, association, and parties in the West African territories. 
Within the federal structure of ACF, administrators and civil servants 
were frequently transferred from one territory to another. Additionally 
the educational system was organised on a grand scale, with central 
higher institutions where students from the different territories came 
together to study. Metropolitan party politics infiltrated into the
African colonies in the era of the Popular Front government and
increasingly following the Second World War. The Communists were the 
predominant early activists in West Africa, setting up local study 
groups and encouraging affiliates to Communist organisations. A 
significant effect of the liberalising post-war reforms was the
burgeoning of trade unions, which quickly developed into a strong 
political and unifying force throughout the Federation. Finally, the 
creation of local assemblies under the Fourth Republic, the participa­
tion of overseas representatives in metropolitan government, and the 
widening electoral franchise together formulated an environment
conducive to rapid political development.
—
Fourth Republic cabinets lasted on average six months. The only new 
obstacle facing the Overseas Ministry in the post-war era was the 1947 
requirement that the Overseas Ministry consult the Assenbly of the
French Union, whose advice however was in no way binding. E. Mortimer, 
France and the Africans., pp. 102-3.
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Dating from the late nineteenth century, the main centre for civil 
service training of colonial subjects was the School for Sons of Chiefs 
and Interpreters. The aim of the school was to prepare native inter­
mediaries for administrative positions, familiarising them with the
30
necessary French language skills and bureaucratic procedures. Located
in the capital of Senegal at the time, Saint Louis, the school underwent
sporadic changes in nature and coirposition, eventually giving way to the
Dakar Boole Normale William Ponty. Ponty became the principal secondary
school of the Federation, and its students the educated elite of French
West Africa. The majority of emergent West African political leaders
were Ponty-trained? a nunber of them had earned the prestigious title of
31
major, denoting head of the class. Recruited by general exam, places
at Ponty were strictly limited. It was estimated that less than 2,000
students graduated from the school between 1919 and 1945. Nevertheless,
the importance of this institution and the elite which it created was
significant, as illustrated by Hodgkin and Schachter:
At Ponty the student body built up connections which trans­
cended territorial or ethnic boundaries. They mastered the 
French language and learned to evaluate European ideas. They 
conceived of themselves as Africans rather than as Ivory 
Coasters or Baule tribesmen. For the rest of his life a 
Ponty major enjoyed a status which enabled him to deal with 
his fellow political leaders with special confidence. (32)
Thus Ponty became a forum for in ter territorial discussion of the
30
The students were also instructed in courses of French history, 
geography and hygiene. R. Buell, The Native Prohlem -in Africa, vol. I, 
p. 993.
31
In the Constituent Assemblies Houphouet, Sissoko and Diallo were 
graduates; Lamine Gu£ye had briefly been a Ponty instructor. In Guinea 
the first prominent political leaders were all Ponty men: Yacine Diallo, 
Manfoa Sano, Madeira Keita and Barry Diawadou. Later party activists 
included two Ponty majors— Diallo Saifoulaye and Diallo Telli.
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colonial situation and a base which fostered coordinated efforts to work 
towards an improved standard of living in French Africa.
African civil servants, as products of the federal schools, were 
kept mobile by the administration and shifted often from one territory 
to the next. This turn-table (rouage) policy actually helped the native 
civil servants to deepen their understanding of regional problems, while 
at the same time aspiring politicians were able to gain exposure and 
establish ties transcending territorial boundaries. Although the 
rotating and federal nature of the civil service aided the development 
of interterritorial parties, and unions, the transfer system was also 
used by the French administration as a means to combat the growth of 
such groups by dispersing potentially dangerous political elements. 
Transfers of political activists to remote areas, due to their local 
dealings and growing influence, were common in the early phase of West 
African political development.
Although the Socialists established an early foothold in Senegal,
elsewhere in French West Africa it was the Communists that actively
pursued association with Africans and offered assistance and guidance in
the development of indigenous political institutions. French Communists
and their sympathisers held various posts in the colonial administration
such as officers, teachers, and technicians, since the Popular Front
government. Of notable influence were the Communist teachers at Ponty
and the upper primary and vocational schools of Bamako, Conakry, and 
33
Dakar. During the war the Communists gained enormous prestige as both
heroes and martyrs of the resistance movement, distributing their
propaganda in African circles. First created in Algiers, the Comit6
d 1 Etudes Franro-Afrinain (CEFA) with sections in the colonies coirprised 
—
R. Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties, p. 23.
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predominantly of Ponty intellectuals, came under Communist influence in
34
its discussions of post-war relations. cut of these committees study
groups known as Groupes d l-sti:idefi Communistea (GECs) emerged in the major
West African cities: Abidjan, Bamako, Bobo-Dioulasso, Conakry, and
Dakar. The organisation of the GECs and the impact of Communist theory
on African political thought were explained by a participant:
The GECs were study groups created and animated by Communist 
or Communist sympathiser French intellectuals following the 
Second World War, where simplified courses of Marxism were 
given to African intellectuals, trade unionists, and 
professionals. The prestige which encircled the PCF was 
great: "first party" leading the resistance to the fascist
German invaders, then member of the French Government. Its 
theories and slogans were powerfully attractive to most of 
the African intellectuals and workers. All believed that the 
war had sounded the death knell of colonialism. In these 
conditions, the intellectuals and workers thought that the 
GECs dispensed "the theory" of happiness, liberty, and 
dignity of man. (35)
Aside from encouraging and directing study groups of Marxist-
Leninist orientation, the Communists in West Africa were also heavily
involved in the post-war trade union movement. As aforementioned, the
Provisional Government by a decree of 7 August 1944 authorised trade
unions in the colonies. The largest group of labour unions in France was
the Confederation G&rterale du Travail (CGT), which had been sending
representatives to Sub-Saharan Africa since 1943. As the Communists grew
rapidly in strength immediately following the war, by 1946 they held 80
36
per cent of the top positions in the CGT. In February of the same 
year, with the support of the Overseas Minister, a CGT delegation
34
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, French West Africa, London, 
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visited ACS’ and called a conference in Dakar of trade union representa­
tives throughout the Federation. The objective of the conference was to
unite European and African workers together "with a view to create a
37
single powerful trade unionism in ACE’." Indigenous labour unions were 
grouped and paired with their metropolitan counterparts within the CGT. 
The advantages of such affiliation were numerous, including the attain­
ment of funding, equipment, organisational and technical assistance, and
in the words of Georges Martens, "they (African unions) were assured of
38
political support in the bosom of the French government." Che outcome
of this conference was the creation of the Union, des Syndicate
Confederes de. Guin&e (USCG). The USCG was headed by five Europeans and
five Africans; one of each was sent in 1947 to represent the union at
39
the Twenty-seventh CGT Congress held in Dakar.
In an effort to coirbat the Communist CGT, local sections of the
Christian Confederation Frangaiso des Travailleurs Chretiens (CFTC)
40
trade union were created in West Africa in 1946. When the Communists 
lost support and left the French government in 1947, the non-Communist 
wing of the CGT split off to form the Eorce Quvri&re (FO) officially 
constituted in April 1948 and henceforth favoured by the colonial
37
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administration. Nevertheless Communist influence remained predominant
in West African trade unionism until 1956, when the African labour
movement opted for their independence and broke all ties with
metropolitan affiliations. It will be shown later that, particularly in
the case of Guinea, trade unions were a decisive force in local
political organisation and interterritorial coordination, protest and
the attainment of significant labour reform, and the emergence of
political leaders.
Finally, as concisely summarised by Leo Hamon,
The origin of African political life is parliamentary. It 
was not the party that preceded the elected candidate. It 
was the elected candidate that preceded the party. (41)
The inclusion of African representatives in metropolitan bodies of the
Fourth Republic, and allowance of political association in the
territories, served "to induce or to provoke nationalist leaders to
convert their movements into political parties," and the introduction of
the electoral franchise made it "technically possible for parties to
42
seek power constitutionally." Thus while numerous social and economic 
factors contributed to the pace and direction of political development 
in French West Africa, the true precipitant was the constitutional 
reform enabling elected representatives to participate in the shaping of 
future French-African relations.
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Political Associations and Elections in Guinea
The growth of political organisations in Guinea was directly related to 
post-war constitutional reform, as depicted in the 1949 annual report of 
the territory:
The political parties were born in 1945 and 1946 with the 
structural reforms and legislative elections. Previously 
there existed only a section of the SFIO consisting of 
several Europeans and Senegalese without influence on the 
masses, and several Europeans directly affiliated to the 
Communist party. (43)
As in Senegal, the Socialists were the first French political party
activists on the scene in post-war Guinea, although very few Africans
joined the local section of the SFIO. A number of influential European
administrators who were Communist sympathisers were present in Guinea
during the war and immediately afterwards. From the Communist dominated
resistance movement a small political organisation was founded in Guinea
called un ion PatHotlque, which became affiliated to the French Front.
National in 1945. Although composed essentially of Europeans, several
young future Guinean leaders were active members of the Front National,
44
namely S§kou Tour6, Abdourahmane Diallo, and Diallo Saifoulaye.
According to the Guinean historian Lansing Kaba, the Front. National;
— had a significant impact on the growth of African nation­
alism: S6kou Tour§ once served as its deputy chairman. It
created the Groupes d'fetndes Comnuinist.es numbering 44 around 
1947, and introduced young urbanised Africans to Marxism.
(45)
Furthermore, out of this organisation emerged the first Guinean politi-
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cal party which was non-ethnic in orientation, the Eartx Progressist
Afrinain dfi. Guin6& (PPAG), in 1946.
The introduction of the franchise and elections to the first
Constituent Assembly in 1945 caught the African subjects almost by
surprise, and their unpreparedness fostered scattered mobilisation of
candidates and political associations. Madeira Keita, one of the first
African political leaders in Guinea, described the situation in the
territory as the following:
The first legislative elections of 1945 came as a surprise 
in Guinea where there were not true political organisations. 
Consequently it was natural, aided by a little demagogic 
ambition, to group the nationals of ethnic associations 
around candidates with guaranteed ties of race, region of 
origin, etc....The disorder of the electoral campaign would 
lead to the spread of so-called ethnic groupings in the end
of 1945 and beginning of 1946. (46)
The first phase of post-war Guinean political history is characterised 
by the transformation of formerly social, ethnic, or regional organisa­
tions into political movements and fluid alliances for electoral 
purposes.
In 1941 a "mutual benefit association" called Union Mand6 was
created for natives of Upper Guinea, the Forest region, and Soudan (i.e. 
47
Manding peoples). The association was active primarily in Conakry, 
where it organised social events such as dances and theatrical produc­
tions . The Union divided into two autonomous sections at the time of 
the October 1945 electoral campaign, those from the Forest region in one
46
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branch and members from Upper Guinea and Soudan in the other. By the
1946 elections the two sections became independently known as Union
Mande and Union Forestiere* popular leaders were Framoi B6r£t£, Sekou
Toure and Lamine Ibrahima Kaba of the former, Vassery Dioumande was
president of the latter. Mairba Sano, a Ponty-trained teacher born in
Kissidougou in the Forest region, yet of assimilated Malinke origin, was
backed by both Unions in the early election caiipaigns.
In Lower Guinea the incontestable leader was Amarah Soumah, a
graduate of the upper primary school in Conakry and son of the Baga king
48
who once owned the land on which the city was founded. The Union de. 
Basae-Guinee represented the interests of the coastal peoples, namely 
the Soussou, Baga, and Nalou. Apart from the major ethnic associations, 
a number of smaller groupings existed, among which the Union des 
instill a ires for the populations of the lies de Los just off Conakry, the 
Foyer senega!aia for resident Senegalese, 1 'Union dn Benin likewise 
representing those from Dahomey and Togo, and a number of youth organi­
sations such as Jeimesfie du Eonjtah., Jeunesse. Mai inks, Jeunesse de.
49
11Un inn des Tonnonlenrsf etc.
Fulani students at Ponty had created the club La. Voix des
Mnntagnards with the expressed aim "to help them overcome their 
50
shyness." Upon their return to Guinea these Ponty graduates
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constituted the Ann^ale; Gilbert vieillard (AGV) in February 1944. The
original goals of the association were:
To maintain and strengthen the ties of solidarity and 
fraternity among the educated Foulah; contribute to the 
evolution of the Fouta and emphasise the value of its 
customs and history through conferences, theatrical produc­
tions, etc. (52)
Composed mainly of intellectuals, in the 1945 elections the AGV
solicited the support of the Fouta region, particularly the traditional
chiefs. For second-college deputy to the Constituent Assembly, the
educated elite favoured the candidacy of Barry Diawadou, son of the
Dabola canton chief, Ponty-graduate and government clerk, who at the
time was in his early thirties. The Fulani aristocracy, however,
preferred an older, more traditional candidate, that of Yacine Diallo, a
Ponty-trained teacher in his fifties and the first African director of a 
53
Conakry school. In recognition of the need for the Fouta bloc of 
votes, the AGV relented and supported Diallo in the October campaign.
Elections to the first Constituent Assembly in the West African 
territories were through a double-college and a double ballot vote held 
on 21 October 1945. Among the registered second-college candidates on 
the first ballot, starting from most votes received, were Yacine Diallo, 
Mamba Sano, Lamine Kaba, Diafode Caba, Fode Tour§, and Amarah Soumah. 
Diallo polled over twice the votes for Sano who was placed second. In an
51
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Vieillard was a French administrator posted in the Fouta Djalon in the 
1930s, at IFAN in 1937 and killed in 1940. His linguistic studies were 
highly regarded, contributing to a better understanding of the Fulani 
people.
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attempt to combat Diallo's overwhelming majority, the three non-Fulani
regions agreed to collectively vote in favour of Sano on the second
54
ballot. Ihis might have succeeded if it had not been for Kaba, who
insisted on running separately, obtaining 1,711 votes; consequently
Diallo won the election with 5,774 votes against 5,065 for Sano.
Although the overall sec end-college voter participation was 78 per cent,
the abstention rate was considerably lower in the Fouta than in the 
55
other regions. Furthermore, as ethnic consideration was supreme, the
Fouta bloc registered 98 per cent of its votes for Diallo— "the
remarkable spirit of discipline of the Foulah bloc was thus brought to 
56
light."
The introduction of the electoral process in Guinea was marred by 
protest and incidents in the capital city. Violent demonstrations 
unfolded outside the Police Commissioner's headquarters on 16 October 
1945, when numerous envelopes sent to registered voters were found not 
to contain voting ballots. The later jailing of 94 protesters sparked 
further violence, and armed forces were called in to restore the peace. 
The French authorities attributed the cause of the conflicts to the 
recent activities of the Comi.t£ dlEtudes Franco-Afr icain r the growing 
number of 6vo1u£r who incited the masses to protest their economic 
hardship, and the declining prestige of the white man and France as a
54
Lamine Ibrahima Kaba was a radical Muslim scholar and teacher who 
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French and rebellious political activities which often provoked violent 
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world (i.e. colonial) power.
During the session of the first Constituent Assentoly in Paris, 
political development continued at a rapid pace in the overseas terri­
tories. Out of the Front National and "in collaboration with militants
of Communist tendency" the Parti Progressists. Africa in da Guinee (PPAG)
58
was created in April 1946. Founded by Fod6 Tour6, a Paris-educated
lawyer of Soussou coastal origin, in October the PPAG came under the
direction of Madeira Keita, a Soudanese Pcnty-trained federal civil
servant then working at the Conakry branch of the Ins.ti±u.t. Frangaift
d 'Afrigue Noire (IFAN). Other influential local PPAG activists included
Sdkou Toure, Abdourahmane Diallo, Amarah Soumah, Barry Diawadou, and 
59
Karim Bangoura.
The formation of the PPAG was significant in that its members
represented all regions of Guinea, and that it "declared itself
resolutely 'anti-racist1 thus giving birth to a true movement of 
60
union." While the ethnic group leaders were attempting to work 
together, likewise the Communists and Socialists in Guinea were 
coordinating their activities and also in the process of forming an 
electoral alliance.
The Communist persuasion of the PPAG cannot be denied; however it 
has been claimed both that the PPAG grew out of the Groupes d 'Etudes
57
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Comnunist.es and that the Guinean GEC was created by the PPAG.
According to archival records, although the Communist ComitS d'Etudes
Franco-Afr icain existed in Conakry by 1945, the local Groups d.'Etudes
CQTnmunlst.es. was officially constituted 20 April 1946, the same day as
the founding of the PPAG. Testimony of Madeira Keita confirmed that
while Communist study groups had previously been in existence, his and
a number of his colleagues' participation began after they had created 
62
the PPAG. Within the GEC the young politicians learned first of all 
how to prepare presentations, conduct meetings, and lead political 
debates. Secondly, through the study of various European publications 
mainly in brochure form, the GEC members were instructed in basic 
Marxist philosophy and doctrine.
As a registered member of the SFIO, Yacine Diallo joined the 
Socialist bloc in the first Assembly and voted in favour of the April 
Constitution. The June 1946 Guinean elections to the Second Constituent 
Assembly were less troublesome than the first; Diallo enjoyed the back­
ing of the AGV and the PPAG, the outcome of which was a landslide
63
victory over Mamba Sano in a peaceful electoral campaign. The PPAG 
support of Diallo demonstrated its commitment to African unity, and soon 
afterwards the party began calling for a conference of native political 
movements to combine forces and work together for the emancipation of 
Africa.
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Meanwhile in Paris, African reaction to 1) the rejection of the
April Constitution and inherent liberal concessions granted to the
overseas territories, 2) the hostile manoeuvrings of the Etats Gdndrany
da la Colon i sat ion Frangaise, and 3) the conservative nature of the
second Assembly and the retrograde Constitution which subsequently
emerged, was to press for unity among overseas representatives and for
interterritorial fusion of their supporting political institutions. The
African delegates took the initiative and called a conference in the
following manner:
Cn 18 September 1946, towards the closing of the Second 
Constituent Assembly, (the Charter of which, although 
progressive, was much less bold than the first) , all the 
African delegates present in Paris, in a moving manifesto, 
convoked a great Congress of French Black Africa in Bamako 
on 18 October. (64)
The response in Guinea to the proposed gathering was immediate. Oi 
22 September, in order to prepare for the heralded congress, the 
founding members of the PPAG created the Comitd d 1 Initiative da 
Rasserrbleroent. Headed by Madeira Keita, the official Guinean delega­
tion to the Bamako congress consisted of ten members representing eight
65
political associations. Moreover, close historic, ethnic, and familial 
ties between the two territories led to the presence of a great number 
of Guinean observers and unofficial guests.
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The number of respective delegates was the following: 2 PPAG; 2
Mouvement Rdvolutionnaire Ddmocratique. of Amara Sissoko; 1 AGV; 1 Union,. 
Mande; 1 Union Foreshidre; 1 Basse-Guinde; 1 Union des Mdtris; 1 GEC. 
Members included Sdkou Tourd, Koumandian Keita, Amarah Soumah, 
and Abdourahmane Diallo. Doudou Gueye, "Ceux qui dtaient au Congrds de 
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The Bamako Congress and Birth of the 
Rassenblement DSmncratiqne Africain
The signatories of the manifesto were all the native deputies from West 
66
Africa, plus Jean-F£lix Ttehicaya and former deputy Gabriel 
d'Arboussier from Gabon-Congo in AEF. It is claimed that the original 
author of the manifesto was d'Arboussier/ a man of mixed French and 
Soudanese origin/ who followed his father's career in the colonial 
service and was elected as a first-college deputy to the first Constit­
uent Assembly. His membership in the Communist Party/ and affiliation to 
the MUR and its African delegates in the first Assembly, however, made
him an unpopular first college representative and consequently he was
not re-elected to the sec aid Commission. Thus having more time to work
on the plan, d'Arboussier drew up the Manifesto which was then discussed
67
and signed at the Paris residence of Lamine Gueye. The main gist of
the text was summarised in its concluding appeal:
It is to complete this work of union, that, in spite of
hostile manoeuvres, we call a great gathering (Rassemble- 
ment) of all the organisations that are introducing
political and social democracy in Black Africa, the condi­
tions of which we have expressed in this Manifesto. (68)
There is a certain significance in the choice of the term rassemblement,
as it implied unity as the expression of the "general will," and
embodied the notion of a common front exercising a moral right to combat
69
imperialism and injustice.
The dream of African unity was shattered when, prompted by the
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suspicion that the gathering was inspired and would be dominated by the
French Communist Party, the Overseas Minister advised the Socialist-
affiliated Africans to boycott the Bamako congress. Bowing to this
pressure, Gu£ye, Senghor, and Diallo all declined to participate in
70
this historic event. All established African associations and
prominent leaders, as well as every French political party, were
invited to attend the conference in Bamako. As a result of Moutet's
actions, only the Communist Party in France responded favourably to the
invitation and sent a delegation. Moreover, the Socialist withdrawal not
only handed Houphouet the leadership of the union movement, it also
marked a shift in the nucleus of West African political development from
Dakar to Abidjan. The majority of the Senegalese contingent at Bamako,
in fact, were delegates of the federal bureaus of the CEFA and GECs
71
with direct ties to the Communist bloc in France.
Once at the congress, Communist influence was especially evident.
The head of the colonial section of the PCF was Raymond Barb6, whose
actions at Bamako were thus illustrated:
The participation of Barbd at the Congress was active. It 
was all the better because of his grand gestures, expressive 
language, his beret, the whole "spectacle" helped assure him 
the sympathy of a good number of young professionals and 
intellectuals from Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Soudan.
(72)
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A delegate from Dahomey, Dr. Derlin Zinsou, substantiated the suspicion
of Communist infiltration with the following commentary:
The Communist Party was in the government. Not only did it 
have ministers, it sent representatives to the Bamako Con­
gress... The Communist Party had given Bamako the following 
order: do not speak of autonomy. It was necessary at the
time, so that the mask was deceptive, that no trace, even 
the smallest, of orthodox Communism appeared. However 
several precautions were lost in the details. For example, 
one forgot to prevent those in charge of the colonial sec­
tion of the Communist Party from coming to Bamako and 
directing in the wings...Oh 1 not really so much in the 
wings, because the strings were really too noticeable. (73)
Obviously not all of the Africans present were content with the blatant
Communist participation and phraseology employed by African proteges.
The Soudanese deputy to the Constituent Assemblies, signatory of
the manifesto, and host to the congress, Fily Dabo Sissoko, also fell
under the pressure of the Socialist Governor and publicly denounced the
movement while delegates were arriving on 18 October. Sissoko called the
congress which was about to begin "a political swindle for Communist 
74
benefit." An impromptu retaliatory speech delivered by Houphouet over­
shadowed Sissoko!s condemnation; persuaded by Houphouet and the 
Soudanese crowd, Sissoko grudgingly presided over the congress.
Despite the attempts made by the administration to deter prospec­
tive representatives and the labelling of the congress as part of a 
Communist plot, from October 19-21 more than 800 African delegates 
converged at Bamako to participate in the birth of what became known as 
the Bassemhlem&nt Democratj.qne Africain (FDA). In his opening speech 
Houphouet pointed out "the real goal, the only one of the rassenblemenl;:
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the union of Africans in their peaceful, freedom struggle." While
denying that the African congress was serving the propaganda interests
of the Conmunist Party, Houphouet's oration contained passages full of
PCF rhetoric, for example when he spoke of:
The liberation of Africa from the odious tutelage of imper­
ialism, of capitalism— source of strife, class struggles,
misery, obscurity— requires total sacrifices from Africans, 
sacrifices from which no one among us ought to refrain. (76)
Still, Houphouet maintained that although if he wanted to become a
Communist he would not wait for the triumph of Communism to register, he
77
was "not yet of a Communist consciousness." In response to the often
repeated argument that the FDA grew out of the GECs in West Africa,
Doudou Gu&ye offered the following explanation in his book about the
relationship between the Communists and the EDA:
One must recognise that these circles were formed by a 
number of post-war African political activists, who respond­
ed with haste to the call for the Bamako rassemblement.
Because of this, some believed that the EDA, from its 
inception, was supported by direct ties with the GECs....
However it was not only exaggerated, but incorrect to think 
and to say that the GECs profoundly marked the EDA. It was 
the EDA that helped itself to certain GEC activists to give 
its members an education and formation that seemed to 
respond, in the beginning, to its objectives and goals. (78)
The main objective of the EDA, clearly outlined at the Bamako
congress, was the emancipation of the African people via the affirmation
of their unique political, economic, social, and cultural "personality,"
and their attachment to a union of nations "freely consented to" with
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guaranteed equal rights and responsibilities. The concept of autonomy 
was purposely omitted from discussion, and "emancipation" clearly meant 
within the French Union. In the pursuit of its ultimate goal, the KDA 
aimed at the union of all Africans without distinction of race, 
religion, social class, or ideology. From this standpoint the "means of 
struggle" were devised as such:
1) Union in the midst of a large political organisation 
encompassing all ideological conceptions, ethnic groups, 
and social classes in each territory;
2) Constitution of an African parliamentary group; and
3) Solidarity among all the peoples of the French Union and 
world democratic forces. (80)
Under the presidency of Houphouet, the congress was organised into
working commissions in charge of drawing up respective resolutions,
initially political, economic, and social. A fourth commission was
added to prepare and then present a general resolution to the congress
for ratification. In brief, the political resolution denounced the
policy of assimilation, deplored the double-college electoral system
and reduced powers of the territorial assemblies, and expressed general
dissatisfaction with the October 1946 Constitution, calling for its 
81
revision. While the economic report addressed African needs of 
increased industrialisation, marketing and native participation in 
development planning, the social resolution (reported by Madeira Keita) 
called for free and obligatory mass education and reform of the health 
sector. Finally, the general resolution reiterated the main points of 
the political report, the necessity for unity, and vowed the formation
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of an African democratic party. Furthermore it was decided to elect a
Coordinating Committee in charge of organising future rassembleirmts.,
whose designated mission was:
to undertake all necessary action in bringing about the 
unity of political parties among the territories and to 
prepare their fusion in a single African movement.
In February 1947 conceptual details of the Bamako movement were
being worked out by the Coordinating Committee meeting in Paris. In a
communique from the meeting, the Committee stressed that:
The spontaneous Union that enabled and continues to encour­
age Africans to stand up against the misdeeds of colonialism 
is not due to such and such ideology. It is the unavoidable 
consequence of the oppression of the African masses and 
their consciousness of this oppression. (82)
Aside from stating that no political leader had the right to impose his
ideology within the organisation, the communique clarified that the KDA:
is not a Party. It is a body of agreement and coordination, 
whose own life depends on the life of its member parties.
(83)
The statutes and organisational framework of the EDA were prepared 
by the Coordinating Committee and circulated along with the above cited 
communique. Contained in the statutes were the following provisions: 
only one party per territory was allowed, which acted autonomously 
within the framework of KDA principles and decisions (Articles 2 & 10); 
the inter territorial congress was the supreme decision-making body of 
the movement, in between which the Coordinating Committee was charged 
with the application of its programme and overall direction (Articles 4 
St 7); and RDA members in the metropolitan government represented, and
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acted in Paris on behalf of, the Coordinating Committee (Article 8). A
permanent secretariat in Abidjan, as well as federal delegations in
Dakar and Brazzaville, were created as auxiliary organs of the movement.
Although in principle a congress was to be convened annually, only
three such rassenblements occurred between 1946 and 1957 inclusive. In
practice the Coordinating Committee, elected by the congress, directed
the activities and maintained interterritorial liaisons of the movement.
The Committee was conposed of firstly the bureau of one President, four
Vice-Presidents, and a Secretary-General, secondly the parliamentary
members, and thirdly one representative from each of the federal delega-
85
tions and territorial parties. The chain of command within the PDA is
illustrated in Figure 2.
The link between the Coordinating Committee and the territorial
sections was the Comite Direct-<=>ur of the respective parties. In replica
of interterritorial organisation, the Party Congress was the supreme
body of the territorial section. Sometimes, however, when a congress was
deemed impractical, a Territorial Conference was called in its place.
The double role of the elected Comite. Directenr was to cpply and
elaborate directives issued by the Coordinating Committee, and to lead
86
the activities of the subordinate organs. Ihe power centre of the
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Directing Committee was the Bureau Politigiiar the functioning secretar­
iat elected by the party congress. Beneath the Directing Committee were 
the Com it 6s da sons-ser:tionf normally organised on a regional (canton) 
basis, and finally on the village or city level were the Comit6s da 
village and Com it 6s da guartier respectively (see Figure 3).
F igu r e 2: Structure of the RDA, Figure 3: T erritorial Organization.
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Upon his return from the Bamako Congress, Sekou Toure launched an appeal
for the constitution of a Comit6 d'Union Democratiguef the organisation
87
of which was confided to Madeira Keita. In the meantime, however, 
Guinean political associations arri aspiring leaders became preoccupied 
with the legislative elections held from Noveirber 1946 through January 
1947. The most prestigious of these was of course the election of depu­
ties to the French National Assenbly, for which four alliance "lists"
87
ANSCM AP 2263/6, "Les Partis Politiques en ACF et Consultations 
Electorales de 1945 a 1955," p. 5.
90
were submitted. The resultant deputies of the November elections were
Yacine Diallo on the Socialist and Progressive ticket and Mamba Sano for
the Socialist Party of Guinea. Diallo benefited from the backing of the
Fouta chieftaincy and the PPAG-Bamako supporters, while Sano owed his
success to the ethnic organisations of Upper Guinea and the Forest 
88
region. Fod§ Tour6, the fellow Socialist and number two on Diallo's
list, was elected second-college senator to the Conseil de. la R£pnb3 ignp
on 8 Decenber. Finally, elections to the territorial Conseil G£n6ral
were conpleted in January 1947.
Political mobilisation for the legislative elections in Guinea
further strengthened the predominant ethnic nature of the existing
associations. Subsequently efforts to found a territorial section of the
RDA, proposed by the former leaders of the PPAG which was dissolved in
early 1947, concentrated on uniting the heads of the regional organisa- 
89
tions. In public addresses soliciting support for the FDA, Madeira 
Keita repeatedly refuted the arguments that the movement was organised 
by the Communists and was anti-French in orientation. Keita explained 
that the African parliamentarians were not sufficient in number to 
create an independent bloc, and their choice of alliance to the Commu­
nists was "because the democratic interests of the PCF and the FDA are
90
more or less the same."
In mid^March it was announced that FDA Vice-President Gabriel 
d'Arboussier had been given a mission, funded by the Ivorian chapter, to 
create territorial sections throughout West Africa. Although Keita and
88
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his associates had hoped that d ’Arboussier would upon his arrival find a
strong Guinean section already in place, and had enlisted over 125
91
members to this effect, the actual founding and organisation of the
local party occurred in the presence and with the assistance of the PDA
federal delegation. After successful tours in Senegal and Soudan,
d'Arboussier arrived in Guinea on 4 June 1947.
In Conakry d ’Arboussier contacted the leaders of the various
political organisations, striving to convince them of the necessity for
concerted action not only within each territory but throughout French
Africa as a whole. The result of these deliberations was -transmitted via
an PDA circular dated 15 June:
After making contact with all the political, cultural, and 
ethnic organisations in Guinea, an accord was reached with 
the following organisations: Union Forest!ere. Union dlL
Mand£, Amicale. Gilbert Vieillard, Union, des Tonc;onienrsr 
Union des insulairesf Union dn Benin, to which are also 
joined an important fraction of Lower Guinea and young 
Senegalese. (92)
Among the bases of the agreement were the following critical stipula­
tions:
1) The organisations were to renounce their political rights 
in favour of the PDA;
2) The Com it.6 Directeur of the PDA section contained repre­
sentation of all ethnic elements of Guinea; and
3) Likewise regional commissions were included in the 
Directing Committee. (93)
Once the terms of the union were accepted, the party statutes of the
FDA-Guinean section were drawn up and adopted in Conakry on 14 June 
94
1947. The organisation scheme was similar to RDA general format;
91
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Thid.
94
Party statutes found in CRDA archives 9/1.
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however special provisions for regional commissions and bloc adherence
to the party were unique to the Guinean statutes.
The concessions granting ethnic and regional representation meant
the continuance of rivalry and local orientations, and were later blamed
for the break-up of the Guinean section, which initially was no more
than a loose coalition of coirpeting organisations and political 
95
leaders. Nevertheless among the 24 elected members of the first
Coinit.6 Dfrecteur. were a number of the leading political activists in
Guinea at the time, including: Madeira Keita as Secretary-General,
Framoi B6r6t6, Amarah Soumah, and Ibrahima Sory Diallo as Secretaries,
Sekou Tour6 responsible for Economic and Social Affairs, Abdourahmane
Diallo for Organisation, Abdoulaye Diallo for Propaganda, and Mamadou 
96 97
Traore for Administrative Affairs. The section's treasurer and his
adjunct were residents from Togo and Senegal, illustrating the federal
character of the PDA. In Paris deputy Mamba Sano confirmed his adhesion
to the newly created Guinean chapter and the KDA parliamentary group.
After addressing crowds estimated at 800 to 900 people in Conakry,
and founding the central organs of the Guinean branch of the KDA,
d'Arboussier travelled north in the territory to spread the news as well
98
as organise local subsections («nnR-Rectinnfl). Accompanied by Keita, 
d'Arboussier held public meetings and presided over the formation of
95
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provisional subsection committees in Kindia, Mamou, Labe, and Kankan, as
well as visiting influential persons in Pita, Dabola, and Kouroussa.
Themes introduced to the masses were the main goals of the RDA— to
protect African originality, unite all Africans, and combat colonialism,
and RDA positions on issues such as the Constitution, PCF, French
government, and powers of local assemblies. While enthusiasm and
attendance were relatively low in the Fouta region, the delegation in
Kankan registered an enormous success, where approximately 1,500
99
Africans were present for the formation of the party subsection.
The creation of the Guinean section of the RDA was officially
100
recognised on 4 July 1947. With the mass adherence of the various
ethnic associations and political leaders, the movement expanded rapidly
in subsection organisation and membership. Hie popularity and prestige
of deputy Sano brought the bulk of his supporters from Upper Guinea and
the Forest region into the RDA. In November 1947 elections to the
Censed 1 da. 1 ’Union Frangaiae were held in Guinea, whereby Maurice
Montrat and Momo Toure emerged as RDA assemblymen. Sekou Tour6 led the
majority of the CGT-affiliated trade union members into the ranks of the 
101
local RDA.
By the end of 1947 the party claimed to have 5,000 members in
Conakry and its environs, and an equivalent number in the rest of the
102
territory. In September the section published and began circulation
99
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of its first newspaper, Ehare. de. Guinea (Guinea's Lighthouse). Propa­
ganda themes of the Guinean party, as interpreted by the local French 
authorities, centred upon the union of Africans against imperialism and 
the colonial trusts, sympathies with the French Communist Party, admini­
strative abuses, and necessary reforms to elevate the standard of living 
of the people and workers, and the constitution of a single pay schedule 
for government employees whether European or African. Party activists
worked evenings and weekends, renting delivery-vans to disseminate
103
information and solicit support of the masses in the outlying areas. 
Mobilisation efforts were largely successful, and so recognised by the 
administrat ion:
In December 1947, the Guinean section of the RDA was at the 
apogee of its power. The party, by its activity, acquired 
an absolute preponderance on the political scene, although 
it. had not "conquered" the land. (104)
103
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CHAPTER III
(^position and Repression of the PDA
From the beginning of 1948 the first symptoms of disintegra­
tion were becoming apparent. The changing of the Governor 
coincided with a general shift in government policies. The 
reaction of the administrative authorities, initially trans­
ferring government enployees deemed too turbulent, little by 
little bore fruit. A number of supporters disapproved of the 
RDA affiliation to the Communist party, the excesses of the 
leaders, and the choice of party directors who were trouble­
makers such as S£kou Tour§, Amarah Soumah and foreigners 
like Soudanese Madeira Keita. (1)
The euphoria surrounding the Guinean section of the RDA at its 
conception, and the initial unity which it inspired, proved to be super­
ficial and ephemeral. The period of decline which ensued was largely the 
result of a deliberate administrative policy to break up the fledgling 
African movement.
In May 1947 a historical event occurred in metropolitan politics 
that had profound inplications for colonial policy. The Communist Party,
voting against the government, was "bundled out of office by presi- 
2
dential decree." Henceforth the French Communists were forced into the
opposition, as the domestic political balance shifted to the Centre. At
the same time Gaullists organised a new party, the RaeseTrblemenf du.
Peuple Frangais (RPF), which swept the municipal elections of October
3
1947 and quickly spread into the overseas territories.
1
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The Guinean section of the RPF was created 26 June 1947 and led by 
P. Auvray and assemblyman L. Delmas. A central principle of the party 
was "to maintain French pre-eminence in the world" and the integrity of
96
In November Paul Coste-Floret (MRP) took over from Moutet as
Overseas Minister and instigated the anti-FDA policy under the justif i-
4
cation of fighting Communism. To this effect Coste-Floret appointed
hardline administrators in West Africa, issuing specific orders to
suppress the movement. The new High-Commissioner was the Socialist Paul
B&uhard, who initially tried to persuade Houphouet to form an alliance
with the SFIO. The RDA President transmitted the proposal to
d'Arboussier, who chose not to pass it on to other members of the RDA
5
Coordinating Committee. The attenpt at conciliation having failed, the 
administration pursued a policy of repression. The main tactics of the 
campaign included: anti-RDA propaganda, bribery and coercion of elected
officials and government employees, electoral machinations and support 
of non-FDA political parties, banning of FDA meetings, transferring of 
influential civil servants, and provocation of incidents warranting 
government intervention and the imprisonment of RDA militants.
Ihe designated "tough" Governor to Guinea was Roland Pr£, who 
arrived in Conakry in January 1948. Just before the Governor's arrival 
an FDA federal delegation toured Guinea, aiming to counter the negative 
publicity attacking the movement. Accompanied by Mamba Sano, deputies 
Ouezzin Coulibaly (Upper Volta/Ivory Coast) and Mamadou Konat£ (Soudan) 
held public meetings refuting arguments that the RDA was anti-French, 
Communist in orientation, and anti-Muslim. Deputy Sano reassured his
the French Union. In January 1948 the RPF claimed to have 300 French 
members and 141 Africans in Guinea, and was bitterly opposed by the 
local FDA section. ICG b. 70.
4
R. Schachter Morgenthau, PoiiHna:! Parhams, p. 91.
5
J.-R. de Benoist, L'Afrique Occidentals FrangaiRftf p. 121.
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enthusiastic supporters that:
The RDA is not Communist and never shall be Communist 
because it has no interest in becoming Communist... .The day 
when it will be against the interests of France, the day 
when it will be against the Muslim religion, the day when it 
will be against African traditions, is the day I will tell 
all my friends and supporters to turn their backs on it. (6)
Earlier Sano had professed a loyalty to France unusual for fervent RDA
militants at the time, particularly in Guinea:
We are treated as anti-French, Communists, and adversaries 
of Islam and of custom. We are none of that. I am Guinean, 
certainly, but above all French. I speak only in French, I 
taught French to my students and I think in French. I 
pledged my adhesion to the H)A because the essential goal of 
the party is the unification of African people...within the 
French Union. The wish to separate Africa from France would 
be suicide. We are and will stay French. (7)
With such a political stance, it was hardly surprising that Sano led the
general fall-out of the RDA section in Guinea when he left the party in
late 1948.
Deputy Yacine Diallo decisively broke all ties with the Fouta-
backed AGV when the organisation entered the RDA. With Senator and
fellow Socialist Fod§ Toure, Diallo founded the Union. Franno-Guin£enne
(UFG) and gathered support from the Coastal and Fouta regions, as well
as the French administration. In May 1947 Fode Tour& had organised the
Soussou population of Lower Guinea into the Comite d 'Union de. la Basse
Guinea, which initially kept its distance from and later worked against 
8
the RDA. Aside from his large personal following, Diallo gained the 
support of AGV members, particularly in the religious centers of Lab6
6
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9
and Mamou, who disagreed with the decision to join the RDA. Hence the 
two leading political formations upon the arrival of Governor Pr6 were 
the EDA and the UFG, patronising their respective deputies Sano and 
Diallo.
The administrative policy of repression was successful in fomenting 
the disintegration of the EDA in Guinea, exposition and conflict between 
the two main political groupings was encouraged by the French authori­
ties, whose preference was made abundantly clear. An example of this 
administrative pressure and its outcome was the case of Kankan, an early 
nucleus of turbulent political activity and an EDA stronghold. In 
describing the rivalry between the local subsections of the UFG and 
EDA, the Kankan Police Commissioner remarked:
The Section of the Union Franco-Guineenne has no sympathy 
for the EDA, which fights the UFG because it is aided by the 
administration and has influence over government enployees, 
who intimidate the Dioulas and merchants who are already EDA 
members, in order to force them to break ties with the EDA 
and come to the UFG. (10)
By April 1948 the bureau of the Kankan subsection was reportedly divided
into opposing factions over how to deal with the repressive situation.
On the one side, fearing persecution because participating in the bureau
was "mal. m "  (negatively seen), some members favoured the reconstitution
of the Kankan section Directing Committee of the Union Mande to treat
political questions. Bureau members of the opposing side argued that
11
this sort of reaction would serve only to further weaken the EDA. The
9
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outcome of the debate was the re-creation of the local section of the
Mande Union, and subsequent retraction of political alliance with affir-
12
nation of the ethnic basis of the association. Moreover, the EDA
subsection of Kankan was officially dissolved several weeks later; its
former members were scattered among the local sections of the Union
13
Mander AGV, and UFG. It was not long before other Guinean EDA sub­
sections followed suit, similar patterns of disintegration were being 
reported throughout the territory.
In Conakry the ethnic leaders were conspicuously absent at EDA 
meetings, and many were cancelled due to lack of audience. Whereas six 
months earlier the crowds attending EDA public meetings were estimated 
at 1,500 to 1,700, in August a scheduled meeting which attracted 15
people was postponed to a later date, when an audience of 200 was
14
present by personal invitation. September 1948 marked the lowest point 
in the history of the Guinean section of the EDA. Not only was partici­
pation insufficient to hold public meetings, it was announced that the 
treasury was empty, and membership was declining in favour of re-created 
sections of ethnic associations. The Union Mande was the first of the 
regional organisations to formally withdraw from the EDA, followed by 
the Union Forestiere and the Amicale Gilbert. Vieillard. The moment 
which clinched the downfall of the Guinean EDA was when "Mamba Sano
12
ANS 17G 573, "Reorganisation de la Section de 1'Union Mande a
Kankan," Suret£, Guinea, No. 529/184, 4 May 1948.
13
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14
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15
spectacularly resigned from the RDA." Similarly, the remaining EDA
Guinean parliamentarian, Momo Toure, renounced his membership and joined
16
the African Overseas Independent group in October 1948.
The parliamentary group known as the TnddppnH n^t-^  d '..QQ.tre-Mer (ICM) 
was launched in September 1948 by non-PDA deputies and PDA defectors 
representing the French Black African territories. Sponsored by the 
MRP, the ICM was attractive to anti-communist PDA members as well as 
disenchanted Socialists desiring African unity in the representative 
bodies. Initiated by Sourou Migan J^ pithy (ex-RDA Cameroon), seven over­
seas deputies formed the new parliamentary group. Of its West African 
National Assembly representatives, the PDA lost three (of its former 
seven) to the ICM. Leopold Senghor of Senegal resigned from the SFIO 
and later became the leader of the ICM movement. Supported by Pierre 
Coste-Floret and the colonial administration, in 1949 the ICM had 14 
deputies in the National Assembly, and therefore was entitled to full 
parliamentary representation on commissions.
Meanwhile in Guinea the administration was pleased with its success 
in breaking up the RDA, and turned its efforts toward thwarting any 
recrudescence of party influence or growth. The remaining PDA stalwarts, 
namely Madeira Keita and Sekou Toure, increased their efforts and toured 
the countryside in an attempt to regain lost support. Monitored closely 
by the authorities, the administrative reaction was the following:
15
ANSCM AP 2143/9, "Evenements de Guinee," High-Commissioner ACF to 
Minister FCM, Dakar, 14 March 1955, p. 5.
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The excessive actions of the RDA led the administration to 
strive to direct its action toward replacing elected 
officials, traditional chiefs, andCDmmandants.de. Gercle 
according to their competence, while aspiring to a moder­
ated equilibrium of stable elements in traditional rural 
society. (17)
In the same vein RDA militants in the outlying districts were
routinely transferred at the request of local authorities. In Siguiri,
for example, an African doctor by the name of Koniba Pl§ah arrived in
June 1948, having been transferred from Macenta for spreading
Communist/RDA propaganda. Pl6ah solicited support for the RDA in the
region, and after a visit from Madeira Keita in November it was decided
to form an RDA subsection in Siguiri. Upon Plfeah’s election as
Secretary-General of the local party subsection, the Commandant de.
Circle immediately petitioned his transfer from Siguiri. Pldah had been
designated to represent the Guinean section at the forthcoming RDA
congress to be held at Bobo-Dioulasso, but was denied authorisation to 
18
attend.
Strengthening Ties with the Communist Party 
From its inception the H)A suffered from its affiliation to the PCF. 
Nevertheless, growing conservatism in metropolitan politics and repres­
sive policies in the overseas territories actually contributed to the 
intensification of the relationship between the Communists and RDA 
members as "democratic forces of the opposition." Pursued and greatly 
weakened by the administration, the RDA defensively sought increased 
support and guidance from the French Communists.
In preparation for a second congress, the RDA Coordinating Commit-
17
ANSCM AP 2143/9, "Evenements de Guinde," p. 5.
18
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tee met in Dakar 2-4 October 1948, although Houphouet was unexplainably 
absentfromthe proceedings. As Vice-President in charge of organisation, 
Gabriel d'Arboussier prepared the groundwork for the meeting, as well 
as the publication which emerged from it, entitled Le Rasagrnhipmpnt 
p&mocratiqua Africain darts. la Lutte Anti-Imp&r ialiste. While most of 
the FDA parliamentarians at this time were preoccupied with repressive 
situations facing territorial sections, d'Arboussier concentrated his 
efforts in Paris and was left a relatively free hand in representing the 
movement. As a member of the Communist Party and learned in its 
doctrine, d'Arboussier used his influence and position to lead the FDA 
leftwards in orientation.
The pamphlet which emerged from the meeting of the Coordinating
Committee was blatantly Marxist in orientation, containing cited
passages from the Communist Manifesto, as well as works of Lenin and
Stalin. In his general report of the situation facing the FDA,
d'Arboussier divided the world into two opposing camps: the democratic
anti-imperialist on the one hand, and the anti-democratic imperialist on
the other. Within this Stalinist framework d'Arboussier pointed out "the
facts which brilliantly justify Marxist scientific theory," adding
19
"moreover few men today contest this evident truth." Proclaiming the 
Communist parliamentary group the "avant.zg.arde. of French democratic 
forces," the report lauded FDA affiliation to the only party that:
...never betrayed the primordial interests of the colonial
masses and oppressed people around the world. (20)
Furthermore, d'Arboussier denied that the repression of the FDA was due
19
Le. Fasspmhi ptttp nt Democrat igne Africa in dans la. lutt.e anti- 
imp6rialistef Dakar, 1948, p. 48.
20
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to its alliance with the Communist forces, claiming the persecution was 
due rather to the fundamental anticolonial position of the movement.
The resolution adopted by the Committee on 3 October 1948 reaf­
firmed the basic principles outlined in the first congress, and 
clarified the position of the RDA in the situation depicted by 
d ’Arboussier:
The Coordinating Committee notes the free choice of the canp 
in which it stands: the canp of the exploited and oppressed, 
the camp of democrats and men of progress who represent the 
future of humanity. (21)
It was then decided to convoke the second RDA congress in Bobo-Dioulasso
(Upper Volta) towards the end of December. Scheduled to immediately
precede the congress was the inauguration of an RDA professional school,
"for which the theoretical and practical formation had become necessary
22
and urgent due to the development of colonial reaction."
Present at the closing of the Coordinating Committee meeting on 4
October, PCF colonial expert Raymond Barbe was about to embark on a
propaganda tour of French Black Africa, where he was hosted by RDA
23
militants and addressed Africans at joint RDA-PCF rallies. The 
inflammatory speeches delivered at these meetings, and public displays 
of intense loyalty between the two allies, would serve as the justifica­
tion for the banning of the planned RDA congress at Bobo-Dioulasso.
It was never the intention of the Communist Party to form an
21
Ibid., p. 92.
22
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African branch of the PCFr but rather to channel all social classes in 
the overseas territories into a mass democratic movement against 
imperialism and oppression. In a circular addressed to the Groups 
d'Etudes Commnnistes dated 20 July 1948, Barb6 articulated the position 
of the PCF regarding the development of Communism in Africa. Citing 
Stalin's Goloniai ism and the National Question, it was pointed out that 
due to low levels of industrialisation, French Black Africa had not yet 
developed a proletariat, nor had the bourgeoisie split into revolution­
ary and conciliatory factions. Taking these considerations into account, 
Barbe outlined the following programme for the unification of Africans 
under the yoke of French colonialism, essentially reiterating the RDA 
platform:
1) The organisation of a union including all social classes, 
not a political party representing one or another;
2) The creation of a large mass movement which would be the 
expression of the masses and not an avant-garde political 
party; and
3) Recognition of a large autonomy in the forms of organisa­
tion and orientation of action among the diverse terri­
tories, regions and local sections of the movement. (24)
Through the influence of the local study groups, the plan was to
strengthen the alliance between the RDA and the French Communist Party.
Although the creation of an African Communist party was ruled out of the
question, Barb§ ordered increased material assistance and collaboration
of GEC militants with sectional leaders of the mass movement. Finally,
it was deemed necessary:
To improve the content and orientation of the RDA itself, on 
the one hand by the development of democratic methods in the 
organisation from the base to the summit, and on the other 
hand the practice of criticism and self-criticism through 
education.. .notably through the institution of schools under
24
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105
the direction of the Coordinating Committee of the FDA or 
its territorial sections. (25)
As aforementioned, Barb§ toured West Africa in October 1948
following the close of the FDA Coordinating Committee meeting held in
Dakar. The orations given at the joint FDA-PCF rallies consisted of
standard Communist rhetoric with the expressed support of local FDA
leaders. Excerpts from Barbe’s public address in Conakry on 16 October
illustrate the defiant tone which the administration interpreted as
serious provocation:
Comrades, one must fight, united against this pack of 
Vichyists, reactionaries, colonialists, capitalists, who 
under the direction of a certain "General de Gaulle," go by
the name FPF....It is necessary to retake your liberty, to
stop the enslaving of the people of the French Union by the
colonialists...the Communist party struggles against the
enslavement of people by other people, only the Communist 
party can give people all over the world liberty and 
happiness, treading if necessary over the bodies of de 
Gaulle supporters, colonialism and capitalism....the day is 
approaching when the Communist party will gain access to 
power and establish a true Government of Democratic Union.
It will give back the liberty of the oppressed peoples of 
Viet-Nam and Madagascar, as well as to you, African 
comrades.... (26)
Similar speeches were delivered alongside FDA militants throughout
Barbd’s mission in West Africa. In Abidjan Houphouet expounded the
thesis that the world was divided into two opposing camps— the
oppressors and the oppressed, while Barbe called for immediate action by
residents of the Enpire against the French government and its American 
27
paymaster. The final straw was the public meeting held in Bobo- 
Dioulasso on 26 October, where Houphouet was again present along with
25
Ibid., p. 8.
26
ICG b.70, EPF, "Compte-rendu de la reunion politique du Parti 
Communiste," Conakry, 16 October 1948.
27
John D. Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa, London, 1988, p. 94.
106
Ougzzin Coulibaly and members of the local FDA section. In his report
to the High-Commissioner, the Governor of Upper Volta noted:
The terms of the various speeches pronounced in the course 
of this meeting, notably those of M. Barb§, are particularly 
intolerable.
Furthermore, warning of the grave consequences of allowing such
behaviour to continue, Governor Mourages concluded:
It is in this sense that I have decided to prohibit the 
forthcoming FDA Congress, which was scheduled to take place 
in Bobo-Dioulasso. (28)
Despite protest carried all the way to the floor of the National 
Assembly, the ban on the congress at Bobo-Dioulasso was upheld. Never­
theless the FDA received authorisation to hold its second congress in 
Treichville, a suburb of Abidjan, from 2-6 January 1949.
As planned, the opening of the first H3A school preceded the 
congress. On this occasion d'Arboussier gave an extraordinary salute to 
the Communists, and thus described the orientation of the FDA "ecole- des 
cadres":
The masters are those of scientific socialism...We must move 
boldly in the direction of these masters of proletarian 
thought, who are in the vanguard of progressive humanity. We 
must move boldly towards Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin who 
is their present day brillant continuator, Stalin the indis­
putable authority on the problems of nationality and 
colonial questions which are precisely our problems and our 
key questions. (29)
In Guinea an FDA school was active sporadically, particularly in 1949
and 1950. Course subjects included national and colonial questions of
the Soviet Union, colonial oppression in political, administrative and
28
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cultural forms, the economic base of oppression and exploitation, the 
peasantry and working class as fundamental bases of the FDA, the anti­
colonial struggle and use of trade unions, and how to effectively lead a 
30
mass movement. The primary instructors of the Conakry school were
S£kou TourO, Madeira Keita, and Amarah Soumah.
The Second Inter territorial FDA Congress held at Treichville was
attended by 123 delegates representing 11 of the 14 territorial
sections, plus several hundred observers including invited guests and 
31
journalists. As at the Bamako congress, all metropolitan political and 
press representatives were from the PCF or Communist-affiliated organi­
sations. Again, the presence and influence of Barbe, "who expressed all
over Africa the readiness of his party to help us hasten our emancipa-
32
tion," was noteworthy.
In a well-organised fashion, 12 reports were presented to the
second congress, out of which eight resolutions were passed by the 
33
general assembly. The resolution on organisation clarified that al­
though elected members were to form FDA parliamentary groups within the 
metropolitan assemblies, these groups were entirely subordinate to the 
Coordinating Committee. Fepeated in the political resolution were many 
of the general themes introduced at the meeting of the Coordinating
30
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Coinmittee at Dakar. In conclusion the RDA reaffirmed its global position
and support for the "progressive forces for change":
The Congress welcomes the powerful upsurge of the democratic 
forces in the world and affirms its confidence in their 
certain victory over the forces of imperialism and war...It 
expresses its faith in the alliance of the peoples of Black 
Africa with the great people of France, which, led by its 
working class and Communist Party, is struggling with cour­
age and confidence for its national independence against 
American imperialism. (34)
Finally, a new Coordinating Committee was elected, whereby Houphouet was
reconfirmed as President of the movement, d'Arboussier was given the key
office as Political Secretary-General, and Ouezzin Coulibaly became the
35
Political Coordinator of parliamentary work.
The Ongoing Crisis in Guinea
The Guinean section of the RDA sent six official delegates to the
congress at Treichville. Returning to Conakry, the Guinean
representatives addressed a disappointingly small crowd, whose
36
enthusiasm and interest were considerably less than anticipated. 
Attendance at RDA meetings was consistently low over the next few 
months, coinciding with the resurgence of ethnic associations on the 
political scene.
In March 1949 a partial election to replace a deceased member of 
the territorial Conseil G£n6ral was held in the districts of Upper 
Guinea. Several months before, in November 1948, elections took place
34
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in the General Assembly for senators to the Conseil de. la. Republiqiie,.
whereby Fod§ Tour6 lost his second-college seat to an independent
Frenchman named Raphael Sailer. Besides being the brother of the
Governor’s Chef dp> nabinet-Sailer was overtly supported by Pre, and
allegations of administrative duplicity were rampant among the &volu£s
37
and RDA supporters. In the March election Governor Pr£ again made his
electoral preference clearly known, supporting Moustapha Ciss£ (his
alleged gardener) of the Mande Union, who was running against the RDA
activist Ray Autra. When the RDA hopeful arrived in Siguiri on a
campaign tour, the Commandanf officially forbade RDA public gatherings
throughout the district in the stated interest of maintaining public 
38
order.
The election of Cissd, notwithstanding an abstention rate greater
39
than 70 per cent, was protested by Autra for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, Autra claimed that his opponent had never even visited several 
of the electoral districts, and was virtually unknown in the areas which 
voted for him. Secondly Cissy's candidacy was ardently supported by 
administrative authorities of the different subdistricts, who had been 
suspiciously called together just prior to the polling. Thirdly, a 
postal agent attested that the following notice was circulated pertain­
ing to the campaign:
"Mr. Moustapha Ciss£ is supported by the Governor Roland 
Pr6. To vote for another candidate is a waste of time.
Woe to those who don't vote for Moustapha Ciss§." (40)
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Furthermore, Autra charged that in an attempt to re-create an atmosphere 
of terror that surrounded the incarceration of Lamine Kaba the previous 
year in the same district, a rumour that he had been arrested by armed 
guards and subsequently jailed was maliciously spread. Finally, irregu­
larities in the distribution of voting ballots, location of polling 
stations, and alleged proof of the subtraction of votes in favour of 
Autra were submitted to the High-Commissioner of West Africa to protest 
the March election.
Governor Pr6, referred to as "Roland la misere," became the direct 
target of grievances against.the administration. Deputy Diallo and the 
Guinean FDA repeatedly petitioned higher authorities for the removal of
Pr£ from office, while Barry Diawadou collaborated with the Governor
41
while receiving support from the AGV and Fouta chiefs. According to 
Madeira Keita, public declarations of Diawadou included the following 
statements:
"The FDA is fighting the politics of Governor Roland Pre. We 
are resolute in maintaining this high-ranking official and 
his Chef de. cabinet Fernand Sailer. We also have taken all 
the necessary steps to prevent the RDA leaders from holding 
their next public meeting." (42)
The Guinean section of the FDA claimed to be under threats of violence
and provocation by opposition groups sabotaging their meetings and
disrupting the peace.
Aside from the political scandals attributed to Governor Pr§, his
management of economic affairs was also considered questionable. In
41
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January 1950 deputy Diallo reported to the French Overseas Minister that
officially Guinea had accumulated a debt of 270 million francs CFA
(moreover the unofficial tally was considerably higher), and that after
a motion to censure the proceedings of the General Council sent to the
Governor had narrowly failed, the subject of economic crisis and
43
mismanagement was dropped from discussion. The deputy relayed tele­
grams he had received from Guinea relating incidents of corruption and 
waste, and called for an official investigation into these matters.
Clashes between the French administration and the FDA soon erupted 
into violent incidents in N'Z§rekor§, the Forest district bordering the 
territory of the Ivory Coast. In September 1949 a handful of RDA 
activists crossed the Ivorian border and began spreading propaganda in 
the region. Soon after their arrival a subsection of the Guinean RDA 
was constituted, which was credited with a sizeable following. 
Particularly noteworthy to the authorities was an event involving the
canton chief of Lola, who reportedly allowed the first HDA meeting in
44
his jurisdiction to take place on his veranda.
Disputes arose in the N'Z6r£kor6 marketplace over the discrepancy 
between the prices for goods sold to Europeans and Africans. The market- 
vendors claimed that foreigners demanded delivery of foodstuffs and paid 
less than market prices. The RDA propagandists pointed out the illegal­
ity of this practice and rumouredly patrolled the N fZerdkor6 market. 
The police report gave the following description of the situation:
43
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Since the installation of an EDA subsection at N'Z6r6kor£, 
incidents occur practically daily between the menbers of 
this party and the European population as well as several 
African government employees. These incidents are provoked 
by the obstruction of free trade in the public markets by 
individuals wearing an EDA insignia reading "Service 
d'Ordre.1 The local people, particularly the women, no 
longer wish to sell their merchandise except at prices fixed 
by EDA meirbers. Moreover it is inportant to specify that the 
prices fixed for the Europeans are well above those for the 
natives. (45)
Over the next few weeks a series of minor incidents leading to several
arrests unfolded in the markets of Lola. The culmination of events was a
inarch of 300 protesters from Lola to administrative headquarters at
N'Z6rekor£, whereupon the military was called in to disperse the crow3
46
and 23 additional agitators were detained.
Investigations of the troubles in N'Zerekorfe were commissioned by 
both Governor Pr§ and EDA-Guinea President Keita. The incident behind 
the protest involved the chief of Lola; however, the explanations pro­
vided by the FDA and the administration differed considerably. According 
to the EDA the Lola chief convened a meeting and announced that he was 
under administrative orders to furnish a list of IDA members in his
subdistrict, and upon resistance the chief reported to the authorities
47
that he had been attacked by three EDA men present at the gathering.
The account furnished by the administration supported the chief's claim
48
of assault, thus justifying the arrest of the three men cited. Despite
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different interpretations, the outcome of both scenarios was a march
instigated by local EDA sympathisers in protest against these arrests.
Recommendations of the administrative investigation were far-
reaching both in inparting much of the blame to the European
authorities, and in outlining ways to redress the situation. The report,
for exanple, carried this description of the administrative personnel:
None of them acted either with insight or professional 
awareness, nor did they act to annihilate, when there was 
still time, the action of the RDA. Not a single pertinent 
measure was taken by them to restrain the coirbativeness of 
the leaders of this party through repression when committing 
offences. (49)
Included in the recommendations were the dismissal of the native chief
of Lola as well as several village chiefs and prison guards, the
transfer of two H)A militants, and judicial prosecution of the EDA on at
least four separate charges. The report concluded, in a hopeful manner,
that peace would continue as long as the administrative personnel "give
everyone the impression of leaving no stone unturned in the destruction 
50
of the EDA."
Autra stayed on in N'Zerekor6 several weeks after calm had been
51
restored, and registered over 4,000 new adherents to the EDA. Follow­
ing his request for a gathering on 20 November, however, the Commandant
de. Cercle proclaimed public meetings prohibited in the period 19
52
November to 19 December. To ensure continued EDA suppression, Governor
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Pr6 relieved the N ’Zdr6kor£ Commandant of his duties and vowed to keep
53
the district under close surveillance.
Apart from N'Z§r£kord the only other budding subsection of the
Guinean FDA, towards the end of 1949, was the reconstituted party in
Kankan. While FDA activists were succeeding in N'Z£r6kord, Guinean
propagandists were also gaining positive results in Kankan, re-enlisting
54
former party members who had deserted the movement the previous year.
In one week more than 800 FDA membership cards were distributed; the
popularity of the movement soon soared when two sons of Kankan's
55
religious leader joined the party. The euphoria surrounding the rapid
growth of the FDA was short-lived, however, when the following occurred:
The Grand Ch&rif, skilfully advised, declared himself 
hostile to the FDA movement and requested that his sons 
offer their resignations; they promptly complied. The same 
day at prayers, the Cherif advised his followers to stay 
outside of political struggles and declared that the FDA is 
anti-Muslim. The Chferif's intervention rapidly bore fruit; 
the progress of the FDA is halted; several resignations are 
registered. (56)
The local FDA president alerted Autra to the impending disaster, 
asking for instructions. En route from N'Zer^kore, Autra spent a week in 
Kankan, hoping to give a new impetus to the local H)A. Despite his 
efforts and a population generally sympathetic to the underlying princi­
ples of the movement, administrative intervention and pressure
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effectively nipped the growth of the party. Before the close of 1949 the
French authorities had not only transferred Moricandian Savane, the
Secretary-General and "true animator" of the Kankan party, to Mali (a
desolate Northern district in Guinea), but had also secured the resigna-
57
tion of the subsection President. Thus the Guinean section of the EDA 
found itself again in a formidable situation, its every move checked by 
the administration, its leaders working in fear of personal repercus­
sions, as illustrated in the 1949 annual report:
By the end of 1949 the FDA is no more than an opposition 
party abandoned by the large majority of its troops, 
officially comprised of only two subsections, N'Z§r§kor6 and 
Kankan. Its financial means do not permit it to lead an 
effective propaganda campaign. It has been purged, and 
become more and more closed. It seems that the leaders have 
been requested not to attract attention to themselves. (58)
The precarious predicament of the Guinean IDA at this time was due
in part to the consolidation of its competition. Created in July 1949,
the Comit£ d Guineenne (CFG) represented a united front of the
four leading ethnic associations in opposition to the IDA. Conprised of
the tin i on Mand&, Amicale Gilbert Vied Hard f Uni,on Forestiere, and Comitfe
de. Renovation de. Basse-Guin6e , the stated purpose behind the merger was
"to combat the demagogues throughout the territory and the enemy
59
agitators of peace, social order, and progress."
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Coming to the aid of the Guinean EDA, d'Arboussier arrived in
Conakry in Deceirber 1949 to lead a defiant stand against administrative
intimidation and threatened violence by political opponents. The RDA
Political Secretary-General chided the Guinean section for lagging far
60
behind the other territories due to its lack of union. The ethnic
organisations' plans to sabotage the public speeches of d'Arboussier
61
were known in advance by the security police as well as the HD A.
Unmoved by harassment and continuous surveillance, during his visit
d'Arboussier spoke to crowis of over 1,000 spectators, registered new
adherents to the movement, and constituted a women's branch of the 
62
Guinean HD A.
Following d'Arboussier's visit, EDA Political Coordinator Coulibaly
eirbarked on a Guinean tour, and was present alongside Autra at a
congress of the union Forest-i&rp held in Macenta. During this congress
Autra was arrested and indicted on charges of fraud emanating from
63
Conakry, and sentenced to two years in prison. Furthermore a local
decree of 7 February 1950 prohibited RDA meetings in the territory of
French Guinea. A dispute arose immediately over the legality of such a
64
measure, and subsequently the decree was annulled on 26 March.
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The ban on RDA meetings was scrupulously upheld throughout the
territory, the lifting of which fostered a reorganisation of party
subsections and the development of a new plan of action. At the request
of the Guinean section, eight RDA propagandists were borrowed from the
Ivory Coast to work with subsections in Upper Guinea and the Forest 
65
region. Missions were sent out by the Directing Committee in order to 
determine regional strategies taking account of local considerations.
An inportant aspect of the campaign to spread the word and solicit, 
support for the movement was the reappearance of an RDA-Guinean news­
paper entitled Coup de. Barcbou (Banboo Stroke) . The former monthly 
newspaper Phar^ do Ginn&e, under the direction of Mamba Sano, survived 
nine months before folding in June 1948 due to administrative pressure, 
financial constraints, and the breaking up of the party. It was not 
until April 1950 that the Guinean section launched its replacement, the 
steady appearance of which was a mere two months and resulted in serious 
trouble for the Guinean RDA. The title Coup de. Bamboo., introduced by a
poem in the first edition of the newspaper, signified the RDA striking
66
the final blow to colonialism. Fervently pro-Communist and anti­
colonial, the paper was soon besieged with lawsuits, the first three of
which cost the RDA 300,000 francs CFA and a three month (suspended)
67
prison sentence for its Director, Madeira Keita.
The militancy encouraged by d'Arboussier was taking effect in 
Guinea, where the RDA section entered its most defiant stage in opposi­
tion to the colonial government. While in Paris the RDA representatives
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were reconsidering their relationship with the Communists and indeed 
negotiating a shift in alliance, in Guinea the FDA was publicly 
reaffirming its devotion to the Communist Party and affiliated organisa­
tions. In April 1950 Madeira Keita had the following to say about the 
rapport between the FDA and the PCF:
It is a total alliance of your leaders for the struggle 
against the colonialists, the exploiters, the blood-suckers; 
as you see we have chosen the clan of Stalin, Ho-Chi-Minh,
Mao Tse-Tung; it is the clan which tomorrow will be victor­
ious, the FDA is an offshoot of the French Communist Party.
(68)
The Growing Impact of Trade Unions 
Although the French administration in Guinea effectively managed to 
subdue nascent nationalist aspirations of indigenous political organisa­
tions, it was far less successful at keeping the labour movement in 
check. Governor Pr& was aware of the potential problems of burgeoning 
trade unionism in Guinea, as he signalled in the 1947 annual political 
report:
It cannot be hidden that the trade union issue is one of the 
factors most likely to disturb the tranquillity of the 
territory. If not attended to, the situation risks becoming 
very dangerous. The Metropole is, in large part, responsible 
for this state of affairs. The inconsistent policies of the 
Government vis a vis inflation, and strikes that are being 
launched at an accelerated pace, have the most troublesome 
effects. (69)
When the decree authorising trade unions in the West African 
Federation was promulgated in 1944, the Guinean labour movement was 
small and inconsequential. Led by S£kou Tour£, the postal workers were 
the first African wage earners in the territory to organise. Railroad 
and other public sector employees followed suit, and shortly thereafter
68
ANS 17G 573, "Compte-Rendu de la Reunion FDA," Services de Police, 
Guinea, No. 422/228, 7 May 1950.
69
"Rapport Politique Annde 1947," Guinea, p. IV.
119
these budding unions were united under the aegis of the metropolitan 
CGT. Economic development and plans for industrialisation of the colony 
helped spur the growth of unionism. By 1950 administrative surveys 
revealed that French Guinea encompassed the greatest repository of 
natural resources in West Africa, and major projects involving iron ore 
and bauxite were already in progress.70
Grievances with regards to working conditions, pay scales, family 
allowances, accident compensation, paid vacations, and discrepancies of 
pay and opportunities between European and African labourers were 
sources of union activity and numerous strikes. While the French 
parliament painstakingly studied a uniform employment code for the 
overseas territories, the indigenous labour force grew increasingly 
intolerant and, with the support of the union movement, pressed for 
local reforms. At this time gubernatorial powers included the setting 
of the territorial minimum wage by decree. In Guinea, the culmination of 
grievances and repeated dissatisfaction over the gap between labour 
requests and administrative concessions resulted in a paralysing two-day 
general strike in June 1950.
The unquestioned leader of Guinean organised labour was S6kou
71
Tourd. A young man with only a primary school education, in 1945 Tour6
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was working as an assistant in the postal service when he founded the
first trade union in Guinea. In 1948 Tour6 was appointed Secretary-
General of the Guinean branch of the CGT, and two years later Secretary-
General of the Coordinating Committee of CGT unions for French West
Africa and Togo. More than from his political endeavours in support of
the RDA, Toure became involved with metropolitan politics and the Commu-
72
nists primarily as an African union activist.
In contrast to the ongoing bitter struggle amongst Guinean politi­
cal parties, competing trade unions in the territory often combined in 
protest and in action, thereby strengthening their position vis a vis 
the administration. Addressing a large gathering of union representa­
tives in May 1950, Tour£ boldly announced that the battle for wages had
begun, and threatened that if the Governor did not comply with their
73
demands a strike would be called. Once it became clear that the
administration was unwilling to raise the minimum wage to the amount
requested by the unionists, preparations were quickly underway to
sustain an all-out strike. The local H3A helped spread the word, and
women were the first to respond in stocking provisions in order not to
leave their households for several days. Moreover it was rumoured that
the success of this strike, and the measures taken by Tour§, would
74
ensure the departure of the "heinous" Governor.
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The strike of 9-10 June, although instigated by wage earners in the
public sector, soon spread into private employment including domestic
servants. The administration conceded that the union action crippled
economic life in Conakry, and as a result granted more than a 20 per
75
cent increase in wages. The process of negotiation was far from 
smooth, however, as the six members of the strike committee were 
imprisoned. Reaction was swift in massive protest against the arrests of 
the union leaders, particularly that of Tour6, on whose behalf it was 
threatened:
Touch one hair of our friend, and you'll raise up in unison 
all the workers not only of Conakry, but of all of Guinea.
(76)
Amidst the uproar and impending endangerment of public order, Governor
Pre was compelled to release the prisoners on suspended sentences with
77
accompanying fines after just three days.
Surviving under Siege and the First FDA-Guinea Party Congress
In the wake of the June strike and the fear which it instilled in the 
French officials, a series of reprisals was aimed at local political 
leaders, particularly of the RDA. The administration specifically 
targeted members of the RDA-Guinea Directing Committee, pursuing them 
with lawsuits, dismissals from public service, and transferrals both 
within and out of the territory. The RDA prepared itself for the worst, 
drawing up contingency plans in anticipation of the removal and 
dispersal of its chief activists.
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As Secretary-General of the Party and Director of its publication,
Madeira Keita was boirbarded with lawsuits and petitions filed by the
local admin i str at ion requesting his arrest. For a long time the
authorities had kept a close surveillance on the PDA leader, and wanted
to dispose of this "dangerous person" who in 1948 was thus portrayed:
Very intelligent, subtle and ardent subscriber to Communist 
doctrine, Madeira is irrefutably the soul and brains of the 
group, and it seems certain that if he were transferred to 
another territory in the Federation after his holiday, the 
FDA would not easily find in Guinea an animator and coordi­
nator likely to equal him. (78)
The motion to transfer Keita was stalled by the Dakar office, however,
and consequently the territorial administration pursued him via other
legal measures. The attempt to condemn Keita for the incidents at
N'Z6r6kore was also dropped by the higher authorities; nevertheless, a
plethora of local lawsuits led the populace to expect a firm prison
79
sentence for their eminent leader.
In the event of his likely internment Keita proposed a division of
responsibilities and territorial regions among the remaining loyalists,
80
and allegedly designated S£kou Toure as his would-be replacement.
Furthermore the party archives and materials were reportedly trans-
81
ferred from Keita!s residence to that of Tour6. To the general 
surprise of everyone concerned, Keita was handed only suspended
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sentences and heavy fines for the numerous complaints brought before the
Conakry tribunal. The FDA leader's victory was short-lived, however, as
transfer orders were issued for him to leave Guinea and report to 
82
Dakar.
Autra was the first member of the Directing Committee to be
transferred to a distant region within Guinea, followed by Ibrahima
83
Diane and Moussa Diakit§. Finally Sekou Tour£ was arbitrarily "put at
the disposition of the Governor of Niger," (i.e. transferred to the
84
least politically active colony in AOF). Besought by the party members 
and Directing Committee, both Keita and Toure decided to resign from 
their posts in the colonial service rather than leave the territory.
The administrative shake-up of the Guinean FDA served as the
impetus for the calling of the party's first Territorial Congress. Held 
in Conakry from 15 to 18 October 1950, the main focus of the first 
congress was internal organisation. In his general, report to the
assembly Keita acknowledged the fundamental weaknesses of the party, 
among which:
CXir grass roots formations function intermittently. They 
have almost no connections with the central Committee; their 
leaders, despite their courage, good will, and devotion, are 
inactive due to lack of experience and know-how; the organi­
sations rapidly become inert before disappearing completely.
(85)
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The party leaders conplained that the regional representatives depended
on the central committee to "do all the work and smooth over all the
difficulties," and again that such action was sporadic and 
86
inconsistent. It was decided that the task of the future was to foster 
direct and sustained contact with the masses, the aim of which was to 
educate, organise, and lead them in the struggle against oppression and 
the evils of colonialism. Furthermore, it was deemed imperative to reach 
out to the incipient African middle class, namely the merchants, 
artisans, transporters, planters, and former military servicemen. 
Likewise the potential boost to the movement via the organisation of 
women and youth branches was considered an essential coirponent of the 
development plan. Lastly, in recognition of mutual interests and common 
pursuits, ties were to be strengthened between the party and the trade 
union movement.
The political resolution emanating from the first Territorial
Congress echoed that of the FDA second congress in its choice of siding
with the camp of the oppressed, fighting colonialism and imperialism in
87
the struggle for world peace. Similarly the resolution denounced 
exploitative capitalism, the war in Viet-Nam, American intervention 
world wide, and the onslaught of the impending third World War. Besides 
calling for equal rights and voting privileges among Europeans and 
Africans, the Guinean resolution added an appeal for the democratisation 
of the chieftaincy with free elections— an issue that was to become 
increasingly integral to the party platform.
_
Ibid., p. 9.
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The final order of business at the congress was the designation of 
a proper name to the territorial section of the RDA. Officially recorded 
on 24 October 1950, the FDA-Guinea chapter became the Parti Democrat igue 
da Guin6e (PDG). The pomp and circumstance, however, was minimal, as the 
future of the party looked quite bleak. By this time virtually all of 
the leaders of the Guinean EDA, including Madeira Keita, Sekou Tour6, 
Diallo Saifoulaye, and Ray Autra, had received orders to leave the 
territory; refusal to comply foreshadowed intensified repression as well 
as personal and economic hardship. Other party militants were 
transferred to remote areas within Guinea, and most were either facing 
charges or had already been imprisioned at one time or another. The 
situation would be aggravated further before either the FDA or the 
French administration recognised the necessity to seek peaceful co­
existence and progressive reform.
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CHAPTER XV
Tactical Retreat and Reconciliation Under Threat of Dissolution
The height of the conflict between the FDA and the French authorities 
was reached in 1950, when violent clashes were erupting almost daily in 
the West African territories, and the movement was faced with the pros­
pect of being either outlawed by the National Government, or brutally
believing themselves
crushed by local officials. Hard-line administrators ,/\justified in their 
struggle against world Communism, embarked on a ruthless campaign to 
suppress the RDA in Africa. Resultingly, elements of repression, fear, 
and pragmatism all contributed to the re-evaluation of RDA strategy and 
tactics by its leaders in parliament.
Reconsideration of the association and parliamentary alliance with 
the Communist Party, coupled with new opportunities arising out of a 
significant change in government, prompted the RDA formally to disaffil­
iate from the PCF and at the same time seek reconciliation with its 
former opponents— both the French government and non-RDA African repre­
sentatives of diverse political associations. Despite negotiation 
attempts on numerous fronts, suspicion and rivalry clouded the process, 
ending in only partial success at rapprochement. Nevertheless, the RDA 
survived this difficult period; its new orientation effectively assured 
its future, and collaboration with the government instilled hope of 
legislative reform and progress for French West Africa.
Incidents Engulfing the RDA
Birthplace and centre of RDA activity, the Ivory Coast was the main 
arena where the occurrence and severity of political disturbances
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intensified throughout 1949 and early 1950, culminating in the attempted
arrest of FDA President Houphouet-Boigny and the banning of PDA meetings
in Africa. It appeared that the Governor sent to repress the PDA in the
Ivory Coast was not producing results quickly enough to suit Overseas
Minister Paul Coste-Floret, and consequently was replaced by the staunch
1
anti-Communist Laurent P^choux in November 1948. P^choux was given
orders to break up the legal and educational systems instituted by the
Parti DSmocratiqiie da la Cote d 'Ivoire (PDCI), and to re-establish the
pre-eminence of French authority over the considerable power wielded by 
2
Houphouet. The first step in weakening the deputy's personal fiefdom
3
was the detachment of the Upper Volta territory in 1948; elections in 
June resulted in suspect victories for anti-PDA candidates backed by the 
admin is trat ion.
In supporting PDA opponents, and pressuring members to resign from 
the movement, the local authorities often prompted public disturbances 
and added to the violent nature of the clashes that ensued. Moreover 
Houphouet loyalists in his home territory were quick to defend their 
leader; provoking them proved an easy means to justify calling in 
government troops to restore the peace and jail PDA agitators.
1
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The territory of Upper Volta had been divided among Niger, Soudan, 
and the Ivory Coast in 1933. The Northern districts of the Ivory Coast 
reattached to the Upper Volta were responsible for the election of 
native Ouezzin Coulibaly, IDA strongman and close personal friend of 
Houphouet, as deputy to the National Assembly in 1946.
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Real trouble in the Ivory Coast began when a co-founder of the
RDA-PCDI, Etienne Djaument, lost his re-nomination to the Council of the 
Republic in Noveirber 1948. Incensed at Houphouet and prodded by the 
administration, Djaument resigned from the PDCI, announced the formation 
of an opposition party, and proceeded to publicly insult the PDA
President. The scheduled birthplace of the new party was Treichville—  
site of the PDA congress just one month prior— the choice of which 
greatly disturbed the PDA leaders, who interpreted the move as
antagonistic. Houphouet and his supporters were present to hear 
Djaument's diatribe; their • loud protests effectively drowned out the 
speaker, who was subsequently forced to adjourn the meeting. On 6
February the attempt, to found the party was again thwarted when RDA 
officials notified the police that their opponents were armed and 
preparing a showdown. Although police intervention staved off a serious 
incident in the meeting hall, riots broke out that afternoon when angry 
mobs stormed the homes of those opposed to the PDA, ending in bloodshed 
and 46 arrests. Three days later eight members of the PDCI Directing 
Committee (those not protected by parliamentary immunity) were arrested; 
administrators gloated at their success in bringing about the downfall 
of the local RDA.
Facing a serious setback the RDA altered its tactics and strategy, 
but boldly continued the fight against administrative repression. In 
protest against ten months imprisonment without trial PDCI leaders began 
a hunger strike on 12 December 1949. In a remarkable show of solidarity 
a boycott of European goods was called in Abidjan in support of the 
detainees, followed by mass demonstrations, a women's march on the
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4
prison, and strikes by domestic servants.
Incidents multiplied and spread into the Ivory Coast countryside. 
On 22 January three Africans were reported killed in Bouafl£, a town in 
close proximity to Houphouet's home village of Yamoussoukro. The PDA 
President, arriving at the scene of the crime to launch an investiga­
tion, was surrounded by crowds of supporters and visited by local RDA 
leaders, including Zoro Bi Tra who was wanted by the police. At that 
moment Houphouet could have been legally arrested for harbouring a
fugitive, his parliamentary immunity lifted for being caught in the act
5
of committing a crime. Nevertheless it was several days later that a
warrant was issued for Houphouet's arrest; the military arrived at his
home in Yammassoukro during the night of 25-26 January to take him into
custody. Sent away by the watchman, the following day police again
tried to apprehend the RDA leader, whereupon Houphouet, refusing the
military escort, sent a message to the Public Prosecutor warning against
the probable ramifications of his arrest, and agreeing to attend the 
6
summons. Meanwhile the news of the attempt to arrest Houphouet incited
thousands of his supporters to march on Yamassoukro, blocking all the 
7
roads for miles. Ouezzin Coulibaly and Gabriel d'Arboussier were 
immediately dispatched from Yammassoukro to meet the Prosecutor in the
4
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place of Houphouet. Having failed to convince the official to drop the
charges against their leader, the two men telexed lawyers in Dakar to
appeal to the federal Attorney-General on Houphouet's behalf. Once
informed about the situation and impending consequences of such an
action, the Prnnnmir ft£n£ral promptly nullified the warrant issued by
8
the Ivory Coast Prosecutor.
Still all was not calm in the territory. Houphouet had sent a
letter to the Prosecutor of Bouafl6 with Victor Biaka Boda— the RDA
senator who had succeeded Djaument— who never reached his destination.
Mysterious circumstances surrounded the disappearance of Senator Boda,
whose remains were found six months later scattered in a wooded area off
the road on which he was travelling. The tense atmosphere pervading the
territory following news of Houphouet's abortive arrest erupted in a
series of clashes between his supporters and government forces. The
climax of these events occurred on 29 January in Dimbokro, when troops
opened fire on a mass of armed protesters, killing 15 and wounding 38
Africans (official figures).
The toll of Africans killed in this wave of incidents surpassed
fifty by January 1950, in addition to over 3,000 jailed in connection
with the violence, protests, boycotts, and strikes largely attributed to 
9
RDA activity. In February the Council of Ministers banned RDA meetings 
throughout Africa. Furthermore the National Assembly sent a Commission 
of Inquiry to the Ivory Coast, and Overseas Minister Jean Letourneau and 
High-Commissioner Paul B^chard personally toured AGP on fact-finding
G. Chaffard, Lee Carnoi-n Secrets, vol. 1, p. 116.
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10
missions. In the meantime Governor Pechoux began petitioning the 
French government, first to dissolve the PDCI, and subsequently the 
entire PDA organisation.
The Proposed Dissolution of the PDA
In mid-February 1950 the Ivory Coast Governor sent a telegram
requesting that the PDCI be banned by a decree from the Council of
11
Ministers, citing the law of 10 January 1936. In response to his 
demand Governor Pechoux was asked to submit to the National Government a 
formal proposition, along with a detailed account of the circumstances 
justifying such an extreme measure. High-Commissioner Bechard, in 
coirplete support of P§choux's initiative, furnished a report of his own 
outlining the illegal activities of the party, including:
1) Superimposing its authority over that of the administra­
tion;
2) Spreading propaganda against the administration and the 
traditional chiefs;
3} Imposing its own police force;
4) Controlling the markets and instigating related boycotts 
and strikes;
5) Sabotaging the public meetings of opposition parties; and
6) Provoking violent incidents. (12)
The High-Commissioner reasoned that the territory had "suffered too much 
from the virtual dictator that had been imposed upon it," and 
consequently "only a radical measure could, in destroying his legend of
10
The ban on PDA meetings, its issuance more significant that its 
actual application, was rescinded in early April. The Commission's find­
ings, though never officially discussed in parliament, were published in 
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13
invincibility, restore the peace in the Ivory Coast."
The detailed analysis submitted by Governor Pechoux focused on the 
viability of invoking the law of 10 January 1936 to formally outlaw the 
IDA. The law stipulated that associations or groups could be dissolved 
by the President of the Republic in accordance with the Council of 
Ministers, if found guilty on one of the following counts:
1) Provoking armed political demonstrations in the streets;
2) Constituting, in characteristic form or military organi­
sation, combat groups or private militias; or
3) Having the goal of interfering with the integrity of the 
National Territory or attempting the use of force to 
challenge the Republican form of government. (14)
Acknowledging that the third case would be inappropriate, whereas proof
of the second was sketchy and incomplete, Pechoux based his proposition
on the first case scenario to justify the formal dissolution of the FDA.
The Governor argued that the political demonstrations— provoked by the
party leaders, public, and armed in nature— fulfilled the necessary
conditions as required by the law. Furthermore, Pechoux explained that
now was the opportune time to dissolve the movement, the February ban on
FDA meetings in Africa having served as a transitional period allowing
for serious consideration and final judgement. Lastly, urging the
suppression of the entire movement rather than solely the PDCI, Pechoux
concluded j
To cut down the tree, one must attack the trunk. The trunk 
being the Ivory Coast, I am left with the hope that the 
other Territories which have secondary branches will not 
voice opposition to a necessary local decision (sic). (15)
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In his last remark the Governor was referring to an inquiry of 
administrative opinion already underway, concerning the dissolution of 
the RDA in the Federation of West Africa. Telegrams were sent to the 
territorial capitals soliciting viewpoints of local officials and esti­
mations of potential repercussions if such a measure were imposed. 
Overall the responses were favourable to the banning of the PDA, 
although several Governors failed to see the absolute necessity of a 
federal injunction. Governor Pechoux hence stepped up his campaign for 
the complete suppression of the movement, stressing that a number of its 
leaders were members of the umbrella organisation and not the Ivory
Coast branch, and pointing out that if just the PDCI was dissolved, then
16
its membership cards could simply be replaced by those of the PDA. The 
sole objection to the outlawing of the party came from Dakar, whence the 
Governor wrote:
The dissolution of the RDA for the entirety of AQF seems 
inopportune. It does not respond to our local necessities 
and will be on the whole poorly received. (17)
The reply from Bamako also signalled that such a move might result in a
malaise social, however the Soudan Governor noted that it would be a
good blow to the PDA. Governor Pr£ of Guinea alluded to potential
problems in the Forest region, but nonetheless professed "general satis-
18
faction and assured calm."
As aforementioned, the French Overseas Minister embarked on a tour
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of West Africa following the gravest of the Ivory Coast incidents. The
information gathered by Minister Letourneau in AOF and later in Paris
apparently convinced him that it would be unwise to altogether outlaw 
19
the EDA. Indeed while official activities in the territories clearly 
illustrated the continued repression of the organisation, dealings in 
Paris between the National Government and the EDA gradually led to a 
shift in respective attitudes and policies, thus opening the door to a 
general reconciliation.
Negotiations in Progress
The leadership of the RDA was -well aware that the organisation's pending 
dissolution was in consequence of both its opposition to the French 
government, and affiliation to the Communist Party. Administrators in 
West Africa repeatedly drew attention to Communist support of the RDA in 
their attempt to have the movement outlawed. Despite the fact that not 
one European was killed, the incidents in the overseas territories were 
branded by local authorities as part of an anti-French rebellion insti­
gated predominantly by the RDA. The escalating violence, as well as 
genuine threats of inprisonment or assassination of activists, compelled 
IDA leaders to re-evaluate party platform and strategy. Undoubtedly the 
events which occurred in Madagascar in 1947— when the parliamentary 
immunity of one deputy was lifted in Paris while the other two were 
arrested in the territory, and repression of an "anti-French" revolt
ending in the deaths of 90,000 Malgash— weighed heavily on the minds of
20
RDA representatives in the metropole.
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EDA reactions to the ban on their meetings in Africa/ and the
proposition of dissolution, varied among the territories and their
respective leaders, the result of which was internal dissension and
divergent opinions concerning the organisation's future course of
action. While some EDA activists favoured military preparedness and
strengthened ties with the world's "democratic1 (i.e. Communist) forces,
others preferred negotiation and were hopeful of bettering relations
with the French government and non-EDA African political groupings.
D'Arboussier led the more militant faction of the EDA, calling for
clandestine activity and reaffirmation of the alliance with the PCF.
Eeportedly d'Arboussier went so far as to notify the EDA section leaders
that they could count on the eventual support of Eussia in their
21
struggle against imperialism and oppression. On the contrary,
pragmatic Houphouet and his loyal followers contemplated a shift in
policy that would effectively terminate the violence and repression,
without altering the goals of the EDA.
In April 1950 an EDA delegation, headed by Houphouet, was present
at the Twelfth Congress of the French Communist Party. Members of the
delegation recognised that the closing of the congress signalled the end
of a period of EDA history? it was hence just a matter of time before
22
the African movement would leave the Communists altogether.
The first step in breaking with the PCF was to evict d'Arboussier 
from the influential office of EDA Secretary-General. Claiming the move
21
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to be a necessary "tactical retreat," EDA parliamentarians asked
23
d'Arboussier in June to give up his post. Reassured that the gesture 
was purely symbolic and the movement would retain confidence in him, 
d'Arboussier duly submitted his resignation to the EDA Coordinating 
Committee on 7 July 1950.
The removal of d'Arboussier from office was seen as a necessary 
step towards African unity and reconciliation of formerly opposed 
parliamentary groups, namely the EDA and the ICM. Beginning in June, 
Houphouet initiated discussions of rapprochement with Raphael Sailer, 
who at the time was senator from Guinea and Secretary of the ICM parlia­
mentary group. The following month the French government fell, ending 
two years of MRP domination and bringing the Socialists back into 
office. The investiture of the new government, headed by Rene Pleven 
with Frangois Mitterrand as Overseas Minister, was welcomed with 
enthusiasm by overseas representatives and, consequently, negotiations 
between the EDA and both the ICM and French national government ensued.
Benefiting from the slightly more liberal political atmosphere. 
Sailer intensified his efforts to facilitate a reconciliation between 
the EDA and the French government. In this vein the ICM Secretary 
approached Governor Paul-Henri Siriex, who was then serving as advisor
to the Prime Minister on affairs concerning the overseas territories,
24
requesting that he serve as intermediary between Houphouet and Pleven. 
Siriex accepted the role of liaison and scheduled a meeting between the 
two parties in late August. The encounter was a great success, after
R. Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties, p. 98.
24
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which Pl6ven instructed his Overseas Minister to cultivate the new 
relationship and subsequently adjust administrative policy pertaining to 
the FDA.
Meanwhile negotiations for unification continued between the RDA
and IOM, culminating in a provisory accord signed on 9 August 1950.
Signatories of the agreement included President Aujoulat, Sailer,
Senghor, Zinsou, and Momo Tour6 of the ICM, and Houphouet, Coulibaly,
and Hamani Diori of the RDA. An explicit stipulation of the protocol,
and pre-condition of future negotiation, however, was the disaffiliation
25
of the RDA from the Communist Party. Thus in the light of improved
relations with the French government, as well as positive steps taken
down the road to African unity, the leadership of the RDA felt the time
towas ripe formally sever all ties between their organisation and theA
French Communists.
"l£. D&gapparentenant-1
Reunited in Paris prior to the opening of the new session, the RDA
parliamentarians unanimously decided to terminate the movement's
political alliance with the Communist bloc. On 18 October 1950 the
following communique was released to the press:
The RDA members of the various metropolitan assemblies, 
recognising that common action among all the elected repre­
sentatives of the overseas territories, in favour of a 
precise programme, provides the best formula for defending 
the higher interests of Africa, . decide to disaffiliate from 
the metropolitan parliamentary groups to which they were 
affiliated until this date, in order to achieve the goal of 
unity. (26)
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In announcing this decision to the Communist delegation, Houphouet 
recounted briefly the history of the EDA, its creation at Bamako in 
1946, and the formative political resolution which defined the movement 
as a rasaeirblement of all African social classes in the struggle against 
oppression and application of the reforms granted in the Constitution. 
Moreover, Houphouet continued, the ousting of the Communists from power 
in 1947, forcing them into the opposition, furnished a pretext for the 
suppression of the EDA by the colonial authorities. Consequently, to 
avoid the impending demolition of the "first and only mass movement in 
black Africa," the removal of the pretext (i.e. Communist affiliation) 
became a tactical necessity.
Apart from the administrative angle of the decision to break with 
the Communists, were two key elements of the movement that, having been 
somewhat side-lined, were brought again to the forefront, namely "mass" 
and "African." As depicted in its original statutes, the EDA was a 
movement independent of philosophical or religious convictions, 
irrespective of ethnic or class distinctions. Early instructions 
emanating from the Coordinating Committee strictly forbade the imposi­
tion of any leader's ideology on an EDA territorial section. In any 
case, following disaffiliation, Houphouet repeatedly insisted that:
We have never shared the Communist ideology; not one of us 
has preached in Africa the theories of the class struggle, 
division of land, etc. (27)
In the Constituent Assemblies the Africans were too small 
numerically to form their own parliamentary group, therefore affiliation 
to metropolitan parties was unavoidable. Not only were the Communists 
—
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in their heyday of political might, but they also seemingly supported
the African causes; therefore joining the Leftist bloc seemed entirely a
propos. In short, allying with the Communists was seen as simply a
means to a jointly desired end, but as Houphouet later professed: "a man
28
dies for a goal, for an ideal, but not for a means."
Conflict arose within the ranks of the FDA leadership when the
ideological convictions of a few were seen as interfering with the
party's relationship with the African masses. First of all, due to
Communist influence, the founding congress of the FDA had been boycotted
by prominent African (Socialist) deputies. Secondly, desertions
attributed to the non-observance of the Bamako goals and to the
Comnunist aura surrounding the organisation soon multiplied, including
parliamentarians Apithy, Aku, and Sano who were among the initiators of
the ICM in 1948. Thirdly, propaganda spread by the administration and
opposition parties labelled the FDA as Communist inspired and
controlled, effectively deterring prospective members from joining the
movement, as well as contributing to the campaign of repression.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ideological tendencies were
creating rifts and opposing factions within the FDA leadership, and
alienating the masses from the central organisation of the party. Dating
from the administrative policy to suppress the FDA, the widening gap
between the party officials and the African population was explained in
the following manner:
During this time, the intellectuals and the leaders direct­
ing the FDA reacted in their own ways, courageously, to the 
repression. They confronted the administrators, magistrates, 
and police. But their mentality was already different than 
__
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that of the militant masses. Established, perhaps even 
unconsciously, in a philosophy of "self--consciousness," they 
let themselves be won over by Communist ideology....Thus 
over these years, in the heat of admirable and exalting 
action, a cleavage separated the intellectuals and the 
leaders of the movement, from the hundreds of thousands of 
members at the base....The principal steps of this tragic 
misunderstanding were the meeting of the Coordinating 
Committee held in Dakar in 1948 and the second EDA Congress 
held at Treicheville from 1-6 January 1949. (29)
The work of d'Arboussier, along with his personal convictions, made
him an easy target as scapegoat for the organisation's decline.
Although d'Arboussier contributed to the drafting of the announcement of
disaffiliation from the Communist Party, at the last minute he reported-
30
ly failed to sign it over a procedural matter. This incident sparked a
well-publicised feud between Houphouet and d'Arboussier, culminating in
31
the latter's exclusion from the FDA in July 1952. In published
letters both men hurled accusations and blamed one another for EDA
shortcomings, exposing a clearly inplacable rivalry. D'Arboussier
pointed out that neither his resignation, nor the proposition to
terminate the alliance with the Communists, were officially decided upon
by the Coordinating Committee. This intentional oversight, according to
d'Arboussier, rendered both actions illegal, necessitating the convoca-
32
tion of the "supreme directing organ" of the movement. Although 
reguests to this effect were frequently transmitted, in fact the 
Coordinating Committee did not formally meet from 1950 to 1955; its
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tasks were essentially taken over by the EDA parliamentary group.
In turn Houphouet reviled d'Arboussier for his personal greed, lust
for power, and attempt to divert the direction of the movement in favour
of inappropriate Communist aspirations. The RDA second congress, single-
handedly prepared by d'Arboussier, was branded a "deviation" from the
organisation founded at Bamako. Finally, after directly associating the
Communist tendency within the RDA to the persona of d'Arboussier,
Houphouet claimed that high-ranking authorities in the French government
had offered him the following explanation of the repressive campaign
aimed at the EDA:
The EDA was not being fought in and of itself, but solely 
because of its alliance with the Communist party in its 
struggle against the regime. (33)
Once the EDA parliamentarians had made public the decision to
disaffiliate from the Communist Party, support was immediately solicited
from the Overseas Minister to diffuse the new orientation in the West
African territories. Houphouet and his associates requested the
authorisation of an EDA mission to traverse ACF in order to explain the
d r j - p m f i n t and relay revised instructions. In spite of the budding
relationship in Paris between the EDA and the French government,
directives emanating from the top were met with long-lasting suspicion
on the local levels, as Mitterrand noted:
The Governors consulted declared themselves almost 
unanimously hostile to such an initiative. Perhaps they saw 
it as a cunning and perverse way to organise clandestine 
action, that the vigour of the repression had until now 
succeeded in paralysing. I had to impose on them my convic­
tion, in certain cases to the point of sanctions. The choice 
of the EDA and its leaders merited confidence. (34)
33F. Houphouet-Boigny, "Reponse a d'Arboussier."
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Aware of the difficulties facing the delegation, the three chosen emis­
saries were among the "sages" of the movement, namely Mamadou Konat£, 
Ouezzin Coulibaly and Hamani Diori. Not only did the mission anticipate 
administrative malice, but expected their assigned task of explaining 
the reasons behind the decision to disaffiliate from the PCF, as well as 
the unorthodox procedure by which it was taken, to be arduous.
Overseas Reaction
The news of disaffiliation generally came as a surprise to EDA activists
in the territories, many of whom had long been diligently following the
orders and analyses of d ’Arboussier. Moreover some EDA section leaders
resented the fact that they had been neither consulted nor informed of
such a critical decision until after it had been made, and indeed under
questionable circumstances.
Following the shake-up in the metrqpole, the arena in which to play
out the Houphouet-d'Arboussier rivalry for EDA leadership was relocated
in the overseas territories. As circulars from Paris repeatedly
condemned the behaviour of the former Secretary-General, eventually the
moderate wing within the sectional Directing Committees prevailed over
35
the "extremist" tendency. The omnipotence of Houphouet was never 
seriously challenged, his image being inseparable from the entirety of
35
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the movement he both founded and presided over. Far more important
than ideological considerations, the cult of personality surrounding
local leaders was a predominant factor of post-war African politics, as
illustrated by a future High-Commissioner of ACF:
The Communist ideology did not penetrate the masses, who 
remained loyal to local politicians and Houphouet, much more 
than to the Communist party; the FDA existed due to 
Houphouet and his subordinates (we are in an Africa where 
the men count as much as, if not more than, parties or 
ideologies). (37)
Nevertheless such a radical shift in policy, coupled with sudden moves 
toward reconciliation with the French government as well as former 
political opponents, was not easily accepted by the African masses nor 
trusted by local administrators.
Reports concerning the reaction in Guinea to the d&sapparentemf?nt 
varied considerably depending upon the source. The central figure of 
Guinean politics from this point onward was Sekou Tour£, whose travels 
in connection with his trade union and associated activities enabled him 
to be present at critical FDA gatherings in Paris. At this time the PDG 
was without elected members in the French parliament. Normally 
Secretary-General Madeira Keita should have represented the Guinean 
section in the FDA Coordinating Committee, which as previously stated 
had been eclipsed by the parliamentary group. Thus under these circum­
stances Tour6 gained considerable influence not only as a union activist 
but also as unofficial spokesman for the FDA-Guinea chapter. The
36
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authorities in Guinea measured the reaction to the FDA disaffiliation 
from the Communist Party largely by the individual response of Tourd. 
A3ministrative opinions from Paris, Dakar, and Conakry, however all 
differed in their interpretations of Tourd's public appearances as well 
as his personal convictions.
Trade unionism in the Federation of West Africa was largely 
dominated by the metropolitan CGT; as one of its leading activists, 
Tourd became inextricably linked with the French Communists. Despite the 
Communist stigma attributed to Tours's character, it appears that, at 
least in Paris, he was considered a Houphouet loyalist in conplete 
agreement with the FDA decision to disaffiliate from the PCF. Amid the 
negotiations between the FDA and the French government, an early appear­
ance of Tour6 at Houphouet's side was noted by Governor Siriex, who 
wrote the following in recollection of a meeting with the FDA President 
in August 1950:
...accompanied by a tall African that I did not know and to 
whom, a detail that struck me, I was not introduced. This 
strapping man was none other than Sekou Tour6....At this 
time he was an obedient disciple of Houphouet-Boigny, while 
strictly allied with the CGT and the Communist Party. (38)
Further evidence of Tourd's seemingly dual allegiance to the FDA
and Communist-affiliated organisations was his participation (along with
d ’Arboussier) in November 1950 at the congress of the Eartisans.de. la.
Paix held in Warsaw, where he was elected to serve as meirber of the
World Council. Returning to Paris, Tourd hosted a meeting between the
African delegation to the peace congress and the FDA parliamentary
group, the agenda of which was discussion of the current situation and
subsequent programme of action. Acknowledging a hostile reaction in
38
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Guinea to the announcement of d.£sapparen.tement., Tour§ expounded;
Guinea's dissatisfaction with the silence and muteness of 
the parliamentary group* He said that it is ignorance of the 
situation that drove the Guinean section to send a motion 
announcing its decision to no longer pay heed to the parlia­
mentary group. He recommended also that we do everything to 
avoid division. (39)
Insisting that increased communication between the directing and subor­
dinate organs of the movement be an immediate priority, Toure accepted 
an intermediary role in the attempt to retain organisational cohesive­
ness, and thus in conclusion:
He assured the group in his own name, in the name of the 
section and that of Africa; he said that the EDA will remain 
united, and expressed confidence in the leadership to 
redress the situation. (40)
Finally, attesting to his growing stature within the leadership circle 
of the PDA, Toure's signature could henceforth be found on directives 
from the parliamentary group, as well as rebuttals aimed at countering 
Communist Party criticism of the movement's new orientation.
In contrast to the common perception in Paris of Tour§ as a devoted 
follower of Houphouet and the revised RDA platform, French admini­
strators in Dakar and Conakry depicted the up and coming leader as a 
fervent Communist resolutely opposed to the concept of disaffiliation, 
defiant of both RDA and governmental authority. A Conakry official 
described Tours's initial response to impending changes in PDA strategy 
accordingly:
S§kou Tour6 reacted strongly against the principle of 
d&gapparent.einent advocated by deputy Houphouet in his last 
correspondence. He estimated that, this new orientation of 
the party could only be detrimental to its future. In any
39
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case, no action should be taken with the Independents before 
consulting the Directing Committees of the various territor­
ies, only they would be capable of making such a decision.
(41)
Following his trips to Paris and Warsaw, however, bulletins from Conakry
cited unusual behaviour of Tour§; for example, he returned to Guinea
incognito, alerting no one of his arrival date, later claiming to be
42
"horrified by public demonstrations in his favour." Local FDA
supporters and the administration alike grew inpatient as Toure failed
to report about his journeys and activities abroad, as well as his own
interpretation of events.
A likely factor behind the code of silence adopted by Tour6 and the
PDG Directing Committee was the anticipated arrival of the FDA mission
charged with explaining the policy changes and new orientation of the
movement. Descending from Bamako, FDA delegates Coulibaly, Konate, and
Diori traversed the territory without stopping until they reached
Conakry on 13 January 1951. The emissaries focused their attention
firstly on the PDG leadership, speaking privately at great length with
both Toure and Keita.
Despite their constant companionship, tension between the H)A
deputies and the local party leaders was noticeable during public
appearances. The major meeting held by the visiting delegates was
"characterised by moderate discourses to which the public was no longer 
43
accustomed." At one point in his discussion of relations with the
41
ANS 17G 573, "Renseignements," Services de Police, Guinea, No. 
1249/722, 24 October 1950.
42
ANS 17G 573, "Rapport Hebdomadaire," Services de Police, Guinea, 
No. 377, 25 December to 1 January 1951.
43
ANS 17G 572, "Reunion publique tenue par les deputies FDA," 
Services de Police, Guinea, No. 86/32, 19 January 1951.
147
French government, Coulibaly asked the audience actually to applaud
High-Commissioner B6chard, the result of which was so reported:
Visibly, a good number of the listeners did not understand 
and so looked directly at Madeira Keita and Sekou Tourd to 
gauge their response. (44)
Finally, in his closing statement on behalf of the Guinean RDA, Keita
deliberately mentioned that the new orientation just presented had been
adopted by the Grand Comitd Directeur r thus distancing himself and the
territorial sections from the decision, as well as abstaining from
45
voicing his personal opinion.
The deputies spent five days in Conakry, after which they visited
and held public meetings in Kankan, Beyla, and N'Zerekore en route to
the Ivory Coast. Overall the mission was perceived as a failure by the
territorial administration, the delegation having been unable to
convince the local leaders and party sympathisers to follow the new
political course charted by the FDA parliamentarians.
Reporting from Dakar, the High-Commissioner outlined the impossi-
46
bility of the Guinean section accepting the new H)A orientation. First 
of all, PDG Secretary-General Keita was considered hostile to disaffil­
iation from the PCF. Secondly, the Guinean leaders would never make 
amends with their bitter rivals— the heads of the Entente Gnin6enne 
favourable to the ICM. Likewise the leaders of the Entente allegedly 
refused to envisage an eventual reconciliation with the local FDA.
44
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Thirdly, the new political line adopted by the FDA parliamentary group 
advocated collaboration with both the administration and the tradition­
al chiefs. If this programme were followed in Guinea, the party would 
effectively be reversing its political platform, and subsequently lose 
its popular support. In light of these circumstances, High-Commissioner 
B&rhard offered the following conclusion concerning the Guinean reaction 
to the new IDA orientation:
Henceforth the Guinean section of the FDA is firmly decided 
to maintain its position, even against deputy Houphouet, and 
to pursue the essential goal that it had previously fixed, 
the struggle against the administration and the Fulani 
feudal system. (47)
Despite the overseas administration’s serious doubts about the 
potential success of FDA reconciliation with governmental authorities as 
well as the sincerity of its leaders, fruitful negotiations in Paris 
rapidly progressed. Resultant official policy changes made in the 
Overseas Ministry were necessarily imposed on reluctant territorial 
administrators.
Reconciliation: Success and Failure 
In disaffiliating from the Communist Party, the FDA was decidedly 
satisfying prerequisites for two of its main goals, namely African 
unity, and collaboration with the French government in the pursuit of 
progressive reform. Once the major obstacle to reconciliation had been 
removed, the FDA was able to engage in negotiations on both fronts.
The day after the FDA decision to disaffiliate from the Communist 
bloc was made public, members of the ICM met in order to determine 
further conditions required of FDA members in parliament before actual 
—
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fusion of the two groups. Following several joint PDA-ICM discussions,
a formal appeal signed by Houphouet, Sailer, and Lamine Gudye was sent
to all African parliamentarians, requesting their presence at a meeting
scheduled on 22 December 1950. Three formal discussions in all were held
to this effect, culminating in the creation of an intergroupg £] us
d 1 outre-me r f presided over by Lamine Gu&ye, with Houphouet, Senghor, and
Charles Cros serving as Vice-Presidents, and Sailer as General- 
49
Secretary. In mid-January the group formulated a common programme of
action enumerating parliamentary reforms of high priority to the
overseas territories.
In spite of an outward semblance of unity, fusion of the African
parliamentary groups and respective political parties proved hopeless.
By early February ICM President Senghor formally admitted the failure of
the attempts at rapprochement:
"The ICM Group made contact with the PDA parliamentarians to 
study issues concerning the overseas territories, but there 
was never an alliance or regrouping between these two forma­
tions." (50)
The problems intruding on African unity basically centered upon 
questions of rivalry— between Senghor and Lamine Gueye, Houphouet and 
both Senegalese leaders, and sectional parties in particular. Addition­
ally, a necessary stipulation of accord was shared electoral lists on 
the territorial level, an act truly inconceivable to local parties in 
the face of important forthcoming elections. And so African parliamen-
48
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tarians went their separate ways largely as before— several renewed 
their allegiance to the metropolitan SFIO, the ICM were sufficient in 
number to remain an independent group, and HDA representatives were 
forced to seek a new parliamentary alliance.
When it became clear that reconciliation with the ICM was unachiev­
able, the FDA recognised that its most promising ally would be the party 
adhered to by Mitterrand and Pleven known as the UDSR. Moreover the UDSR 
was in dire need of increased meirbership; in January 1951 its number 
dropped to 13, and were it not for the Finance Minister's temporary 
allegiance, the Prime Minister's party would have been without commis­
sion representation. Besides, Mitterrand had boldly shown confidence in 
the FDA and its leadership, and was in the process of dismantling the 
administrative policy of repression of the movement.
In January 1951 the Overseas Minister relieved the Governor of Chad
from his post. The following month the detested Governor of Guinea
Roland Pr£, on the verge of being suspended, was replaced by Paul-Henri 
51
Siriex. A critical event displaying Mitterrand's determination to 
compel the overseas administration into reconciliation with the RDA was 
the inauguration of the Virdi Canal, an artificial port built in Abidjan 
out of FIDES funds. On 5 February, to the horror of High-Commissioner 
B6chard, Governor Pechoux, and onlooking colons., the Overseas Minister 
presided over the opening of the new harbour with Houphouet at his side. 
The same day Mitterrand reiterated the fundamental policy changes 
deliberated in the FCM Ministry in Paris, as he recalled:
On February fifth, I held a conference with the Governors of
the eight territories in ACF and the principal administra-
51
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tors in the Federation. I gave them my orders. They voiced 
their objections. Most of them candidly expressed their 
misgivings. (52)
Distrustful that his instructions would be followed and that neutrality 
on the part of the administration would be maintained throughout 
approaching legislative elections in the territories, in May the Over­
seas Minister recalled both B^chard and Pechoux. Mitterrand was not part 
of Pleven's second cabinet constituted in August; instead he became the
president of the UDSR, to which the PDA officially allied, forming the
UDSR-RDA parliamentary group before the close of 1951.
Despite abrupt changes in the top administrative offices in the 
overseas territories, considerable time elapsed before new policy 
directives filtered down to local authorities, which historically 
functioned with a great deal of autonomy. Aware that the revised PDA
orientation was inposed on the chapter parties by the parliamentary
group in Paris, territorial administrations remained suspicious of the 
sincerity of local activists. Likewise party militants addressing the 
masses found it difficult to preach "collaboration" where they had 
recently pledged "open confrontation" with the colonial forces. Leaders 
of the chapter parties held the key to swaying local populations; 
however confusion and divergent opinions fomented dissension, culminat­
ing in opposing factions threatening the unity of the movement. In 
Guinea the atmosphere of distrust and PDG suppression continued for some 
time before final capitulation to the new FDA orientation would lead to 
inproved relations with the French government. Guinean acknowledgement 
of the break with the Communists and acceptance of the new PDA line were
52
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finally proclaimed publicly by FDG officials nearly one full year after 
the announcement of dSsapparentement - In the meantime reluctance on the 
part of both the party and the administration to reconciliation signi­
fied heightened tension surrounding an embittered struggle.
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CHAPTER V
Reluctant Conformity in Guinea
In the light of their new-found amicable relationship with the French 
National Government, FDA parliamentarians were not only confident in 
their decision to disaffiliate from the Communists, but also optimistic 
that their actions would foster an end to administrative repression and 
meet general satisfaction in the overseas territories. Nevertheless 
hesitance of local leaders and administrators significantly delayed the 
reconciliation process.
Adjustment to the new orientation by IDA chapter parties was 
severely hampered by various events of 1951, casting doubt upon the 
willingness on the part of territorial administrations to comply with 
policy changes dictated by the Overseas Ministry. Similarly local
reaction and inconsistent behaviour fueled administrative suspicion and
mistrust of EDA section leaders. In Guinea the campaign to suppress the
EDA had been remarkably successful. The rhetoric enployed by PDG
militants, as well as the party's connection with the Communist labour 
union movement, furnished easy pretexts for administrative intervention 
in local politics. Change in PDG orientation as well as territorial 
government policy proved difficult, both initially to accept and 
subsequently to institute.
The EDA parliamentary group formally announced its decision to 
sever all ties with the Communist Party just as the first PDG Congress 
was coming to its close. In spite of the new orientation adopted by the 
EDA leadership in Paris, for the time being politics of the Guinean
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section carried on virtually undisturbed. One week after the IDA
declaration of d r n^t-fiinent and accompanying collaboration with
French authorities, PDG activists continued to pledge allegiance to the
plan of action mapped out at the recent congress, including "open war to
1
the bitter end against the administration." In a particularly militant
public address, Madeira Keita reportedly went so far as to state: "even
2
dead, our blood will serve our ideal."
An organisational programme for 1951, detailing specific instruc­
tions of proper procedure, was drawn up by the PDG directorate and 
circulated to party subsections. Discipline was regarded as the key to 
the survival and future success of the PDG, and emphasis was placed on
the grass-roots level. The primary role of the party was to educate and
3
lead the masses in their struggle against colonial oppression. To this
effect, directions and exemplars of letters, requests, protests,
motions, etc. to bring grievances before local authorities, were issued
from the Political Bureau to regional subordinates. Along with the
delimitations of legal processes in dealing with local administrations,
regional committee mentoers were scrupulously instructed in matters of
etiquette, propaganda strategy, and book keeping of subsection 
4
treasuries. Furthermore a strict hierarchy and network of communication 
was formulated within the PDG whereby, for example, a local committee 
was forbidden to address the territorial government directly; procedure
1
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dictated the channelling of requests through the district committee 
upward to the central Directing Committee. In essence the structural and 
procedural organisation of the PDG largely imitated that of the 
Communist Party, especially in regard to local cells, the format of 
gatherings and public meetings, and spreading of propaganda.
Much of the PDG reorganisation was hurriedly undertaken in prepara­
tion for the June 1951 elections to the National Assembly. Despite the 
new EDA conciliatory orientation and increased local mobilisation of the 
masses, the movement suffered surprisingly heavy electoral losses 
throughout West Africa. Apart from the reluctance of territorial admini­
strations to give up the battle to suppress the EDA, it appears that the 
Overseas Ministry, in fear of European response to sudden EDA advances, 
tacitly allowed local intervention in the legislative elections in order
to modify the movement's success. Largely in consequence of electoral 
5
machinations, PDA leaders CXiezzin Coulibaly, Hamani Diori, and Gabriel
Lisette lost their seats in the National Assembly; only three of the
former eight EDA deputies were re-elected, namely F§lix Houphouet-
Boigny, Mamadou Konate, and F6lix Ttehicaya. Hopes pinned on a new era of
PDA success through collaboration with the French authorities were thus
dashed in the overseas territories, as the results of the June elections
6
"marked the nadir of FDA popularity."
5
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National Assembly Elections, June 1951
Preparations and predictions for the 1951 legislative competition in
Guinea were well under way six months in advance of the June elections.
In November 1950 an KPF assemblyman representing Guinea heralded the
onset of the electoral process in the territory, while at the same time
attesting to the importance of administrative support:
The electoral campaign is here and now open in Guinea. Mr.
Roland Pr6 will back a list composed of Mamba Sano and Barry 
Diawadou— in my opinion, only the former will pass. The SFIO 
will present a list wiith outgoing deputy Yacine Diallo 
which will be supported by Mr. Bechard. Mamba Sano and Barry 
Diawadou are not RPF and this is a point where I do not 
understand the action of Governor Roland Pr£. With one word 
from him the candidates would adhere to the itassCTblgTreni- 
(RPF)— however this word has never been given. In any case 
it is likely that Roland Pr§ will no longer be in Guinea at 
the time of the elections. (7)
Not only was Governor Pr6 succeeded by Paul-Henri Siriex in February
1951, but a temporary High-Commissioner replaced Bechard in May— just
one month prior to the crucial elections. Nevertheless the anti-EDA
policies instituted by Bechard and Pr6 were carried over in the new
administrations and legislative elections.
The format of elections to the National Assembly entailed voting
for lists composed of two to three candidates, fostering a plethora of
rapidly shifting alliances among political leaders and organisations. An
electoral entente existed briefly between Yacine Diallo, the Comit-e de.
Basse-Gu ln6e (Fod£ Tour6), and the PDG (Sikou Tour6). The PDG had worked
closely with deputy Diallo for the recall of Governor Pre from Guinea,
after which Diallo vowed to support the organisation's grievances in 
8
parliament. In the end the three candidates ran on separate lists;
7
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Diallo, assured of administrative backing, had been paired with Albert
Liurette— the cousin of the Governor's Chef.de. cabinet. Predominantly
European in composition, the RPF in Guinea was often in collaboration
with the conservative territorial administration. In a letter to RPF
President Jacques Foccart, assemblyman Louis Delmas explained an
unfortunate misunderstanding in the jumble of electoral alliances which
removed him from the predetermined party list in Guineas
Over a span of 24 hours, that is to say Saturday evening 
until Sunday noon, I was the second candidate on the list of 
Barry Diawadou with the guarantee from the administration 
that a member of this list would be elected. In fact, it was 
confirmed that this list would have had two elected candi­
dates. At noon on Sunday, following a letter from senator 
Sailer, Barry Diawadou changed his mind and chose Marchi as 
his second. (9)
Subsequently Diafod§ Caba was endorsed as the RPF candidate, while Barry
Diawadou ran on an independent ticket. A total of eight lists was
presented for the National Assembly elections held in Guinea on 17 June 
10
1951.
Although the prevailing mood in Paris was conciliatory regarding
the FDA, it appears certain that the federal government did not remain
neutral in the overseas parliamentary elections. According to Georges
Chaffard, the understanding in the Foreign Ministry was the following:
if the FDA emerged victorious in the June elections, then European
opinion would react with fear and malign the new policy of coopera- 
11
tion. It was therefore decided that only limited success would be 
granted the FDA, thus allowing time for gradual acceptance of future
9
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administrative collaboration with the movement. Furthermore, Chaffard
claimed that Mitterrand actually forewarned Houphouet of his plan to
defeat IDA candidates; in any case, it sufficed to let administrative
interference in local elections take its usual course to achieve the 
12
intended result. In Guinea the new government took into account the 
wishes of the higher authorities, as reported again by French assembly- 
man Delmas:
The administration thus foresees the election of the first 
two members of Yacine Diallo*s list (SFIO), which corre­
sponds to the orders from the Overseas Minister and B6chard, 
and the election of Mamba Sano— or else the election of the 
first two candidates on Mamba Sano's list plus Yacine 
Diallo. (13)
The interim High-Commissioner replacing B§chard, Paul Chauvet, toured
AQF several weeks prior to the legislative elections. The Commissioner
exerted pressure on CommandanKq dp> Cerclp, canton chiefs, and local
dignitaries; even a staunch adversary of the PDA admitted "Chauvet had
14
given the order to combat only the FDA.1
The official tally of the elections on 17 June 1951, largely as 
anticipated by the administration and informed sources, proclaimed 
Yacine Diallo, his second Albert Liurette, and Mamba Sano as deputies 
representing Guinea in the National Assembly (see Table 3). Protests of 
electoral machinations, irregular and illegal practices surrounding 
voting procedure, and administrative falsification of results were 
mounted from nearly all losing sides, including S6kou Tour6 (PDG), Barry
12
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Diawadou (RPF), and Fode Tour6 (SFIO).
By the law of 23 May 1951 the franchise in West Africa was expanded 
to include civil or military pensioners, heads of families or house­
holds, and mothers of two children "living or dead for France." In spite 
of the short time span between the publication of the new franchise and 
the June elections, in Guinea the number of registered voters for the 
1951 elections to the National Assembly was three times what it had been 
in 1946. In contesting the validity of the elections, however, the PDG 
held that the registration of the increased electorate was unjust and 
manipulated to combat the PDA. Indeed it is interesting to note that, 
apart from Conakry, the main PDA strongholds in Guinea at the time—  
Beyla, Kankan, Kouroussa, and N'Z6rdkor6, were among the districts with 
the lowest percentages of registered voters per population. As well as 
being charged with violations of voting card distribution and omission 
of voters on electoral lists, the same localities accounted for the 
highest abstention rates in the territory. The case of N’Z§rekor6 was 
particularly fradulent, where the official journal confirmed 48,340 
registered voters in the district, and subsequent election results 
published the deflated figure of 38,340. Furthermore, due to stalled 
distribution, it was reported that between 13,000 and 17,000 ballots
were not issued to registered voters in N'Z£rekor6, undoubtedly
16
contributing to the high percentage of "abstention."
15
S6kou Tour6 had run on a ticket listed as L'Union Democratiquo des 
Travail loura at Anciens Combattantsf which contested the elections with 
the support of the PDG. As a party member, Barry Diawadou unsuccessfully 
solicited the RPF to call for the invalidation of the June elections in 
Guinea. The officially sponsored RPF candidate, Diafode Caba, reportedly 
made a deal with the Governor not to contest the legislative results in 
exchange for assured victory in the forthcoming elections to the General 
Council. ICG b.69, Letter from L. Delmas to Diafod6 Caba, 1 August 1951.
16
B. Diawadou, "Compte-rendu sur le d6roulement des Elections," p. 9.
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In lieu of the required direct distribution by a regulatory commis­
sion, in Conakry employers were charged with the issuance of voting 
papers, 4,680 of which were returned to the city hall and remained 
inaccessible. In this situation S§kou Tour& was considered deprived of
electoral recognition as undisputed leader of the Guinean labour move-
17
ment as well as top PDG activist. Moreover, grave irregularities
surrounded the tallying of votes in the territorial capital. Although
the law stipulated that district totals in the form of proc&s-verbanx be
sent directly to the electoral commission, totals were instead
calculated at the Governor's office. Furthermore, ten days after the
vote, the proc&s-verbaux from Dabola, Dalaba, Dinguiraye, Faranah,
18
Gueckddou, and Kissidougou had still not arrived in Conakry.
The results emanating from the Fouta Djalon, widely considered the 
personal fiefdom of Yacine Diallo, went largely undisputed by opposi­
tion candidates. One major except ion, however, was S6kou Tours's 
hometown of Faranah (which was actually a separate district in Upper 
Guinea), the delayed results of which were incorrectly submitted by the 
Commandant de Cercle of Dabola (of the Fouta region), and revealed an 
inconceivable loss for the city's native son.
In Upper Guinea the successes of Diafode Caba and Mairtoa Sano were 
also questionable. One of few members of the RPF, Caba was a recognised 
longshot in the parliamentary elections, even with added help from the
17
CFDA 9/doss 10, Joint report calling for the invalidation of the 17 
June elections in Guinea, drawn up by the candidates on the list of 
L'.Union Democrat i qnc> des Travailleurs £±_ Anciens Conhat-.tante (S&kou 
Tour6, Barry Mamadou Diould6, Niankoi Samoe) and the PDG.
18
Assembl£e Nationale, "Operations 6lectorales du Territoire de la 
Guin6e," Sitting of 22 August 1951, p. 6396.
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19
administration. On a campaign tour of the region in March it was noted
that deputy Sano had particular difficulty drumming up support from the
Maiink6 population, which was naturally partial to kinsmen Sekou Tour6
and Madeira Keita. While greeted with indifference in Kouroussa, Sano
was "coldy received" in Kankan, and in Siguiri the situation was
20
described as "almost hostile." Yet, albeit with serious violation of
ballot distribution and high abstention rate, in Siguiri Sano reportedly 
21
carried the vote.
Allegations and evidence of election tampering were most prominent 
in the Forest region. It seems that N'Z^rekore was not the only district 
where registered voters were prevented from exercising their rights. In 
Gueck6dou a canton chief and childhood friend of Toure held that he had
been threatened with losing his position if any votes were registered
for the HDA; published results of the village marked one vote in Tours's
22
favour out of 1,034. In neighbouring Kissidougou voters with
registered ballots in hand were turned away from the polls by admini-
23
strators claiming their names were not on the lists. Moreover, in an 
atmosphere of intimidation, it was observed that village chiefs were 
required to report to polling stations the number of registered voters
19
ICG b.70, L. Delmas, "Note pour M. Sous telle,1 11 June 1951.
20
ANSCM AP 2171/7, High-Commissioner AOF to Minister FCM, "Note sur
les voyages effectu£s recemment dans la F6d6ration par certains parle-
mentaires Africains," Dakar, 20 April 1951, pp. 19-21.
21
Voting cards in Siguiri were issued on the day of the elections;
the decree of 24 May 1951 stipulated their distribution by a regulatory
commission three days before the scheduled vote.
22
Joint report of candidates S6kou Tour§ et aL. and PDG, p. 1.
23
B. Diawadou, "Conpte-rendu sur le ddroulement des Elections," p. 9.
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in their jurisdictions; subsequently as many envelopes were stuffed with
24
ballots for Sano. Such circumstances may explain the fact that a
nunber of cantons in Kissidougou and Macenta registered 98 to 100
per cent of both votes cast and ballots in Sano's favour. Additionally,
the proems-verbany of 14 polling stations from Macenta were allegedly
25
signed by the same hand.
Submitted primarily by Sfekou Tour6 and supported by spokesmen for
the Communist Party, the case for invalidation of the June legislative
elections in Guinea was brought before the National Assembly on 22
August 1951. After a brief discussion of the investigation into the
matter, the chairman summarised the findings and recommendation of the
commission accordingly:
It seems evident to us that certain fraudulent acts were
committed. The fact that at several voting stations the 
totality of registered voters supported the same list is 
shocking. For exaitple the voting bureau of Sebori submitted 
the following results: Registered voters 1,364; votes cast
1,364. The list of Yacine Diallo obtained 1,363 votes and 
that of Diafod£ Caba 1 vote. In any case, such a result is 
not an isolated case. Many others are comparable.. .If one 
had to rigorously judge the overseas elections none of them 
would be validated.. .though the facts of pressure and fraud 
that occurred are regrettable, we propose the validation of 
the elections in the territory of Guinea. (26)
And so the dubious results of the Guinean elections, along with
suspicions of continued administrative repression of the PDG, were
27
confirmed by the French parliament.
24
Joint report of candidates S6kou Tour6 eJt aL. and PDG, p. 5.
25
CEDA 9/doss 10, Report submitted to the President of the National 
Assembly by Sekou Tour§ and fellow list candidates, p. 5.
26
Assenbl6e Nationals, Sitting of 22 August 1951, p. 6401.
27
Incidentally there was solid evidence to support the RDA claim that 
Ouezzin Coulibaly of the Ivory Coast and Hamani Diori of Niger were also 
defeated due to local French electoral machinations. Their cases were 
also overruled by the National Asseitbly. R. Schachter Morgenthau, 
Political Parties,, p. 103.
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Enduring Scepticism
I was alarmed at the reading of the election results of 17 
June in your territory, in the realisation that the EDA list 
of Sdkou Tour£ had obtained a relatively inportant propor­
tion of suffrages (approximately 14 per cent of votes cast).
I ask you to study very closely the factors which are at the 
base of this situation and to follow them very 
attentively.... (28)
Such was the reaction of interim High-Commissioner Chauvet to the
legislative elections in Guinea? subsequently orders were issued for
tighter surveillance on local FDA activity and monitoring of popular
support. Curiously, the results of the June elections matched very
closely the forecast of Governor Siriex, particulary pertaining to
29
Tour6, and therefore should not have come as a great surprise. In any
case, by playing a double role as a leading IDA activist and trade
unionist in West Africa, Tour6 was increasingly the object of suspicion
and distrust on the part of the administration.
In the wake of the falsified elections the French government was
especially anxious to determine the FDA response and subsequent future
course of action. The burning question posed to the territorial
Governors was whether the new orientation should be interpreted locally
as "a firm commitment to collaborate with the administration, or on the
30
contrary camouflaged opposition politics." For the most part the
28
ANS 17G 573, Letter interim High-Commissioner ACF to Governor 
Guinea, No. 591/AP2, Paris, 25 June 1951.
29
The Governor's predictions compared to electoral results were the 
following: estimate results estimate results
Y. Diallo 28% 30% S. TourS 14% 14%
M. Sano 21% 26% B. Diawadou 12% 10%
ICG b.70, L, Delmas, "Pronostics du Gouverneur Siriex," 11 June 1951.
30
ANS 17G 572, High-Commissioner ACF to Governors ACF, No. 129 
INT/AP, Dakar, 31 August 1951.
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government received favourable analyses of the PDA chapters in the Ivory
Coastr Soudan, Upper Volta, and Senegal respecting the directives
revising party platform and calling for moderation. In Niger two
opposing factions, Communist versus conciliatory, were reportedly still
dividing the local section of the PDA. The territory of Guinea, however,
was singled out as the trouble spot in West Africa, where:
The Communist tendency of the party, which had never ceased 
asserting itself, seems to be more and more pronounced under 
the pretence of a recrudescence of trade union activity 
orchestrated by S6kou Tour£...Guinea thus appears to be the 
avant-garde> of the Communist tendency in the Federation, 
under the guise of CGT unionism. (31)
Moreover administrative portrayal of the PDG depicted the spread of
"Communist gangrene" like a "wave unfurling over the entire terri- 
32
tory." In conclusion, the territorial administration claimed that the
information collected "clearly shows that the actual attitude of the PDG
33
has not conformed to that adopted— for the time being— by Houphouet."
An inportant aspect of PDG political activity in Guinea was its 
relationship to trade unionism, specifically the local CGT branch under 
the leadership of Tour£. While the Guinean chapter of the H)A was with­
out parliamentary representation, collaboration with the metropolitan 
CGT had definite advantages for union members, including training,
31
ANS 17G 572, High-Commissioner ACF to Direction G§n6rale de
1'Interieur, "Note sur Involution politique actuelle du PDA," No. 
778/AP2, Dakar, 31 August 1951.
32
Also commonly referred to as "Stalinist gangrene." ANS 17G 573, 
"Renseignements," Services de Police, Guinea, No. 1395/723, 30 August 
1951.
33
ANS 17G 573, "Rapport Hebdomadaire," Services de Police, Guinea, 
No. 1435/745, 10 September 1951.
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34
experience, travel, financial support, and allies in Paris. At a time
when industrialisation was taking off in the territory, the labour
movement was becoming a potentially explosive social force in need of
organisation and direction. In the words of the Governor, Tour6 had
proven himself to be "the only individual capable of leading a movement
35
which consists of many hands but few heads." Amidst confusion over the 
new orientation dictated by PDA parliamentarians in Paris, Toure 
returned to Guinea in January 1951 from several trips abroad in 
conjunction with his union responsibilities, and concentrated his 
efforts predominantly on labour issues in the overseas territories.
For a while Toure successfully skirted public discussion of contro­
versial topics threatening political dissension within the PDG. 
Unfortunately his silence only fed administrative suspicions, surely 
adding justifiable cause to the continued repression of the movement. 
Awaiting enlightenment on his true convictions, the High-Commissioner 
gave the following description of Toure's inconsistent behaviour:
The local leaders were very late in accounting for changes 
in the political orientation of the party; the directors 
initially appeared to be rebellious— two tendencies emerged:
"hard" and "soft". S&kou Tour£ is maintaining an ambiguous 
attitude; he seems to be in the middle of the two tenden­
cies; he manoeuvres easily (at least in appearance) among 
contradictory activities which permit him to proclaim that 
the FDA has broken all ties with the PCF, as well as to 
propagate the ideals of the Federation Syndicale Mond iale.
It is precisely this double role, "trade unionist (CGT)" and 
"politician (FDA)", that characterises the Guinean leader—  
his desire to retain his future liberty of action and a 
certain independence with regard to his presumed mentors 
(CGT and FDA) is evident. (36)
34
R. Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties, p. 227.
35
ANS 2G 51 133, "Premier trimestre 1951," Guinea, No. 201 APA, 31 
March 1951.
36
ANSCM AP 2143/9, High-Commissioner ACF to Minister FCM, "Evenements 
de Guin6e," Paris, 14 March 1955, p. 8.
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Nevertheless in the light of his outright defeat in the legislative 
elections, the perilous predicament of the PDG (including an empty 
treasury and approaching elections to the Territorial Assembly), and 
mounting hostile relations between the government and the party, Tour6 
recognised that, for the sake of survival and future success, his only 
recourse was to solicit help from the EDA central leadership while 
making amends with the administration.
Belated Recognition of Dfesapparentement 
and Pan-African Labour Conference, 1951
In a September letter addressed to members of the EDA Coordinating
Committee, the PDG Directing Committee reported general confusion about
the movement's new orientation, illustrating its apparent failure in an
37
unchanged atmosphere of administrative repression. The PDG directorate 
thus urgently requested a gathering of the full Coordinating Committee 
(i.e. with territorial delegates) in order to re-evaluate the organisa­
tion's course of action.
Contributing to the current PDG crisis was the prolonged absence of 
Tour6 from Guinea. In Paris for approximately six weeks, then Dakar for 
two, Tourd was preparing for a forthcoming pan-African labour conference 
to be held in Bamako, while at the same time actively participating in 
HDA central activities. In a letter to Madeira Keita dated 6 September, 
Tour6 expressed concern over unanswered correspondence with the chapter
Committee, mentioning also that he was temporarily acting with Gabriel
38
Lisette as Secretary of the parliamentary group. Interestingly,
37
ANS 17G 573, "Rapport Hebdomadaire," Services de Police, Guinea, 
No. 1794/984, 8 October 1951.
38
ANS 17G 573, Copy of letter from Tour6 to Keita written in Paris, 6 
September 1951.
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several communiques issued by the Paris delegation of the EDA Coordina­
ting Committee at this time listed Tour € as Secretary-General of the EDA 
39
in Guinea. Technically Toure was not a member of the Coordinating
Committee, nor was he the official leader of the PDG— theoretically both
positions were currently occupied by Keita. Nevertheless Toure was
building quite a reputation within the EDA directorate, as well as
cultivating better relations with the French government.
A3ministrative reports of Toure's stay in Dakar depicted radical
shifts in the attitude and behaviour of the emerging politician. Kept
under close surveillance, Toure1s actions were summarised accordingly by
a federal «nrpt6 officer:
With everyone, he has deplored the past errors of the party 
and shown that collaboration with the Communist Party only 
benefited the enemies of the EDA and that it was time, with 
Houphouet, for devotion to constructive work within the EDA, 
newly restored and expurgated. (40)
The investiture of Bernard Cornut-Gentille as High-Commissioner of 
French West Africa in late September proved an opportune time for Tour6 
to display both preparedness in accepting the revised EDA platform, and 
desire for improved relations with the French administration. Through 
his persuasive efforts, evidently Tour& was successful in momentarily 
convincing the higher authorities of his sincerity, as attested by the 
Commissioner in the 1951 last trimester report on politics in ACF:
39
For example communique of 10 October 1951. Incidentally Toure left 
Paris for Dakar on 3 October; his name also appears on similar 
statements issued in Paris through November. CEDA, Comit6 de
Coordination, textes de 1947 a 1958.
40
ANS 17G 573, "Extrait du Bulletin Quotidien de la Surety de Dakar," 
4 October 1951.
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The determining factor of internal development was incon­
testably the "conversion", towards the end of the last 
trimester, of militant unionist Sekou Toure, of whom it 
could have been said several months ago that he was capable 
of becoming the Communist leader in ACF. (41)
The way in which Tour§ seemingly clinched administrative approval, as
well as the confidence of the IDA leadership, was by stating his
intention to follow up FDA d6sapparentement with a similar breakaway of
the African labour unions from the Communist CGT. When questioned about
the approaching labour conference, Tour6 reportedly made the following
declaration:
It is possible that the administration will ban the Pan- 
African Conference in Bamako. For my part, such a decision 
would be regrettable, because I was intending to proclaim, 
face to face with Abdoulaye Diallo and CGT representatives 
from the metropole, that I have personally learned with 
certitude of the utopian and dangerous nature of the Commu­
nist hold on the African masses. Furthermore I would have 
affirmed my unyielding will to offer my resignation as 
Secretary-General of the Coordinating Committee of the ACF 
trade unions because this organism owes allegiance to the 
CGT and is therefore Communist. (42)
Pointing out the inability of the Communist Party to penetrate the
African soul, Tour6 hinted that he was considering leading an organised
43
"movement of African essence."
Meanwhile, following another round of colonial service ending in
suspension, Ray Autra returned to Guinea and dedicated himself to
44
restrengthening the beleaguered PDG. Preceding Tour6 in visits to
41
ANSCM AP 2228/2, "Synthese des Faits Politiques," Dernier trimestre
1951.
42
ANS 17G 572, "Renseignements: les sentiments actuels de TOURE
S6kou," Surety, Dakar, 5 October 1951.
43
Ibid.
44
Ray Autra had been suspended from the colonial service in September 
1950, then reinstated in January 1951 and transferred to Niger, where he 
was suspended again in September and hence returned home to Guinea.
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Paris and Dakar, Autra had also been convinced of the necessity to
follow the trend set by Houphouet towards better working relations with
the French authorities. In his efforts to quell dissension and confusion
within the PDG, Autra illustrated the failure of the PCF in Africa,
clarified Houphouet*s position and the revised EDA orientation, toured
Guinea on an information and propaganda mission, and announced that a
45
meeting of the EDA Coordinating Committee would soon take place. 
Despite the positively noted maturation and toil of Autra (who formerly 
was considered a dangerous menace), it appears that the future outlook 
of the PDG rested almost entirely on the enlightened opinions and con­
clusions of Toure. Less optimistic than the federal authorities, the 
local administration in Guinea, awaiting Tours's return and participa­
tion at the Bamako labour conference, continued to cast doubts on the 
sincerity of staunch Communist PDG militants, for example:
Moussa Sane Diallo and Madeira Keita— the former more so 
than the latter— are of strict Communist obedience....
Madeira Keita, torn by contradictory familial sentiments, 
could prove less firm in his convictions and follow S6kou 
Tour£, if the latter would accept Houphouet*s propositions—  
which seems possible, however uncertain— and consent to 
changing tactics. It is however difficult to believe that 
the union leader is going to suddenly "convert"...if he 
remains the head of the Union des. Syndic at.s Confed£r£s de.
Guinee, and accepts the general secretariat of the CGT 
Unions of ACF, he would only be playing a "double game", the 
CGT being no more than a branch of the PCF. (46)
Tour§ flew from Dakar to Conakry on 13 October. Confident in his
45
Autra divulged that a meeting of the Coordinating Committee would 
be scheduled in Bamako; later he announced St. Louis as the prospective 
site. This gathering in fact was never called but repeatedly stalled 
until 1955. ANS 17G 573, "Renseignements," Services de Police, Guinea, 
No. 1787/977, 8 October 1951.
46
Ibid.
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amended political stance in line with the new EDA orientation, Tour6
reportedly made the following announcement:
For my part, I think that a certain French nationalism 
should not be excluded from the KDA. We must prove our 
sincerity vis a vis the administration which, moreover, 
watches over and monitors our actions to see if they conform 
to our words. Africa must have a purely African party for a 
solely African democracy. That is my point of view. I do not 
know if it is shared by Madeira Keita and the others. (47)
In recognition of recent controversies and opposing tendencies, a
meeting of the PDG Directing Committee to define the party platform took
place three days after Tours's arrival. In his opening address, Toure
established that the EDA had broken all ties with the PCF,
d£sapparentement was not a ploy to fool the administration but real,
Houphouet had not. reneged on the principles established at the Bamako
congress, and that the new direction ought to be followed for the sake 
48
of African unity. Amarah Soumah wholly approved of the new orientation
and methods adopted by the parliamentary group, while Keita agreed
albeit with several reservations. The main opponent of the revised
platform was Sane Moussa Diallo, who claimed that first of all Tour§ was
wrong, and secondly many militants within the KDA territorial sections
would follow d'Arboussier rather than Houphouet, thus remaining faithful
49
to the PCF doctrine. The following day Tour& received a letter from 
the EDA President, enclosed with a lump sum of money to assist his
47
ANS 17G 573, "Renseignements," services de Police, Guinea, No.
1843/1015, 15 October 1951.
48
ANS 17G 573, "Rapport Hebdomadaire," Services de Police, Guinea, 
No. 1907/1053, 15-21 October 1951.
49
D'Arboussier at the time was attempting to set up a Communist party 
in Africa allied to the PCF.
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50
efforts at bringing the Guinean KDA section back into the fold.
Additionally, the President of the PDA announced his intention to
personally visit. Guinea in mid-November, promising to hold a public
meeting in Conakry alongside his latest hard-pressed disciple— Tour6.
In the meantime, the pan-African labour conference at Bamako took
place as scheduled from 22-27 October 1951. Preceding the conference,
Toure had been charged with the "report of labour union orientation in
51
ACE’", while his rival Abdoulaye Diallo had the honour of presenting 
the rapport moral. Despite preparatory remarks and media hype, the 
anticipated face-off between these two men failed to materialise in open 
discussion, evidently due to skilful manoeuvrings of the CGT metropol­
itan delegates, and "corridor games" aimed at cutting off Tourd's 
attempts to lead a separatist movement. This in fact was as expected, 
the following administrative prediction proving true:
50
This was not the first time the PDCI sent financial support to the 
PDG. Archival reports mention such contributions from the very inception 
of the PDG, for example 50,000 francs CFA in November 1948, 75,000 in
November 1950 when the party was in dire straits, 50,000 in June 1950 
for Tours's election campaign, and now 50,000 to show PDA support and 
encouragement in spreading the new orientation. ANS 17G 573, Surete
report, No. 1176/64, Conakry, 5 November 1948; ANS 17G 573, Services de
Police, Guinea, No. 138/775, 30 November 1950; ANS 20G 114, Services de
Police, Guinea, No. 950/444, 30 June 1951; and ANS 17G 573, Services de
Police, Guinea, No. 1907/1053, Week report 15-21 October 1951.
51
A Fulbe from Upper Guinea, Abdoulaye Diallo was a Ponty graduate, 
Guinean delegate to the PDA founding Bamako Congress in 1946 (although 
he reconciled with Yacine Diallo in 1948), and member of the Territorial 
Assembly. A. Diallo became a CGT activist leading the allied group of 
trade unions in Soudan, and was nominated Vice-President of the 
F6dOration Syndicate Mondial^ (FSM) in 1949. The choice Of A. Diallo 
over Tour§ was apparently due to the former's membership in the French 
Communist Party where the latter had abstained. J.-R. de Benoist, 
L'Afriqnp Occidentale Frangai.qa, p. 226.
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For anyone familiar with the system, knowing the tactics of 
obstruction practised by the PCF when faced with danger, it 
can be assumed that all angles will be covered so that Tour6 
is "stifled", "confined" to such an extent that he will not
be able to freely express himself. (52)
Although secession was effectively circumvented, the Guinean and
Senegalese delegations, in a show of protest, did refuse to vote for
several resolutions passed by the general assembly.
In Guinea a malaise again reigned within the PDG Directing Commit-
53
tee, depicted as a struggle between three factions. Cn the one hand
the majority of the members, led by Tour6 and Soumah, were resigned to
follow Houphouet*s orders and the new orientation of the HDA. Cn the
other hand, denouncing Toure as both a "traitor" and "chameleon", Sane
Moussa Diallo militated in favour of continued political and trade union
54
solidarity with the Communist Party. Finally, Madeira Keita was seen
as straddling the fence between the two opposing tendencies, finding it
difficult to denounce his Marxist past and Communist orthodoxy, yet
financially dependent on party funds since his suspension from the
colonial service. In the end the faction headed by Toure prevailed, thus
attesting to the foresight of the PDA President:
Mr. Houphouet himself holds him (Toure) in high esteem, and
considers that he is the man most qualified to lead the 
Guinean masses towards a "new destiny." (55)
Cn 26 December 1951 to a crowd estimated at 550 people, Toure and Keita
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formally outlined the present position of the PDA, including its
programme, tactics and goals. At this belated time the PDG leaders
finally declared publicly that the EDA no longer had any ties whatsoever
56
with the Communist Party.
Organised Protest and Territorial Elections
PDG recognition of desappar en tement and acceptance of the new FDA 
orientation did not signal an appeasement in the otherwise confronta­
tional relationship between the party and the local authorities. On the 
contrary, the PDG intensified its efforts to reorganise and indoctrinate 
the Guinean masses, while signs of administrative repression 
foreshadowed the forthcoming elections to the Territorial Asseirbly.
In January 1952 the PDG set up a "Commission of Orientation and 
Platform", composed of select meirbers of the Directing Committee, to
analyse the political situation in Sub-Saharan Africa and methods 
eitployed by the EDA in order to devise a programme of action. The 
findings of the Commission included harsh criticism of the KDA Coordina­
ting Committee which, in conjunction with the parliamentary group, 
charted a new course of action without consulting the territorial 
sections. The resulting confusion fomented internal dissension and the 
emergence of opposing tendencies, threatening the unity of the chapter 
parties and indeed the life of the movement. According to the
Commission's report, recognition of past mistakes led to the following
conclusion:
The origin of our errors was in the over-estimation of
parliamentary action, over-estimation of the ways and means 
of the administration, and belief in the possible applica-
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tion of the Constitution, We realise now that the 
determining action is that of the masses— educated and 
directed in formulating and defending our interests at home, 
capable of supporting the action of the leaders and elected 
representat ives. (57)
The PDG Commission held that while the PDA Coordinating Committee,
depicted as out of touch with Africa through "lack of internal
democracy", concentrated its efforts in Paris, the general masses
suffering under administrative repression were almost completely
neglected. And, since "all Africans have the same aspirations, they all
suffer the same humiliations," the committee reasoned that "it is not
impossible that they see eye to eye," and therefore unity stemming from
the grass-roots level was to be given top priority in the PDG 
58
programme. Additionally the goal of African entente necessitated 
increased contacts and collaboration with local associations, co­
operatives, businesses, women and youth organisations, and trade unions. 
Finally, common action in organised protest was deemed the unifying 
factor drawing the masses into the anti-colonial struggle.
The first step in the PDG campaign for reform was to publicise 
local grievances and suppression of the PDA. In a report sent to the EDA 
Coordinating Committee (copies were also directed to the Overseas 
Minister and ACF High-Commissioner), the PDG directorate announced that 
despite its adoption of a "softer policy" aimed at "fruitful collabora­
tion" with the administration, repression of the party and its militants
59
had actually intensified since the June National Assembly elections.
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According to PDG sources, under the pretext of regional economic 
conferences attended solely by European administrators, Governor Siriex 
was in fact distributing orders to combat local PDA subsections. More­
over the committee reported a host of cases demonstrating arbitrary 
transfers, arrests, beatings and imprisonment of PDG militants, as well 
as forced labour and a pervading atmosphere of terror in certain areas. 
The majority of the complaints had been lodged in Beyla, Kouroussa, 
Kankan, and N'Z§rekor£— districts which registered the greatest support 
for the PDA in recent elections. Che example cited in the report 
concerned the President of the PDG subsection in Beyla, who reportedly 
refused under duress to resign from the party; subsequently he and four 
other local activists were sentenced to three months in prison on 
trumped up charges of failing to provide porters for medical workers.
The PDG was successful in seizing the attention of the Overseas
Minister, who subsequently demanded an investigation into the party's 
60
accusations. Several months later, however, the Governor claimed that
due to the fact that the stated events took place in outlying districts,
information was still insufficient to respond to the allegations put
forward by the PDG. Referring to the Committee's assertion of softened
policy and collaboration with the administration, the Governor wrote;
I am very sceptical of the sincerity of this attitude. In 
fact it is ascertainable that on the one hand the Guinean 
leaders of the local HDA, Madeira Keita, Sekou Toure, San6 
Moussa Diallo, remain committed Stalinists, diffusing Commu­
nist publications and announcing that "the time of the true 
struggle for independence is approaching"; on the other hand 
PDA resignations are increasing at an accelerated pace, 
including EDA leaders and electoral candidates...Amara
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Soumah has made known his intention to leave the party 
despite his position in the Directing Committee. This resig­
nation would be a fatal blow to the PDG. (61)
Apart from Soumah, the Governor proudly announced the resignation of an
influential PDA candidate in N'Z6r6kor6, as well as the President and
entire subsection of Beyla.
Elections to the Territorial Asserrblies in French West Africa were
held on 30 March 1952. Tour6 ran as the IDG candidate in N'Z^rekor^, the
announcement of which prorrpted numerous incidents of alleged administra-
62
tive interference throughout the district. Out of seven EDA candidates 
only Soumah was elected in Conakry; however two weeks later he resigned 
from the IDA, thus leaving the PDG without representation in the terri­
torial council of 50 members.
Shortly after the elections, Houphouet made a brief appearance in 
Conakry specifically to meet with Tour6 in the wake of his defeat and 
bitter local reaction. Several months earlier Toure had written a PDG 
meirber in Abidjan expressing his disappointment that the FDA President
failed to live up to his promise to visit Guinea, and was ignoring
63
desperate pleas for funds made by the PDG. Infuriated over alleged
proof of blatant administrative interference in the elections, the
Guinean leader reportedly told Houphouet that: "Now, with the agreement
of Madeira Keita, I am going to engage in open warfare against the 
64
administration." The IDA President reproached Tour6 for refusing to
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run for an assembly seat in the Ivory Coast, where he had previously 
offered him solid backing and assurances. Furthermore, Houphouet rebuked 
the intransigence of the FDG leadership, pointing out the futility of 
reprisals aimed at the government, and in conclusion offered the follow­
ing suggestion and assistance:
I advise you to act with prudence and learn to wait for your 
time to come. Regarding the debt incurred during the 
electoral campaign, never fear, I will pay it. (65)
The reason for containment, and restriction of the PDG by the local 
authorities was its recent suspected link with the Communist Party. Fuel 
for administrative suppression of the Guinean section of the FDA was 
added by the Overseas Ministry when the territory was depicted as the 
main target for Communist infiltration and influence in French West 
Africa. Just prior to the assembly elections, the metropolitan govern­
ment concluded that the "Guinean H3A has remained fundamentally Marxist
\
(Sekou Toure as head)", and that the territory was on its way to
66
becoming the "future bastion of Communism in West Africa." The situa­
tion worsened amidst administrative reports that the PDG was receiving 
financial assistance from the PCF in preparation for the impending
"great war," heralding the birth of the "African Communist Party,
67
destined to replace the old formula of the FDA."
At this point High-Commissioner Cornut-Gentille stepped in to
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rationalise the situation, submitting his interpretation of Guinean
politics, the local FDA section, and Communist activity to the Overseas 
68
Minister. The Commissioner asserted that he was well aware of the
inflow of Communist propaganda in ACF, and although FDA activists in
Guinea were among the frequent destinations, to imply that Communist
activity in West Africa was centered on Guinea was premature, because
other FDA leaders (such as Bakary Djibo in Niger and Abdoulaye Diallo in
Soudan) clearly received as much attention as Toure. Finally, Cornut-
Gentille had not. yet made up his mind about the true convictions of
Tour6, as he wrote:
Concerning Sekou Toure, whose influence as a union leader 
largely surpasses the territorial boundaries, he also seems 
to be in the process of finding his own orientation....It 
thus appears difficult actually to prejudge the definite 
position of Sdkou Toure. There is no doubt, however, that it 
will have a preponderant influence on the political and 
especially trade union orientation in Guinea. (69)
This hesitation in judgement essentially paved the way for better rela­
tions between the emergent leader of the PDG and the French government.
Trade Union Activity: The Code dn Trava i 1 
Dating back to 1947, Overseas Minister Marius Moutet prepared a project 
for a uniform Labour Code in the TCM. Numerous obstacles and changes of 
government delayed the enactment of the bill into law. The Code finally 
passed in the National Assembly at the end of the first Legislature in 
April 1951. Following the extended pause for new elections, the Code was 
eventually laid before the Council of the Republic in December. In the
68
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senate the bill was discussed at great length and considerably amended 
before being returned to the National Assembly in February 1952 for 
promulgation. Further delays caused mounting inpatience of African trade 
unionists, who hence decided to unite forces in order to pressure the 
government to finalise the proceedings and approve the Code.
Union leaders in Guinea, namely Sekou Toure (CGT) and David Soumah 
(CFTC), called for a conference intersyndicale to discuss the problems 
caused by the delay of the Labour Code. The conference met in Dakar from 
6-8 October 1952. In the presence of delegates from most of the trade 
unions operating in ACF, Soumah reported on the current contents of the 
Code, while Toure discussed measures needed to secure its passage. The 
conference recognised the necessity for united action, ordering a 
general strike in ACF on 3 November to impress urgency on the French 
government in adopting the Code.
The strike of 3 November was a triumphant success in Guinea,
Soudan, and in the major cities of Senegal, where nearly all public and
private sector employees joined in the protest. In the Ivory Coast,
Upper Volta, and Dahomey, the strike registered a 50 per cent participa- 
70
tion rate. The strike achieved its aim when subsequently the National 
Assembly hurriedly passed the Labour Code, which became law on 15 
Decenber 1952. Included in the Code dn Travail were passages affirming 
the abolition of forced labour, guaranteeing the rights of trade unions, 
prescribing equal pay for equal working conditions, protecting workers 
against, sudden dismissal, and reducing the working week to 40 hours with 
one day of rest and annual paid holiday. In theory the Code gave the
70
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African labourer legal protection against exploitation. Union leaders in 
ACF rejoiced at what they reckoned to be the beginning of a new era of 
improved working conditions, benefits, and equal rights in African 
economic development. In Guinea Tourd reaffirmed his image as a hero, 
capable of moving a mountain (in this case the French parliament) , with 
the support of the masses firmly behind him.
Silent Transfer of PDG Leadership
Reconfirmed in his position of leading trade unionist in West Africa,
Toure now turned his sights on assuming the highest seat in local
politics. Under somewhat mysterious circumstances, Toure emerged at the
summit of the PDG directorate in early 1953. It has been suggested that
Tour§ persuaded the High-Commissioner to remove his competition in the
71
PDG secretariat by transferring Keita out of Guinea. In retrospect,
Ray Autra similarly noted Toure's rise to power:
As soon as he was taken in by the High-Commissioner Bernard 
Cornut-Gentille, he had us all transferred, one to the Ivory 
Coast, one to Dahomey.... (72)
Keita himself explained that after being summoned to the Governor's
palace, he was informed of his reinstatement into the colonial service
and immediate transfer to Dahomey. Instead of refusing, as he had done
73
in the past, Keita decided to follow the Governor's orders. It is 
uncertain whether either Tour§ or the High-Commissioner played a part in
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this manoeuvre; however at this time Cornut-Gentille was clearly 
undecided about Tours's reliability, and it is widely held that no 
hostility whatsoever existed between kinsmen Keita and Toure at any 
time.
Concerning the case of Autra, moreover, the administration in
Guinea was indeed directly accountable for his latest transfer to the
Ivory Coast, at the request of the Governor:
The presence in Guinea, in the course of the last few 
months, of the instructor Ray Autra, transferred two years 
ago first to Niger then to Dahomey because of his subversive 
attitude, has acted as a catalyst for confrontation....It 
would be nice if the territory could be definitively
relieved of the more dangerous elements, authentically 
Communist, such as the pharmacist Sane Moussa Diallo...and 
Ray Autra, to the return assignment of whom I have already 
expressed my unfavourable opinion. (74)
Furthermore, in the eyes of the local authorities Toure remained very 
suspect; he was accused of playing a double jen between the FDA 
moderates and the Communists, yet was also recognised as potentially 
competent to rally the PDG to Houphouet's side if he so desired. 
Nonetheless, to solicit the transfer of civil servants or otherwise, it 
is doubtful that Toure had any influence at this point in the territor­
ial administration, evidence of honest collaboration being non-existent.
In December 1952 Toure accepted the sponsorship of the Communist 
Party, along with Gabriel d'Arboussier and Abdoulaye Diallo, in repre­
senting West Africa at the annual Congres de. la. Eaix_. Tour6 participated 
in the African delegation to the chagrin of Houphouet, who then summoned 
his disobedient prot£g& to Abidjan to discuss the matter. According to 
sources in the Ivory Coast, Tours's behaviour was reckoned a "sin out of
ANS 17G 573, Governor Guinea to High-Commissioner ACF, No. 444/APA, 
Conakry, 7 October 1952.
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vanity/" the young leader being unable to refuse an all-expense paid
75
trip to Vienna where the congress was held. Nevertheless, Tour6
reportedly apologised to the EDA President in admitting his mistake as
well as promising a public retraction, and thus "returned to the bosom 
76
of the FDA."
Erratic behaviour such as that displayed by Toure, amidst the most
prominent EDA militants, was of grave concern to the FDA President. Upon
his return to Conakry from Abidjan, Toure explained Houphouet*s reasons
for the repeated postponement of the Coordinating Committee meeting,
fervently requested by FDA territorial sections. Apparently the delay
was caused in part by financial difficulties, but more likely due to
"the necessity to bring back to the IDA certain followers of 
77
d'Arboussier." The considerable influence wielded by Toure in both the
politics of the PDG and trade union activities was potentially either a
great asset or colossal problem of the IDA. Keeping Tour6 in line with
the movement's designated orientation was deemed crucial to IDA unity,
proof of which was evident in Houphouet's tolerance and persistence in
retrieving him from frequent deviations from the charted path.
The way in which Tour6 assumed the office of Secretary-General of
the PDG is indeed questionable. Administrative reports of January 1953
78
designated Abdourahmane Diallo as Keita*s replacement; several months
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later the circumstances surrounding the changeover to Toure remain
largely indeterminable. According to Keita a railway worker by the name
of Traord was officially left in charge; however Toure was in fact
directing the party, and hence was unconstitutionally appointed
Secretary-General by PDG militants before a congress could be convoked
79
and elections held to this effect.
Political power in the PDG was increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of a select few party members. While the Comite Directeur met less 
and less frequently, party directives were more often issued by a 
smaller "Comi te Politique11, later known as the Bureau Politique. 
Henceforth as the unequivocal master of the PDG as well as prominent 
union activist, Toure was on his way to becoming the most powerful 
African in Guinea. Intent on removing obstacles to his path toward 
personal dominance and PDG supremacy in the territory, Toure skilfully 
manoeuvred to obtain recognised status via legislative elections while 
at the same time setting out to discredit and decimate opposition 
parties and political foes.
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CHAPTER VI
The Struggle for Power
Following his somewhat irregular ascension to the top position of the
PDG, Sekou Toure aimed to strengthen the party through its ties to the
local trade union movement. The success of the general strike of 3
November 1952 gave a considerable boost to the popularity of the trade
unions, and heightened public awareness of the potential of united
effort. Already recognised as a powerful union militant and organiser
throughout French West Africa, Toure used this influence to coordinate
the political action of the PDG with that of the trade unions operating
in Guinea. The one thing Tour§ still lacked and desperately sought was
election to public office, which seemingly would solidify his political
position in Guinea, and earn him respect and hopefully improved
relations with the French authorities. The importance of obtaining an
elected office was aptly pointed out by Aristide Zolberg:
One might think that to co-operate with the colonial power 
might be interpreted as a sell-out and cost popular support.
But in fact the opposite usually took place....To whatever 
charisma they (African leaders) possessed in the eyes of 
their followers was added the charisma of European power.
(1)
In February 1953 Governor Siriex departed from Guinea, and was 
subsequently replaced by Jean-Paul Parisot. Meanwhile Houphouet was 
discreetly meeting with High-Commissioner Cornut-Gentille to press for 
administrative acceptance of Toure as an EDA loyalist rather than 
-
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2
Communist menace. The chance arose to fulfill Tours's aspirations for 
elected office in August 1953, when partial elections to replace Paul 
T£tau, a deceased member of the Territorial Assembly, were held in the 
district of Beyla. Houphouet described his role in the election 
accordingly:
When, following a vacancy in the region of Beyla, we decided 
to nominate S£kou Tour£, I visited Governor-General Cornut- 
Gentille. I was not asking for the support of the government 
or local administration, but simply neutrality. The promise 
was given; that night I visited administrative encampments 
with Cornut-Gentille...he had summoned the administrators 
and given the instructions that neutrality be absolutely 
respected. (3)
Toure mounted a large campaign for his election, aided by four PDA
delegates, a car and a financial contribution, all supplied by
Houphouet, and the support of vacationing Guinean students speaking on 
4
his behalf.
In light of the considerable efforts to bring a resounding victory
to Toure, the electoral results of 2 August 1953 were in fact rather
obscure. In a district of 12,342 registered voters, Toure narrowly
carried the election with 729 votes against 703 of the second place
candidate. The 86 per cent abstention rate was officially attributed to
5
"unfavourable weather dispersing the population." At any rate Toure 
finally succeeded in gaining electoral office, the Territorial Assembly 
being the first step from which he would climb the ladder of African 
representation and participation in the French administration.
2
P.H. siriex, Houphouet-Boigny; An African Statesman, p. 135.
3
Hassemblement Democratigue Africain, Actea de. Collogue international 
aur 1'Histoire dn PDA, Abidjan, 1986, p. 81.
4
ANS 2G 53, High-Commissioner AOF, "Revue des evenements du 3e 
trimestre 1953, Guinee," Dakar, 12 September 1953, p. 3.
5
IhifL., p . 1.
187
Triumphant Trade Unionism
By 1953 Guinea had the fastest-growing economy in the West African
Federation, becoming the third richest territory after the Ivory Coast
and Senegal. Earlier a book written by Governor Pr6, entitled L'Avenir
de. la Guin6e_ Erangaise, had outlined the vast mineral prospects in the
territory, describing Guinea as the colony most endowed with natural 
6
resources.
Statistics pointed to the dawn of an industrial era in Guinea:
exports were up, from 17,000 tons in 1944 to 155,000 tons in 1952, and
7
to 841,000 tons in 1953. Coastal production of iron ore and bauxite
rose sharply between 1953 and 1955, while further deposits were still 
being uncovered. In the Forest region, the official record of diamond 
excavation (widespread smuggling not included) increased from 50,000 
carats in 1948 to 300,000 carats in 1955. The profits generated by the 
rise in world prices due to the Korean War helped finance the installa­
tion of numerous secondary industries in Guinea.
Industrial growth fostered an expanding labour force, which 
resulted in Africans flocking to the cities and production sites in 
search of gainful employment. The population of Conakry rose from an
estimated 13,000 in 1937 to 40,000 in 1955, reaching 100,000 by late 
8
1958. In these circumstances the trade unions, particularly the CGT, 
were instrumental in organising and supporting the new breed of Guinean 
labourers.
6
Roland Pre, L'Avenir de. la. Guinee Frangaise, Conakry, 1951.
7
R. Schacter Morgenthau, Political Parties, p. 227.
8
A. Lewin, La Guinee, p. 20.
188
As aforementioned, following the strike on 3 November engulfing the
Federation, the Code du Travail was finally adopted on 15 December 1952.
Henceforth the preoccupation of the labour unions shifted to the actual
application of the Code in the West African territories. The
administration as well as local employers were reluctant to implement
the reforms stipulated in the new code, and reportedly delayed its
application, claiming that implied wage increases would place an
intolerable strain on their budgets. The major conflict centered on the
shortening of the work week from 48 to 40 hours, without assured pay
rises of 20 per cent for the African labourers. The increase in hourly
wages, to be set by the local administrations, was not forthcoming.
As in 1952, Guinean labour leaders called for a conference
jnJ-^ rsynrHH^ Ip in order to formulate a coordinated approach toward the
successful implementation of the Code. Demonstrations spread throughout
AOF in 1953, the culmination of which was a proposed general strike
scheduled to begin in September. Sekou Toure was the main organiser of
the impending strike. It is clear that the administration in Guinea
hoped that Toure’s election to the Territorial Assembly at this time
would curb his appetite for trade union heroism and anti-colonial
activities, as one official wrote:
One thought that the EDA leader would change his political 
line if he received an electoral mandate...however that did 
not prevent Sdkou Toure from launching a general strike 
immediately afterwards, and maintaining it for a nunfoer of 
weeks with unquestionable success in Conakry. (9)
Just two weeks after Tours's election, Governor Parisot issued a
decree establishing the reduced work week of 40 hours and an increase in
ANSOM AP 2148/4, "Situation politique 1955," p. 3.
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the minimum wage from 17.50 to 20 francs CFA. The pay rise of 14.28
per cent was broken down into 8.28 per cent in compensation for the
shorter working hours and 6 per cent in consideration of the rising cost 
10
of living. The 20 per cent salary increase demanded by the trade 
unions meant fixing the minimum wage at 21 francs CFA, and thus protest 
continued unabated.
A comite intfirsyndicale was created in Guinea, composed of the 
major trade unions, namely the CGT, CF1C, Railworkers and nominally the 
FO. Led by Tour£ of the CGT and David Soumah of the CF1C, the committee 
organised demonstrations on 18 August, 7 and 14 September 1953, and 
decided to call a general strike of unlimited duration until their 
demand for the 20 per cent wage increase was met by the territorial 
government.
From the onset of the union negotiations, administrative reports
confirmed that "the personal action of S&kou Toure was the determining
11
factor in the vote of the motion to strike." Subsequently Governor
Parisot alerted the High-Commissioner that the threat of massive strike
12
was serious, yet it could be avoided if concessions were granted. The
response of the federal government was an announcement that measures
would be undertaken in order to reduce the cost of living in the West
African territories, thereby increasing the purchasing power of the
13
workers rather than their salaries. There was little Parisot could do
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in this stalemate, as he again admitted that "everything depends on
14
S6kou Toure's decision."
Toure launched the legendary general strike in Guinea on 21
September 1953. In the 66 days which followed, Toure maintained
discipline among the strikers, touring Conakry and surrounding areas
daily to deliver speeches, news bulletins, and watchwords. The
government reported that the strike was total, paralysing commerce in 
15
the territory. Soon fed up with Toure*s apparent hold on the capital,
the Governor intended to have him arrested over a planned demonstration
16
that was subsequently cancelled. A personal conflict of wills 
developed between Tourd and Parisot, while rumours circulated about the 
supremacy of the former over the latter in the territory. In a speech 
before 1,400 strikers, Tour6 displayed his intransigence in the follow­
ing declaration:
We want nothing from individual persons. We do not want to 
"sack" the Governor as certain people are claiming. It is 
not a question of a political strike and we are not issuing 
any policies. We are fighting solely the politics of 
injustice and famine. If the Government does not want the 
workers to combat the administration and its authority, let 
it grant them the Code du. Travail. (17)
By mid-November employers in Guinea were pursuing talks with the comit.e
intersyndioale in search of a compromise pay rise. The union leaders,
14
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however, showed no interest whatsoever in an offer of a 16 per cent
18
salary increase over the initial proposal of 14.3 per cent. When
Governor Parisot returned from a meeting in Dakar without any new
initiatives, Tour£ and Soumah went personally to see the High-
Commissioner. Finally, on 25 November, Cornut-Gentilie was able to
report that "following agreement reached after ultra-laborious negotia-
19
tions, work will resume today in Guinea." The Guinean labour leaders 
had secured from the federal government a minimum wage of 20.56 francs 
CFA, an increase of 17.5 per cent.. Two days later a French ministerial 
decree raised the hourly wage in AOF by a uniform 20 per cent, the move 
for which the Guinean labour movement received the lion's share of the 
credit.
The impact of the strike in Guinea was manifold. Membership in
20
local trade unions as well as the PDG soared. The working class was 
mobilised into a weighty political force, capable of united sustained 
effort in pressing the administration for local reforms. Women played an 
important role in the strike, not only in supplying food for the 
strikers and their families, but also as messengers, organisers, and 
morale-boosters helping to maintain discipline among the troops.
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Finally^ in the words of the High-Commissioner, the strike:
made a star out of the union leader S£kou Toure, whose 
political "valour,” from this moment onward, surpasses the 
framework of Guinea and takes on an importance on the 
federal level. (21)
As Secretary-General of the CGT in West Africa, Toure's rapidly
accruing power worried even the central leadership of the French CGT. In
February 1954 a congress of CGT unions in ACF was held in Abidjan, where
the statutes were altered to elect three West African Secretaries (in
22
lieu of one) to the Coordinating Committee. Meanwhile Houphouet,
concerned that Toure was manipulating the trade union movement for
political ends, began pressing him to reaffirm strict allegiance to the
PDA. Toure accordingly did so, and at this time hints at a possible
23
future rupture with the metropolitan CGT were laid.
Guinean Politics Redefined
The sudden death of Yacine Diallo on the night of 14 April 1954 created 
a considerable political void in Guinea. Diallo had been a major 
stabilising factor in Guinean politics, as he was supported by the 
administration as well as the traditional chieftaincy, and effectively 
maintained unity throughout the Fouta region. The replacement election 
for Diallo's seat in the National Assembly, held on 27 June, was 
engulfed in intense rivalry between his potential successors.
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For the first time in Guinea, ethnicity did not play the 
determinant role in electoral alliances. From its inception the RDA 
consistently campaigned against regional and ethnic divisions; as a 
major defender of the labour force, the PDG was acquiring new supporters 
from all over the territory. Indeed the timing seemed opportune to elect 
S6kou Tour6, now more famous and powerful than ever, as H5A-PDG 
representative in the National Assembly. In order to combat the greatly 
strengthened PDG in the forthcoming elections, a coordinating committee 
conposed of representatives from the Amicale Gilbert viaillard., Union 
Mande, Union Forestiere, and Comity d'Union da Basse-Gninee was created. 
Initially an electoral alliance, this coalition subsequently formed a 
political party known as the Bloc Africain da Guinea (BAG).
With the recommendation of the almamy Ibrahima Sory Dara, spiritual 
leader of the Fulani, Barry Diawadou was selected as the BAG candidate. 
Son of the almamy of Dabola, as well as Ponty graduate, Diawadou had 
been the popular intellectual of the AGV. At the age of 37 Diawadou had 
previously been an opponent of Yacine Diallo, running against him in the 
1951 election to the National Assembly. As Diallo's appointed successor, 
Diawadou inherited the support of the administration as well as Fulani 
aristocracy. Shifting his political stance toward his conservative 
backers, Diawadou lost the support of the younger educated elite he 
hitherto represented. This faction of the AGV, including its former 
president Diallo Abdoulaye, thus split off to found a new party, the 
Democratic Socialiste de. Guinee (DSG). Aligned with the metropolitan 
SFIO, the DSG denounced the feudal istic ways of the Fouta chieftaincy, 
and put forth Barry Ibrahima, a university graduate known locally as 
Barry III, as its candidate for the June by-election.
The French government carefully planned to work against Sekou Toure
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in the legislative elections. In fixing the dates for the by-election,
special consideration was given to the Fouta region in order to register
the highest voter turn-out possible. As was stated in a note for the
Overseas Minister, "it is inportant that the Fulani vote in great
numbers to defeat S§kou Tour£, and to obtain representation in the
24
National Assembly." The July election date initially proposed by the
High-Commissioner was rejected on the grounds of possible rains in the
region, which might give an advantage to Tour§; therefore the June date
was finally agreed upon.
On the federal level,- however, the High-Commissioner had a
different opinion of Toure’s candidacy. In a report dated 17 May,
Cornut-Gentille tried to persuade the French government that Tour£
should not be considered an enemy of the administration, and instead
should be given a fair chance, as he wrote:
If the political situation just before the election indi­
cates that his candidacy has a real chance of being returned 
by electoral suffrage, it is important that this success is 
in no way a success "against" the administration....it is 
advisable in any case to examine his candidacy without 
"apriorism." (25)
Meanwhile rumours of Toure's dealings with the High-Commissioner spread
in Paris, as he reportedly received Cornut-Gentille's pledge of support,
and consequently "Parisot received instructions which did not please 
26
him."
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Just prior to the election, the government fell and a new Overseas
Minister, Robert Buron, was appointed. Buron was considered "the most
27
liberal politician to hold that office since Mitterrand." In his 
determination to "integrate" the EDA into territorial government, Buron 
also reinitiated the proposals for municipal reorganisation, measures 
that would lead to decentralisation and the strengthening of the Terri­
torial Assemblies. Buron replaced all the department heads at Rue 
CXidinot within a few weeks of his instatement, and began recalling 
alleged tough governors. Although the Mendes-France government ended in 
early 1955, the subsequent Overseas Minister Paul Teitgen under the 
Faure government carried on the policies adopted by Buron.
Six days before the Guinea by-election, Buron clarified his 
position concerning administrative policy in AOF:
At the very moment that I assume my duties I wish to affirm 
on the matter of Guinea, and in general all territories, my 
absolute will to keep the administration in an attitude of 
strict neutrality regarding electoral procedures. (28)
Cornut-Gentille reported back that he had already given imperative
orders, both written and oral, to the Governor of Guinea concerning
neutrality, and that he had sent numerous personal emissaries to
29
reinforce his instructions. Nonetheless, it seemed the orders fell on 
deaf ears, as reports of administrative opposition continued to 
circulate, for example:
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In any case, it seems that Governor Parisot, much less 
confident than the authorities in Dakar, intends to combat 
S§kou Tour6,..whatever the instructions of the High- 
Commissioner. His chances of obtaining the seat vacated by 
Yacine Diallo suffer from hostility organised by the local 
government. (30)
The results of the elections of 27 June 1954 were largely as 
anticipated by the Governor's forecasts:
As expected the Fouta region recorded the lowest abstention rate,
totalling 91,935 votes in favour of Diawadou. Governor Parisot noted the
following significant characteristic of elections in Guinea:
The Fouta Djalon essentially constitutes the political power 
in Guinea by the fact of its population (more than 750,000 
inhabitants) and the number of registered voters (more than 
190,000). Thus the Fouta can be the sole determining factor 
in legislative elections if it forms a united front. (32)
The predominance of the Fulani voting bloc was aided in the 1954
elections, when out of 82,980 newly registered voters, 72,056 were
33
designated to the Fouta region.
Apart from the disproportionate increase in number of registered
voters per region, the PDG (supported by the DSG on many accounts)
brought a multitude of the usual complaints and charges of administra­
tive duplicity to the French government, such as:
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Barry Diawadou 
Sekou Toure 
Barry Ibrahima
145,497 
85,808 
16,098 (31)
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1) 10,000 voters were stricken from the electoral lists in 
districts claiming PDG dominance;
2) HDA militants were wrongfully imprisoned;
3) The administration financed the campaign and travel 
expenses of Diawadou and his supporters;
4) Chefs da oanton were threatened with losing their 
positions if they didn't force the vote for Diawadou;
5) Electoral ballots were not distributed by a commission 
but rather by Commandants da Cercle and local chiefs;
6) Delegates supporting Diawadou were designated presidents 
of voting stations and transported by administrative 
vehicles;
7) K)A members were not allowed to participate in the 
supervision of polling stations, ballot tallying, 
or reporting; and
8) Violent incidents were organised against the PDG. (34)
Governor Parisot insisted that strict neutrality was observed throughout
the territory in the elections of 27 June, and dismissed Toure's
objections with the simple statement that "the favourite dialectic of
35
Sekou Tour6 is the lie."
The case for the validation of the Guinea by-election was brought 
before the National Assembly in January 1955. The expected opposition of 
the UDSR and SFIO was however not forthcoming. In fact the only recorded 
protest to Diawadou's election came from the Communist deputy Charles 
Benoist. Members of the UDSR, to which the HDA was affiliated in 
parliament, were notably absent on the day of the vote, while the SFIO 
as a bloc abstained. Consequently the validation of Barry Diawadou to 
the National Assembly passed uneventfully on 21 January 1955.
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The PDG Takeover
The period following the June by-election and preceding the validation 
of Diawadou was very turbulent in Guinea. Incidents occurred at the 
slightest provocation; moreover mass protest and confrontation of 
political opponents were more often deliberately planned than 
spontaneous. The KDA-PDG was chiefly responsible for large demonstra­
tions giving rise-' to damage of personal property and clashes with both 
Diawadou supporters and security forces. What enabled the PDG to 
organise such widespread protest and demonstration of strength was a 
highly successful mobilisation campaign launched by Toure immediately 
after the June election. According to the party newspaper, PDG member­
ship rose from 5,000 in the beginning of 1954 to 300,000 by the end of 
36
that same year.
Building on the established trade union base, the PDG now aimed
especially at incorporating women into the movement. Once mobilised,
Guinean women constituted a vast political force, extremely loyal to
Tour6, and capable of inciting the masses to protest and violence. Toure
also effectively used women in the campaign to agitate men; the courage
and vigilance displayed by females was intended to bring shame on the
weaker men. Speaking to crowds of over 1,000 women, Toure proclaimed:
Many among you have more courage than your husbands....Man 
owes everything to woman, women are like salt, a political 
party without women is a dish without seasoning. (37)
Moreover the PDG leader called for women to hold fast to the party line,
and not to fear their husbands if they did not agree. It was reported
—
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that Tourd went so far as to invite women to refuse their husbands if
they were not party activists, telling them not to worry, because he
38
would give them true democrats in their place. Songs which became
slogans of the women’s movement included the following verses:
If men are afraid of repression, let them give us the 
trousers in their place.
We will no longer share a bed with any enemy of Sily, who is 
our legitimate husband, Sekou Tour£ will choose for us a 
democratic mate. (39)
Toure had a great charm with the ladies, not only was he considered very
handsome, but "vigorously leading the struggle for women’s liberation,
40
he is the idol of Soussou and Malinke women." The effects of the PDG's
mobilisation of women was widespread, and beneficial to the strength of
the party as well as that of the women’s campaign for equal rights. As
noted by an official reporting from Kindia in January 1955:
Custom has rapidly evolved in the course of the last few 
years and particularly in the year 1954, with the 
emancipation of women movement advocated by the KDA, which 
moreover has been a determining factor in its success. The 
Soussou woman can now be considered man’s equal; no longer 
is there a question of marriage against her will. (41)
The PDG was in fact leading a social revolution in Guinea,
confronting traditional views of the roles of women, youth, the
chieftaincy, social organisation, and justice. Greatly in the fashion of
the Communist Party, the PDG reorganised Guinean society on the grass
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roots level. With amazing speed the party instituted "parallel 
administrations" throughout the territory. In an analysis submitted in 
February 1955 by Administrator Brajot of the French Overseas Ministry, 
the case of Labaya was given as an example of the rapid KDA-PDG 
takeover:
In the elections of June 1954, the population of Labaya, 
grouped behind the chief David Sylla, voted as a bloc for 
Barry Diawadou. Six months later, the sub-division is almost 
completely won over by the H3A, the chief is injured, his 
friends molested, his compound ransacked, and he himself 
owes his life only to the intervention of the local police.
(42)
The attack launched by the PDG on the chieftaincy was particularly 
fierce. Long considered puppets of the administration by many local 
populations, the village and canton chiefs not professing allegiance to 
the PDG were harassed to the point of capitulation, or suffered public 
humiliation and loss of control over their jurisdictions. Whereas the 
administration recognised chiefs as representatives of the government, 
the PDG campaigned that the chief was the representative of his people, 
and therefore a village with a majority of party members must be led by 
a PDG chief. In the above example, chief David Sylla proved an ideal 
case for PDG exposure of administrative chiefs as enemies of the people.
In the Coastal district of Dubreka, following a rapid inplantation 
of PDA structure, non-PDA Sylla was repeatedly harassed by local 
villagers. His attempts to collect taxes and investigate disturbances 
were hampered by crowds of women insulting him and blocking his path. On 
several occasions Sylla was forced off his horse and relieved of his 
gun and saber. In mid-January 1955, "PDA policemen" supposedly uncovered 
__
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a plot by Sylla to murder the local PDG President Thierno Camara. The
43
accused assassin, a Fulani, was subsequently held in FDA custody.
Interrogated in front of a large crowd, the suspect eventually admitted
under duress that he was taking orders from the chief; after which his
head was shaved and he was paraded around the village publicly
confessing his crimes. When news of this unlawful arrest and trial
reached district headquarters, nine arrest warrants were issued against
the FDA perpetrators, including Thierno Camara. When the police arrived
on 9 February to make the arrests, they were met by a large mob of FDA
militants from several neighbouring villages, intending to prevent them
from carrying out their mission. Sylla was accompanying the police in
order to identify the wanted men. The crowd was armed and a riot broke
out, whereby tear gas as well as grenades were employed by the police.
Himself under attack, chief Sylla reached for his saber and rode through
the crowd seriously wounding at least four women, and maiming up to ten 
44
people. The wife of the local PDG President, M ’Ballya Camara, received 
saber wounds which killed her unborn child, and she died several days 
later from her injuries. M'Ballya Camara thus became one of the most 
celebrated martyrs of the PDG, while David Sylla served as the public 
example of the heinous chieftaincy, brutalising the Guinean masses under 
administrative protection.
Numerous reports told of how the FDA successfully implemented a 
puppet organisation acting as a screen between the local populations and 
the French administration. Governor Parisot explained the situation to
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the High-Commissioner accordingly:
From Bok6 to Forbeariah, Conakry to Kindia, there is no 
longer a village where an order is carried out, or a franc 
of taxes paid, without the consent of FDA officials. The 
party, which in order to do this used the pre-existing 
framework of village society, has put in place its police 
wearing insignias and its own tribunals. Practically no more 
communication relays exist between the Commandants de. Cercle 
and the masses....The most insane circulars travel around 
the country about the invulnerability of whoever carries the 
party membership card, about the exoneration of FDA members 
from taxes, and about the legitimacy of refusing to obey any 
order not emanating from the party. (45)
Societies were restructured in the following manner: the existing
village chief, having joined the KDA, was charged solely with official
relations with the Commandant de. Cercle, whereby a "president" was
nominated, aided by a committee composed of an appointed attorney,
judge, commissioner, doctor, and treasurer. The president was seconded
by a presidente.— the leader of the women's organisation, whose role was
usually substantial in local party activity. Furthermore the puppet
administration maintained a network of messengers and its own police
force. Political restructuring was coupled with economic reorganisation,
as PDG villages farmed communally, carried out local building projects,
and shared the wealth of the community. Finally, cultural events were
also designated, including frequent gatherings, meetings, and teaching
of "progressive music" set to party songs and chants. Regarding the
plethora of existing PDG villages, administrator Brajot concluded the
following:
In sum, the village works en bloc, acts en bloc, votes en 
hi or;, obeys en bloc. If necessary, and if the leaders give 
the order, it will rise up en bloc. (46)
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The methods employed by the PDG to subjugate the Guinean masses 
were largely tactics learned from prior Communist education. The party 
cell was a totalitarian organisation, where participation was mandatory, 
and no defection was tolerated. According to the detailed report 
furnished by Brajot, the following steps were taken in order to implant 
PDG cells throughout the territory:
1) Public meetings of indoctrination: the party does not set 
out to prove anything, it merely affirms. Simple 
principles are endlessly repeated until they are accepted 
as truths by the masses. These affirmations are 
accompanied by absurd promises such as "we will soon 
share the wealth of the capitalists," "the party will 
equally divide the abundant riches of the country," and 
"because of this the people will be able to live without 
work ing";
2) Organisation of the party: starting at. the base, cells 
are formed at the village level. Nominated officials are 
normally heads of large families or influential persons 
who are able to lead more or less the entire commmunity 
into the party. Hence PDG membership cards are sold and 
distributed to all in a matter of days;
3) Elimination of opponents: initially by threats and 
propaganda stating that party cards are necessary to buy 
or sell goods, take buses or trains, receive medical 
care, send children to school, etc. Finally outright 
coercion is used, including boycotts of non-FDA goods and 
services, burglary, and incineration of property and 
homes; and
4) Call toward violence and creating incidents: final stage
to subjugate the adversary. Harassment and provocation 
of opponents until clashes ensue, after which the PDG 
exposes violence on the part of its foes, puts forth 
martyrs, and further rallies the masses to protest IDA 
arrests and repression.(47)
Incidents
Incidents of unprecedented violence in Guinea occurred systematically 
throughout the territory following the election of Barry Diawadou to the 
National Assembly in June 1954. Over the next eight months, and corre­
sponding to the PDG reorganisation and takeover of countless villages,
47
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clashes between political opponents and with the security forces were
commonplace. Characteristically the violence was often initiated by
women, whose insults provoked their victims to hostilities, as well as
their own men whom they made ashamed of their hesitations. Skirmishes
between political adversaries often escalated into beatings, stonings,
attaoks on personal property (including ransacking or burning), and the
use of knives or occasionally guns. Upon their arrival at the scene,
police were usually stoned, their paths blocked by the crowds and large
objects placed in their way. It was reported that tear gas had little
effect on the mobs; for example 57 bombs were used in Boffa in an
48
attempt to break up a riot. In several cases grenades were thrown, 
under the pretext of protecting wounded security officers. The clashes 
were very often organised in nature, with specific opponents targeted in 
advance, and large numbers of militants recruited. Finally, the violence 
was not confined to urban areas, but spread into newly politically 
activated villages and sub-districts hitherto unmotivated by political 
issues.
The following is a brief summary of the most serious incidents,
which occurred in Guinea between June 1954 and February 1955;
27 June 1954: Partial elections to the National Assembly.
Protest demonstrations in Bok6 immediately after the pro­
nouncement of Barry Diawadou as deputy.
July: A crowd of 3,000 people stage a mass reception upon
the arrival of Tour§ in Conakry.(1.7)
Arrival of Diawadou is met by insults leading to brawls 
between Soussous (FDA) and Fulani.(24.7) The following day 
more incidents, police intervention, approximately 30 
arrests.
September: An FDA meeting denouncing Diawadou supporters
led to the stoning of the latters' homes.(6.9)
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Diawadou is carried away by an opposing crowd. (12.9) Same 
day following a private meeting held by Tourd, IDA militants 
marched in the streets brandishing insults and throwing 
rocks at their opponents and respective houses. 
Demonstrations again the next day, police intervention, 5 
arrests.
October: Random incidents occurred October 3-7.
In Conakry, Ansoumany Kontd, insulted and threatened at his 
home by EDA activists, fired upon the crowfl with a shotgun 
injuring 2 demonstrators. Kontd himself suffered several 
knife wounds. Police intervention.(21.10) Same night and 
continuing for 3 days, PDA crowds attacked their opponents, 
ransacking and burning several houses, beating their victims 
and stoning the security police. Police used tear gas and 
batons to disperse the mobs.
Upon the arrival of French Overseas Minister Robert Buron, 
IDA militants attempt to block the path of the military 
parade. Massive IDA demonstrations at Conakry, Kindia, 
Mamou, and each railway stop along the Minister's tour, (end 
of October)
In Kindia and Fordcariah, protest against the canton chiefs, 
police intervention.(31.10)
November: In Tatdma (Boffa district) 2 village chiefs are
molested by PDA supporters, their homes pillaged.(4.11)
Violence in Conakry, 5 arrests.(16.11)
Further clashes in Madind (Fordcariah)(20.11), and Coyah 
(Dubrdka)(21.11), involving 3 wounded, deployment of 
security forces.
Near Dubrdka EDA militants stoned the houses of the village 
chief and 2 notables of Kdninde. A crowd opposing the police 
investigation blocked roads with tree trunks.(9.12) The 
following day 150 people stormed the district headquarters 
and clashed with police; 7 wounded, 15 arrests.
Coyah (Dubrdka)— IDA ransacked the home of a political 
rival, and threw rocks at 2 policemen, who were subsequently 
forced to release 2 men in their custody.(9.12)
Sinsinkoro (Kissidougou)— The canton chief, surrounded and 
molested by IDA men, wounded 5 people with his 
shotgun.(17.12)
Ouassou (Boffa)— Territorial councillor Amarah Soumah is 
threatened and manhandled by EDA supporters.(26.12) Same day 
village chief of Sagoma is attacked by a band of IDA 
militants, his house is destroyed, as well as that of his 
secretary.
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January-February 1955: Boke— RDA demonstrations at meeting 
of Diawadouists. A Commandant de. CereIe and an inspector are 
assailed with rocks, the latter wounded in the face. Aggres­
sion against canton chief and RDA opponents. Reinforcements 
of district security forces sent.(28.1)
Conakry— French Union Assemblyman, Karim Bangoura, announced 
in a private meeting that his party (BAG) would respond to 
RDA violence blow for blow. That evening clashes between RDA 
and BAG. Several arrests.(30.1) Following night, RDA 
militants attack and pillage the home of the Chef de. 
quart-ier of Corinthie, who fired several gun shots. Other 
acts of aggression committed against 3 Diawadouists. 
Victims: 1 Fulani killed, 44 wounded of which 7
hospitalised. Security forces stoned by the crowds.
Following day, 2 brawls break out. in the city, one in. front 
of the Commissioner’s office where demonstrators demanded 
the release of prisoners, the second involving the torching 
of a house. 25 arrests.(1.2)
The next night, in the suburb of Coleah, 1 dwelling and 4 
market stalls owned by Fulani are burned. Political parties 
appeal for calm.(2.2)
Coyah (Dubrdka)— demonstration with stoning, 5 homes of 
Diawadou supporters are attacked, 2 burned. Attacks conduct­
ed with the use of a bugle and whistle.(3.2)
Following night at Maneah, near Coyah, a conpound of a 
Diawadouist burned. Police intervention, arrests.(4.2)
The next few nights incidents involving the setting afire of 
cars and trucks of Diawadouists.
Banbaya (Dubreka)— On 8 February the canton chief is 
molested, beaten, pulled off of his horse, his gun taken 
from him. The next day 2 squads of police, arriving to 
execute warrants to arrest RDA militants, are attacked by 
several hundred demonstrators armed with guns, knives and 
sling-shots. During the ensuing scuffle, the chief uses his 
sabre. Victims: 9 wounded policemen, of which 2 seriously?
approximately 20 wounded RDA, 8 seriously. One woman lost 
her unborn child and died one week later from her injuries.
Bakao and Colia (Boffa)— A trader and a canton chief are 
attacked and beaten by RDA elements. One compound pillaged 
and another incinerated.(16.2) Police make 13 arrests, and 
later use batons and grenades to break up a mob of several 
hundred demonstrators encircling the prison demanding the 
release of those detained.(19.2)
President and Secretary of the RDA section at Boffa, who had 
given written instructions capable of disrupting the peace, 
are arrested.(22.2)
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Negotiations and Appeal for Calm
Ouezzin Coulibaly/ Ivorian senator and Political Secretary of the RDA, 
arrived in Conakry on 15 February to serve as intermediary in negotia­
tions between Sekou Tour6 and Governor Parisot. In spite of a rather 
anbiguous communique published in the PDG newspaper La Libert§, 
Coulibaly wrote, signed, and had Tour£ countersign a set of
"instructions" to party officials clarifying points of RDA principles 
49
and doctrine. Coulibaly's circular reminded the PDG sub-sections that 
the PDA was an interterritorial movement., with a discipline and orienta­
tion determined by its Coordinating Committee, to which the territorial 
sections owed strict allegiance and obedience. Secondly, the FDA "is a 
party in the government," nationally recognised and represented in 
parliament. Thirdly, Coulibaly stressed that the RDA membership card in 
no way rendered its holder above the law, and taxes must be paid even to 
chiefs of opposing political parties. Finally, and explicitly, "the RDA 
prohibits all demonstrations of a fascist nature, such as the creation 
of shock troops, so-called commissioners, and police publicly brandish­
ing arm-badges and stripes."
A second communique, signed by Tour6 and members of the PDG
50
executive, followed on 18 February. While denying any responsibility 
for the recent incidents, the circular denounced the instigators of 
violence and reiterated that the "RDA will not tolerate any subversive 
activity." Professing loyalty to the RDA Coordinating Committee, the PDG 
__
"Instructions aux responsables du PDG," signed by Ouezzin 
Coulibaly and reproduced in Annex 3 of Pruvost report.
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"Communique du Bureau du PDG," 18 February 1955, reprinted in 
Annex 4 of Pruvost report.
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directorate vowed:
to defend the interests of the country within the framework 
of legality, in sincere cooperation with the public authori­
ties and all men of good will in the private sector who are
concerned about economic development and the evolution of
African society within the French Union.
Negotiations between the EDA and the government included 
discussions of the economic future of Guinea, an issue of prime consid­
eration to Tour§. In fact the acknowledgement that public disturbances 
threatened the rapid development of the territory was the stated reason 
behind the appeal for calm. Ultimately the PDG circular ordered strict 
discipline among party ranks, and maintained that only the PDG executive 
had the authority to formulate written or oral instructions to party
sub-sections. Five thousand of these orders were distributed, and it was
reported that subsequently total calm was restored in Guinea.
Parisot sent instructions out to his subordinates as well, announc­
ing the arrival of PDA representatives to redress the situation on the 
local level. The Governor, who believed that the major factor behind the 
incidents was the widespread belief that the possession of an FDA 
membership card exempted its holder from administrative legality,
reported that he had received formal assurance that the "mentality of
51
the masses" would be corrected without delay. In this endeavour 
Parisot instructed his administrators to help the FDA as much as 
possible, however "without making it seem vis a vis the FDA, or vis a 
vis the population, that we are sharing the use of public power."
For some time now the personal power wielded by Toure was a thorn
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Governor Guinea, "Note d ’orientation politique," No. 23/CAB, 25
February 1955, reprinted in Customs report, pp. 35-8.
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in the side of the administration. In Guinea the RDA symbol, the
elephant or "sily" (in Soussou language), became synonymous with Toure
himself. Rice in Conakry was called "riz Sdkou Toure" or simply "sily,"
and was available to those who asked for it by name, presenting their
52
H)A membership card. Another of Toure's nicknames was "Governor" of
Conakry, as he was referred to in song and popular slogans.
Tours’s ascendance to the position of Governor in the eyes of his
followers stemmed from the visit of French Overseas Minister Buron to
Guinea in October 1954. As acknowledged by Governor Parisot:
During the trip made by the French Overseas Minister, Sekou
Toure submitted the proof that he was able to mobilise the
quasi-totality of the urban centers according to his will.
(53)
Buron was met by a giant reception sponsored by the PDG, whose menbers
directed traffic and organised the parade. Demonstrators carried signs
reading "Vive le Ministre" on one side and "Vive le PDA" on the other.
PDG women, wearing dresses embroidered with the sily, sang songs
proclaiming that the Minister was handing Guinea over to Tour£.
Surely the RDA display of coordination and leadership had an impact
cxi the visiting dignitary, who reportedly gave up his seat to Toure at a
54
reception held in the Governor's palace. Stories such as this, and the 
fact that Tour6 accompanied Buron on his tour of Guinea, fueled PDG 
propaganda that the Minister had conferred the governing of the terri­
tory to the PDG leader.
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In official correspondence between the Overseas Minister and the
High-Commissioner, it is clear that both men favoured a policy of
working with Tour§ rather than against him. In a letter dated 4 April
1955, Buron approved the following policy submitted by Cornut-Gentille
concerning the course of action in Guinea following the incidents:
Practice with patience and firmness the policy of 
rapprochement between the leaders of diverse tendencies; 
appease instead of agitate...wisdom dictates to try to use 
the forces one considers harmful in order to prevent them 
from causing harm. (55)
The FDA Coordinating Committee meets in Conakry
The FDA Coordinating Committee had not officially convened since 1948.
With the mixed feelings surrounding the desapparentement from the PCF in
1950 and the d'Arboussier split in 1952, a formal IDA. congress and
Coordinating Committee meeting had been repeatedly postponed. Finally
the leadership felt secure enough to call the central organ of the FDA
together to solidify ties as well as weed out the remaining minimal
dissension in the movement.
The choice of Conakry as the meeting place was deliberate on
several accounts. First of all the IDA section in Guinea was influential
in size and impact in federal activities. Moreover it was evident that.
since 1954 the growth of the FDA-PDG "was due, to a certain extent., more
to the particular personality of Sekou Tour6 than to the influence of 
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the party itself." It was in the interest of the interterritorial FDA
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211
that the Guinean section be kept to the party line. Secondly despite the 
great strength of the FDA in Guinea, the party still suffered from 
administrative hostility and surprisingly was yet to have any elected 
representatives in the French government. Committee members wanted the 
meeting to take place in Conakry in order to display FDA support of its 
problematic section, as well as work towards bettering its relations 
with the French territorial government. Thirdly Houphouet and his RDA 
subordinates were anxiously waiting for Toure to make several public 
announcements, and it was agreed that the Coordinating Committee meeting 
in Conakry would be the appropriate time and place.
The meeting was initially scheduled to take place beginning 22 
February 1955, but. violent incidents in Conakry led to its postponement 
until July. The French government agreed to allow the meeting to be held 
in Conakry only after promises had been made concerning Tours’s 
intentions. Houphouet and Gabriel Lisette persuaded the Overseas 
Minister that Toure, in front of his own people, would reaffirm his 
party’s allegiance to FDA orientation and doctrine as well as to the 
movement’s central leadership. Moreover Tour§ was expected to pledge PDG 
willingness to cooperate with the French administration and the tradi­
tional chieftaincy in the economic and social development of Guinea. 
Most importantly it was anticipated that Tour6 would finally publicly 
recognise the total split between the FDA and the Communist Party, and 
announce the creation of an African trade union movement, independent of 
the metropolitan CGT and the greater F6d&rat ion Syndic ale? Mond iall e. A 
move long awaited by the French officials, severing ties with the CGT 
and FSM signalled the end of Communist influence over FDA members, and
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heightened prospects of inproved relations with union-oriented Tour6 and 
the PDG.
At this point Tourd's main aspiration was to prove himself the 
undisputed political leader in Guinea by gaining a seat in the French 
parliament. Through violence, repression, and martyrdom Tourfe obtained 
popularity among his people, but was treated with unwavering hostility 
and suspicion by the local French authorities. It was Houphouet who once 
again brought Toure back into the fold. Toure was reminded that early 
incidents and repression in the Ivory Coast paved the way for coopera­
tion, peace, and prosperity in the territory, greatly benefiting the 
RDA. It seems that this time Tour§ was convinced of the utility of 
cooperation versus resistance, and unity of action on political and 
economic fronts towards progressive reform in the West African 
Federation.
In May 1955 a preparatory conference was held in Dakar to set the
agenda for the forthcoming R)A Coordinating Committee meeting, scheduled
to begin 8 July in Conakry. Toure used this occasion to outline and
discuss the situation facing Guinea and possible measures to relieve the
underlying tension. In a subsequent letter addressed to Houphouet, Toure
57
reiterated his main points and concerns. According to the PDG leader, 
he and his party willingly accepted and followed the 1950 move of 
d6sapparentement from the PCF. Tour£ explained that the PDG— basically a 
party of workers that grew out of a trade union base, and greatly aided 
by the youth and women's movements— was suffering from interference by 
—
ANSCM AP 2143/9, Letter S6kou Tour6 to Felix Houphouet-Boigny, 
Dakar, 20 May 1955.
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the administration in political affairs, including its support of rival 
ethnic groups provoking violent incidents in the territory. Claiming 
that the PDG influenced more than half of the population, Toure 
repeatedly complained that the party was not represented in the existing 
municipal councils, nor the French government, and in fact he himself 
was the only PDG member serving in the Territorial Assembly. Tour£ 
committed himself to cooperation with the authorities, as long as the 
following conditions were met:
1) Administrative neutrality in elections;
2) Consultation of party leaders for opinions regarding 
potential projects concerning the territory? and
3) An end to deliberate transfers of political activists 
and unlawful imprisonment of citizens due to their 
political affiliations.
In conclusion, Toure summarised his position accordingly;
If I reach an understanding on these issues, my efforts in 
the triple plan, syndical, economic, and political, will 
gain quicker results, and rapidly lead to the installation 
in Guinea of a new atmosphere of mutual understanding and 
constructive action. (58)
To this end, Toure was again asking Houphouet to intervene on his behalf 
to the higher authorities in an effort to convince them of his sincerity 
and loyalty to the PDA and the Federation.
Twenty-nine delegates from six West African territories partici­
pated in the H3A Coordinating Committee meeting held in Conakry, 8-11
part of the
July 1955. In his opening remarks Tour6 upheld his^bargain by stating 
that the PDG held total confidence in the Coordinating Committee, and 
had broken all relations with the Communist Party. The close of Tours's 
speech was remarkably reformed in nature— "Vive le PDA1 Vive l'Union
58
Ibid..
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Frangaise! Vive la France!" In fact one of the outstanding character­
istics of the speeches and sentiment put forth by the Committee was a 
deep loyalty to France and the French Union. In his "Rapport Moral et 
d'Orientation," Houphouet thus stressed the bond between France and her 
overseas territories:
Our ardent wish is that French families understand that the 
FDA has turned toward the entire French people with the 
desire to build with them a durable community where 
inevitable family quarrels will not harm the loyalty, 
confidence, nor the willingness to live together. (60)
Moreover the 1949 FDA congress was labelled an aberration, and the
principles of the founding Bamako congress of 1946 were reaffirmed. The
goal of the RDA was again defined as:
The creation of a mass movement which is both the expression
of the masses and the masses themselves, not an avant-garde
political party, but uniting all social classes to lead to 
the emancipation of the African territories within the
framework of the French Union by affirmation of their 
individual political, economic, social and cultural 
characteristics. (61)
Resolutions were adopted in the following areas: political,
economic, social, organisation, the press, and anciens combat.t.ants.
Two parties which had refused to follow the 1950 shift in orientation,
the UDS of Senegal and the UPC of Cameroun, were excluded from the
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RDA. The general resolution emerging from the Committee called for
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The UDS stood for the Union Democratigue S6n£galaioef and the UPC 
was the Union dos Populations Cameronnaioes led by Urn Nyobe. The UDN 
(Union Democrat igue Nigerienne) of Bakary Djibo was also denied recogni­
tion as it was a splinter group from the formal Nigerien RDA Section the 
PPN (Parti. Progress is t,e Nigerien).
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universal suffrage and an end to the double-college electoral system, a
federal orientation regarding West Africa, and true cooperation between
Europeans and Africans.
Tbur6's moves towards breaking the alliance between the West
African trade union movement and the French CGT and World Federation
(FSM) were discussed in a private session of the Coordinating 
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Committee. In his closing remarks, however, Houphouet spoke about
Tours's explanation of the problem and of the PDG leader's personal
persecution due to his activities in a Communist-affiliated trade union.
Houphouet then gave the following tribute to Tour§, while proclaiming
the advent of a new era of African trade unionism:
Union leader, having the total confidence of West African 
workers, he could not, just because the CGT is affiliated to 
a paraconurunist organisation, abandon his responsibilities.
He was fought against like a Communist, and even today this 
weighs against him. But we know the value of actions led by 
Sekou Tourd to benefit African workers and masses, and 
further benefits will soon be revealed. The dawn of the 
truth is already on the horizon, and I, in the name of the 
FDA, thank him. (64)
Thus the Coordinating Committee in Conakry accomplished all it had set
out to do, and the FDA was again strong in unity and refreshed in its
commitments, goals, orientation, and purpose.
Coincidentally, Governor Parisot, who previously referred to Tour£
as his "archenemy," was replaced by Henri Bonfils on 12 July 1955.
Henceforth the road appeared open for the paving of smoother relations
between the PDG and the a3ministration.
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Rival Congresses in Conakry
By the end of 1955 there were three main political parties operating in 
Guinea, namely the RDA-PDG, BAG, and DSG. Following the RDA Coordinating 
Committee meeting in Conakry in July, the rival parties each held 
respective congresses, the BAG in August and the DSG in November 1955.
Although deputy Barry Diawadou and French Union assemblyman Karim 
Bangoura had been largely responsible for the formation of the BAG in 
late 1954, these men were later eclipsed as Koumandian Keita became the 
acting President of the party. Secretary-General of the union of primary 
school teachers and bitter enemy of fellow tribesman Sekou Toure, Keita 
organised the first BAG congress, held in Conakry from 4-7 August 1955.
Despite the little interest the masses had thus far shown in the
party, the one hundred or so congress delegates included a fair number
of elected politicians, such as: senator Fode Toure, former French Union
assemblyman Momo Tour§, one member of the Grand Council in Dakar, and
ten territorial assemblymen (most notably Amara Soumah and Assembly
65
President Framoi Berete). Announcing its affiliation to the Radical 
Socialist (Edgar Faure) party in France, the BAG proclaimed its "solemn 
attachment to a single, indivisible Republic," and denounced the 
federalist orientation adopted by its major political opponent. Among 
the political resolutions passed by the congress were the following:
The BAG:
1) Is against Communism and all forces of totalitarianism;
2) Condemns all trade union activity which takes orders from 
foreign countries;
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Barry Diawadou was absent at the congress, being excused for 
having business in Paris to attend to. ANSCM AP 2143/7, Report of the 
BAG Congress from the High-Commissioner ACF to Minister FCM, No. 2466, 
Dakar, 23 August 1955.
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3) Underlines the necessity of maintaining traditional 
structures but recognises that chiefs must adapt to 
modern times;
4) Is for reforming the French West African government into 
a coordinating and managerial body;
5) Is for decentralisation of the administration, with more 
powers to the Territorial Assemblies; and
6) Demands absolute administrative neutrality in future 
elections, (66)
Clearly the BAG relied on the conservative chieftaincy as its major
source of support, and secondly the young educated ”jeune elite"—
67
teachers, doctors, clerks, and government employees. As the political
successor of Yacine Diallo, Diawadou and his party also received the
unofficial backing of the local French administration.
Barry Ibrahima (known as Barry III) , leader of the DSG, sought
support for his party in his native Fouta region, while at the same time
68
holding a defiant stand against the chieftaincy. Party propaganda was
targeted at the Guinean elite— the upcoming class of administrative
69
functionaries, small businessmen, traders, and artisans. Although 
affiliated to the metropolitan SFIO, the DSG remained weak in number and
influence in the Fouta as well as elsewhere in Guinea. At one point,
however, it seemed as though the DSG might join ranks with the PDG. 
Members of the PDG were present at the first congress of the DSG held in 
a suburb of Conakry from 20-22 November 1955. Although the platforms of 
the two parties were similar regarding federalism, administrative
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chiefs, and proposed governmental reforms, the predominant leadership of 
uneducated Toure proved unacceptable to university graduate Barry III. 
Barry III was nicknamed "Silyore," or little elephant, by PDG women of 
coastal Guinea, while Toure and the RDA were called "Sily". In the end, 
the violence pursued by the PDG in eliminating its political opponents 
drove the DSG gradually closer to the BAG until the two parties finally 
merged in 1958.
Recurrent Violence
The arrival of Governor Bonfils was met with enthusiasm by the competing 
political parties, especially the PDG which looked forward to a new era 
of cooperation with the French administration. For several months a 
satisfactory calm reigned in the territory, which ended abruptly when 
Bonfils left Guinea on holiday in Septeirber 1955. Secretary-General 
Marchesseau, acting as interim replacement for the Governor, was soon to 
be blamed for fomenting violence.
Incidents occurred mainly in the outlying coastal districts, later 
spreading into the capital city. According to Marchesseau, PDG sections 
1 en brousse" were slow to accept, even hostile toward the new orienta­
tion of cooperation adopted by the PDG directorate following the PDA
70
Coordinating Committee meeting in Conakry. Districts hitherto 
dominated by the FDA were faced with the creation of BAG sections and 
found the public criticism of the PDG by BAG spokesmen intolerable. When 
clashes erupted and the BAG propagandists sought shelter from the 
district police, the PDG activists accused the administration of 
—
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supporting the opposition. Furthermore, as the vast majority of 
individuals arrested in connection with the violence were PDG members, 
the party charged the administration with continued persecution and 
injustice.
Latant hostility erupted first in Coyah (Dubrfeka district) on 11
September 1955. Two weeks of considerable violence consumed Dubreka and
the neighbouring district of Forbeariah. The PDG directorate, seemingly
unable to control the situation, sought instead to cast blame on the
administration and the BAG. Speaking to a crowd of 300 PDG supporters in
Conakry on 29 September, Tour6 first of all denounced the administration
for pursuing an anti-KDA campaign, despite PDG efforts at cooperation
71
and reconciliation. Secondly Tour£ supplied supposed proof of admini­
strative collusion with the BAG— the example given was when the BAG 
announced the judicial decision (consisting of a fine) of a defamation 
of character suit filed by Fod£ Mamadou Toure against Sekou Tour§, 
before the case was officially closed. Thirdly Tour6 claimed that the 
administrative policy of transferring politically active RDA members had 
been reinstituted, and that a number of critical PDG section leaders had 
been ordered to leave their districts. Finally, pointing to the 
coincidence that the transfers as well as the incidents began after the 
departure of Governor Bonfils, Tour§ accused Marchesseau of not only 
collaborating with the BAG, but also of taking orders from former 
Governor Parisot. As a result of this scathing attack on the administra­
tion and its cohorts the BAG, incidents in Conakry multiplied, occurring 
now on a daily basis. The following is a brief summary of the incidents 
_
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which took place in Guinea between 11 September and 7 October 1955:
11 September: Coyah (Dubrdka district)— Clashes between EDA
and BAG following a BAG meeting presided by Karim Bangoura.
14 September: Keninke Lory (Dubreka)— After verbal provoca­
tion, EDA members later attacked 3 BAG activists, burning 
their compounds.
19 September: Various incidents in 3 villages in Forecariah
district involving BAG members being attacked and 2 
compounds torched.
23 September: Forbear iah— BAG propaganda tour including 8
party leaders and Fod£ Mamadou Tour£ led to skirmishes with 
RDA women. BAG cars were stoned and party members sought 
police protection.
28 September: Forbear iah— Canton chief of Madine is taken by 
force from his home by armed RDA men. Crowd of 300 people 
stoned, ransacked and burnt his dwelling. Members of his 
family were wounded, one seriously. 8 RDA arrested, 
including President and Vice-President of EDA Madine 
section. Rocks used for the stoning were transported from a 
quarry 5 kilometers outside of Madine, therefore the attack 
on the chief was deemed premeditated by the RDA.
Night 1-2 October: Conakry— RDA "commandos," approximately
20 young men, damaged a number of buildings, among which the 
homes of territorial assemblyman Amarah Soumah, senator Fod§ 
Mamadou Toure, and the police barracks. Police were unable 
to catch vandals who were transported by car. Several other 
homes belonging to village and suburban (chefs de. quartier) 
chiefs were attacked. 30 arrests, 15 remanded in custody.
2 Cctober: Conakry— RDA activist Fode Youssouf, already 
given 4 months suspended sentence and 3,000 franc fine for 
the Coyah incidents of 11 September, led a group of RDA 
militants to attack approximately 30 BAG members leaving a 
private meeting. Several serious injuries. BAG members 
sought refuge at the police headquarters, 2 squads of 
security police were called in and used tear gas to disperse 
the crowd of 300 or so who were using sling-shots and 
surrounding the station. While the police were blocked in 
the station, other RDA destroyed the house of another BAG 
notable, Kabel6 Camara, wounding 2 women and killing a youth 
related to him.
3 October: Police broke up several violent demonstrations in 
Conakry, involving one death, one seriously wounded and 
several minor injuries to BAG members. Thirty-six demonstra­
tors were slightly wounded by the police, and 22 policemen 
injured, 8 serious enough to be temporarily taken off the 
force.
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4 October: Conakry— BAG leader and clerk to senator Fode 
Tour6, Baba Camara, was attacked and seriously wounded at 
his office. Numerous files disappeared or were destroyed, 
including a rumoured dossier of the illegal actions of the 
Secretary-General of the PDG that was due to be sent to 
Par is.
Same day PDG member Camara Bengaly received a head wound 
from a rock as he was getting into his car.
5 October: Conakry— 8 BAG homes pillaged, Governmental 
decree banning all political meetings in Lower Guinea.
6 October: Conakry— Village of Kapora (majority BAG) was 
approached by a band of PDA, clash ended with PDA 
withdrawal. Several wounded PDA men wearing white armbands—  
reportedly new insignias for the "shock troops" of the 
party— were left behind and turned over to the police.
Security reinforcements requested from Dakar, 2 squads 
arrived same evening.
7 October: Minor incidents in Conakry involving attacks on 
BAG individuals and aggression towards police.
As the situation approached anarchy in Conakry, Governor Bonfils
was requested to return to Guinea without delay; he arrived in Conakry 
72
on 8 October. In the Governor's absence the events outside Conakry had
resulted in 43 imprisoned PDA members, and 1 BAG who was subsequently
released. In one week in Conakry, 30 September-7 October, 87 people were
arrested, of which 35 were later prosecuted— 34 PDA and 1 BAG. The
wounded hospitalised in Conakry amounted to 1 PDG, 32 BAG, 7 policemen,
73
and 16 of unknown political persuasion.
Bonfils was instrumental in the return of calm to Guinea. Upon his 
arrival the Governor met with PDG and BAG leaders, who were noticeably 
distressed from the violent turn of events and the little control they
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held over subsequent vengeful attacks. Both sides placed trust in the
neutrality of Bonfils, and peace accords were reached on 14 October.
Cooperation with the administration, however, by no means brought any
appeasement of ill feelings between the HDA and the BAG. In his summary
of negotiations between the rival parties, Bonfils explained the
opposing views accordingly:
The EDA keeps repeating its version of the incidents and 
revels in its persecution complex, contesting any
illustration of facts that differs from its own
interpretation, including that of the administration.
The BAG transmits its hatred of Sdkou Tour§ in an utterly 
unrealistic denial of his political existence, accusing the 
administration of perpetuating the "S6kou Toure myth." (74)
In his report on the September-October incidents, Governor Bonfils
offered a detailed analysis of his interpretation of the political
75
situation in Guinea. According to Bonfils the root of the problem 
plaguing Guinean society could be found in the distinction of class. 
Ethnicity no longer being a major consideration in political affilia­
tion, the crux of the matter, as Bonfils reckoned, was the division of 
society into the following opposing groups: bourgeoisie vs. proletariat, 
haves vs. have-nots, traditional notables vs. peasants, educated elite 
vs. illiterate masses, etc. More so than a political party, the PDG grew 
up as a trade union movement with labourers and unionists filling the 
greater part of its ranks. Tour6 himself was not a highly-educated man, 
but a supreme organiser, extremely capable of arousing the masses to 
protest and united action. The PDG worked for major reforms in economic,
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administrative, and political affairs, with radical aims such as the 
emancipation of the African working class. By contrast the BAG stood for 
traditional values of chieftaincy and hierarchical ordering of society, 
while equally affirming the incorporation of West Africa into the French 
Republic.
loyalists of both the PDG and the BAG found criticism of their 
parties, leaders, and ideals very difficult to tolerate. While initially 
clashes may have been sparked by political speeches and public insults 
raging between the rival parties, it seems that before long incidents 
were breaking out over personal vendettas or arguments that were indeed 
void of any political concern. Particularly in regards to the PDG, 
traditional rivalries, revenge, and personal antagonisms got mixed into 
politics, as local activists believed that the party should come to 
their defence in all matters, and that they should support fellow 
members in any struggle against the enemy.
The BAG in most cases fell victim to PDG aggression, however this 
helped the party to unite its forces and recognise its capacity to 
defend itself. Furthermore, playing the martyr actually benefited the 
BAG in gaining additional support from the chieftaincy and the admini­
stration. Thus while RDA aggressors were filling the local jails, the 
BAG was barely touched by the law, receiving police protection often and 
appearing blameless in the eyes of justice.
Despite numerous arrests, fines, and prison sentences, the PDG 
also managed to increase its support during this period. Perhaps not the 
most desirable elements to enlist, angry youths thirsty for action were 
among those to volunteer as PDG so-called commandos and mob supporters. 
Moreover, the violence even resulted in several BAG converts, as
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Secretary-General Marchesseau reported:
Following the atmosphere of anxiety and insecurity that the 
commandos made reign in Conakry, police report that numerous 
new members are joining the HDA, with requests of immediate 
delivery of membership cards. They seem to be coming from 
BAG members.. .The intimidation campaign of the EDA has thus 
partially succeeded. (76)
As aforementioned, peace accords were agreed upon by both the FDG 
and BAG shortly after the return of Governor Bonfils to Guinea. As 
usual, EDA Political Secretary Ouezzin Coulibaly was present in the 
negotiations, exercising his authority to compel Tour£ and the PDG 
towards quelling unrest in the territory and re-establishing an atmos­
phere of cooperation with the administration. On 19 October 1955 the PDG
directorate issued a circular requesting an end to all hostilities and 
demanding the respect of the sub-sections regarding the following 
orders:
1) Do not respond to any provocation no matter where from or 
who against;
2) There are matters which have nothing to do with the 
party. Anyone who provokes personal quarrels will suffer 
the consequences and the EDA will not take up their 
defence. The party refuses to assume responsibility for
matters which are merely the settling of scores; and
3) The peace which we are preaching must be explained and 
understood on every level, and every militant must 
prevent and calm any provocation whatsoever. (77)
Although peace was apparently desired by all active participants in 
the negotiations, the willingness of the rival political parties to seek 
peaceful coexistence was far from assured. In fact the clinching show­
down was just, on the horizon. Ihis time however the competition for
76
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control of the territory would take place at the polling stations rather 
than in the streets, as the elections to the National Assembly of 2 
January 1956 would prove critical to the direction of future political 
events in Guinea.
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CHAPTER VII
PDG Supremacy
Having twice refused confidence in the Faure government, the French
National Assembly was dissolved in Noventoer 1955. New legislative
elections were scheduled for 2 January 1956 in France as well as the
overseas territories. This was the opportunity long-awaited by Toure and
the RDA to demonstrate the mass organisation and appeal of the movement.
Furthermore when it appeared that, probably for the first time since
1946, the administration would uphold electoral neutrality, the PDG
eagerly welcomed the chance to prove its dominant position in Guinea. To
an African political leader, a seat in the French parliament was
regarded as the apogee of elected office. Apart from high status, a
deputy had access to education, travel, a regular salary, and immunity
from colonial and normal processes of French law. Additionally, serving
in the French government was of prime importance to an aspiring African
politician, because it gave him "a sense of political acceptance in 
1
France."
Following triumphant success in the National Assenbly elections, 
Toure proceeded to fulfill his vow to create an independent African 
labour movement. The year 1956 brought sweeping changes in the overseas 
territories, not only in trade union activity, but also with the intro­
duction of a wide range of decentralising reforms under the Loi-Cadre. 
In Guinea the PDG capitalised on every opportunity to increase its 
_
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dominance in the territory as well as wipe out its opposition. By March 
1957 the party had secure! 56 out of 60 seats in the newly elected 
Territorial Assembly, and subsequently Toure became Vice-President, 
acting as virtual Prime Minister of Guinea. In just over a year Tour§ 
orchestrated the PDG takeover of the territorial government in Guinea; 
the future of the country lay virtually in the hands of one man.
National Assenbly Elections, January 1956
The opening of the electoral campaign was heralded by a radio broadcast
emanating from the office of the High-Commissioner in Dakar. In his
message of 13 December, Cornut-Gentille announced that there was to be
an enforced absolute neutrality on the part of the administration in the
2
forthcoming elections. In Guinea, Governor Bonfils echoed the remarks
and neutrality orders of the High-Commissioner in his own radio message
3
diffused the following day. The broadcasts were well-received by the 
various political parties, and generally the masses looked forward to an 
honest competition that would finally reflect the actual political 
support in the territories.
In Guinea the focus of the electoral campaign centered on the Fouta 
Djalon. Accounting for nearly half of the registered voters in the 
territory, the Fouta districts, when voting in bloc, had previously been 
the major determinant in electoral outcomes. Recognising that their best 
chance of success lay in support from their native areas, both the BAG 
and the DSG concentrated their cairpaign efforts in Middle Guinea.
2
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Moreover, financial and technical constraints, as well as admitted
weaknesses in the Coastal and Forest regions, contributed to the Fouta-
based strategies of the opposition parties. The PDG however was
determined to gain a foothold in this region, so critical to elections
in Guinea. Leaving the campaign organisation in the other three regions
largely in the hands of his subordinates, Toure directed his attention
mainly to the Fouta districts, speaking to crowds at local markets,
while sending out his propagandists to outlying villages. Aiming the PDG
message at the poorer masses (as opposed to the wealthy aristocracy),
the party furthered its campaign to denounce the traditional chiefs,
portraying itself as the chairpion of the peasants and workers. This
platform proved remarkably successful, as Governor Bonfils noted:
Definitely, the propaganda themes employed by the EDA were 
received without verbal violence, moreover the criticism 
formulated against the traditional chieftaincy found a very 
favourable echo. In this sense the campaign was intelligent­
ly led. Otherwise the campaign was intense, utilising 
considerable means (groups of propagandists, representatives 
designated in every village, transport vehicles in constant 
use and in very large numbers) while the activity of the 
other parties was more discreet. In several districts these 
latter parties displayed a certain weakness in using their 
capabilities at hand. (4)
In branching out to nearly every village across the territory, the
PDG touched hitherto politically disinterested areas, educating the
masses regarding their electoral duty to their homeland, and getting
5
eligible voters to register. Propagandists portrayed the EDA as the 
"grand liberator" of Africa, responsible for the abolition of forced 
labour and injustice, and serving as protector of its members and
4
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emancipator of the African people. PDG slogans which were particularly
appealing to large audiences included the following:
Your taxes are squandered by the councillors and the 
administration, which causes them to be higher.
The association with France is like that of a cavalry man 
and a horse. We’ve had enough of always being the horse.
Unite and you will be more powerful then the whites.
A white man earns ten times more than a black and it’s 
because they take everything that we have nothing.
Without the EDA, you will be always subjected to forced 
labour, slavery, and injustice.
The administration supports the chiefs who exploit you.
Struggle therefore to rid yourselves of these parasites.
If the fortune held by the whites and the big businesses 
were shared among you, you would all be rich and happy. (6)
Apart from the catch-phrases and rabble-rousing speeches delivered to
enthusiastic listeners, the PDG official platform was largely synonymous
with the political resolution passed at the Coordinating Committee
meeting in Conakry five months earlier. The interterritorial EDA called
for a federal orientation in Sub-Saharan Africa, deconcentration and
decentralisation of governing powers, increased powers to the
Territorial Assemblies, Africanisation of public services and economic
positions, universal suffrage, and abolition of the double-college 
7
electoral system. One slight noteworthy addition to the orthodox EDA 
platform was the PDG call for "the democratisation of the chieftaincy 
from the province to the village level."
Included in the BAG election platform were measures supporting the 
traditional chieftaincy, such as: pressing the vote of the statutes for 
the customary chiefs introduced by Yacine Diallo in 1948 (hence long 
debated but never passed in the National Assembly) , improvement of the 
situation of village chiefs by the granting of a unique statute, and the
6
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creation of a corps of secretaries and representatives of canton 
8
chiefs. To sum up their position regarding the French administration,
the BAG professed:
We are those who believe that the French Union is now more 
than ever a necessity for the Metropole as well as for the 
overseas territories. It is perfectly viable under the 
conditions that Frenchmen and Africans grant each other 
reciprocal confidence for a truer cooperation. (9)
Both the PDG and the BAG were selective in choosing complementary
candidates for their electoral lists. Naturally Toure headed the list
submitted by the PDG, and after Barry III of the DSG refused the
invitation (preferring to run on a separate SFIO ticket), was seconded
by a Fulani named Diallo Saifoulaye. Serving as Political Secretary of
the PDG, Saifoulaye had been a Ponty major and an early active member of
both the EDA and the Communist study groups (GECs) in Guinea, before
being summarily transferred to Soudan and Niger. Son of Alpha Bocar
Diallo, dean of the canton chiefs in the Fouta Djalon, it was hoped that
Saifoulaye could muster some support for the PDG in his home region.
Exploiting the fact that the name Saifoulaye, signifying "the sword of
God," figures in a Koranic tale, the PDG also incorporated Islam into
its political appeal. The BAG put forth two former deputies, Barry
Diawadou as its first candidate, followed by Mamba Sano. Historically
Sano enjoyed strong backing from the people in his native Forest region,
who the BAG hoped would follow him to the polls on 2 January.
Despite the intense activity in preparation of the electoral
campaign, for the most part the atmosphere remained remarkably calm.
Only minor incidents were recorded across the territory, none involving
8
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serious injuries or requiring more than local police intervention to 
10
restore order. Likewise election day was reportedly peaceful, as the
PDG had effectively organised and instructed its many supporters in
procedure and format. The abstention rate in the territory reached
nearly 58 per cent, which in fact was not extraordinary, as previous
legislative elections of 1951 and 1954 registered 56 per cent and 52
per cent respectively. Abstention rates varied significantly from region
to region; however, the Fouta rate of 42 per cent marked a considerable
increase over past records, while the Coastal region, mobilised by the
PDG, registered the lowest rate of 26 per cent.
The success of the PDG in the legislative elections held on 2
January 1956 in Guinea largely surpassed administrative expectations. In
the forecasts submitted by the Commandants de. Cerole and tallied by
Governor Bonfils, it was estimated that two seats would go to Barry
Diawadou and Mamba Sano on the BAG list, followed by one seat allocated
11
to S§kou Toure of the PDA. In reality the PDA carried the vote in 17 
out of the 20 districts in the territory, accounting for 61 per cent of 
the total votes cast. As a result, Toure and his second Saifoulaye were 
duly elected to the National Asseirbly, as well as Diawadou as a distant 
third.
As shown in Table 4, on the one hand the PDA outstripped the
Governor's forecasts in all four regions in Guinea. On the other hand 
the BAG fell far short of administrative expectations throughout the 
_
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territory, totalling a mere 26 per cent of the votes cast. The DSG came 
in nearly as anticipated, taking 10 per cent of the overall tally. The 
real surprise came in the results registered in Middle Guinea (Fouta 
region). Apart from Dalaba where the vote was split three ways allowing 
the DSG to prevail, the RDA lost only Mamou by a small margin and Pita 
to the BAG (see Table 5) . Overall the BAG won only half the votes 
expected of it, and the PDA proved shockingly victorious in the region.
Table 4: National Assenfoly Elections in Guinea, 2 January 1956.
Peg ion Forecast Results Forecast Results Forecast Results
PDA BAG DSG
Coastal Guinea 78,000 124,227 21,500 13,611 7,300 3,036
Fouta Djalon 65,900 107,192 183,200 94,214 45,100 49,326
Upper Guinea 31,370 55,942 28,275 12,348 3,105 1,484
Forest 41,000 59,928 59,000 26,585 200 1,507
Total 216,270 347,289 291,975 146,758 55,705 55,353
Table 5: National Assenfoly Elections in Guinea, 2 January 1956;
Fouta Djalon Region.
District Forecast Results Forecast Results Forecast Results
PDA BAG DSG
Mamou 3,000 8,076 13,800 8,899 5,000 4,447
Dalaba 7,000 10,057 21,000 7,454 3,000 11,147
Dabola 14,900 24,164 19,700 6,842 5,600 3,136
Pita 6,000 9,966 37,000 27,616 14,500 15,727
Labe 23,000 38,878 66,700 32,333 16,000 14,036
Gaoul 12,000 16,051 25,000 11,000 1,000 853
Total 65,900 107,192 183,200 94,214 45,100 49,326
Sources: ANSCM AP 2183/3, "Elections Legislatives, 2 Janvier 1956;"
ANS 20G 122, "Elections a l'A.N., 2 Janvier 1956," Guinea.
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Several days following the vote, Governor Bonfils submitted a
report to the High-Commissioner in order to apologize for the gross
margin of error in his forecasts, as he attempted to explain:
...why and how no one, not even among those who in principle 
live in contact with the population— some for more than 15 
years— was able or knew how to look behind the veil which 
the vote of 2 January uncovered, suddenly making Guinea seem 
different than what had previously been believed. (12)
Bonfils believed that the election results attested to the "grave.
malaise” which had characterised Guinea since the partial election to
the National Assembly in 1954. The strength of the RDA, he argued, was
not a recent phenomenon, and the current situation corresponded more
justly to the real state of political affairs in Guinea. Attributing the
success of the RDA in the Fouta largely to the choice of Saifoulaye as
the running-mate of Toure, Bonfils wrote:
Today the proof is given that the Fulani bastion is well won 
over by the RDA, and that the urban centers were not the 
only ones open to its actions. (13)
Bonfils concluded his report by noting a significant positive outcome of
the January elections:
In conclusion, undoubtedly it has been a long time since the 
position of the administration has been as strong in Guinea 
as it is at this moment. Cleared of suspicious 
manoeuvrings, it proved its objectivity and willingness to 
respect the rules of the game. (14)
Outside of Senegal, the RDA was equally triumphant in the West 
African Federation, electing nine deputies to the National Assembly. The 
RDA thus became the largest African party, making up over half of the
12
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UDSR group, whose name was consequently changed to UDSR-PDA. The RDA 
representatives in the French parliament were the following: those from
the previous assembly— Felix Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast), Mamadou 
Konate (Soudan), Felix Tchicaya (Moyen-Congo); three who had sat in the 
1946 assenfoly but failed to be re-elected in 1951— (Xiezzin Coulibaly 
(Ivory Coast), Hamani Diori (Niger), and Gabriel Lisette (Tchad); and 
three newcomers— S6kou Toure and Diallo Saifoulaye (Guinea), and Modibo 
Keita (Soudan) . Furthermore Houphouet was appointed Minist-re-d6l&gu6 in 
the office of the new Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet, the first 
African to be awarded a French cabinet position, while Konate became the 
Vice-President of the National Asseirbly. A grand patron of the HDA, 
Mamadou Konate died in May 1956 and was subsequently replaced by Bocoum 
Bar6ma (PDA) in the National Assenfoly; the Vice-Presidency of the 
Assenfoly went to his Soudanese political successor Modibo Keita. Mean^ - 
while the IGM, which was an independent group in 1955 due to its size of 
14 members in parliament, had only seven re-elected, and was therefore 
obliged to affiliate formally with the MRP. At this time the RDA and ICM 
again contemplated uniting forces, however negotiations later broke off 
over disagreements concerning impending reforms.
Trade Union Autonomy 
Riding high on PDA success in the January elections, the time was 
finally deemed appropriate for the creation of an African trade union 
movement, independent of foreign affiliation and domination. Tour& had 
called for such an organisation at the PDA Coordinating Committee 
meeting in Conakry in July 1955, and had been encouraged both by the 
African labourers and the French administration to follow through with 
his plan. In actual fact it was in Senegal that the first steps were
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taken toward trade union autonomy, whan in November 1955, with Tours's
blessing, the CGT unions of Senegal-Mauritania opted to create an
independent nonfederation Gen£rale des Travailleurs Africains. (CGTA);
15
provisional directors were Bassirou Gueye and S6ydou Diallo. After his
election as deputy in January and his expulsion from the AOF section of
the CGT in February for refusing to accept orders from Paris, Tour6 set
16
out to organise the CGTA on the federal level.
The CGTA was envisioned as an African centrale, without formal 
affiliation to, but rather on par with, the CGT and the F6dOration 
.qyndioale Mondiale (FSyi) . Historically African unionists rejected 
certain CGT themes as inapplicable to the TOM, such as the Communist 
notion of class struggle, and the opposition to nationalist aspirations. 
Moreover, while pledging loyalty to the creation of a genuine French- 
African community, the CGTA hoped to broaden its horizons by encouraging 
foreign investment in Africa in the pursuit of rapid economic 
development.
The CGTA section in Guinea was officially constituted in April
1956. In a speech in Conakry before more than 1,000 trade unionists, 
Toure paralleled RDA history with that of the West African branch of the 
CGT. Reiterating the theme of debilitating consequences due to Communist 
affiliation, Toure explained the problems associated with PCF tutelage 
of the RDA:
We quickly realised that the "whites" directing this party 
dictated our line of action, gave us instructions, and 
wanted to force us to do things contrary to the better
15
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interests of Africa. Consequently we broke totally with the 
Communist Party. (17)
Continuing in this vein, Toure concluded:
In breaking with the CGT we wanted to rid ourselves of the 
last ties of allegiance with the Communist Party. (18)
In his quest for.total adherence to the local CGTA, Toure announced that
so far 22 out of the 27 trade unions in Guinea were in favour of joining
the movement, adding that "those who wish to oppose it will be swept
19
away by the masses." Some opposition was aired concerning the decision
for autonomy, particularly by Toure's political and union rivals, as
well as Guinean students in France who labelled Toure’s actions as "the
20
paying of his debt after his election." Nevertheless the CGTA quickly 
gained a strong foothold in Guinea and in Senegal, its success gener­
ating further moves toward autonomy as well as calling for unification 
of the various unions into a single African movement.
In turn the Christian CFTC decided likewise to become independent. 
Under the chairmanship of David Soumah, the CFTC transformed itself into 
the Confederation Africaine des Travail leu rs Crovants (CATC) at its 
congress held in Ouagadougou in July 1956. The replacement of the word 
Chretiens meaning Christians with Croyant.s (believers) was purposeful—  
it was intended to open its membership to labourers of all faiths.
Not all the CGT members followed TOur6 in the motion to split and 
form the CGTA. Abdoulaye Diallo, leader of the CGT unions in the Soudan,
17
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Vice-President of the FSM, and personal foe of Toure, headed a faction
that retained ties to the metropolitian CGT. After six months of waging
a losing battle, however, Diallo eventually capitulated, conceding to
the principle of autonomy, and the CGTA and CGT jointly called for a
conference in Cotonou in order to unite all organised labourers in
French West Africa. In December 1956 the CATC echoed the appeals for
trade union unity.
A preparatory meeting for the Cotonou conference was held in Dakar,
where CGT members formally announced their independence from the central
French body, but the Foree Onvriere? refused to renounce its allegiance
to the SFIO. The actual conference took place in Cotonou, 16-19 January
1957, with the stated goal:
to unite and organise the workers of Black Africa, coordi­
nate their trade union activities in the struggle against 
the colonial regime and all other forms of exploitation, to 
defend their moral and material interests, and to affirm the 
personality of African trade unionism. (21)
Furthermore the conference objected to "imperialist wars" and announced
its support of the independence movements in Algeria and Cameroon.
Adopting a federal approach concerning African development, the
delegates denounced recent reforms diminishing the powers of the Grand
Council in Dakar.
The outcome of the Cotonou conference was the formation of the
Union Gen§rale des Travail 1fiiirfl d a  1 'Afrlqne Noire (UGTAN). The dominant
figure in the movement and indeed the conference was Tour£. Abdoulaye
Diallo was nominated to handle UGTAN’s external relations. Animated by
David Soumah, the CATC distrusted Communist jargon pronounced at
__
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Cotonou/ as well as the influence of former CGT members (such as Diallo) 
in the new organisation, and therefore seceded from UGTAN shortly after 
its creation.
Personal motives and long term plans for African development aside, 
it certainly seems plausible that Tourfe's decision to break away from 
the CGT in April 1956 was hastened both by his increasingly prominent 
position in the RDA, and his recent election to the National Asseirbly. 
The French administration, as well as Houphouet, believed that such a 
split would end local Communist influence and enhance cooperation with 
the established authorities. In building an autonomous African union 
movement, however, Toure found it essential to co-opt the former CGT 
militants and use these experienced activists in the new organisation. 
Thus while Houphouet envisioned that such a move would rid Toure of his 
Communist stigma and help in keeping him "in line," in fact Toure wound 
up leading a powerful movement that propelled his ideas even further 
than he could have then anticipated. Again Toure would struggle between 
dual allegiances, his personal views— carried by the labour movement—  
not always correlating with those of Houphouet and the veteran RDA.
The Loi-Cadre
In the cabinet of Prime Minister Mollet, fellow Socialist Gaston Deferre 
was appointed Overseas Minister. Apart from increasing African demands 
of more territorial autonomy, large-scale bloodshed in Algeria had 
convinced Deferre that major decentralising reform was needed in the 
overseas territories to avoid similiar disaster in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Revision of French policy was directed into two channels. First, 
decentralization, transferring some authority from Paris and Dakar to 
African governing bodies. Secondly, deconcentration, transferring
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authority from Paris to French representatives in Dakar "in order to
22
streamline Franco-African communication channels." To avoid long
delays previously characteristic of bills pertaining to Africa, Deferre
presented his plan as purely an administrative reform, in the form of a
Hoi-cadre (framework law). The French Overseas Ministry offered the
following description of the reform at hand:
The To 1-Cad re is, in effect, much more than an outcome of 
French policy in her overseas territories; it constitutes 
the point of departure of a steady evolution of the will to 
lead the populations to their capacity to conduct their own 
affairs, all the while remaining strictly associated with 
France. (23)
Adopted by the French parliament on 23 June 1956, the Toi-Cadre* 
operated accordingly: decrees submitted by the executive were sent
simultaneously to the National Assembly and the Assembly of the French 
Union; the former had two months to accept, reject, or amend, while the 
latter had fifteen days in which to give its opinion; decrees had a four
month time limit for promulgation. According to Article 74 of the French
Constitution, reform of internal organisation in the territories 
required consultation of the French Union Assenfoly and the Territorial 
Assemblies— a procedure which the Toi-Cadre essentially sidestepped. 
Nevertheless, through this process more than two dozen decrees altering 
the structure of the TOM were issued between June 1956 and April 1957.
Radical reforms were instituted via the To i-Cadre, such as
universal suffrage for all persons over the age of 21 and abolition of
the double-college voting system; an enlargement of the membership and
22
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powers of the Territorial Assemblies; reorganisation of the civil 
service; creation of circumscription and rural councils; the 
establishment of territorial executive Government Councils; and reduced 
powers of the federal government and Grand Council. Only matters 
associated with sovereignty remained under direct French control, 
namely: foreign policy, defence, monetary and fiscal systems, higher
education, and broadcasting.
Perhaps the most significant reform introduced under the Ioi-Cadre? 
involved the creation of territorial Conseils de Gouvernement. Destined 
to function as embryo cabinets, the Government Councils were comprised 
of 6 to 12 members elected by the Territorial Assemblies; the member 
receiving the most votes would assume the office of Vice-President. The 
Governor nominally presided over the Council; however, the intention of 
the reform instituting territorial executives was for the Council to 
manage local affairs as autonomously as possible. Members of the 
Government Council, entitled Ministers, were assigned to lead various 
sectors of public services such as finance, transport, health, labour, 
etc. The Governor did reserve the right to petition the French 
government for annulment within three months of any decision of the 
Government Council or the Territorial Assembly. Such a measure could be 
proposed on the grounds of threatening national security, public order, 
private liberties, or concerning extraordinary measures considered to 
exceed the law.
The powers of the Territorial Assemblies were also greatly 
enhanced. By a law of 15 November 1956 the number of members in the 
assenblies was increased in each territory by ten. Before the Loi-Cadrer 
it was estimated that more than half of the expenditures approved by the
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Territorial Assenblies were obligatory. As a result of the Loi^ Cadre., 
22 out of 30 categories of mandatory spending were abolished, leaving 
the assemblies much greater financial leverage and responsibility. 
Moreover the assenblies were granted legislative powers in a number of 
public sectors including works, services, land, agriculture, health, 
customary law, cooperatives, urbanisation, internal trade, forestry, 
fisheries, and most mineral rights. Primary and secondary education was 
also placed under the jurisdiction of the assemblies, although French 
standards were maintained for higher education, teachers, and major 
examinations.
As power was transferred to the territorial level, the federal
government and Grand Council lost a great deal of their former
authority. As stated in an official report by the Foreign Office:
25
"truthfully speaking, there will no longer be a government-general." 
The role of the federal government was reduced to overall coordination 
and arbitration between the overseas territories, mainly in matters 
pertaining to finance, geology and mineral surveying, higher education, 
and interterritorial concerns such as health, drought, and animal 
epidemics. Furthermore services previously administered from Dakar were 
shifted to Paris, namely the postal system and broadcasting. Finally the 
fatal blow to the federal government was financial, as most taxes now 
went directly into the hands of the Territorial Assenblies. Unlike the 
assenblies which had elected Government Councils, to the dismay of the
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Grand Council an executive was not created on the federal level, and 
therefore its decisions remained up to the High-Commissioner to imple­
ment. Coincidentally, Cornut-Gentille, who served as High-Commissioner 
of AOF for five years and was largely responsible for the successful 
reconciliation between the French administration and the FDA, was 
succeeded by Gaston Cusin on 5 July 1956. Thus, under the wide-open 
provisions of the Loi-Cadre., the structure and institutions of AGF were 
radically transformed in a very short period of time. The future path of 
development to be pursued by the African overseas territories, as one 
administrator despairingly recognised, was largely in their own hands:
The question in fact remains open: for better or for worse,
what will prevail? The truth, and this is what is most 
alarming, is that the solution escapes us conpletely: it no 
longer depends upon us that our territories evolve harmoni­
ously or anarchically....It no longer depends upon us that 
the irreversibility of history leads such or such territory, 
under the rule of educated Marxists, towards the negation of 
democracy, or that others erupt in partisan contradiction 
....The fate of each region of French Black Africa is hence­
forth completely in the hands of its inhabitants In the
course of history, our territories are marching towards 
their autonomy. (26)
Such a restructuring of the Federation caused some critics to 
denounce the ini-Gadre. as leading to the "balkanisation" of West Africa. 
The term, coined by Leopold Senghor, stood for the breaking up of AGF 
into independent territories, a process which many agreed would divide 
and destroy African unity, and necessary cooperation and aid between 
richer and poorer regions within the Federation. Senghor also pointed 
out that keeping the embryonic African states weak would assure their 
continued dependence on France, therefore further prolonging any 
possibility of independence. Against Houphouet and the formal position
26
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of the RDA, UGTAN later formally backed Senghor's stance, fearing the
disintegration of African labour unity.
Tours's position concerning the Lot-Cadre was notoriously
ambiguous. In a speech before a crowd of 2,000 in Conakry on 16 February
1957, Tour£ acknowledged that the reforms, particularly the additional
powers granted to the Territorial Assenblies, undoubtedly constituted "a
step ahead," however he added that "the Loi-Cadre voted at this time is
27
today already outmoded." Nevertheless, Tour§ positively noted that
"autonoiry is, let's not forget, a step towards independence, the
28
aspiration of all subjugated peoples." In addressing the issue of
federal government reform Tourd mentioned that their {i.e. H3A)
conception of the new administrative structure was different from that
of Senghor, mainly for the purpose of expediency, as it would take one
or two months to constantly refer simple matters to Dakar. Yet it was
also clear that Toure at this time did envision the future creation of a
federal government, or possibly a coordinating committee composed of the
territorial Vice-Presidents to handle interterritorial affairs. Likewise
Tour£ insisted upon the necessity to set up statutes pertaining to
services within the Federation, in order to maintain mobility of civil
servants and equal benefits from one territory to another. For the time
being, however, Tourd concluded:
Nevertheless, I am convinced that the Loi-Cadre will allow 
us to give our country a new life, full of progress that 
will radically change it into a new country. (29)
— -
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Violent Intimidation
Radical reform introduced in 1956 and 1957 in the overseas territories 
fuelled the fires of competition raging between rival political parties 
scrambling to fill newly created positions of power. Particularly in 
Guinea, the struggle once again turned violent, as the PDG aimed to 
secure total domination on the political front. Intimidation tactics 
were unleashed in order to quell remaining dissent, and the totalitarian 
nature of the PDG was clearly revealed.
After eight years of drafting and numerous delays in parliament, a 
bill reorganising municipal government in French Africa finally passed 
in Novenber 1955. The bill elevated 25 towns in the West African 
Federation to the status of full communes (communes de. piein exere ice), 
while permitting territorial Governors to transform an indefinite number 
of others into lesser communes de moyen exercice. Elections of municipal 
councils and mayors of the new townships were scheduled to take place on 
18 Novenber 1956. In Guinea the political competition of the electoral 
campaign was largely overshadowed by outbreaks of considerable violence, 
in the end taking on an ethnic slant that threatened civil war.
In the span of one week, 29 September to 5 October 1956, the
casualty list of violent, incidents in Guinea amounted to the following:
7 dead, 263 wounded (not including 32 police, 26 territorial guards, and
30
10 civil servants), and over 500 arrested. Of the seven dead, six were 
Fulani, one Soussou? all were members of the BAG or SFIO. According to 
administrative reports, the trouble began brewing in a private RDA 
__
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meeting on 28 September in which Sylla Momo, better known as Momo Jo, 
declared:
From this day forward, we must not give the BAG the time or 
place to meet in the neighbourhoods. I ask all of you to 
take courage; as for me, I'm no longer afraid of prison.
(31)
The following day deputies Tour£ and Saifoulaye publicly accused the 
administration of sabotaging the budgets and emptying the municipal 
treasuries on the brink of handing them over to future locally elected 
councils. That evening several brawls broke out, involving RDA attacks 
on BAG members, including a violent encounter outside the house of BAG 
territorial assemblyman Amara Soumah, in which an estimated crowd of 600 
showered the street with stones. It took five police squads two and a 
half hours to restore order, by which time five servicemen and a 
European policeman were wounded.
Speaking to a crowd of 3,000 on Sunday 30 September, Toure again
denounced the administration for miisusing public funds, which he claimed
would prevent the RDA (following their anticipated triumph in the 
forthcoming elections) from carrying out promised reforms, resulting in 
seeming PDG failure in the eyes of the people. Furthermore Tour§ 
implicated the authorities as the provoking agents in the recent 
incidents, purposely creating an atmosphere of instability, violence, 
and repression on the eve of crucial elections.
The same day incidents broke out once again at the home of Amarah
Soumah, where Momo Jo received a knife wound from a BAG supporter. 
Police used tear gas to dispel the mobs, and blocked off several of the 
targeted streets in order to maintain order. Expecting an appeal for 
calm, the Governor allowed TOur& to make a public statement, in which he 
_
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did so only after renewed verbal attacks on the government. Nevertheless 
the audience of 1,000 people left the scene and returned home peace­
fully. In other Conakry suburbs, however, various incidents of houses 
and persons under siege were reported into the night. Throughout the 
following day scattered attacks took place on BAG and DSG homes, while 
market and street brawls occurred in which FDA gangs demanded to see
party cards, roughing up any individual not having one in his 
32
possess ion.
Amid increasing violence and frequency of assaults, Governor 
Bonfils issued an order banning all gatherings and demonstrations in 
Conakry, public or private, for 15 days beginning 1 October 1956. On 2 
October a curfew from nine o’clock p.m. to six a.m. was further decreed 
by the Governor. Despite stricter police measures the violence intensi­
fied and spread into the outlying districts in Conakry. Scores of BAG 
homes, including that of party leader Keita Koumandian, were pillaged 
and burnt, as police stood by and watched, unable to ward off the
onslaught. Cto 3 October Governor Bonfils extended the curfew order 
indefinitely.
In spite of appeals for calm by all three parties, violence 
continued unabated. After hearing reports that a massive purchase of 
knives was underway, the Governor banned future sales and ordered the 
major shops closed. Hie conflict hence assumed an ethnic dimension, as
Fulani BAG and DSG supporters joined together in vengeance against RDA
members of Soussou origin. Meanwhile the Foulah casuality list was 
mounting; 3 died in hospital on 3 October, including the chauffeur of
32
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Barry Diawadou from an earlier stab wound to the lung, and an 
unidentified body was found with a fractured skull.
As police and firemen worked around the clock to the point of 
exhaustion, the situation placed the territory of Guinea on the brink of 
civil war. Nevertheless, a tripartite accord was reached between the 
rival parties late in the evening of 4 October. Supplied with transport­
ation and loud speakers from the administration, tripartite teams 
circulated Conakry calling for peace. The following day calm was 
effectively restored; the week of terror had come to an end.
In the aftermath of the latest wave of violent incidents in Guinea, 
nearly all fingers pointed directly at Tour£ regarding the 
responsibility for the unrest. A handful of reports concerning the 
situation underlying the violence in Guinea were submitted to the 
central authorities, all except one (written by Madeira Keita, former 
president of the PDG and representative of the PDA in Soudan) blamed 
Toure as the major source behind the troubles. In the Governor’s report, 
Bonfils argued that the so-called "administrative plot" against the PDA 
was nonsense, as were the PDG claims of budgetary sabotage in the 
irunicipalities. According to Bonfils:
The personality of deputy Sekou Toure is to be submitted as 
evidence number one. Self-educated trade unionist, he has 
remained and lives as a unionist, transposing the techniques 
of social agitation into political affairs. After having, 
for one year, tried to build up a relationship with him, I 
fear that he is incapable of any action other than violent.
(33)
Citing the approaching municipal elections as the motive behind the 
timing of the outbreak of violence, Bonfils concluded that the "real
33
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goal is the total triumph of the RDA and the equally couplet e
34
elimination of the other parties."
Similarly the analysis submitted by the High-Commissioner offered
the following conclusion: "It is not its place that the HDA is aiming to
35
secure, it is all the place." Attributing the "quasi-total responsi­
bility" of the incidents to the actions of deputy Toure, Cusin explained 
that the reasons behind former episodes of violence in Guinea were no 
longer valid since the PDG swept the January elections to the National 
Assembly. Moreover the High-Commissioner surmised that perhaps the 
administration had been duped by Toure’s supposed "conversion,"— his 
rebuffal of Communism, particularly regarding the founding of the CGTA
where essentially "no difference of doctrine exists between the CGT and 
36
CGTA." Surrounded by notorious Marxists in the PDG and CGTA such as 
Diallo Saifoulaye and Gabriel d'Arboussier, Toure's ambiguous political 
nature and contradictions in practice made him once again an administra­
tive target of suspicion and mistrust.
The RDA rebuttal amidst administrative accusations of PDG 
complicity in the latest incidents was feeble at best. Tourd was 
summoned to Paris by Houphouet and left Guinea on 7 Ctetober. Upon his 
return, focus shifted to electoral preparations and the violence of the 
recent past was entirely overlooked in party gatherings and functions. 
In Soudan, however, apparently the RDA section commissioned former PDG 
President Madeira Keita to write a report about the Conakry incidents.
34
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to be sent to the central EDA Coordinating Committee. In his analysis
Keita cited out-of-date excuses such as administrative interference in
elections, repression, judicial partiality, etc. Keita also claimed that
the incidents were intentionally provoked by the administration, in
order to: 1) repress the FDA, 2) break African unity, and 3) create an
unstable atmosphere discouraging development, investment, and the
37
industrialisation of the territory. Containing these hardly convincing
arguments, it is doubtful that this report or its conclusions received
any serious attention, and certainly was not defended or even
acknowledged in the metropolitan government.
The Guinean members of the French Union Assembly, however, urgently
requested an investigation concerning the explosive situation
38
threatening civil war in the territory, A formal inquiry was
subsequently launched by the Assembly, and a team of four members was
sent to Guinea, charged with the following mission: "to establish the
39
causes and responsible parties of the recent events in Conakry."
In short, the committee found that economic and social issues were
really not at the root of the disturbances. Employment in Conakry was
estimated at 2.0,000 versus 17,000 in 1953; however this increase was far
40
less than the rapid migration to the capital. Nonetheless the inquiry 
determined that the unemployed were not to blame for the incidents, as
37
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the PDG had claimed. Indeed the opposition parties held that the PDG had 
paid these out-of-work labourers to militate in favour of the party. 
Thus local politics, particularly around election time, were deemed the 
instigating factor behind the periodic outbreaks of violence in Guinea. 
Moreover the Commission held that the PDG was largely at fault for the 
unrest, as the report offered the following conclusion:
The responsibility of the PDG thus appears total in the
incidents that have taken place in Guinea since July 1954.
(41)
The report submitted by the Commission of inquiry detailed the 
action of the PDG in fomenting political instability in the territory. 
The clear aim of PDG activity was known to be the conquest of power, the 
methods for which could be divided into six categories:
1) Direct action— violence and attacks against persons and 
property of people not professing PDG allegiance or
possessing party membership cards;
2) Party organisation— highly structured nature and disci­
pline of the PDG, including its parallel administration 
and uniformed officers;
3) Parallel organisations— use of allied organisations such 
as the CGTA in coordinating and monopolising joint 
actions;
4) Infiltration— the police force in Conakry was said to be
lax in its reactions due to.the fact that an estimated 90
per cent of the force were pro-PDG;
5) Actions versus resistance— the PDG maintains no tolerance 
for "saboteurs” or political opponents, and stirs up the 
masses to take action against them; and
6) Legalism— the PDG also engages in incessant legal 
measures such as petitions, complaints, and lawsuits.(42)
Apart from the PDG, the administration was also criticised for its 
pacifism and lack of contact with the indigenous population. Recommenda­
tions of the Commission's report included a revamping of the politicised
41
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police force as well as understaffed administration, both of which the 
PDG had infiltrated to the extent that party intermediaries influenced 
and directed official orders and action. As a minor measure, the 
Commission also recommended the banning of public display of party flags 
or banners, as such properties became blatant targets of attack when 
inter-party tension ran high.
Municipal Elections, November 1956
The situation in Guinea following the most recent period of violence
remained tense as the November municipal elections rapidly approached.
An added factor of uncertainty was the arrival of a new Governor to
replace Bonfils on 3 November. Jean Ramadier, an ardent Socialist, held
the post of Chef de. cabinet under High-Commissioner B£chard in 1948,
after which he served as Commandant de Cercle in Boake, Ivory Coast. A
personal fiefdom of Houphouet, in Boake Ramadier cultivated a trusting
relationship with the FDA in advancing the controversial policy of
cooperation and reconciliation. Considered a "leftist" politician,
Ramadier’s friendly relations with the RDA did not prevent him from
favouring Bakary Djibo over Hamani Diori (FDA) in Niger, where he was
43
appointed Governor in 1953. Upon his arrival the position Governor 
Ramadier would assume in Guinea was unclear, while critical elections 
were just a fortnight away.
As aforementioned, the Municipal Reorganisation Bill of November 
1955 elevated 25 West African towns to the standing of communes, da plein 
exercice. in Guinea 5 major towns were granted the new status, namely
43
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Conakry, Kankan, Kindia, Mamou, and N'Zerdkor§. Furthermore the follow­
ing nine towns were raised to the level of onmmtines da moyen exerclce:
Beyla, Bok6, Dalaba, For6cariah, Kissidougou, Kouroussa, Labe, Macenta, 
and Siguiri. Elections for municipal councils of all the communes were 
scheduled for 18 Noveirber 1956. Mayors of the communes da pie in exercice 
would hence be elected by their respective councils, while Commandants 
da Cercle would automatically assume the post of mayors in the lesser 
communes.
Once the October violence had subsided, the political campaign for
the municipal elections was short but intense. Toure personally
canpaigned on behalf of the FDG, making a grand speaking tour across the
territory. Reiterating his attacks on administrative "sabotage" and
corruption of public funds, in Kankan Toure defiantly called for unity
in action, urging the masses "to hunt anyone who is susceptible to 
44
treason." For his part, deputy Saifoulaye was designated to solicit
support from his native Fouta region. Ihe party again capitalised on
Saifoulaye's background as well as his name, with such propaganda
statements and proverbs as:
The H)A is the party of the Fulani...Diallo Saifoulaye is
the sword that cuts the ties that impede the liberty of the
Foulahs oppressed by the chiefs. The word Saifoulaye in 
Arabic signifies "saber." (45)
Organised into election committees, the PDG clearly intended to retain
party pre-eminence after anticipated victory in assuming high-ranking
administrative positions. The party leadership would hence dictate
—
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political action and government policy; for example Tourd announced that
"after the elections the HDA Directing Committee in Conakry will proceed
46
to choose the candidates for the post of mayor."
As for the BAG, the situation in the territorial districts was
depicted as "catastrophic." According to a BAG spokesman, "not a single
party sub-section nor village committee is functioning; outside of
47
Kankan there is total inactivity." Unable to be present in Guinea for
the elections, deputy Diawadou summarised his election forecasts and
outlined an appropriate BAG strategy in a letter addressed to a friend
in Kankan. Acknowledging that the PDA would carry the majority of the
votes in all of the communes de plein exercice except Mamou, Diawadou
considered options and conditions to formulating joint lists with the
RDA in the hope of gaining moderate representation on the municipal 
48
councils. In the end all negotiations of such nature failed, and the
three parties submitted separate electoral lists on 18 November. In
fact, instead of including members of different parties on their lists,
the PDG presented eight Europeans and several women as candidates in the 
49
municipalities.
Election day in Guinea was exceptionally calm. Administrative 
neutrality was noted by all competing parties, and voter turnout was
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above average. The outcome of the elections was largely as anticipated,
the PDG landslide victory this time came as no great surprise. The major
disappointment of the BAG was that the PDG also predominated in Mamou,
where Saifoulaye was subsequently elected mayor. Across the territory
the PDG registered 85 per cent of the popular vote, taking 113 of the
135 seats in the five communes de. pie in exercice. In the middle
communes, the DSG held the majority in Dalaba and Labd; the remaining 7
municipalities were dominated by PDG elected councillors.
The atmosphere in Guinea following the announcement of the
electoral results remained peaceful. PDG sections, anticipating the
victory, iviaintained order and discipline among their ranks. Celebrations
were kept to a minimum so as to display acceptance of responsibility as
well as thwart possible provocation of the loser parties. The BAG and
DSG made it seem as though they took their losses very well, and even
announced their delight in seeing Tour<§ elected mayor of Conakry. The
justification for such ironic satisfaction was the following:
Sekou Toure promised that the Africans in Conakry would no 
longer have to pay taxes...that they would find work for all 
the unemployed....We will see what he will do now with his 
new responsibilities...the masses will soon learn the true 
value of their "idol". (50)
Elsewhere in the overseas territories, the FDA was equally 
triumphant. Houphouet became the mayor of Abidjan, Modibo Keita of 
Bamako, and Lisette of Fort-Lamy. Two recent affiliates to the K)A also 
did well: Leon Mba, the leader of the Bloc. Democratigue GabonaIs (BDG),
became mayor of Libreville, and the Union Democrat igue Dahom£enne (UDD) 
—
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gained control of Cotonou, the largest town in Dahomey, although 
Apithy's Republican Party secured the capital city Porto Novo. 
Coalitions of opposing parties defeated RDA leaders Felix Tchicaya and 
Hamani Diori in Congo-Brazzaville and Niger respectively. In Niamey, 
Bakary Djibo was one of 11 members of his party to be elected to the 
town council, versus 13 seats secured by Hamani Diori (RDA) and 4 seats 
to the Socialists. A last minute alliance between Djibo and the SFIO led 
to the election of Djibo, who became a menber of the SFIO, as mayor of 
the capital city.
The exposition Unites
Two conferences were held simultaneously in French West Africa aiming to 
unite the scattered parties opposed to the W A  into interterritorial 
movements. In Conakry the affiliates to the SFIO met under the leader­
ship of veteran politican and newly elected mayor of Dakar Lamine Gueye, 
while in Dakar Leopold Senghor organised a conference of former ICM 
members and their respective political parties.
Hosted by Barry III of the DSG, the founding congress of the 
Mnuvement Socialiste Africain (MSA) convened in Conakry from 11-13 
January 1957. Qie of the main purposes of the congress was to create an 
autonomous Socialist movement, in Africa, independent of the metropolitan 
party. To this end the Africans received the official blessing of the 
SFIO, which sent a high-ranking delegation including its acting 
Secretary-General to attend the proceedings in Conakry.
Seventy delegates participated in the MSA founding congress, 
representing all of the Socialist parties in ACF and that of Chad in 
AEF. Rather than amassing into a single body, it was decided that the 
parties would remain autonomous in structure yet united in action, the
256
reason being: "a plurality of parties seen© to us preferable to one
51
movement, because in no democracy do we find only one single party." 
Nevertheless a Directing Committee, composed of 25 members serving two- 
year terms, was elected to administer the MSA. Seated in Dakar, the 
committee included President Lamine Gueye, Vice-President Fily Dabo 
Sissoko, Secretary-General Barry III, and Bakary Djibo as deputy 
Secretary-General.
Regarding MSA relations with the French government and the SFIO, 
the delegates repeatedly reaffirmed their commitments, as world Social­
ists, to continue cooperating with and backing the current Socialist 
administration in France. After heated debate it was decided that the 
MSA would remain allied to the metropolitan SFIO in the Paris 
assemblies. At this time the new movement wholly supported the Mollet 
and Deferre government, as well as the Loi.-Cadre reforms. Sidestepping 
the issue of independence, the political report submitted to the 
congress by Lamine Gueye thus stated the main aims of the African 
Socialist movement:
The goal to strive for is to allow the accession of peoples 
to the management of their own affairs and their free asso­
ciation to the French community. The decrees applying the 
Loi-Cadre will help in this endeavour. (52)
Several months later in Kankan, where the RDA sub-section was notorious­
ly outspoken in denouncing the Loi-Cadre and demanding independence, the 
DSG-MSA section campaigned for French-African collaboration, emphasising 
that:
_
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It is not actually in the interest of Africa that the whites 
leave us.. .Africans will certainly be able to govern 
themselves, but the time has not yet come. (53)
While Lamine Gu£ye and his associates were founding the MSA in 
Conakry, Leopold Senghor hosted his ICM colleagues at the Convention 
Afri caine (CA) meeting in Dakar. The conference was attended by 
representatives of eight hitherto ICM parties, plus 6 observing parties 
including the FDA. Bolder and more defined in policy than either the MSA 
or RDA, the CA embraced Senghor’s federalist ideas— in calling for both 
a federal French Republic and the strengthening of the East and West 
African Federations. The movement advocated autonomy of the overseas 
territories within their respective Federations, which would later 
become two member states in the federal Republic. Furthermore Senghor 
proposed a confederal union, to which the French Republic would hence 
belong, along with independent states such as Togo, Cameroon, Morocco 
and Tunisia. Regarding Algeria the CA requested an immediate cease-fire 
followed by negotiations and probable independent status within the 
envisioned confederation. As for the overseas territories, the eventual 
right to independence of the confederation's component parts was 
stressed, however ruled out in the near future.
Whereas the MSA was strictly opposed to the idea of creating a 
single African party or movement, the CA favoured such an approach 
toward African unity. Senghor's hopes of African union were dashed, 
however, when his call was ignored by the Socialists, and none of the 
observer parties to the congress, including the BAG of Guinea, official­
ly joined the CA. Earlier, in fact, negotiations of a possible merger
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had taken place between the H)A and ICM. Following the January 1956 
elections, EDA-ICM discussions took place in Abidjan and Paris. Unity 
was expected to be a main theme of an EDA congress scheduled to take 
place in Bamako. The congress, initially planned for October 1956, was 
repeatedly postponed. Then differences of opinion over decrees applying 
the Loi-Cadre signalled the end of HDA-ICM collaboration, as Senghor 
began denouncing the balkanising reforms that Houphouet had a large role 
in drafting. Besides the EDA had been steadily increasing in strength, 
and was looking forward to sweeping the Territorial Assembly elections 
scheduled to take place in March.
PDG Second Territorial Conference
Largely in preparation of the forthcoming elections, the PDG held its 
Second Territorial Conference, 23-24 February 1957. As a tactical move, 
the site chosen for the gathering was Lab£— capital of the Fouta region 
and lingering bastion of "feudalism." The district of Labe also had 
recorded the least percentage of votes in favour of the EDA in the
recent municipal elections, returning a DSG majority to the town 
council. Thus by situating the conference in Labe, the PDG ventured to 
impress the local inhabitants and hoped to drum up additional support in 
the territorial elections. Labe, in fact, was the most highly populated 
district in Guinea, with six seats in the Territorial Assembly at
stake.
The PDG conference essentially overwhelmed Lab6, as droves of
participants, more than twice as many as were expected, arrived in
search of accommodation. The official PDG delegates included 30 members 
of the Directing Committee and 140 territorial representatives (four 
from each of the 35 sections); an astounding figure of 620 additional
259
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observers attended the conference.
Although Tour£ presided over and dominated the proceedings as 
usual, he encountered unusual opposition on several occasions. Upon the 
opening of the conference, the agenda was immediately revised, shortened 
to the following three items: analysis of the general political situa­
tion in the territory, the programme for the next elections, and the 
election of a new PDG Directing Committee. Discussion of other issues 
such as RDA work in parliament, the Loi-Cadre and its application, and 
economic and mineral prospects in Guinea, were subsequently deferred to 
a future party congress. Conference meirfoers objected to electing a new 
Directing Committee at this time, while Toure insisted that it was 
necessary in the face of new administrative responsibilities created by 
the recent reforms. In the end Tour£ was defeated on this matter, as the 
PDG directorate rejected the election proposal with 26 votes against 9. 
Interpreted in several circles as symbolic of "the beginning of the fall
of the dictator," this minor failure in no way threatened the omnipotent
55
position of the PDG leader.
Tour§ later exhibited his remarkable oratory skills as he delivered 
his report on the general political situation in the territory, a speech 
which lasted more than four hours. After tracing the entire history of 
the RDA and its Guinean chapter, Toure went on to summarise the current 
political predicament of the overseas territories. Regarding the Loi- 
Cadre, Tour6 reiterated that "it is only a step and not an end in 
itself," noting that "in one year, the situation has evolved to such a
54
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degree that this old reform no longer responds to a single FDA aspira- 
56
tion." TOur6 then aroused his audience by declaring that if the new
administrative structure failed, "there will not be any other valid
alternative left for us except independence." Furthering Toure's
remarks, members spoke of liberty as the "magic word" missing in all the
empty reforms recently introduced in the Federations.
The second day of the conference was largely devoted to
presentation and discussion of the party platform in the forthcoming
elections. The circumstances surrounding each party sub-section were
taken into consideration, particularly in the Fouta region. Tour£
explained the absolute necessity of conquering the Fouta accordingly:
The Fouta remains the cattle pen where freedom is completely 
denied to its inhabitants, that is why we attach such 
importance to a victory in the Fouta, victory which we shall 
carry over our two enemies: the powerful feudal system and
the administration which supports it. (57)
The triunph in the Mamou municipal elections was a source of
considerable PDG pride, symbolising the first step in wiping out the
feudal lords, in this case the supreme almamy of the Fouta. In
proverbial style, Toure gloated "once the head of the snake is cut off,
58
the rest of it can be made into a belt."
Subsequent debate concerning the electoral campaign heated up over 
controversial issues. Again Tour& met stiff opposition in attempting to 
get his proposals adopted. Membership in the Territorial Assembly had 
been raised from 50 to 60 seats. Toure moved that the nomination of
candidates should take place as follows: 36 elected by the party sub-
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sections and 24 designated by an enlarged Directing Committee in
Conakry. A major dispute arose when Toure announced that eight of the
candidates put forth by the PDG directorate were to be European, Libano-
Syrian, or mulatto. At this point Ismael Toure, representative of Kankan
and half-brother of S6kou, voiced strong objection to including
Europeans on PDG electoral lists. It appears that the majority of the
audience sided with the opinions of Ismael Tour6, as the people cheered,
59
applauded, and whistled their support. Nevertheless Toure remained 
intransigent, insisting that minorities as well as the various strata of 
society be represented in the Territorial Assembly. The opposition 
rebounded with the illustration that, for 5,000 Europeans residing in 
Guinea, eight assembly seats were allotted, whereby in certain 
districts, 70,000 Africans were represented by only two councillors. A 
virtual duel between the half-brothers ensued, prolonging the debate an 
additional four hours. This time, however, Toure refused to concede to 
his opponents, and the report detailing the election programme was 
finally unanimously adopted by the conference delegates without altera­
tion. Thus, albeit slightly shaken, Toure presided over the closing of 
the conference, still standing firmly on his pedestal of power. The 
delegates and numerous observers departed from Lab6 without incident, 
returning home in order to prepare for the approaching elections.
Territorial Assembly Elections, March 1957
While the dominance of the PDG on the political scene in Guinea needed 
little proof, the outcome of the Territorial Assembly elections would 
prove determinant in the future development of the territory. Under the 
new provisions of the Loi-Cadre the Assembly would elect a Council of
59
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Ministers as well as a Vice-President acting as virtual Prime Minister. 
With largely extended powers the Territorial Assembly/ particularly if 
controlled by a majority party, could enact legislation significantly 
altering the administrative and economic structure in Guinea. For this 
reason the PDG organised a vigorous election campaign covering all 
districts and cantons.
While the PDG campaign enveloped the territory, the opposition
parties concentrated their efforts in the few areas where they still had
a fighting chance of success. The DSG was strongest in the Fouta
districts Pita and Labe, and the BAG hoped to consolidate support in
60
Telimele and Gaoul. Barry Diawadou was in Guinea this time to campaign 
for the BAG, but confined his touring mostly to the Fouta region and the 
northern district of Youkounkoun. Otherwise both the DSG and BAG 
conceded victory to the PDG, and all but abandoned activities in PDG 
strongholds.
As a mass party with the majority of its members uneducated, the 
PDG faced difficulty in selecting worthy candidates for the Territorial 
Assembly elections. In the previous assembly Tour6 was the only repre­
sentative of the PDG, and he and Saifoulaye were likewise the only party 
members having parliamentary experience. Toure's decision to include 
Europeans on PDG lists was an unpopular but necessary move, due to their 
knowledge and expertise on territorial administration. The option of 
allowing a few seats to trained BAG men, however, was utterly rejected. 
Furthermore the party sub-sections in each district were keen to see 
their native sons elected, and reportedly voiced opposition to voting
60
ANS 17G 613, "Renseignements, vie politique a l’int^rieur du
territoire," Services de Police, Guinea, No. 617/266, 16 March 1957.
263
for "strangers" chosen by the Directing Committee in Conakry. A witness
described the current PDG predicament accordingly:
It is very visible that the PDG is suffering from a growth 
crisis, due to an overly rapid swelling of its bottom ranks 
following the last two electoral campaigns. Its actual 
dilemma is that it lacks trained personnel. Moreover the 
party is a victim of the campaign of violence it unleashed 
over the past few years to destroy, to its benefit, the BAG.
It could not, even if it wanted, incorporate worthy men of 
this party (who are not lacking) because RDA militants,
"having suffered" in the struggle, would never comprehend 
why "saboteura" were taking their places. (61)
Hardly unusual in Guinean politics, the electoral campaign was
marred by scattered incidents of violent clashes between opposing
parties. Minor but repeated skirmishes were reported in Conakry,
Dubreka, Labe, and Gaoul, all involving the PDG versus the BAG or DSG.
In Dabola and Pita more serious incidents occurred, corresponding to the
campaign trails of Toure and Saifoulaye respectively. In Dabola Toure’s
presence excited RDA women to the extent that they led a crowd of more
than 1,000 demonstrators to besiege the home of BAG deputy Diawadou.
Dabola police, several of whom were wounded, needed reinforcements from
62
Mamou to halt, the onslaught. Meanwhile simultaneous public meetings
held in Pita by Saifoulaye and DSG leader Barry III produced violent
63
conflict resulting in one death and 15 seriously wounded.
In spite of the divers incidents preceding the elections, on 
polling day 31 March the prevailing atmosphere was calm. No one doubted
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the inpending PDG victory; the opposition parties quietly awaited the 
results of areas where they still had glimmers of hope. The defeat of 
the opposition was indeed crushing; the PDG took 56 out of the 60 seats 
in the Assembly. Of the remaining four seats, three went to the DSG in 
Pita, and one to an independent canton chief in Dinguiraye. The BAG was 
completely wiped out of the Assembly. Even in his home town where his 
father was the canton chief, Diawadou received only 2,332 votes against 
4,464 for the PDA candidate. Barry III just barely held on to his seat 
in Pita, and overall the DSG fared moderately better than the BAG. The 
March election results reduced the former opposition into almost 
inconsequential minor parties, with the following votes cast:
The creation of the interterritorial MSA and CA movements, 
moreover, did little to affect the outcome of the territorial elections 
across West Africa, and subsequently Toure called for their integration
into the PDA. The main MSA victory was in Niger where the party of 
Djibo controlled two-thirds of the Assembly; the remaining seats were 
occupied by the PDA. Overall the MSA fared slightly better than the CA, 
whose 47 out of 54 total seats were concentrated in Senegal. In the 
Ivory Coast, Soudan, and Guinea the PDA gained overwhelming majorities, 
and in Upper Volta a slight majority. In total, the PDA acquired 51 
per cent of the Territorial Assembly seats in ACJF. Subsequent elections
64
ANSCM AP 2185/5, "Resultats des Elections du 31 Mars 1957," Guinea.
65
ANS 17G 613, "Renseignements, interview de Sekou Toure par l'A.F.P. 
sur les Elections du 31 Mars," Services de Police, Guinea, No. 83/334, 
Conakry, 5 April 1957.
PDA
DSG (MSA)
BAG
Independents
575,000
78.000
45.000
67,000 (64)
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to the Grand Council returned a majority of FDA leaders (including 
Tour§), and Houphouet thus was elected President. Gabriel d'Arboussier, 
who had been forgiven . i past extremism and recently reintegrated into 
the upper ranks of the PDA, was elected Vice-President, of the Grand 
Council.
On 9 May 1957 the Territorial Assembly in Guinea elected its
Council of Ministers. Cbtaining the most votes, Tour6 was thereby
appointed Vice-President of the Council, and reportedly hand-picked the
66
other candidates nominated for office. The Assembly outrightly
approved the proposed Council, whose members and respective Ministries
included: Fodeba Keita— Interior; Alioune Drame— Finances; Bengaly
Camara— Labour; Lansana Beavogui— Commerce and Industry; and Ismael
Tour£— Transport. The list of Ministers was submitted to the Assembly by
the PDG Directing Committee without consultation of party sub-sections.
Nonetheless, with the exception of Kankan, party sub-sections from all
67
over Guinea expressed satisfaction with the new Government Council.
In Kankan the radical PDG section criticised the election of the 
Ministers because not one of their three local councillors was selected. 
In actual fact the section President, Lamine Kaba, was an elderly PDG 
veteran suffering from ill health, and therefore deemed unfit to serve 
as Minister. After voicing the sole opposition to the list of candidates
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in the Assembly meeting during which he insulted the PDG leadership,
Kaba was consequently temporarily suspended from his post as President
68
of the Kankan party section. The other two councillors had been 
purposely overlooked due to similar displays of militancy and insubor­
dination to EDA leaders. The aggressive character of the Kankan sub­
section was notoriously difficult to control. In a public meeting held 
on 12 May, for example, a municipal councillor was quoted as follows:
The PDA will never fail. The goal that it has assigned 
itself is to expose all that is going on in Africa so that 
Africa can obtain its freedom and independence, aims which 
are not accomplished without arms and the spilling of blood.
It is therefore necessary to take up arms to achieve our 
independence. (69)
This oration brought thunderous applause, as members of the crowd 
chanted "arms and blood are needed to obtain independence." Thus while 
PDA leaders, most in new positions within the administration, worked for 
peaceful collaboration and development in the territories, it is clear 
that at least some lower-ranking segments of the PDG had already begun 
pressing the issue of independence.
Meanwhile in Conakry the Deputy-Mayor of Conakry and Vice-President 
of the Council of Ministers gave seemingly an inaugural address to the 
Guinean government and people. Tour6 spoke about the future of Guinea 
largely in economic terms. "If we don't find rapid solutions to the 
difficulties attacking the peasant, livestock-breeder, fisherman, 
farmer, workman, youth, woman, etc." Toure noted, "it will be difficult
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to justify semi-autonomy and the Loi-Cadre which introduced it." 
Industralisation, in the eyes of the Vice-President/ meant not only
mineral mining/ but also production of finished goods. In this vein
Tour6 went on to discuss the necessity of substantial financing (i.e. 
foreign investment). A long-time suspected Communist, Tour£ defied his 
image by speaking explicitly about the urgent need to solicit and employ 
foreign capital in the development of the territory. "Happiness/
dignity/ and liberty for Africans" was deemed the motto of the new
government. Finally/ equality between all people was assured, as Tour6 
concluded:
We must rapidly strip the old European of his superiority 
complex, and the old African of his inferiority conplex as 
well as his fatalism, in order to create two beings that 
love each other, two complete men intimately fraternising 
because they are aware of their equality and their bonded 
destiny. (71)
Tour6 surprised the crowd by closing his address with the following 
cheer: "Vive la France, Vive la Guinee, Vive la Communaute Franco-
Africaine." Apparently this was the first time he had sung such praises 
to France, and the supporting masses took note with unease.
Clearly Toure held the fate of his people in his hands. At this 
point, however, no one was quite sure in which direction he would lead 
them. Certainly he intended to carry the reforms introduced under the 
Lol-Cadrfi to their fullest extent. There was little even the French 
authorities could do to influence the future course of events in Guinea. 
Still one major obstacle remained in the path of Tours’s quest for 
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absolute power in Guinea— the chieftaincy. Thus in his determination to 
leave no stone unturned in the pursuit of his ideals, Tour§ now focused 
his attention on ridding Guinea of its "last bastion of feudalism," the 
enslaving forces that historically were responsible for the oppression 
of the masses, and had continued their malpractices under the protection 
of French colonialism.
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CHAPTER VIII 
The Abolition of the Chieftaincy
The official suppression of the "so-called customary chieftaincy" in 
Guinea took place on 31 December 1957. Although the simple decree, 
unique to French West Africa, seemed to pass almost entirely unhindered 
by the colonial authorities, its implications were significant in regard 
to the securing of the PDG’s political supremacy in the territory, as 
well as contributing to the successful outcome of the future campaign 
for independence.
Authors addressing this somewhat mysterious act of government have
been at odds in their analysis of the motivating factors behind the
abolition of the chieftaincy in Guinea. One school of thought, best
articulated by Suret-Canale, holds that:
The fall of the Guinean chieftaincy was the result of a 
deep-seated popular movement well before the years 1957- 
1958....The disintegration of the chieftaincy was an accom­
plished fact. Its legal suppression was only the final act 
of the movement.... (1)
This interpretation of events leads to unequivocal praise for the
insight and wisdom displayed by Sekou Toure in wiping away "the worm-
2
eaten cadre of unpopular and backward-looking notables." It follows 
from this argument that there was an undeniable connection between the 
abolition of the "feudal" remnants in Guinean society and the option for 
immediate independence in September 1958.
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The opposing school of thought that Suret-Canale indeed denounces 
is headed by B. Ameillon, and sees the suppression as a political 
manoeuvre by high-ranking PDG officials in their struggle for hegemony 
in Guinean politics. In essence the argument maintains that "It (the 
chieftaincy) constituted the single restriction to the total power of 
t*he party."
The degenerate nature of the institution of the chieftaincy in the 
territory is a central theme common to both sides of the debate. Few 
would disagree that colonialism had transformed the very foundations 
upon which traditional chieftaincy was built and functioned, nor that 
the chiefs no longer represented and worked for the collective interests 
of the masses under their tutelage. From the very inception of the 
European conquest, chiefs found themselves in a precarious situation in 
regard to their future existence under colonial rule. Traditional 
rulers that resisted the French takeover were eventually crushed, their 
territories parcelled, and those that were captured most often found 
themselves imprisoned or exiled. The fate of those rulers generally 
termed "collaborators" of the French turned out to be no more secure in 
the long run than that of the resisters. Although initial treaties 
promised to respect traditional kingship and custom, annexation and 
conplete administrative reorganisation were on the horizon. The imple­
mentation and evolution of the colonial system, its use of what it 
deemed "chiefs" and the designation of their purpose and role, and 
finally their integration into the administrative structure of the 
territory served eventually to alienate them from both what remained of 
traditional society and what was emerging as the modern African social 
and political setting.
B. Aroeillon, La Guinde; Bilan d 'uns Independance, Paris, 1964, p.24.
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The evolution of the politique indigene can be summarised as
passing through the following phases: 1) the initial protectorate policy 
where, in theory, customary practices and institutions of traditional 
authority were to be left intact under French supervision, leading to
2) direct administration including annexation, territorial division, and 
the often dubious selection procedure of native authorities, and finally
3) a reassessment of past mistakes, recognition of the increasing
alienation of rulers from ruled and the precarious situation of the 
chieftaincy, and an attenpt to rehabilitate customary chiefs,
concentrating on the grass-roots level of territorial administration. 
The progression of the French native policy clearly reflects the 
undeniable degradation of the institution of the chieftaincy under
colonial rule and the endeavour to adapt in order to save it from total 
collapse. To understand fully the abolition of the chieftaincy in Guinea 
three concurrent themes must be addressed: firstly the evolution and
erosion of traditional society, secondly the contributing factors behind 
the decline of the native authorities, and finally the particular 
political circumstances that motivated the Guinean government to abolish 
rather than reform the institution of the chieftaincy, and the procedure 
that effectively enabled it to carry out its programme.
The Erosion of Traditional Society 
Ironically, by the time the French came to terms with their past 
mistakes regarding the selection, treatment, and use of the chieftaincy 
in the West African colonies and subsequently devised a policy to 
re-establish the institution, indigenous society had evolved in such a 
way that the chieftaincy was fast becoming obsolete. By the early 1950s 
social evolution was evident in all sectors of African society,
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expressed notably by the 6volues, working and commercial classes, women, 
youth, and in Guinea even the peasants. Economic growth coincided with 
increased educational opportunities, society on the whole was consider­
ably more mobile, and as a result reliance upon and deference shown to 
the customary chiefs steadily declined. The growth of political parties 
and their penetration into the countryside propelled desires for social 
and economic modernisation. Coupled with excessive behaviour, and the 
affiliation to the colonial system that the chiefs represented and the 
African populace resented, the institution of the chieftaincy was in 
dire straits.
Despite apparent detestation of the offices of native authority, at
this time there was no satisfactory replacement available to appease
both the colonial authorities and the African subjects. As a report on
the situation in Guinea in 1955 pointed out.:
One can neither support the rigid guardianship of the old 
chieftaincy and the administration, nor present in replace­
ment a new human cell having any real stability. (4)
The report continued with the observation that the evolues constituted 
the new influential class in Guinea, resulting in the tendency to liber­
ate the masses from traditional authority, custom, moral values and 
ancestral rites. Peasants and workers, cognisant of their expanding 
opportunities to elect these young African leaders, increasingly shifted 
their support to the politicians, most often at the expense of the 
chiefs.
By 1955 reports about the erosion of traditional society were 
arriving in the Governor's office from most districts in Guinea. The
4
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head of the subdivision of Dinguiraye wrote in January 1955 that "custom 
is not evolving...in fact it is disappearing." He continued in more 
detail that:
It is particularly sensitive in the civil domain and in the 
organisation of the family. The traditional rules of 
marriage and customary divorce are disappearing bit by bit 
without anything arriving to replace them. This is followed 
by a degradation of the family unit of which the consequent 
es are rapidly becoming serious. Marriages are becoming 
affairs of simple cohabitation or organised prostitution. 
Adultery is so banal that one no longer pays any attention 
to it. Even incest shocks no one and the cases are frequent.
In the midst of this dissolution, children are born without 
any precise civil status. Pregnant women are remarrying 
without the slightest delay. (5)
The Commandant d£. Cercle of Dabola in February of the same year reported 
a similar situation of moral decay in his district. He too was particu­
larly concerned about the questions of marriage, divorce, filiation, and 
the growing number of children born from adulterous relationships. The
future, as predicted by the Commandant, was one where "the pillars of
6
the family and social organisation will collapse." An integral part of 
this abandonment of custom was the liberation of women spearheaded by 
the political campaign of the PDG.
Tied to the emancipation of women was the liberation of the Guinean 
youth, also a programme incited by the PDG. Inspector Pruvost in his 
report on contact with the population cited an elderly trade unionist 
discussing the modern generation's disregard for the traditional custom 
of requesting certain family elders' permission for marriage:
5
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"The youth, at least in Lower Guinea, no longer recognise 
this hierarchy. There is a complete split with their elders, 
they only do exactly as they please. There is a great gap 
between them and us." (7)
Suret-Canale discussed the erosion of traditional society in La 
Repnhligna de. Guinea, where he related the process, accelerating from 
1950 onwards, to economic growth, namely the progress of the trade 
economy and the establishment of the first mines. This dissolution of 
traditional social structures, according to Suret-Canale, was manifested 
notably through the following factors:
1) The disintegration of the extended family favouring their 
replacement in the form of smaller private households;
2) The impoverishment of the masses accompanied by 
accentuation of social differentiation, particularly in 
the face of noticeable accumulation of wealth by a rising 
class of plantation owners and a salaried workforce;
3) Rural exodus to urban centres, administrative headquar­
ters, and particularly to the capital?
4) Evolution towards the previously rare practices of buying 
and selling land and livestock;
5) The development of an indigenous commercial class, prof­
itably establishing small enterprises such as shops, 
restaurants, transportation services, etc.; and
6) The economic and moral crisis of the chiefs, who were 
retaining their positions of authority solely through the 
support of the colonial government. (8)
The evolution and modernisation of African society under colonialism
brought new choices and opportunities for the whole of the subject
population. This "new world," and the difficulties of the chief's
position within it, were aptly summarised by L.P. Mair:
The chief has ceased to be the ultimate source of protection 
to the humble, aid to the needy, and advancement to the 
ambitious. It is not simply that the superior government has 
taken his place, but that the new world offers opportunities 
which depend on the creation of relationships right outside
Ibid.., p. 3.
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the traditional system. People can attain success in comm­
erce , or eminence in the professions, without being beholden 
in any way to their political superiors....In these circum­
stances, resentment against the rule of chiefs is something 
more than a protest against injustice, even though it may 
express itself in that form. It is part of a wider demand: 
the demand for full participation in the institutions which 
control the destinies of Africans. (9)
Thus a gradual displacement of the institution of the chieftaincy was
taking place in the evolution of African society.
The Decline of the Chieftaincy
From the very onset of colonial rule and the incorporation of the chiefs 
into the system, their precise legal status was left largely undeter­
mined. Throughout the colonial period the chiefs, completely without 
any clear legal rights, were subject to the same sanctions as their 
subjects. They no longer felt any security of tenure, as their positions 
of authority depended wholly upon the continued satisfaction of the 
colonial administration, judged by the productivity of the localities 
under their jurisdiction. Finally their position in colonial society 
was precarious in the sense that on the one hand the chiefs represented 
the administration and were responsible to carry out its policies and
demands, while on the other hand in theory they were also representa­
tives of the native subjects, expressing the will of the people to their
governors. Caught in a position of being no more than "intermediaries,"
although useful on occasion to both sides, the chiefs struggled to 
survive within a system that rendered them unpopular with their 
superiors as well as their subordinates.
The main legislation codifying the institution of the chieftaincy
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in French Guinea was the Decree of 15 November 1934 on Native Admini­
stration in Guinea. In the spirit of the time the decree stipulated 
that "the chief is designated according to local custom," however this 
was directly followed by an escape clause: "or, failing this, according
to the rules laid down by the Commandant de. Cercle and approved by the
10
Lieutenant-Governor." As designated by the 1934 decree, the main
responsibilities of the chiefs were to collect taxes, oversee local
production and the "protection of crops, plantations and harvests,"
guarantee free passage and the upkeep of roads, monitor hygiene, and
11
maintain law and order. Further requirements demanded of the chiefs 
in French West Africa were to supply labourers, and sometimes 
(especially during wartime) furnish products to the colonial government. 
Additional common administrative duties included the hosting of visiting 
officials, and bureaucratic requirements such as the keeping of public 
records of health, education, births, deaths, marriages, etc. To 
fulfill many of their administrative functions the chiefs normally 
solicited the help of clerks, interpreters, secretaries, messengers, 
and educated assistants, which they were responsible for paying out of 
their quite meager allowances. Finally, although severely limited in 
legal status, the chiefs were theoretically given the heavy responsi­
bility of the administration of justice and the maintenance of general 
law and order in their respective provinces, to the extent of including 
the prevention of "brawls and disputes as well as any disturbance in 
—
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12
public places."
Despite the wide assortment of specific functions relegated to the 
native authorities, their formal status in colonial government and 
society remained fundamentally undefined. The ambiguous legal position 
of the chiefs under the colonial system was concisely summarised by P. 
Alexandre:
It was impossible to define a chief in French administrative 
or constitutional law, or at least to define him other than 
in a negative manner: he was not a public official, nor an
elected magistrate, he was not the representative of a 
public collectivity or of a legal entity in private law, no 
more was he an ordinary person who had assumed a da facto 
authority since his was defined and restricted by the local 
regulations. (13)
Apart from their constitutional dilemma of status, the traditional
judicial powers of the chiefs over their subjects were gradually revoked
by the colonial authorities. Initially during the protectorate phase of
colonial rule, sanctioned by a decree in 1892 in French Guinea, the
chiefs retained their customary rights in the administration of justice,
except for cases of serious crimes which were sent to French courts.
Due to the practical inexistence of functional French courts in the
territories, criminal jurisdiction was reappointed to local chiefs in
1902. Apparently dissatisfied with the administration of justice in the
hands of native authorities, the French decided rather than reorganise
the system under closer supervision, instead to do away with it 
14
entirely. In 1912 the judicial powers of village chiefs were
conpletely abolished, and customary courts (t.r ihunaux -indigonos! were
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created in district and subdivision headquarters. District courts were 
under European judges, while African judges were permitted in the lesser 
courts at the subdivision level. By a crippling decree of 1924, however, 
almost all legal matters and judicial powers were brought under direct 
French supervision.
It is often argued that the decline of the chieftaincy was due in 
part to the financial predicament of the chiefs. Whereas traditionally 
chiefs received tribute from a variety of sources- lesser chiefs, 
vassals, numerous dues and taxes, revenues from courts of justice, and 
taxes on trade and production- the colonial authorities denied chiefs 
their former sources of income, replacing them with only modest salaries 
insufficient to cover their expenses. Chiefs serving under the colonial 
system were paid on a sliding scale. Chefs dp> canf-on were on fixed 
salaries according to the grade of the office holder, those in densely 
populated districts normally deemed as having to carry more 
responsibility were therefore classified higher in grade. The Chefs de 
village were not paid salaries, but rather were entitled to a fixed 
percentage of the taxes they were responsible for collecting. This 
again was on a sliding scale, and a further regulation stipulated that 
the sooner the tax was returned the greater the rebate awarded to the 
village chief. In Guinea the rebate on tax collection on the village 
level ranged from five to eight percent.
The salaries of the chief were considered by most to be inadequate 
to support their status in society. The chiefs were responsible for 
paying their own administrative and tax-collecting agents, hosting 
colonial officers in the style to which they were accustomed, financing 
customary ceremonies, and maintaining their personal stature as men of 
wealth and power. Unable to sustain their positions of high social
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status on their salaries alone, this situation of financial distress 
often led the native chiefs to shift the burden onto their subjects. 
Customary dues were multiplied, forced labour in the village included 
the tilling of the chief’s fields, construction or repair of his private 
dwellings, and new taxes were introduced such as percentages of the 
harvest, inheritance, and for extravagances such as feasts and luxury 
items fancied by the chief.
An example of the despotism reportedly imposed by the chiefs of the 
Fouta Djalon in 1953 included a per capita tax for the purchase of a 
modern house and luxury car, a tax to cover the expenses of a pilgrimage 
to Mecca, plus a whole array of lesser taxes to contribute to each feast 
day as well as French holiday. Taxes were also levied on the death of 
anyone over the age of seven, and if left unpaid the lands and posses­
sions of the deceased were confiscated.
The legal position of the chiefs was repeatedly brought into 
question in conplaints of abuses and crimes committed against the 
subject populations. It is generally true that the French officers 
turned a blind eye to the oppressive operations of the chiefs so long as 
taxes were secured and law and order effectively maintained. When 
abuses of power were publicised incriminating the particular actions of 
a local chief, however, the colonial government absolved itself of any 
responsibility whatsoever.
The masses needed only the PDG’s political organisation and 
encouragement to voice dissatisfaction, then join forces in working 
toward the achievement of positive results in the struggle against, first 
chiefly then colonial "despotic" rule. In 1955 the process was already 
underway, as an administrator from Kindia reported:
The masses, who had seemed largely apathetic and one thought 
immune to all types of propaganda, have shown on the
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contrary that they are capable of undergoing collective 
training and responding to orders. The masses today are 
greatly distraught, because they no longer know if they 
ought to continue to follow the traditional chiefs or on the 
contrary to listen to spokesmen of the PDA, who assure them 
that the administration is henceforth without the power to 
counteract the will of the party. The masses are in the end 
being seduced by the latter...and have complete confidence 
in their leader S£kou Toure, who they see as being the only 
one capable of realising their various aspirations. (15)
The loss of contact between the administration and the masses was
one of the principal causes of the rapidly escalating violent incidents
beginning in 1954. These disturbances coincided with the equally swift
penetration of the PDG throughout the territory. It was commonly
reported that the Guinean chapter of the PDA would with lightning speed
infiltrate a village, then immediately proceed to set up a "puppet
organisation" as a screen between the people and the local
authorities. In this situation of sporadic chaos and violence, the
Governor of Guinea in February 1955 requested that 20 administrators or
functionaries be sent "to re-establish necessary contact with the 
16
population." The fact that the envisioned solution involved the 
ordering of French administrators attests to the recognition that the 
chiefs were no longer capable of functioning as intermediaries or 
maintaining law and order in their jurisdictions. In short it was 
already evident that the native authorities were failing to serve their 
purpose in the colonial system. Nevertheless a primary recommendation 
to the colonial government in the wake of the 1954-1955 incidents was:
15
District of Kindia, 30 January 1955, in Pruvost report, "Incidents 
de 1954-1955," pp. 49-50.
16
Pruvost report, "Contact avec les Populations," 12 February 1955, 
p. 29.
281
Finally, to study the means of safeguarding and reinforcing, 
in the shortest delay, the authority of the customary 
chiefs, upon which the administrators must be able to rely.
(17)
This, however, was not by any means the first call for action to fore­
stall the impending doom of the chieftaincy in Guinea. A brief 
recapitulation of the reforms underway will demonstrate two opposing 
tendencies, reflecting diverging schools of administrative thought: an
attenpt to strengthen the institution of the chieftaincy legally, 
morally and economically, while at the same time, progress towards the 
democratisation of territorial government which in the end enabled the 
Guinean government to abolish it.
Post-War Reforms and Democracy
The delegates at the 1944 Brazzaville Conference were aware of the
plight of the chieftaincy. However, while reaffirming the principles of
earlier theoreticians regarding the chieftaincy as an indispensable cog
in the colonial system and of the necessity to re-establish it with
appropriate measures of reform, legal statute was left to the determina-
18
tion of the French parliament.
On 9 August 1947, in a session of the National Assembly, a resolu­
tion proposed by Yacine Diallo, Lamine Gueye, Leopold Senghor and other 
African representatives was adopted:
...inviting the Government to specify a statute on the 
indigenous chiefs in French West Africa, French Equatorial 
Africa, in Togo and Cameroon, on the triple points of their 
material and moral situation and the sanctions to which they 
are subject. (19)
17
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19
ANSCM AP 2152/1, National Assembly, Proposition de Resolution No. 
1711, Second Sitting 9 August 1947.
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For nearly a decade afterwards a series of proposals and projects for 
laws were debated in the parliament and French Union Assembly. Despite 
universal agreement on the main objectives of reform: definition of a
legal status of the chiefs and penalties for abuse of position, improve­
ment in their material status, reinforcement of their prestige, and 
standardised selection procedure and specification of duties, each 
proposal was condemned on the grounds of being either too specific to 
include the wide variety of traditional practices, or overly vague to be 
of any true merit. The approximate number of administrative chiefs 
functioning in French West Africa in 1939 was 50,287, of which there
were 32 provincial chiefs, 2,206 canton chiefs, and 48,049 village 
20
chiefs. In attempting to standardise this diversity of local situa­
tions, each of the proposed statutes met insurmountable obstacles which 
eventually denied its passage. The fundamental contradiction of these 
efforts at reform was the desire to respect custom and the traditional 
authority of the chiefs, while at the same time encourage the process of 
evolution of democratic institutions as outlined by the Constitution and 
new colonial policy.
The Demise of the Guinean Chieftaincy 
The untimely death of Yacine Diallo, the growth of the KDA-PDG, and the 
results of the 1956 elections together indicated the near certain doom 
of the chieftaincy in Guinea. The sudden loss of the eloquent spokesman 
Yacin Diallo left a void of political unity and representation of both 
the chieftaincy and the Fouta Djalon, that was henceforth never effect­
ively filled. While in most of the West African territories the chiefs
20
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were a political force considered advantageous to have on one's side, in 
Guinea the tension between the emerging political elite and the 
"collaborators" was acute.
One likely factor enabling the Guinean politicians to strongly 
denounce the traditional authorities was the immense success of the 
PDG's rural campaign. From the introduction of universal suffrage in 
the overseas territories, generally the peasants in West Africa voted in 
allegiance to their historical rulers. For this reason most political 
parties actively sought the support of the chiefs in order to obtain 
that of the masses. This, however, was not the case in Guinea, where 
the PDG purposely exposed the weaknesses and abuses of the chiefs in the 
pursuit of direct contact with the peasants, establishing itself firmly 
between the representatives of the colonial authority and the subject 
population. On numerous occasions between 1955 and 1958, PDG supporters 
violently assaulted the institution of the chieftaincy, physically 
attacking certain chiefs and their henchmen, and burning residences and 
fields as a demonstration of their vulnerability.
There appears to be some debate over the motivation behind the PDG 
attack on the chieftaincy. As cited earlier, Suret-Canale maintained 
that the chieftaincy had lost all of its traditional and representation­
al characteristics and was in fact already defunct, its legal suppres­
sion sinply recognised this fai t acconpli. Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, 
after extensive interviews with the PDG leadership, claimed that their
attitude was the following: "we are not against the chiefs, we are only
21
against the bad chiefs." She offered as evidence a strategy pursued by 
—
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the PDG, namely to locate areas where traditional rules of succession
had been violated, whereby the party would seek the support of the
legitimate claimant. According to Schachter Morgenthau this meant that
22
the PDG "did not disdain chiefly backing." As the final proof of her 
argument she cited the PDA resolution to befriend the chieftaincy pro­
nounced in Conakry in 1955.
The middle position of the debate, as expressed by Maurice Gastaud, 
saw the fundamental strategy of the PDG as a battle primarily against 
colonialism. In the pursuit of freedom, it was necessary to take a 
crucial step to unite the masses. This step, in his opinion, was the
abolition of the chieftaincy— the principal support of the colonial 
23
regime.
A different approach regarding the cairpaign for the abolition of
the chieftaincy held that its suppression was the final measure securing
the hegemonic position of the PDG in the Guinean Government. Ameillon
saw this as the deliberate manoeuvre by the aspiring Guinean
politicians; in fact this view may be supported by general tendencies
characteristic of this era. Michael Crowder mentioned the general
phenomenon that:
The French-speaking (African) politician was concerned not 
with the chief’s power-base, for he had little except French 
support. He was concerned with the chief in so much as he 
was an obstacle provided by the French to his political 
ambitions. (24)
22
Ibid.
23
Maurice Gastaud, "Naissance et Evolution du P.D.G." Cahiers du 
Centre d'Etudes et de recherohes Marxjat.es, 55, 1967, p. 8.
24
M. Crowder and O. Ikime, West African Chiefs, p. XXVI.
285
In his 1961 study of African political parties, Thomas Hodgkin also
depicted the contradiction facing the chieftaincy in the modern
political context:
The assumptions on which kingship or chiefly rule is 
founded— whether the ruler be hereditary or elected, 
absolute or constitutional, Animist, Muslim, or Christian—  
are in conflict with the assumptions on which party govern­
ment is founded. The authority of the chief depends 
primarily upon his status within the traditional order, his 
capacity to perform ritual functions; the authority of the 
party leader depends upon his achievements within the modern 
order, his capacity to realise desired political change.
(25)
The official stance adopted by the PDG in regards to the chieftaincy, in
the words of Diallo Saifoulaye and published in La Liherte in 1956, was
the following:
Our formal position regarding the problem of the chieftaincy 
is this: the chieftaincy, degraded by the colonial admini­
stration, no longer represents the tradition which gave rise 
to the office. In many circumstances the chiefs betrayed 
their functions by making themselves servile instruments of 
colonial power against the permanent interests of the 
people. Most were designated illegitimately and hold their
posts only because they made themselves spokesmen and 
defenders of the colonial authorities. Others have used 
their administrative powers to the point of scandal....True 
traditional chieftaincy no longer exists...and nothing can 
replace it. (26)
Finally, one author has suggested that the responsibility of the
abolition was shared between the "reform-minded colonial administrators
under the leadership of Governor Jean Hamadier, and modern-minded
27
political leaders such as Sekou Toure." Victor D. DuBois explained in
25
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286
his thesis on the nationalist movement in Guinea that the chieftaincy 
had expired "once it had become purposeless in the eyes of the French 
and obstructive in the eyes of the Guineans." The point that the 
chieftaincy had lost much of its usefulness is indisputable. The argu­
ment that the French administrators actively encouraged its suppression, 
however, is seriously lacking in evidence and indeed highly doubtful.
Colonial Response to the Fall of the Chiefs
The attitude of the French authorities regarding the state of decline of 
the chieftaincy in Guinea was one of awareness but not alarm. Guinea 
had three successive Governors between 1954 and 1957, and the problem of 
the chieftaincy was recurrently addressed by each one in turn. 
Following the 1954 elections and subsequent incidents, the loss of 
contact with the population and the predicament of the chiefs became 
topics of serious study. In February 1955 Governor Parisot hosted a 
conference in Conakry of the Command ants de. Cercle to address the 
question of the chieftaincy. In his report to the federal headquarters 
in Dakar, Parisot elucidated the following points emanating from the 
conference:
1) The chieftaincy remains an indispensable part of social 
life in the territory and the population would not accept 
its abolition;
2) Chiefs should not be elected, as this would negate the 
essence of the institution and result in perilous circum­
stances;
3) The financial situation of the chiefs is in crisis; 
customary dues are being denied, and they are heavily 
burdened by the expenses incurred through their admini­
strative duties;
4) The administrators agree that the endowments of the 
chiefs should be increased;
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5) The Chnfs de. circonscr ipHon are unanimous in stressing 
the necessity to maintain and confirm the chiefs' posi­
tion in the domain of justice contuTniere. (28)
Governor Parisot then recommended a project to be undertaken, firstly to
reorganise customary justice, and secondly to inprove the ranking and
remuneration system in the territory. He concluded his report with the
following supplication:
It is high time for intervention because the chieftaincy is 
anxious, banned or abused under the blows of those who are 
weakening it, and rendered distasteful in the eyes of the 
people....The chiefs, whose deep loyalty we have constantly 
enjoyed, doubt "French authority." (29)
The dissatisfaction felt by the chiefs, regarding the lack of
support offered them by the colonial authorities, was a constant theme
in Guinean politics throughout the mid-1950s. Numerous petitions were
drafted, imploring the administration to reassure the position of the
customary chiefs and to intervene in cases of disorder and intense
conflict, particularly vis a vis the rapidly swelling ranks of the PDG.
A crucial shift in French policy regarding the PDG took place in the
wake of the 1954-1955 Guinean uprisings. Governor Parisot, a self-
declared enemy of Toure in 1954, was in dire need of high ranking PDG
cooperation in 1955 to reinstitute calm in the territory. A great deal
of bargaining was going on at. this time between the French authorities
and the IDG, the outcome of which was the dispersion of PDG spokesmen to
implore their followers to cease the violence, accompanied by a circular
requesting that all possible administrative assistance be given to their 
30
mission. Additionally, the PDA Coordinating Committee purposely met in
28
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Conakry so that Tour& could announce his agreed upon break with the 
Communists, a speech anxiously awaited by the colonial cdministration. 
It was at this meeting where the R)A reaffirmed its intention to work
both with the French authorities and the chiefs for harmony in demo­
cratic progress. Tour6, in order to reassert his loyalty to the FDA and 
its revised programme, clarified his position versus the chieftaincy in 
a letter to FDA President Houphouet where he carefully wrote:
I am anxious to reaffirm to you my ardent desire to contrib­
ute to the creation in Guinea of a peaceful social climate
indispensable to the useful cooperation with the Administra­
tive authorities as with the chieftaincies. (31)
In the same letter Toure repeatedly referred to the abuses of the 
chiefs, and responded to criticisms of his political stance, partic­
ularly in regard to the chieftaincy issue. The tone of this concluding 
paragraph expresses Tours's real opinion of the institution of the 
chieftaincy, revealing a slight resentment of having been obliged to 
defend his position:
Certainly, our militants who suffer from the actions of 
certain chiefs do not hide their indignation, perhaps they 
express the violent sentiment of the entire population. A 
number of chiefs are members of the PDG, I can with their 
help undertake action to reduce tension between the chief­
taincies and the rural masses. Must I make myself clear that 
I am aware that the coexistence of the traditional framework 
and the responsible elites, promoted by the new institu­
tions, is imperative to the harmonious evolution of African 
society? (32)
Governor Bonfils, who took over from Parisot in 1955, was equally 
concerned with the decline of the chieftaincy in Guinea. Acting on the 
recommendations of both Pruvost and Parisot, Bonfils reformed both the
31
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ranking and remuneration system for the Guinean chiefs. In May 1955 the
Territorial Assembly passed a Projet, d ’Arret& improving the financial
situation of the canton chiefs. Henceforth the 243 cantons were divided
into 7 classes, their order of importance determined according to the
following criteria: area, population, geographic location, existence of
markets, commercial centers, etc. Respective salaries of the Chefs, da
33
canton ranged from 60,000 to 600,000 francs CFA per annum.
Additionally, dignitary titles of Chef superieur were bestowed on chiefs
serving more than 15 years, along with varying salary increases.
Finally, to respect the unique position of the almamy of the Fouta (also
the canton chief of Mamou), the title Chef da province was awarded with
34
a salary of 1,300,000 francs CFA.
In a later communique sent to the Commandants d a  Cercle and
subdivision heads in April 1956, Bonfils reminded his administrators
that the "extremely difficult situation of the chieftaincy" was still a
subject addressed at each conference of the territory’s Commandants de. 
35
Cercle. Bonfils made clear his position that "there is however no 
question of the disappearance of this traditional force, that is an 
indispensable element of political equilibrium in the life of this 
country." It appears that the Governor attempted to take on the role of 
mediator between the PDG and the chieftaincy, giving consideration to
33
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the grievances of each opponent. He acknowledged the PDG claim that it 
was only against the bad chiefs, and agreed that the French administra­
tion had been wrongfully tolerant of the well known abuses of some of 
its collaborators. The good chiefs, Bonfils claimed, were aware of some
of the wrongdoings of fellow native authorities, and therefore were in
36
the process of regrouping themselves. The instructions to the dis­
trict and subdivision heads laid out by Bonfils were strong and clear:
1) It is no longer admissible to retain useless illegitimate 
chiefs;
2) The chief must no longer be the absolute sovereign but 
the head of a collectivity from which he heeds advice;
3) The 1934 statute of the chieftaincy in Guinea must be 
re-established, for it includes the maintenance of advis­
ory councils both at the village and canton level, and 
incorporates democratic measures that will increase the 
validity and popularity of the chieftaincy; therefore 
create village and canton commissions;
4) Multiply and choose carefully your Conseils de. notables f 
giving them substantial matters to deliberate; and
5) Introduce women into your councils. (37)
In short, Governor Bonfils was demanding the democratisation of 
power and further autonomy of village and canton collectivities, which 
he expected would increase the acceptance of the chieftaincy in rural 
areas and by politicians concerned with blatant abuses of power. The 
main reason why Bonfils was calling for a re-evaluation of the 1934 
Decree on Native Administration in Guinea is that by this time circulars 
announcing the unlikeliness of a common statute ever being adopted by 
the parliament for French West Africa were arriving in Conakry. Hence 
the recommendation of the French government was for the individual
36
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territories to work out their own reforms regarding the status and
duties of the chiefs. Finally, in January 1957 a circular from the High-
Commissioner addressed to the Governors of West Africa explicitly
invited the territorial governments to sort out the perilous predicament
of the chieftaincies, reading: "I leave you free to decide following
38
the particular circumstances in your territory." The fundamental legal 
transformation which made a reform of this nature possible was a result 
of the Loi-Cadrfi of June 1956.
Legal Manoeuvring and the Suppression of the Chieftaincy
The stipulation of the Loi-Cadre that enabled the Guinean government to
effectively abolish the institution of the chieftaincy was contained in
Article 1. The structural reforms permissible by Article 1 included "the
reorganisation of the federal governments and the modification of the
39
attributions of the heads of territorial groups and councils." While 
interests common to the Republic were to remain in the hands of the 
French, local interests, including that of the civil service, were to be 
henceforth regulated by respective territorial governments.
The necessity to reorganise the administrative structure in Guinea 
had been recognised since 1955. The disturbances of 1954-1955 were 
blamed partly upon the lack of administrative personnel on the local 
level, and the fact that administrative districts were too large to 
permit constant contact with the population. In April 1955 the French 
Overseas Minister pointed out to the High-Commissioner that while 
Guinea's area and population were similar to that of the Ivory Coast, 
—
ANSCM AP 2152/1, High-Commissioner ACF to Territorial Governors, 
No. 59/AP, Dakar, 21 January 1957.
39
ANSCM AP 2189/8, Paper entitled "Loi-Cadre", August 1957.
292
Guinea had only 20 mercies and 7 subdivisions, to Ivory Coast's
respective 18 and 48. The Minister therefore recommended the creation
of new administrative circonscriptions, which was also in accordance
40
with the wishes of the Guinean parliamentarians in Paris.
The territorial reorganisation envisioned by the Loi-Cadre took 
place in April and May 1957, after elections for the new Territorial 
Assemblies had been held in the end of March. Immediately the Guinean 
government concentrated on the question of administrative reform. 
In June 1957 the High-Commissioner reported to Paris that in the wake of 
continued violence (particularly in October 1956), the obvious solution 
was to let the Guinean authorities handle their own internal and insti­
tutional affairs, as he wrote:
Finally the reform of the institutions will permit the 
Guinean political leaders, now equipped with governmental 
responsibilities, to participate in the re-establishment of 
a favourable climate. (41)
One month later, at a conference of the Commandants da. Cercle, the 
administrative reforms to be implemented were decided upon. This terri­
torial reorganisation finalised the abolition of the chieftaincy.
The historic conference of the Commandants dp Cercle and African 
Ministers, presided over by Governor Ramadier and led by Vice-President 
Toure, took place in Conakry from 25 to 27 July 1957. In his opening 
address, Ramadier elucidated the diminished role of the French admini­
strators in the decision-making process of Guinean politics:
40
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Our role, Administrators, is to make clear to them, to give 
them objectively, loyally, impartially, all elements of the 
decision, but the decision on these territorial problems is 
now their doing. And it is when these decisions are made by 
the ConseiJ da Gouvernement that you will be transmitted 
instructions that you will have to implement. (42)
The first speaker to the conference was Fodeba Keita, Minister of the 
Interior, who began by summarising the two problems associated with the 
Guinean chieftaincies. Firstly, Keita discussed the institutional 
conflict, where the chieftaincy was considered to be incompatible with 
the social and economic development of the country as envisioned by the 
Tn-i-Cadro. Secondly the Minister held that the chieftaincy as an insti­
tution suffered from the unacceptable lack of personal integrity of many 
of its chiefs. In full agreement with the Interior Minister, Governor
Ramadier added: "we all know that the role of the chieftaincy has come
43
to an end." Next the Governor invited opinions of the Commandants as
to the possible implications of the suppression of the chieftaincy in
their respective districts. The following excerpts from the various
circles denote the general consensus concerning the recognised
inefficiency and popular opinion of the chiefs:
Kouroussa: "In the district of Kouroussa, where one waits
from one day to the next for the suppression of the chief­
taincy, there will be no damage, because for almost 4 
months, the Chefs de. canton have been absolutely useless";
Kissidougou: "In Kissidougou, customary chiefs did not
exist; those who are there are strictly artificial, they 
have neither activity, influence nor consideration";
Boffa: "For more than a year and a half, the canton and
village chiefs are chiefs in name only. They no longer have 
any influence on the population whatsoever";
42
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Bokfe: "The population did not wait for our decision to
reject the institution of the chiefs";
Gaoual: "There is absolutely no inconvenience in suppressing 
the canton chiefs who have no human or economic decency."
(44)
Only two districts, Dinguiraye and Mamou, registered hesitation to the 
abolition of the chieftaincy. The case of Dinguiraye was particular in 
that the chiefs were direct descendants of Al-Haj Umar Tal. The 
Commandant explained that the chiefs still carried considerable 
religious and spiritual weight in the area, and that the population 
would accept the suppression of the chieftaincy, however not applaud it. 
Regarding Mamou, home of the almamy of the Fouta Djalon, the Commandant 
expressed fears of anarchy following the abolition of the chieftaincy, 
particularly on the village level. Nearly all of the administrators, 
however, voiced concern over potential disorder and confusion during the 
transition period to new administrative organisation.
Toure demonstrated at the conference that he was well prepared to 
answer the numerous questions about a viable administrative replacement 
for the chieftaincy. In his initial address Toure explained that the 
chieftaincy, besides being tarnished with corrupt individuals, was out­
moded as a pillar in the evolving political structure. Economically the 
old territorial divisions were inadequate, and peasants were unlawfully 
mobilised to perform tasks for the personal interests of the chiefs; 
according to Toure both factors were directly thwarting the pace and 
progress of national economic development. Following a study of the 
economic conditions of the territory and the prospects for industriali­
sation, the Guinean government was in the process of devising a national
44
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development plan. Based upon necessary regional reorganisation/ Tour«§
argued that the envisioned development scheme could not be successfully
inplemented by the chiefs:
We asked ourselves the question that, when it came down to 
it, would this reorganisation be possible through the insti­
tution of the chieftaincy? We have responded negatively, the 
chieftaincy no longer plays this economic role because it no 
longer has the confidence of the populace. Without the 
constraint, the administrative force which constitutes its 
only significance, it no longer can, I'm telling you, lead 
the peasant masses. (45)
By the second day of the conference it was considered agreed that 
the chieftaincy was' to be suppressed, as Ramadier in his opening remarks 
stated:
We have killed the chieftaincy. It was destroyed automati­
cally economically by the modification of peasant and rural 
life. Now, if we want to create a new organisation of
peasant and rural life, it is a matter of finding a parallel 
administrative support. (46)
In these circumstances attention was turned toward the new administra­
tive structures to be forthwith introduced. The organisational reform 
emerging from the conference altered the regional structure of cercle 
and subdivisionr abolished the region referred to as canton, and added
those of pos.te. admin 1st rati f and village. In accordance with PDG
philosophy, the village collectivity was considered the critical cell of 
rural society, and 4,723 "rural communes" were organised. The local 
base of the party was hence concentrated in the form of councils elected 
by universal suffrage, of which the president was given the title of
chief. In a radio address on 27 August Vice-President TOur£ declared 
that the Guinean Conseil de. Gouvernement had adopted a text reorganising
45
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the administrative structure of the territory, which would be submitted
47
to the forthcoming session of the Territorial Assembly for approval.
Just prior to Toure's radio announcement, Governor Ramadier wrote a 
letter summarising the recent political developments in Guinea to the 
French Overseas Minister. He set the stage by acknowledging that the 
Guinean government functioned as a team, coirpletely dependent upon their 
eminent leader President Sekou Tour§. Seemingly to justify Tourd's 
behaviour, Ramadier then reminded the Minister that "the African 
conception of power is totalitarian," and that, the political campaign of 
the PDG had for years been directed against the administration and the 
chiefs. The Governor explained the predicament facing the administra­
tion in Guinea accordingly;
If I succeeded in acknowledging that now the territorial 
administration was at the disposition of the Conse-M de. 
Gonvernement r and that it intended to aid the realisation of 
the Council's policies and not to contradict them, the 
chieftaincy remained, representing a force of monolithism 
and opposition, the very essence of all political movement 
that lacks direction. (48)
To address this predicament, therefore, Ramadier claimed that he 
suggested the July meeting of the Commandants de. Cerclef at which a 
solution was envisioned. Following cautionary advice from the Governor
and the administrators, it was there decided to suppress the chief­
taincy, and structural replacements of profound significance were 
presented. Ramadier concluded by highlighting both the potential 
difficulties ensuing from the abolition of the chieftaincy and the
47
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personal character of Tour§, including his apparent determination to 
prevail:
I advised President S6kou Tourd that prudence was essential, 
that if in certain regions of the territory the suppression 
of the chieftaincy would proceed without incident, without 
complication, to the general satisfaction of the population, 
in the Fouta the problem is likely to be different. The 
Vice-President of the Conseil da Gouvernement has set the 
wheels in motion, it would be difficult to get him to turn 
back. Of course he will do everything possible to avoid 
struggle, but if the opposition wants to fight, he will not 
be able to refuse it. (49)
Perhaps a bit surprisingly, the reaction of the French Overseas 
Ministry was not one of grave concern. The reply to Ramadier's letter 
acknowledged the transmission of Tours's broadcast and requested details 
of the new administrative divisions. Finally the Director of Political 
Affairs responded that he would like to think that this reorganisation 
was combined with the institution of rural collectivities as commis­
sioned by a French decree in April, and that these would help take over
50
from the suppressed chieftaincies.
While the French government under the Loi-Cadre had the power to
51
annul the decisions made by a Conseil de. Gouvernement r in the case of 
the abolition of the chieftaincy in Guinea the authorities never even 
considered the possibility of intervention. Whatever the initial
49
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attempts to impede the growth of the PDG and the ascendancy of Tourd as 
its omnipotent leader, the French administration had since reconciled 
itself with the political supremacy of the party. Faced often with the 
necessity to work with the PDG to re-establish peace and the maintenance 
of law and order in the territory, successive Governors had little room 
for political manoeuvring, particularly against the wishes of the masses 
as expressed by the emerging political elite. Guinean politicians 
proved adept at making the most out of the sweeping reforms introduced 
by the Loi-Cadre, and in this situation it appears that the French 
strategy in dealing with this potent force was to attempt to maintain 
good relations with the Guinean nationalist leaders. The plight of the 
chieftaincy and loss of contact with the population was a well- 
documented administrative concern in Guinea. Although the extent of the 
relationship with the masses envisioned and achieved by the PDG may not 
have been foreseen by the French officials, nevertheless the Guinean 
government was wilfully handed the means of securing their future path 
of development.
From the standpoint of the PDG the importance of the political 
backing and participation of the masses was a recurrent theme in the 
movement to suppress the chieftaincy. In this respect, while no longer 
representing the collective will of the population, the chieftaincy was 
actually regarded as a dividing wall, its demolition therefore impera­
tive in order to secure direct contact with the masses. Tourd alluded 
to the simple fact that the abolition of the chieftaincy was required to
dissolve opposition to the party when he stated: "politically, the
52
chieftaincy was mobilised as an arm against the PDA."
52
S. Tourd, Gmndp; Prftlndo a 1'Indeppndannpf p. 53.
299
Finally, the administrative reorganisation and suppression of the
chieftaincy was deemed crucial to the dismemberment of the colonial
system, as Toure explained in January 1958:
Which is why, immediately after the constitution of our 
Consul! de. Gouvernement-, the first step was to define our 
line of action, the popular objectives to reach. This line 
of action...rests essentially upon the integral decolonisa­
tion of all the structures of the country. It is impossible 
to fight against colonialism while maintaining the struc­
tures that favour its system of exploitation and oppression; 
it is inpossible, finally, to struggle against colonisation 
without denouncing and destroying the causes which at. the 
base are internal conflicts of which we have long suffered.
As you know, our movement, which controls practically all 
the organisations introduced by the Loi-Cadre, in the sense 
of decolonisation, has indicated by concrete realisations, 
its absolute determination to bring down the colonial 
regime. We consider it incompatible with the dignity and 
African interest and also with the durability and the 
development of French influence. (53)
The same spirit propelled Toure to conclude:
Yes! The bastion of indigenous feudalism has fallen. The 
institution of the chieftaincy has been suppressed as of 
1 January 1958, and with it have disappeared all of the 
abuses of which it was guilty with respect to the rural 
populations. (54)
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CHAPTER IX 
Guinea Opts for Independence
Despite the fact that the Territorial Assembly in Guinea had taken the 
provisions of the Loi-Cadro further than any other West African terri­
tory, particularly in its abolition of the chieftaincy, PDG leaders were 
among the first to voice dissatisfaction with the degree of autonomy 
granted under the 1956 reforms. Moreover, while in 1956 parliamentary
debate pertaining to the overseas territories was dominated by the
issues of territorial government and autonomy, by 1957 the focus shifted 
to the controversial subjects of federation and independence. As it was 
generally recognised that the natural progression of autonomy would lead 
to eventual independence, the question of what form it would take— as a 
federation or as many small states— was brought to the forefront of
African political debate.
African deputies in Paris were divided over the future relationship
1
between France and the overseas territories. As a Minister in the 
French government and major contributor in the drafting of the Loi-
Cadre, Houphouet's preference, for dismantling the African Federations 
in favour of largely autonomous states, dominated the reform package. 
From first glance at the draft reforms, Leopold Senghor denounced what 
he deemed the "balkanisation" of Africa, calling for the return of 
powers that were stripped from the Grand Council, and for the creation 
of a federal executive. In subsequent National Assembly debate African
1
See Donal Cruise O'Brien, "The Limits of Political Choice in French 
West Africa," Civilisations, XV, 2, 1965, pp. 1-15.
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deputies, in turn, sided with either the "territorialist" position of 
Houphouet, or the "federalist" stance of Senghor. In the end the Loi- 
Cadre decrees, which greatly diminished the powers of the federal 
council yet failed to grant full territorial self-government, pleased 
neither side of the dispute.
In light of the triumphant success of the PDA in the March 1957 
territorial elections, the Coordinating Committee was summoned to 
Yamoussokro in order to prepare the movement's third congress. 
Beginning on 4 April the Committee spent four working days discussing 
the recent elections, the new institutions and associated responsibili-- 
ties introduced by the Loi-Cadre, the movement's relations with the 
French government with the future prospects of a French-African Commu­
nity, and the details of the forthcoming congress. The PDA Third Inter­
territorial Congress was scheduled to take place in July, but was later 
postponed until September, in Bamako— the birthplace of the PDA. 
Interestingly, although the hottest topic of debate in Paris among the 
deputies was federalism, the subject was deliberately omitted from the 
Ordre dn jour set for the Bamako mass congress. Responding to criticism 
that the PDA was eluding the problem of independence, Doudou Gueye 
explained that the prospect of independence required the "mature 
conscience of a collective society"; however, he continued:
Is this the only fact that influences the recourse to inde­
pendence? I would respond immediately in the affirmative if 
our societies did not suffer from an extraordinary imbalance 
between the degree of "political" evolution of this society 
and its degree of "economic" evolution. This imbalance 
between the "desire" and the "ability" is clearly at the 
root of the problem....There is only recourse to a solution 
of what is possible. (2)
-
Doudou Gueye, "Apres la reunion de Yamoussokro le PDA n1elude pas le 
probleme d 1independance." Afrigue Nouvelle, 30 April 1957.
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Albeit aware of Houphouet's views on the matter# S6kou Toure became 
a strong advocate of the federalist position. Perhaps Toure envisioned 
African independence in the not-too-distant future {Houphouet totally 
rejected the notion); Toure nevertheless realised that strength could 
only be achieved through African unity and interdependence. Toure 
launched his federalist campaign in a speech before the Guinea Territor­
ial Assembly in July 1957, culminating in a vote demanding a federal 
executive at Dakar. Prior to this the argument had been purposely kept 
solely between high-ranking African politicians, primarily because the 
introduction of the debate to the territorial sections increased the 
threat of a possible split within the PDA. Toure pre-empted the working 
out of a common position at the Bamako congress by presenting a motion 
to the federal Grand Council in August. Co-authored by Doudou Thiam, a 
CA-BPS councillor from Senegal, the motion for the creation of a federal 
executive in charge of communal services and interests was passed 
unanimously by the Council on 29 August 1957. Houphouet was absent from 
the Council sitting; nevertheless all PDA members present supported 
Toure's proposal, including Council Vice-President Gabriel d'Arboussier, 
Doudou Gueye, and Modibo Keita. The adopted plan called for the consti­
tution of a federal executive, the officers of which would be elected
either from the territorial Government Councils or via procedures
3
similar to those for the Territorial Assemblies. Furthermore the 
Council decided to send a delegation to Paris to present the motion to 
the National Assembly. In the meantime a major battle over conflicting 
views, about the future shape of the French-African Community and
3
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Gabriel d'Arboussier, Sekou Toure and Fodeba Keita, 4 September 1957.
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federalism issue, proved irrepressible at the third EDA mass congress.
The Third HDA Inter territorial Congress
The historic third EDA congress, the largest of its kind in African
history, opened in Bamako on 25 Septeirber 1957. The congress was
attended by 254 delegates from 10 out of the 12 territories within AOF
and AEF, 570 official observers, 25 journalists, and more than 2,000
additional territorial delegates who, due to lack of space, were forced
to remain outside the conference halls where loudspeakers were provided.
Among the 254 main delegates, apart from a Minister and Secretary of
State in the French government, were 6 territorial Vice-Presidents, 32
Council Ministers, 17 parliamentarians, 16 Grand Councillors, 67
4
territorial assemblymen, 51 municipal councillors, and 14 mayors. 
Distinguished observers included French politicians Frangois Mitterrand, 
Edgar Faure, Pierre Mendes-France, and representatives of all metropoli­
tan political parties except the Communists, who ironically had been the 
only ones present at past EDA congresses. Leaders of other African 
political parties present at the congress included Mamadou Dia of the CA 
and Barry Diawadou of the BAG.
EDA President Houphouet-Boigny arrived for the congress in regal 
style. Treated as one of the highest-ranking Ministers in the French 
government, Houphouet was met at the Bamako airport by a detachment of 
troops, then ushered to the Governor's palace where he was graciously 
accommodated. In his opening address Houphouet reaffirmed the principal 
aims of the EDA, calling for unity between all African political move­
ments in the struggle for emancipation and equality between the overseas
4
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territories and the metropole. Insisting on the revision of Title Eight
of the French Constitution, Houphouet outlined his vision of a French-
African Community where member states would be on equal footing with one
another. The form of government under which the Community would
function, Houphouet announced, was federalist. Initially delighted, the
excitement of the crowd favouring the federalist approach slowly waned,
as Houphouet went on to describe his plan in detail. Indeed his proposal
aimed at the creation of a federal government and federal parliament,
but on the level of the overall Community, for example such as the
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The clinching
remark that foreshadowed a -serious conflict within the RDA was when
Houphouet stated:
We specify that in order for us to achieve this goal, the 
steps which seem the most effective are on one hand: the
rapid suppression of intermediary organs between the central 
federal power and the territories? and on the other hand: 
that the personality and autonomy of the territories be 
more strongly asserted daily. (5)
The debate over the issue of federalism was not officially on the agenda 
for discussion. It was not until the close of the congress, when dele­
gates disputed the contents of the general resolution, that opposition 
to Houphouet’s ideas finally surfaced. In fact the heated arguments 
which ensued delayed the closing of the congress for two days, until a 
conpromise resolution was eventually passed.
In the meantime the congress progressed quite peacefully, as nine 
reports were presented on all aspects of African society, including one
5
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6
by Toure on trade unionism. Several minor disruptions during the first
few days of the congress can be traced to various observer groups rather
than KDA delegates. As usual/ representatives of the students’ union
FEANF (Federation des etudiants d'Afrique n.o.ir.e) spoke out with
vengeance against oppression, calling for "unity/ liberty, and
7
independence for our people." The newly created Dakar Parti Africaia da 
1 1Tndependance (PAI) seconded the motion made by the youth for immediate 
independence. Finally trade unionists from UGTAN applauded militants 
demanding independence for Algeria, and affirmed their position favour­
ing the creation of a federal executive in AGF. All in all, the H)A 
demonstrated a high level of political maturity by allowing dissenting 
voices and outside organisations to air their grievances during congress 
proceed ings.
Real trouble began brewing on 28 September, the last scheduled day 
of the congress, over the political resolution presented to the 
delegates for ratification. The resolution called for a revision of the 
French Constitution allowing for the creation of a French Community 
comprised of autonomous states with a federal government and parliament. 
Toure, now present at the deliberations, led the majority of the dele­
gates in rejecting the proposed resolution. Flamboyantly attired in 
Guinean national dress, Toure read excerpts from the political resolu­
tion unanimously passed by the recent PDG Territorial Conference held in 
Kankan just prior to the HDA congress, including the following passages: 
_
Due to a fall in which he was injured, Toure was unable to attend 
the first 3 days of the congress. His speech was pre-recorded and played 
for the delegates.
7
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The Loi -Cadref with the absence of federal executives, con­
stitutes the parcelling out of the AOF and AEF Federations.
The people of Black Africa, like all dependent 
populations, aspire to obtain their sovereignty and demand 
their right to self-determination: this means the right to
decide their futures, including the right to separate from
the metropole and to form independent states...however the 
right to separation does not imply an obligation to secede.
Also, it affirms that the prerequisite to the creation of a
true French-African Community is the recognition of our 
right to self-determination.
This is why we demand the immediate ascension of the AOF 
and AEF Federations to internal autonomy by the institution 
of federal legislative assemblies and the creation of 
federal executives elected by these assemblies and their 
leaders, which will permit these groups to form federal 
states. (8)
Thus Tours's vision was that of a confederation with France, whereby
direct territorial representation in French government would cease, to
be replaced by representatives of the two African Federations acting as
states on equal par with the metropolitan state.
The majority of the delegates at the Bamako congress supported the
federalist approach to future Franco-African relations, believing that
separate territories would be too weak economically to take on the
management of important services, and therefore if the Federations were
dismantled these would revert back to metropolitan control. In this
sense the federal issue was tied to the desire for full internal
autonomy, seen possible only if and when African governments were set up
at the federal level. As long as concessions were made only to
individual territories (i.e. units with populations of 1-4 million each)
9
they would always be in the form of "toys and lollipops." Morgenthau 
has argued that the French government accepted territorial autonomy as a
8
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9
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way to prevent African independence, and that the existence of a self-
10
governing federation was perceived as a threat. By contrast ,
Mortimer held that the French government considered such a
"balkanisation" of Africa disastrous, explaining:
The Federal solution was economically desirable from both 
French and African points of view, but politically it was 
inpossible for France to impose it on Africans who did not 
want it. (11)
Skurnick has claimed that the Federation was created initially to serve
French interests, yet the individual colonies were always regarded as
the fundamental political units, and therefore the Federation was only a
temporary structure that was discarded when it outlived its useful- 
12
ness. This argument does not coorelate with archival evidence, and as
pointed out by Crowder and Cruise O'Brien: "effective power in French
West Africa lay with the Governor-General in Dakar, who had overriding
13
authority over the Territorial Governors." Additonally, as summarised 
by Morgenthau:
Only the Governor-General could correspond with the govern­
ment. He had control over civil police and the military, and 
no French law or decree was in force until promulgated by 
him. Therefore the permanent administration, a specially 
significant force while governments changed often, once 
again enjoyed considerable power. (14)
Moreover, by 1944 the whole of the Federation was more important than
10
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its corrponent parts, and the African political elite was much more
15
federal (" AQFienna") than territorial in outlook.
The leader of the largest federal interterritorial political move­
ment baulked the federalist position for several reasons. Firstly, as a 
net contributor to the federal budget, the Ivory Coast had for some time 
considered itself the "milch cow" of French West Africa. By 1957 Ivory
Coast export income amounted to 46 per cent of the federal total,
16
produced by one seventh of the population of AOF. A second economic 
consideration was that the Ivory Coast was not dependent on any of its 
neighbours for trade. Thirdly, the Ivorian Territorial Assembly was 
firmly against the idea of creating federal executives, particularly in 
Dakar. Finally, as an insider and prominent member of the French govern­
ment, Houphouet was not hostile to the notion that France would continue 
to have an important role in African affairs, as he envisioned a 
French-African government and community.
Meanwhile back at the congress, obviously in a minority position,
17
supported only by the delegations from the Ivory Coast and Gabon, 
Houphouet stormed out of the scheduled closing hearing, where the 
federalism debate continued throughout the night. Likewise the RDA 
president refused to return to the conference hall the following day, 
instead remaining in the Governor's palace. Furthermore Houphouet 
decided not to stand for re-election as President of the RDA— elections
15
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which should have taken place the day before, at the close of the 
congress. Nevertheless a conpromise resolution was drawn up in 
Houphouet’s absence, which read as follows:
The Congress considers that the independence of peoples 
is an inalienable right permitting them to dispose of the 
attributes of their sovereignty according to the interests 
of the masses.
But it considers that interdependence is the golden rule 
of people's lives and is manifested in the 20th century in 
the constitution of large political and economic groupings 
...under these conditions the Congress proposes the realisa­
tion and reinforcement of a French-African Community, 
democratic and fraternal, based on equality.
The Congress mandates its parliamentary group to present 
in the least possible delay a motion for the constitution of 
a Federal State, composed of autonomous states with a 
federal government and federal parliament serving as the 
supreme organ of a unified state. (18)
By failing to specify whether the federal state should be at the level
of the French-African Community or the level of African federation, the
resolution was approved by the congress, admittedly as a cover-up to
retain PDA unity. Tourd then urged PDA delegates to maintain Houphouet
as PDA president:
Houphouet must remain president of the PDA, not in service 
to his ideas, but in service of the ideas expressed by this 
congress. (19)
Hence in the absence of the IDA President, Toure presided over the
elections of a new PDA Coordinating Committee, as well as gi.ving the
closing address to the Third Interterritorial PDA Congress on 30 
20
September 1957. Toure's behaviour at the close of the congress could
lSAfrnqne Informations, No. 129/30, 4 October 1957, p. 16.
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be seen as almost contradictory. VJhile assuming the role of champion and 
major spokesman of the point of view conflicting with Houphouet/ Toure 
at the same time became the conciliator and major advocate for maintain­
ing unity within the RDA, and was largely responsible for the re- 
election of Houphouet as the leader of the movement. In sum/ the London 
Times gave the following account of Toure’s character, intellect, and 
influence at the RDA congress:
Sekou Toure commands astounding loyalty and devotion from 
all who come in contact with him, he has equally won great 
respect for his remarkable intelligence from all who work 
with him, Africans and Europeans alike. Sekou Toure, an 
orator of power, speaks-for the new politically conscious 
generation of French Africa, which wants the freedom to 
create African nations with modern institutions....He is 
trying to replace chieftaincy, tribalism, and other institu­
tions which have helped to retard African development....
Sekou Toure's performance at Bamako made his pre-eminence in 
the RDA quite obvious. (21)
The Bamako Aftermath and the PDG Third Territorial Conference
Although the RDA congress ended on a conciliatory note with a compromise 
resolution, it was clear that grave differences in opinion remained. 
FDA delegates returned to their respective territories, proceeding to 
drum up support for individual points of view, proving that indeed no 
common perspective or platform had been finally adopted in Bamako.
Shortly after his return to Guinea, Toure held a public conference 
in Conakry, attended by 4,000 people, at which he gave a report of the 
Bamako proceedings. Toure opened his discussion of the FDA congress 
accordingly:
The first aim of the Congress was to fix the destiny of 
Africa, the second, to show that immediate independence is 
an inalienable right of all people, big or small.
21
The Times, 24 October 1957, p. 5.
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However, independence is not as one may think, an end in 
itself, but a way to a freely determined future, it is an 
absolute right, but one which does not exclude the possi­
bility to enter into interdependence, a framework of 
alliance with France, and this is why the Congress finally 
called for a French-African Community. (22)
Depicting the proposed community as a marriage of sorts, Toure explained
that the union was not necessarily founded on love, but rather on reason
and interests. He then pointed out how both sides will benefit from such
a relationship: Africa would attain cultural and economic aid from
France, and in exchange France will profit from the great economic
potential of Africa. Regarding the form of the community, Toure
presented both sides of the federal argument to his supporters, albeit
with conspicuous bias, as follows:
On one side: to form autonomous African republics in the
midst of this community, for example the republics of 
Soudan, Ivory Coast, or Guinea, which would amount to the 
division of Africa since Guinea is nothing without Senegal 
or the Ivory Coast, etc....and the Fouta or other regions of 
our territory are nothing without the support of the others.
This view is held by a minority which does not understand 
the true needs of Africa.
On the other side: to form the following nations: AOF, AEF,
and Madagascar, associated with France on equal footing, in 
a federal republic. This idea was firmly defended by the 
majority of the delegates, among whom the Guinean represent­
atives. (23)
At this time Toure was not advocating outright independence for the 
overseas territories, as he repeatedly campaigned for African federalism 
and continued close ties with France.
Two weeks later the newly elected RDA Coordinating Committee was 
convoked in Paris. The stated purpose of the gathering was to discuss
22
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the lessons of the Bamako congress, a possible regrouping of African
political parties, and designation of specific tasks to committee
members. Toure was listed as "absent and excused" from the proceedings
which met on 29, 30, and 31 October 1957. The Committee acknowledged
that a certain malaise, was prevalent at the Bamako congress, due largely
24
to newcomer EDA leaders suffering from "demagogy and extremism."
Calling for stricter discipline, the committee urged members to stop
seeking individual publicity and confounding territorial autonomy with
the liberty to say whatever a person wishes. Moreover the committee
reported that the metropolitan government was "worried if not hostile
about our undertakings." Houphouet denied that the EDA was divided over
the issue of a federal executive, claiming that political opponents had
exploited the events in order to discredit the movement. Finally, in
recognition of the need to retain closer ties between territorial sec-
tions, secretariats were designated to deal with particular aspects of
coordination, such as political, social, administrative, financial, and
trade union activities.
Back in Guinea, Toure was preparing for the Third PDG Territorial
Conference, which met from 23-26 January 1958. In his opening Rapport
Moral at Eoli±iqua, Toure denounced the balkanisation of AOF on the
following grounds:
The breaking up of the Federation is an indication that 
France wishes to divide the Africans in order to create 
opposition between them, and to separately arbitrate local 
conflicts. (25)
—
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The federal issue was of paramount importance to Tour£ because he 
believed that it was inextricably linked with African unity. Despite his 
unquenchable thirst for total control over Guinean affairs, Toure's 
repeated willingness to defer certain powers to an African federal 
government proved that he was indeed an African nationalist at heart. 
Toure considered that Guinea was nothing outside the West African 
Federation, and moreover the Federation needed continued assistance 
from, and association with, France. Realistically speaking, Toure ex­
plained his position regarding future French-African relations:
We are for the French-African Community, to which African 
States acquiesce a part of their sovereignty, because we are 
aware that, at this point in time, Africa has nothing to 
gain from isolation, and that France will be our most 
valuable partner. (26)
Thus Toure brought home the debates over the federal executive and 
the French-African Community. In fact these issues dominated the PDG 
conference, while territorial matters were almost completely ignored. 
Toure knew that he would face opposition from Houphouet, and possibly 
from the FDA Coordinating Committee which usually wound up supporting 
the opinions of the President, for his recent actions. Perhaps this was 
why Toure preferred to be absent at the Paris meeting, instead solidi­
fying his position by bringing the debate into the territorial sections 
and enlisting the support of the PDG masses.
Closing on 26 January, the PDG conference delegates put forth the 
following party objectives:
1) Increase the powers of the Territorial Assemblies;
2) Territorial autonomy, with administration managed solely 
by the Conseils da Gouvernement;
3) Grands Conseils to be transformed into federal parlia­
ments electing a federal executive responsible for all 
common services; and
26
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4) An end to all assimilation policies and African represen- 
tation in metropolitan organs of government, except the 
Assembly of the French Union which deals with communal 
interests of the French-African Community. (27)
Attesting to his renewed emphasis on unity as well as slight distancing
from France, Toure concluded the conference with a noticeable chant
variation: "Vive le H)A! Vive 1'Association Franco-Africaine!”
Expulsion of the PDG Mamou Section
Just prior to the third party conference a significant event occurred in
PDG history. In reaction to severe criticism from leaders of the Mamou
sub-section of the party, the PDG directorate expelled the entire
section, making clear their intolerance for so-called "deviant"
behaviour. The case of Mamou was held as an example, in the words of
Toure, "to anyone refusing to submit to the decisions of the directing
28
organ of the party."
R.W. Johnson has written an illuminating account of the PDG and the
Mamou "deviation", in which he traced the history of the turbulent sub- 
29
section. Mamou was a small town in the Fouta region where French 
colonisers had forcibly relocated the almamy of the Alfaya line at the 
turn of the century. The most revered of the Fouta chiefs, almaxny 
Ibrahima Sory Dara, was given the unique title of Chef super ienr dn 
Fouta Djalon in 1950, in recognition of his loyalty to the French admin­
istration. The almamy was a major supporter of veteran politician
27
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Yacine Diallo, and was himself elected to the first Consoil General, in 
1946 as well as the federal Grand Conseil..
Mamou grew largely as an administrative town, under the religious 
and political dominance of the alTnamy who had served as canton chief 
since 1928. The town, situated between Guinea's two largest cities, 
Conakry and Kankan, benefited from road and rail links which contributed 
greatly to its commercial development. According to Johnson, despite 
the presence of the almamv and general hostility of the Fulani people 
towards the PDG, the party was able to take root in Mamou aided by 
several factors, namely:
1) Mamou was a "new" town, artificially created at a pivotal 
location in the territory;
2) Hence, for various commercial and occupational reasons, 
the town drew an ethnically diverse population for 
settlement; and
3) Aware of the town's strategic importance and mixed popu­
lation, the PDG set out to gain a foothold in Mamou as 
early as 1951. (30)
Interestingly, the French administration unwittingly played a role 
in the "extremist" nature of the PDG section at Mamou. Considering the 
Fouta capital and fiefdom of the almamy relatively safe from PDG infil­
tration, the territorial administration frequently transferred radical 
(particularly "Communist") PDA activists to Mamou, for example 
Saifoulaye Diallo and sub-section President Pldah Koniba. These civil 
servants, many of whom were highly educated Ponty graduates as well as 
earlier members of the Groupes d.'Etudes Communistes, formed the core of 
the PDG leadership group in Mamou. This particular aspect of the Mamou 
section is significant, as Johnson pointed out:
30
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The fact that the PDG leadership in Conakry was firmly in 
the hands of men of Toure's own stamp (i.e. uneducated), 
with a well^developed suspicion of Ponty-trained "intellect­
uals," goes not a little way to explaining the later tension 
between Mamou and Conakry. (31)
Furthermore it is noted that the Mamou leadership paid allegiance first
and foremost to PDG principles and revolutionary doctrine, not to the
persona, myth, and "charisma" associated with the party's eminent
leader.
While Johnson traced the beginning of the open confrontation
between Mamou and Conakry to an incident surrounding the January 1956
elections to the National Assembly, HDA-PDG archives reveal an earlier
starting point for ensuing hostile relations. In fact, the most severe
attack on the Conakry Directorate by the Mamou section leaders took
place in August 1955. The most probable explanation why this episode
blew over without formal disciplinary action is because Toure and the
PDG had not yet secured electoral office and dominance on the Guinean
political scene. In any case the Mamou critique of PDG organisation and
activity was boldly outlined in a seven page letter from the Directing
Bureau of the Mamou section to the PDG Directing Committee in Conakry
32
dated 1 August 1955.
The above mentioned letter, intended as an analysis of the Guinean 
section of the FDA with recommendations for reform, was divided into two 
parts, entitled "anarchic organisation" and "catastrophic management." 
In part one, the Mamou leadership denounced PDG organisation on the 
following grounds:
—
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1) The absence of collective direction. "It is in fact 
obvious that comrade S£kou Toure is doing all the work, 
the other members are merely figureheads.. .proven by the 
fact that in Tour£'s absence the central organ of the 
party is paralysed, and with it the life of the move­
ment";
2) The practice of censorship of ideas. "CXir position is the 
following: no dictatorship from within the party, no 
matter where it comes from";
3) The tendency to rest on one's laurels: Following the 
falsified elections of 27 June 1954, a cult of personal­
ity was erected around S£kou Tour£. "Tour6, overcome with 
dizziness, seems to take pleasure in this adulation, 
sacrificing the future of the movement to the edification 
of his personal glory";
4) Trips and frequent contacts with the AOF High- 
Commissioner. These trips risk the PDG being interpreted 
as a party "of the administration";
5) The decrease in trade union activity; and
6) The increasingly timid contents of La Libert^ and the
non-publication of the newspaper. (33)
In the second part of the letter, the Mamou section drew attention to 
the faulty management of the PDG, linking empty party treasuries to the 
lavish lifestyles of high-ranking party officials. In short, the recom­
mendations of the Mamou intellectuals called for:
1) The return to collective leadership of the party;
2) Installation of self-criticism (anto-crit-i one);
3) Substitution of party ideals for the personality cult
and myth of S£kou Toure;
4) Resumption of trade union activities;
5) Tighter financial regulation and control;
6) Holding of a PDG Territorial Congress; and
7) The return to Guinea of party activists Madeira Keita 
and Ray Autra from Dahomey, Moussa Diakite from the Ivory 
Coast, and Lansana Diane from Mauritania. (34)
The effect of this scathing report on PDG organisation and manage­
ment is not entirely clear. In a circular two years later in which the 
history of the problem with the Mamou section was explained, it was 
briefly mentioned that a delegation of the Directing Committee had been 
sent to Mamou in 1955 in order to confront the deviant behaviour of
33
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local party leaders. The August letter had been labelled "strictly 
confidential" by its authors, and is not referred to in PDG public 
meetings in Conakry or Mamou, or even acknowledged by French officials 
reporting at that time. Thus it appears that this early breach of disci­
pline was quietly smoothed over and excused (but certainly not 
forgotten) by the PDG central leadership. Such was not the case, 
however, when the same Mamou section leaders attempted public criticism 
of the party directorate in 1957. By this time the PDG was essentially 
governing Guinea, and after wiping out the opposition parties in the 
quest for power, attacks on PDG elected officials and their management 
of government from within the party proved entirely unacceptable.
The catalyst for the expulsion of the Mamou section was a similar
critique of the PDG Directorate submitted by the Mamou Directing
Committee in a letter dated 2 August 1957. Although much more moderate
in tone than its 1955 predecessor, the analysis of the situation in
Guinea following territorial elections in 1957 reiterated many of the
former accusations of party mismanagement, censorship and intimidation
of subordinate sections, and excessive lifestyles of party officials
36
(although this time individual offenders were not named) . The Mamou 
leaders claimed that internal democracy no longer existed within the 
PDG, as fundamental decisions were made only at the highest level 
without any consultation of party sub-sections or the masses.
In the summer of 1957 Mamou became the hotbed of discontent with
—
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the new PDG government when students, railway workers, and teachers—  
three of the most troublesome groups thwarting total PDG control of the 
territory— all held their annual congresses there. The students were 
notorious for demanding immediate independence; the railway union 
historically resented being subordinated to PDG domination; and the 
teachers rejected the educational policies proposed by the new 
government. The congress of the teachers' trade union, held in Mamou 
from 6-9 August 1957, particularly drew the wrath of the PDG administra­
tion. Headed by Koumandian Keita, BAG President and arch rival of Toure, 
the teachers' congress passed motions critical of the new government, in 
spite of the fact that many of its activists were PDG menbers. Further­
more the congress proposed a strike of unlimited duration if their 
demands were not met, one of which was the reinstatement of union member 
Ray Autra.
Returning to his hometown of Mamou in 1957, Autra began making
waves within the PDG by openly campaigning for independence and
denouncing the increasingly common practice of multiple office-holding
37
by party leaders. While Autra (incidentally also a Ponty man) 
refrained from pointing a finger at particular party headmen, it was 
clear who the principal pluralist offender was, as Tours's portfolio by 
this time included the following posts: Secretary-General of the PDG,
deputy to the French National Assembly, member of the Guinean 
Territorial Assembly, Councillor to the federal Grand Conseil, Vice- 
President of the Guinean Council of Ministers, Mayor of Conakry, Vice- 
President of the FDA and member of the Coordinating Committee, and 
Secretary-General of both the federal labour organisation UGTAN and the
R.W. Johnson, "The PDG and the Mamou Deviation," p. 358-9.
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Guinean branch of the movement. In classic administrative style, the PDG
government summarily transferred Autra to the coastal (loyalist PDG)
38
district of Boffa. In refusing to take up his new teaching post, 
Autra's status was left undetermined. The fact that the anti-PDG 
teachers' union protested on behalf of Autra further enflamed party 
officials; consequently Autra was expelled from the PDG in Noveirber 
1957.
The outspoken and deviant character of both the Mamou section and
Pay Autra embarrassed the PDG central leadership at a time when Toure
was making serious efforts toward reconciliation with the French
authorities. Toure recognised that although the PDG had swept into power 
through recent elections and institutions created under the Lair£adre., 
there were still many loopholes in which the French government could 
overturn intended PDG reforms. Another prime consideration of the PDG 
government was the economic development of Guinea, for which French 
financial and technical assistance were deemed crucial. Thus in the 
PDG's attenpts to wipe out opposition simultaneously from above (i.e. in 
the French government) and below (within Guinea) , many "extremist"
elements of the party were purged.
As in 1955, the August 1957 condemnation of the PDG directorate was 
not immediately acted upon by party officials. It wasn't until the Mamou 
sub-section decided to go public with its criticisms and seek support 
from other PDG sub-sections that the Directing Committee decided that 
enough was enough. The Mamou leaders surpassed the tolerance level of 
their superiors by publishing a manifesto of their conplaints against
38
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the PDG, and by attempting to draw Houphouet and fellow H)A leaders as
well as French politicians into the dispute. Finally on 9 Noveirber Toure
led a delegation to Mamou to discuss the situation and demand formal
apologies. Members of the Conakry delegation included five Council
Ministers, President of the Territorial Assembly Diallo Saifoulaye, four
Assembly members representing the Fouta region, and a nuirber of
39
additional party workers. No official reception was waiting for the 
members of government at the Mamou train station. That evening negotia- 
tions between the Conakry delegation and select representatives of the 
Mamou section took place behind closed doors. During 10 long hours of 
debate continuing throughout the night, the following issues were 
reportedly discussed:
1) The Mamou section's criticism of government salaries and 
the supposed growth of a "new colonialist bourgeoisie";
2) The support given by the Mamou section to the teachers'
union and the affair involving Ray Autra;
3) Courses in Marxism recently given to intellectuals of the 
Mamou section;
4) The support and attendance of local PDG members at a
student conference held in Mamou after having been 
forbidden elsewhere;
5) The active participation of the Mamou section at the
teachers' congress in August, and the railway union 
conference (the Secretary-General of which had earlier 
been expelled from the PDG); and
6) Mamou responses in "vexatious terms" to letters from the 
Directing Committee concerning internal party matters.
(40)
Discussions ended in deadlock, however, when the Mamou representatives 
refused to repent by denouncing their section leaders. Consequently
Toure marched his delegation straight back to the train station, and
39
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left Mamou without even having been offered a meal. Stopping in Kindia, 
Toure announced the expulsion of the entire Mamou section from the PDG.
Isolation of the expelled section was swift and total. Previously
sympathetic party sub-sections quickly condemned the ousted section and
renewed their allegiance to the PDG Directing Committee in Conakry.
Saifoulaye, Mayor of Mamou and Toure's right-hand man, was charged with
the reconstitution of the Mamou section. After resisting for some time,
the expelled Mamou leaders eventually capitulated and sent a delegation
to Conakry in order to negotiate a settlement. Humiliated by reciprocal
coldness, first displayed in Mamou to the Conakry delegation, the Mamou
representatives found the city center deserted as they dispersed seeking
food and accommodation. Negotiations with a select few PDG hardline
leaders were long and intense. This time, however, discussion of Mamou
criticisms was forbidden, as the debate was kept to the wrongful
behaviour of the section leaders. Still without a clear resolve, the
Mamou delegation returned home tired and dispirited. On 26 December the
Mamou section leaders formally resigned and, in the presence of
Saifoulaye, a new "moderate" Directing Bureau was elected on 5 
41
January.
The expulsion of the PDG section at Mamou was significant in that 
it confirmed the dictatorial nature of the PDG government. What happened 
to the Mamou sub-section and its leaders served as an example to other 
PDG sub-sections of punitive action resulting from insubordination and 
criticism of the party directorate. Internal democracy of the PDG proved 
to be a farce, and hence was not tested again from within party ranks.
_
ANS 17G 622, "Renseignements: election du Comit6 politique de la
Sous-Section PDG-HDA de Mamou," Services de Police, Guinea, No. 64-22, 
10 January 1958.
323
African Parties Attempt to Regroup
At the FDA Third Interterritorial Congress in Bamako in September 1957,
observer parties, including the CA and BAG, formally proposed:
The holding of a conference of all African political 
parties, as soon as possible, in order to define conditions 
and means of regroupment. (42)
The political resolution of the Bamako Congress seconded the motion for
regroupment, charging its Coordinating Committee with the organisation
of a meeting to this effect.
In mid-October non-HDA parliamentarians assembled in Paris to
reconsider the idea of African unity. Fily Dabo Sissoko was charged with
writing to Houphouet, calling for the regroupment conference to be held
towards the end of December in Bamako. The initial RDA response was
disappointing. A letter, signed by Gabriel Lisette on behalf of the
bureau of the RDA Coordinating Committee, agreed in principle to such a
conference, however with the following stipulations: that, after
devising a common programme, parties essentially had to regroup around
the existing RDA, minor parties merging into majority parties and hence
43
forming territorial sections of the RDA. Furthermore the RDA insisted 
that the conference be held in Paris on 9 December. Many of the African 
leaders (several of them RDA including Toure) were opposed to the idea 
of holding a purely African conference in Paris; nonetheless Houphouet 
determined Paris was preferable because of past local hostilities 
between territorial parties. Sissoko regarded the R)A attitude as 
unwilling to seriously negotiate, and thus temporarily cooled his 
efforts.
—
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On 2 November the Bureau of the EDA Coordinating Committee met
again, this time discussing more earnestly the unity proposal. After 
further contacts, agreement was finally reached and the regroupment 
conference was scheduled to take place in February. Meeting in the Salle 
Colbert of the Palais Bourbon in Paris, the Conference dn regr_Qupement 
ries partis afrlea ins. opened on 15 February 1958. The sixty-odd delegates 
included representatives from the three interterritorial movements— EDA,
CA and MSA, as well as eight territorial parties (including the Guinean
44
BAG) . Eleven out of the twelve Vice-Presidents of the AQF and AEF
Coneeile da Gouvernement were present at the proceedings; only Apithy of
Dahomey was unable to escape pressing problems at home.
Hosted by the EDA and chaired by Hamani Diori, the conference 
designated a multi-party commission to draw up a minimum programme and 
process for regroupment. The EDA group was conprised of Sekou Toure, 
Modibo Keita, Abdoulaye Diallo, and Gabriel d ’Arboussier, all of whom 
were known to oppose Houphouet's views about the federal executive. It 
seems that the other parties also chose "leftist federalists" to repre­
sent them on the commission, such as Bakary Djibo of the MSA, and 
Leopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia of the CA. The proposals submitted to
the conference on 17 February were in fact the work of three men: Sekou
Toure (RDA), Abdoulaye Ly (CA), and Ya Douirbia (MSA). The "minimum 
political programme" contained two major points:
1) Internal autonomy for the territories: "In AGF, AEF, and
all other groups of territories, there should be federa­
tions democratically constituted by these territories on 
the basis of solidarity, equality, and voluntary renun­
ciation of territorial sovereignty"; and
44
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the conference after delegates refused to demand immediate independence.
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2) Relationship between France and the former overseas 
territories: "A federal republic comprised of France, the 
groups of territories, and the ungrcuped territories, 
should be built on the basis of free co-operation, 
absolute equality and the right to independence...Such a 
republic could develop into a confederal union joining 
the federal republic with already independent states or
those in the process of becoming independent." (45)
Concerning the method of regroupment, the commission's report stated
that parties in each territory would join the majority party, the
amalgamation taking on a new name. Each territorial section was to be
equally represented in the governing body of the federal movement.
The question of a new name for the movement was the point of major 
discord at the conference. The PDA insisted to keep its abbreviated 
name, refusing even a slight compromise, such as RPA (Rassemihlfimont 
Populaire Afrioain). The matter was left unresolved at the February 
conference, deferred to discussion at a future FDA Coordinating Commit­
tee meeting scheduled to take place in Abidjan in mid-March. A second 
conference on regroupment was planned in Dakar to precede the opening of 
the Grand Conseil in late March.
The central committee of the IDA convened in Abidjan, 12-14 March. 
The only reference to the prospect of regroupment in the published
circular of the meeting was the statement that the committee had consid­
ered the positions of the different movements concerning the name
change, and had charged a delegation to contact the others on this 
matter. Evidently nothing had been decided upon, and in the midst of 
disagreement. Houphouet again retired into seclusion at his Yamoussoukro 
home.
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Houphouet in fact already planned to give up his presidency of the
Grand Council, and did not appear in Dakar for either the second
regroupment conference or the opening session of the federal council.
Arriving late for the meeting, Tour6 found the regroupment process
already defunct; the FDA had refused to alter its name, and the other
parties felt strong enough to snub the EDA and band together against it.
That night all the conference parties except the EDA merged and founded
a new inter territorial party called the Parti, da Begroupement Afr-icain
(PRA) . The next day at the Grand Council proceedings the PDA just
barely managed to maintain a majority, due to a last minute compromise
with the unaffiliated Mauritanians. D'Arboussier was elected President
of the Council, and in return for their support a Mauritanian took the
Vice-Presidency. On 5 April, the closing day of the Grand Council
session, with the Ivorian members conspicuously absent, a resolution was
passed reaffirming the "urgent necessity to create a federal executive
46
of the group of territories."
Several days later the Ivory Coast Councillors disassociated 
themselves from the federal motion, participating in a unanimous condem­
nation of it by the Ivory Coast Territorial Assembly on 12 April.
Additionally the Assembly announced it would seek to "integrate directly
47
into the French-African Community." Houphouet was not present at the 
session. Tour6 retaliated by issuing a communique stating that the FDA 
members in the Council stood firmly behind the motion of 5 April. The 
HDA Coordinating Committee was again convoked on 24 April in Paris, 
where differences were smoothed over on the surface. It appears that
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Tour£ and Keita, at least partially in deference to their senior Presi­
dent, backed off in the face of causing an irreparable split in the 
movement.
Meanwhile in Guinea it had been clear for some time that political 
union between the PDA and local opposition parties was a very unlikely 
prospect. In between the PDG Third Territorial Conference at the end of 
January and the regroupment conference of 15 February, the leaders of 
the BAG and MSA-DSG, Barry Diawadou and Barry III respectively, embarked 
on a joint canpaign tour across Guinea. Canvassing together for the 
first time, Diawadou and Barry III widely denounced the PDG government, 
urging the people to "react with force" against it. In the Fouta the 
opposition leaders announced that the region was being reduced to 
slavery, while at the same time funding the wealthy government officials 
with their taxes. Speaking in Mamou, Diawadou claimed that over the last 
few years the inhabitants of the Fouta Djalon were the only ones who 
paid taxes, while Coastal peoples had not. He thus instructed his 
followers:
From today onward, when someone asks you to pay your taxes, 
do like the inhabitants of the Coast or Upper Guinea. But 
never say that you are refusing to pay. On the contrary, say 
that you are immediately going to "search" for the 
money...after twelve months make it known that you are still 
"searching" but have not yet "found" it. (48)
Diawadou and Barry III proclaimed that the BAG and MSA-DSG were
"firmly united" in the struggle "to the end" against the tyranny of
49
Sekou Toure and the PDG. The danger of such remarks, whether perceived
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or imagined, pronpted the opposition leaders to send telegrams to the
French authorities claiming that an assassination plot was brewing
against them, warning the government that any such attempt would be
50
reciprocated against Sekou Toure and Diallo Saifoulaye. These events
took place just three days before Diawadou and Barry III were to attend
the regroupment conference in Paris, as the former explained:
Barry Ibrahima and I are going to Paris on 13 February to 
participate in the Conference of African political parties.
It is a matter of joining these parties into the Convent ion 
AfricaIne. We are in favour of this union and hope that it 
will come to pass, because it will enable us to fight on 
equal par with a majority party like the FDA. (51)
Diawadou failed to mention that the conference was hosted by the IDA, 
and the plan was to unite all the in ter territorial movements and minor­
ity parties together. It is hard to imagine that such unity could 
possibly have been attained in Guinea at this time, and surely Guinea 
was not the only territory to suffer from fierce local rivalries.
The breakdown in the unity negotiations and subsequent formation of 
the PRA suited the Guinean opposition leaders fine. The official 
creation of the Guinean section of the PRA took place in Conakry on 13 
April 1958, when 3,000 people gathered at the graveside of Yacine Diallo 
and then held a public meeting. In reality, the major aspects of the PRA 
programme outlined at this conference essentially reflected Toure's own 
views. Concerning the federal executive, for example, Diawadou called 
for:
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The revision of Title Eight of the French Constitution and 
the creation of a Federal Government in Dakar, elected by a 
federal assembly, on the same level as France. (52)
Diawadou did add one final point to the party platform, that "the PRA
has decided to systematically oppose Sekou Tour6." Now with united
forces, Diawadou and Barry III would attempt an abrupt return to the
political scene in the run-up to the forthcoming May elections in
Guinea.
The Guinean Opposition Attempts a Violent Electoral Comeback
Under the administrative reorganisation programme involving the aboli­
tion of the chieftaincy, Chefs de. canton, were replaced by government 
officials nominated in Conakry. These administrators were to be assisted 
by locally elected Conseils de. conscr ipt ion, the first elections for 
which were scheduled to take place on 18 May 1958.
A common occurrence in Guinea around election time was outbreaks of 
considerable violence between rival political factions. Although the PDG 
had single-handedly governed the territory for over a year, the creation 
of the PRA and merger of the two minority parties in Guinea fostered an 
upsurge in opposition activity. In a distinctly provocative campaign, 
the Union Popnlaire da Gninee (UPG— Guinean branch of the PRA) sought 
electoral support by denouncing and discrediting the PDG administration. 
Moreover it is evident that the UPG did incite numerous incidents during 
the campaign for the May elections, after which it attempted to expose 
the "racist" persecution of the Fulani by the PDG, again stirring up the 
possibility of civil war.
_
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As aforementioned, Barry Diawadou and Barry III began a united
campaign to degrade the PDG and its government in February 1958. The
initial PDG reaction to what it labelled "subversive propaganda,"
particularly in the Fouta region, was to urge the masses to "stay calm
53
and do not respond to any provocation whatsoever." By mid-April,
however, the impending organisation of the PRA in Guinea, as well as the
increased threat, of civil disobedience and revolt encouraged by the
opposition leaders prompted a stronger PDG response, as the Directing
Committee announced:
The motion we propose is to no longer rest on the 
defensive...We can no longer stand back with arms folded as 
people set out to destroy what we have painstakingly 
constructed. Concerning our adversaries, we will not. outlaw 
their demonstrations, but the masses will be ready to react 
if provoked. (54)
Hence the creation of the PRA-UPG on 13 April and subsequent formation
55
of party sub-sections took place amid mounting antagonism between
supporters of political rivals.
As tension peaked, a wave of serious incidents swept through the
territory, commencing in Conakry on 29 April. Violence first erupted in
Camayenne, a suburb of Conakry, when a group of Fulani PRA members was
56
attacked by a Soussou crowd; 19 were wounded and two houses burned. 
The following day reprisal claimed six Soussou homes by fire. On 1 May
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aggression spread into the outskirts of the capital city, where armed
Fulani gangs circulated, spreading terror and provoking clashes. The
violence reached its climax on the night of 2-3 May, when serious
incidents occurred in several Conakry suburbs, ending in 16 deaths and
more than 100 people injured. PRA supporters continued to incite unrest
in the areas surrounding Conakry on 3 May; hospitals admitted numerous 
57
gunshot victims. Sporadic attacks on persons and property continued
over the next two days until calm and order were finally restored on 5
May. Moreover, clashes between political opponents during this period
were not confined to the Conakry area, as similar outbreaks of violence
and destruction were reported in the districts of Forecariah, Pita,
58 59
Dafoola, Kindia, and Gaoul, In total, 26 people were killed, 392
wounded, 174 properties burnt out, and 184 activists arrested between
29 April and 8 May 1958 in Guinea. All territorial forces were employed
in the six centers where the incidents occurred, including police,
security forces, army, territorial guard, reserves, and a squadron of
tanks. Additionally, two squads of police reinforcements were requested
60
and sent from Dakar.
Administrative reports attribute the latest storm of events in 
Guinea largely to nascent PRA "enthusiasm." Amidst escalating violence,
57
Ibid.., p . 6.
58
ANS 17G 622, Scattered police reports dated 9-16 May 1958 from
cited districts.
59
Of which 17 Fulani, 6 Soussou, 1 Kissien, and two officers— a 
European and a Senegalese who died in a jeep accident. ANS 17G 622, 
"Bilan des Incidents du 1 au 8 Mai 1958," French administrative report, 
Conakry, n.d.
60
"Incidents de Conakry," pp. 7-8, 13.
332
French administrators summoned (separately) Barry III and Sekou Toure to 
demand the immediate diffusion of appeals for calm. The rival leaders 
defiantly responded to questioning on 2 May almost identically:
"The PRA will defend itself if attacked."
"The PDA will not provoke but will defend itself if 
attacked." (61)
Nevertheless the following day the Conseil de. Gouvernement published a 
communique, and Toure made a radio broadcast in which he echoed PDG 
accusations of "certain opposition political parties" deliberately 
fomenting the prevailing unrest, while calling for an end to all hostil­
ities and the restoration of an "atmosphere of confidence, friendship,
62
and absolute calm." Furthermore Toure outlined the economic sabotage
committed by the PRA, discouraging investments and threatening the
ongoing development and industrialisation of the territory. Addressing
the masses, Toure thus described the plan of his opponents, who:
rely on the misery of Guineans to attain power. In such a 
quest, it matters little to them if they ruin the country 
and compromise its future. (63)
The way in which the PRA hoped to gain power in Guinea was through 
the May elections. It appears that the party aimed to discredit the PDG 
by instilling chaos and terror in the territory (similar to earlier PDG 
tactics which proved successful). The PRA strategy backfired, however, 
when the polling masses on 18 May clearly opted for outright dictator­
ship over anarchy and civil war. Claiming the party had passed the stage
61
"Incidents de Conakry," p. 4.
62
Radio broadcast printed in annex of report, "Bilan des Incidents,"
p. 4.
63
ANSCM AP 2194/4, Interior Ministry, PDG Government, "La verite sur 
les evenements de Guinee, Livre Blanc," No. 590, Conakry, 7 May 1958, p. 
10.
333
of spreading propaganda, the PDG actually did very little canpaigning
for the local council elections. As it turned out, the PDG had no need
for serious concern about potential PRA success. The outcome of the
elections for the Const* 11s da c i rconscr iption was as follows: the HDA-
PDG secured 88.3 per cent of the total votes cast; the PRA-UPG 11.7 
64
per cent. An abstention rate of nearly 40 per cent was justifiably
attributed to the rainy season. Although somewhat successful in the
Fouta districts of Pita, Mamou, Labe and Dalaba, the PRA failed to
achieve a single council majority. Crushing electoral defeat reportedly
prompted a nuirber of former Fulani PRA supporters either to flee from
65
Conakry or request immediate PDG membership.
Constitutional Revision and the French Fifth Republic
Meanwhile in Paris the Fourth Republic was crumbling. The crisis began 
with the fall of the Gaillard government on 15 April 1958. Overthrown by 
a revolt of right-wingers who believed the government's policy on 
Algeria had been too soft, three "Algerie Frangaist*" politicians subse­
quently attempted and failed to form cabinets. On 13 May serious riots 
broke out in Algiers, and General Charles de Gaulle was called to Paris 
to try to solve the Algerian problem. This endeavour led de Gaulle to 
create both a new government and Constitution establishing the French 
Fifth Republic. The investiture of the de Gaulle government by the 
National Assembly took place on 11 June. The cabinet included Houphouet-
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Boigny as Ministre d'Etatf and Bernard Cornut-Gentille (former High- 
Commissioner of AOF) as Overseas Minister.
Immediately the de Gaulle government began the process of drafting 
a new constitution, which took place in three phases: preparation of an 
avant-projet by the government; discussion of the project by a Consulta­
tive Constitutional Committee; and the adoption of a revised version by 
the government. The avant-projet was devised by a group of chosen 
"experts," of which State Minister Houphouet was the only African repre­
sentative. By this time it was clear that a new relationship between 
France and the overseas territories would be a major facet in a new 
constitution, and African positions on what form of relationship to 
pursue were now crystallised.
In Guinea the PDG held its Fourth Congress in Conakry from 5-8 
66
June. In his Rapport Moral e±_ Politique Toure congratulated the PDG in
Guinea for understanding, "better than any other territory," the
inadequacy of the Loi-Cadre and the necessary steps to undertake for the
sake of African unity, explaining:
This is why Guinea finds itself at the forefront in the 
struggle for the reinforcement of African unity and 
interterritorial solidarity, for which the institution of 
the federal executive remains one of the surest ways to 
guarantee collective security. (67)
Toure thus connected the "avant-garde" nature of the PDG with 
responsibility to fight for a federal executive in Dakar and a confed­
eral relationship with France.
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Although willing to concede certain aspects of sovereignty to a
greater (African) union, Toure announced "we will not renounce our
independence." Nonetheless Toure reaffirmed that "France remains the
68
nation with which we intend to link our destiny." Regarding constitu­
tional revision the PDG congress stipulated the following necessary 
provisions:
1) Recognition of full internal autonomy?
2) Constitution of a federal executive;
3) Transformation of the Grand Conseil into a legislative
Assembly? and
4) Creation of a French-African Community which groups 
France and the states of AQF, AEF, and Madagascar. This 
Community must have a federal government and parliament.
(69)
The political resolution of the congress boldly demanded "the recogni-
70
tion of independence as an inalienable right of mankind." In sum, the
statements and declarations made during the Fourth PDG Congress proved
that the Guinean section of the PDA was not following the orders nor
orientation of the central directing body of the movement. In fact,
issues of African federation and independence cut across party lines,
uniting leaders of opposing movements such as Toure of the RDA and
71
Senghor of the PRA.
The PRA benefited from a great morale boost during its founding 
congress held in Cotonou 25-27 July 1958. The excitment generated at the
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congress, however, carried the movement far further to the radical side
than anticipated. Leopold Senghor, much like Houphouet at the latest FDA
congress, found that his "followers" had surpassed his moderate 
72
ideals. PRA congress members rejected Senghor's claim that
"independence does not have positive content, it is not a solution,"
while Bakary Djibo carried the day with his declaration that "you can
only associate when you are already independent. National independence
73
first, the rest later."
The PRA cry for independence may have been due to early leakage of 
several provisions of the constitutional avant-projet which was
published on 30 July. It was rumoured that the choice would be given to 
the overseas territories of either federation with Prance or secession. 
Furthermore within the federation the territories were not to be
recognised as states, nor was there any mention of the right to indepen­
dence. Incensed at these prospects, congress meirbers condemned de
Gaulle's draft, passing the following resolution:
The Congress adopts the password (mot, d-'ordre) of immediate 
independence, and decides to take all the necessary measures 
to mobilise the African masses around this password and to 
translate into fact this desire for independence. (74)
The PRA stance on the federal issue was largely the same as advocated by 
Sekou Toure. Like Toure, the PRA stood for the creation of a federal 
executive and a confederal union with France, the only added PRA stipu­
lation being that independence precede amalgamation. The motion in 
the political resolution (read by Senghor) calling for immediate
72
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independence reportedly was greeted by an "indescribable enthusiasm"
75
which continued through the close of the congress on 27 July.
The following day, in an extraordinary session of the Guinean
Territorial Assembly, Tourd alluded to the possibility of rejecting a
constitution which did not suit African desires, as he announced:
We have already alerted the metropolitan government to the 
fact that any constitutional project which does not put an 
end to the out-dated and inappropriate policy of assimila­
tion and integration; does not recognise the right to 
independence of people in the territories; and does not 
affirm the principle of equality, will meet unanimous and 
firm rejection from us. (76)
At this time Toure seemingly accepted the notion of independence a. 
terms., and limited his campaign to the "inalienable right" to independ­
ence, obviously distancing himself from the calls for "immediate 
independence." After all, in the same speech before the Assembly, Toure 
had the following message for the French government:
Do not confuse the exercise of our right to self- 
determination with any wish whatsoever to separate ourselves 
from France. (77)
Clearly the economic future of the territory and substantial French
investment weighed heavily on the minds of the Guinean politicians. It
was noted that even the Guinean PRA contingent at the Cotonou congress
78
voiced caution at the prospect of cutting ties with the metropole.
The economic considerations influencing political choice in French
79
West Africa have been outlined by Berg. Foreboding dilemmas over-
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shadowed the lure of immediate independence for most of the African 
territories# such as: dependence on substantial French capital invest­
ment and aid; close trade integration in a highly protected franc zone; 
lack of national economy and minute trade relationships with African 
neighbours; the vast majority of ACF's imports and exports coming from 
and going to France at favoured terms; and European personnel occupying 
key posts in the civil service and skilled labour. It has been estimated 
that between 1946 and 1958 over 70 per cent of total public investment
and more than 30 per cent of civil and military recurrent expenditure
80
was financed by France. Regarding interterritorial trade, partly due 
to inadequate road and railway links, in 1956 Guinea sent less than 2 
per cent of its exports to neighbours, from which it received less than 
one-fifth of its imports. Moreover, approximately 70 per cent of French 
West Africa’s imports came from France, and roughly the same percentage 
of AGF's exports went there. Furthermore, the imminent breakup of the 
Federation left the poorer territories (which previously benefited from 
the federal redistribution of wealth) even more dependent on France. 
Nevertheless Guinea seemed to be in a stronger position than its neigh­
bours, as Berg explained:
economic and other conditions were more permissive there, 
allowing it to opt for independence with slighter risks than 
in most of the other territories: it was highly organized
politically; it was not greatly dependent on aid from the 
other FWA territories through the federal budget; its mining 
boom was attracting new injections of foreign capital; its 
economic future was hopeful. (81)
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Furthering Berg's arguments, Cruise O'Brien has pointed out that the
economic explanation should be considered along with the political,
administrative, and sociological situation facing the West African 
82
leaders.
Approved by the French government on 28 July, the avant-projet of
the Constitution was hence handed over to a Consultative Constitutional
Committee. The Committee included 26 deputies and 13 members chosen for
their "competence"; African members were Ffelix Houphouet-Boigny and
Gabriel Lisette of the EDA, Leopold Senghor and Lamine Gueye for the
PEA, and Philibert Tsiranana of Madagascar. According to Georges
Chaffard, Sekou Toure was kept out of the committee at the request of
83
Houphouet. Chaffard claimed that the newly appointed Overseas 
Minister, Bernard Cornut-Gentille, vigilantly campaigned for Toure's 
appointment to the Consultative body. Apparently Cornut-Gentille, who 
had a long history in dealing with the problematic PDG leader, insisted 
that Toure could still be "recuperated" in the eyes of Houphouet and the 
French government. Houphouet had refused to present Tour£ as an EDA 
candidate for the committee, which was elected by the National Assembly. 
Cornut-Gentille next approached de Gaulle directly, asking that Toure be 
appointed a member of the committee "due to personal competence." Again
Houphouet intervened to stress his disapproval, and Toure was hence
denied further consideration.
82
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The Consultative Constitutional Committee was divided between 
supporters of Houphouet's proposals and those of Senghor. The text 
eventually adopted was a compromise formula which provided for federa­
tion as well as confederation: territories were free to choose the form
of their association with France, grouped or independent, and this 
status would be revisable after five years.
Opposed to any allusion to independence, Houphouet called the IDA
Coordinating Committee to Paris on 3 August for the purpose of drawing
up a statement of the movement's position to be presented personally to
de Gaulle. Despite certain reservations of Toure and Modibo Keita,
Houphouet's views were more or less accepted by the Committee. Ouezzin
Coulibaly played an important role in persuading dissenting opinions to
relent for the sake of FDA and African unity. The PDA platform, as
agreed by the Coordinating Committee in Paris, stood for: territorial
autonomy, suppression of the AGF government and no federal executive in
Dakar, creation of a French-African federation, and rejection of
84
immediate independence (but possible future evolution). No doubt 
partly to secure compliance, Houphouet bestowed on Toure the honour of 
defending the IDA position to de Gaulle. Toure led the IDA delegation 
which met the General on 5 August. Having fulfilled his duty, Tour6 then 
left Paris, heading for Dakar to meet with UGTAN representatives.
Meanwhile de Gaulle increasingly intervened in the deliberations of 
the Constitutional Committee, impressing his views on its members. On 8
August the General clarified his position to the Committee with the
following remarks:
84
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We are going to build a modern federal State, on the basis 
of spontaneous acceptance by the overseas people and by 
France. Of course I understand the lure of seccession. But 
it involves danger, independence has its costs. The refer­
endum will tell us whether secession carries the day. But 
what is inconceivable is an independent state which France 
continues to help....People talk of "federation," "confeder­
ation," which is just a dispute over vocabulary. I say 
federation, and there we stop. It is the referendum that 
will put an end to the debate. (85)
These statements, wholly supported by Houphouet and Lisette, came as a 
great disappointment to Senghor and Lamine Gueye. The PRA representa­
tives resented having to choose between a French-African Community void 
of constituent African federations, and outright independence (or 
"secession" as de Gaulle preferred).
Upon hearing de Gaulle’s declarations over Dakar radio, Toure 
admitted in an interview that he was "shocked." Toure went on to say:
My own attachment to African dignity was shocked. We were 
told that we can choose independence, but that it will come 
with all its consequences. Well, I say that these conse­
quences will not only be for Africans, they may also affect 
the French. (86)
Toure was backed by PRA and UGTAN leader Bakary Djibo, who subsequently
announced that "we are not. afraid of the economic consequences of 
87
secession."
The Constitutional draft was approved by the Consultative Commis­
sion and sent to de Gaulle on 14 August. The term "federation" was 
dropped altogether, replaced by "community." Provisions for the overseas 
territories within the Community included the "right" to independence,
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but not immediate independence nor a confederation. The final text of 
the Constitution was produced by the government on 21 August 1958. Most 
of the proposals of the Consultative Committee were incorporated into 
the final draft/ with two significant last minute amendments: the option 
of Community members changing their status after five years was deleted, 
and a member state could become independent at a later date, but only by 
withdrawing from the Community.
As independence and membership in the Community were deemed incom­
patible, the Constitution failed to meet "confederalist" aspirations. 
The question of a federal executive was left unanswered; theoretically 
the territories were free to enter the Community "either as groups or 
single units." The Constitution was to be presented to the French and 
African populace in a referendum scheduled for 28 September. In the 
meantime, de Gaulle embarked on a campaign tour of Africa, explaining 
his conception of the French-African Community and urging the overseas 
territories to join with a "yes” vote to the referendum.
Showdown in Conakry
Between 21 and 28 August General Charles de Gaulle visited Fort Lamy,
Tananarive, Brazzaville, Abidjan, Conakry and Dakar. In Brazzaville de
Gaulle expounded his idea that joining the proposed Community did not
rule out independence at a later date, guaranteeing that France would
not oppose such an action. De Gaulle’s promises of an open future,
freedom to create their own federations within the Community, and
continued French aid and technical assistance, brought satisfaction to
the crovds and politicians in Chad, Congo, and the Ivory Coast, whose
88
leaders announced they would be voting "yes" to the referendum.
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In Abidjan Houphouet had reassured de Gaulle that the FDA would, as
89
a bloc, be behind him. The reception that awaited the General in
Guinea seemed initially to confirm such optimism. De Gaulle arrived in
Conakry in the afternoon of 25 August. In PDG fashion, the masses were
impeccably organised at the airport and along the parade route leading
to the Governor's palace. School children, workers, and civil servants
were mobilised to greet the French delegation, welcoming the visitors
with a great show of African dance, music, and folklore. The crowds,
dressed in magnificent colour, waved and sang to "Sily" as the official
delegation passed. Delighted and no doubt impressed, de Gaulle commented
90
to Toure: "I hope it will be as nice as this in Dakar." Toure
responded that he hoped so too, and intended himself to travel to Dakar 
the following day. De Gaulle then invited Toure to accompany him in his 
private plane. In such a friendly atmosphere Toure offered to accommo­
date Overseas Minister Cornut-Gentille and AQF High-Commissioner Pierre
Messmer at his home, while the General settled in at the Governor's 
91
palace.
In the Governor's office de Gaulle asked Mauberna what he expected
the referendum results would be. The Governor responded that a vote of
95 per cent would follow Toure's wishes, however he thought that the
92
final decision whether to vote "yes" or "no" had not yet been made. 
Mauberna then gave de Gaulle a copy of the text of Toure's intended
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speech, the significant passages underlined in red. Whether or not de
Gaulle read in advance Toure’s text or not is unknown. After such a
tremendous reception, however, certainly the tone and passion of Toure's
address before the National Assembly came as a shock to the normally
stoic de Gaulle. Attired in national dress, Toure directed his oration
mainly to his devoted audience, at times even turning his back on his
distinguished guest. The crowd erupted with irrepressible excitement and
jubilation as Toure announced:
We will never renounce our natural and legitimate right to 
independence. We prefer poverty in liberty to wealth in 
slavery. (93)
Finally Toure reiterated the conditions to be met before Guinea would 
agree to the new constitution, as if it was not too late to amend the 
final draft.
The impromptu retaliation of de Gaulle to such a scathing attack on
France included the following remarks:
You have talked of independence, I say here even more loudly 
than I have elsewhere that independence is at the 
disposition of Guinea. It can obtain it on 28 September by 
voting "no" to the proposal, and I guarantee that the 
metropole will make no objection. There will, of course, be 
consequences.... (94)
This face-off in Conakry on 25 August marked the beginning of the end of
Franco-Guinean relations.
In a subsequent private meeting with Cornut-Gentille, Messmer, and
Mauberna, de Gaulle concluded: "Gentlemen, there is a man whom we shall
never get along with; one thing is clear— we will be leaving Guinea the
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95
morning of 29 September." Furthermore the luggage of the Overseas
Minister and High-Commissioner was removed from Tours's residence, and
Toure was informed that there would not be space for him on the 
96
General's plane. De Gaulle chose to dine alone that evening, refusing
to meet Toure except to say "Bonne chance pour la Guinee" at the airport
the next morning. Looking back, the General had the following to say
about his reception in Conakry:
I found myself enveloped by the organisation of a totali­
tarian Republic. There was nothing that was hostile or 
offensive towards me personally. But from the aerodrome to 
the centre of the town, the crow! lined up on both sides of 
the road in well ordered battalions, and cried Independence 
with a single voice. (97)
In Dakar de Gaulle was met by popular protest (mainly by students,
PAI, PRA, and UGTAN members) calling for immediate independence and
African unity. Aware of likely confrontation, PRA leaders Leopold
Senghor and Mamadou Dia chose to remain in Paris, while Lamine Gueye
98
cordially hosted the General on behalf of the Senegalese government. 
Speaking to the dissident crowds, the general reaffirmed that the option 
for independence was available to the overseas territories. On 27 August 
the French President left Dakar for Algiers, leaving behind Cornut- 
Gentille.
Still hopeful of restraining Tour§, the Overseas Minister sent his 
private plane to Conakry to bring the rebel leader to Dakar. According
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to Chaffard, Cornut-Gentille and Toure then spent all night discussing 
the proposed Constitution. Tour£ remained intransigent in insisting on a 
revised text providing for a confederal union and the creation of feder­
al executives for AGF and AEF. If these two concessions were added in
the text, then Guinea would vote "yes". "If not?" asked Cornut-Gentille.
99
"Well then, we will think about it," was Toure"s final retort.
Organisations Favouring Independence: PRA, UGTAN, FEANF, and PAI
At this point Tour6 had good reason to believe that if the PDG formally
decided to press for a "no" vote, Guinea would not be alone in this
venture. At the founding congress of the PRA in July 1958, a resolution
had been passed calling for immediate independence. Other organisations,
namely UGTAN, FEANF, and the PAI, soon followed suit in joining the
100
campaign for the rejection of the Constitution.
The main reason why Toure travelled to Dakar on 27 August was to
meet with the UGTAN Directing Committee. Niger Council President Bakary
Djibo and Soudanese Labour Minister Abdoulaye Diallo had already made
clear their preference for immediate independence. In Dakar the UGTAN
central committee adopted a resolution to be sent to de Gaulle, reading:
Any limitation of the future sovereignty of African states 
in the economic and judicial sectors will compromise their 
chances of national development. (101)
The trade union directorate demanded independence within a united
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confederal system.
An UGTAN conference subsequently took place in Bamako, 10-11
September. Delegates to the conference represented all the territories
of ACF (with the exception of Ivory Coast), plus Togo and Cameroon. The
report presented by the Directing Committee was unanimously approved.
Moreover the conference decided to reject the proposed Constitution,
opting for immediate independence. Thus UGTAN, calling for trade union
unity and coordinated efforts with the youth movement, entered the West
102
African mobilisation campaign for a "no" vote.
The main organisation of African students was the Federation des
etudiants d 'Afrigne Noire, en France (FEANF), created in Bordeaux in 
103
1950. Initial goals of the FEANF included: the grouping of all assoc­
iations of African students in France; the improvement of their "moral
104
and material status"; and the study of problems relating to Africa.
The organisation of the FEANF was as follows: the union was led by an
executive committee, elected at annual congresses and meeting three 
times yearly; sections were created in most French universities, and in 
14 overseas territories— eight in AGF, four in AEF, plus Togo and 
Cameroon. The FEANF regularly published its own newspaper entitled 
1 'Etudiant d 'Afr Ique Noire..
Although the federation vowed to remain independent, not adhering 
to any political party or movement, FEANF soon focused most of its
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attention and activities in the political arena. The students1 union
became a forum for African nationalism, taking on a "progressive" and
"revolutionary" stance for the emancipation of Africa. The founding
members of FEANF were members of the FDA; its statutes and goals similar
to those outlined in the FDA congresses of 1946 and 1949. The two
movements parted company, however, when FEANF disapproved of the FDA
disaffiliation from the Communist Party. The students1 union remained
leftist in orientation, in close alignment with the Union des Et.udiants
Commonist.es Frangais. (UBCF) , and the Union Internationale des Etudiants
(UIE) seated in Prague.
The FEANF first called for the independence of the African overseas
territories at its sixth annual congress held in Paris in December 1955.
From this point onwards the two principal goals of the movement were
defined as "the struggle for the conquest of independence and the
105
reassertion of African unity."
The students were among the first protesters denouncing the
balkanising effects of the Loi-Cadre reforms. In June 1958 FEANF
circulars deplored the new government of de Gaulle, blaming the
"fascist, fierce enemies of the independence of countries under French
106
domination" for his political comeback. The same month the organisa­
tion held an extraordinary congress to work out its position concerning 
the constitutional issues at hand. The resolution of the ninth FEANF 
congress, held in Paris from 21-23 June 1958, proclaimed:
Neither the revision of the French Constitution, nor the 
referendum, nor any other project will alter the
105
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determination of the African people to attain total 
independence. (107)
Moreover the students' union accused the African parliamentarians of
"treason" in "abusing the confidence of the African masses by their
collaboration with a regime that signifies the enslavement and misery of 
108
our people."
In August the students were joined by a number of organisations to 
formulate a united appeal for immediate independence. Meeting in Dakar 
on 12 August 1958, members of associations including the PAI, FEANF, 
Conseil de. la Jeunesse d'Afrigne, UGTAN Senegal branch, a women's union, 
and Muslim cultural union participated in talks culminating in the 
publication of a declaration entitled "Front, da lut.t.e pour l 1 independ- 
anca. nationals.." This united front was essentially led by the PAI, of 
which many FEANF militants were members.
In sum, during the summer of 1958, apart from the Senegalese PAI, 
three inter territorial movements: the PRA, UGTAN, and FEANF, declared
their intentions to press for immediate independence and rejection of 
the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic. Apart from domestic 
considerations, certainly the common position adopted by these organisa­
tions had an influence on the Guinean decision to call for a "no" vote 
on 28 September.
Guinea Decides to Vote "No"
In spite of his leftist reputation as the enfant terrible of the FDA, 
Tourd was not always a popular figure of FEANF. Particularly after his 
election to the French National Assembly in 1956, FEANF often accused
107
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the PDG leader of "repaying his debt" to the administration with undue
collaboration. In April 1958 a FEANF delegation met with Tour§ in
Paris, announcing that the organisation was intensifying its struggle
109
against the policies pursued by the PDA leadership. At this time the
Guinean leader was reportedly sympathetic to the students1 position,
admitting that he too held considerable reservations about the direction
Houphouet was leading the movement.
The Guinean branch of FEANF was the Union general p des etndiants at
slaves da Guinea (UGEEG), created in 1950 with headquarters in Conakry.
At its annual congress in Conakry, 17-20 July 1958, the UGEEG echoed the
FEANF call for the rejection of the constitutional project, proclaiming:
110
"we prefer independence, even in misery." This time, however, Tour§
was less supportive of the students1 platform, warning them that they
had better not count on him, nor the PDG, in building a campaign around
the theme of independence. In fact the PDG had officially set up its
youth branch, the Jaunessa da la Revolution Democratique Africaino
(JPDA) , on 29 March 1958. As pointed out by Achille Mbenbe, however,
youth organizations such as the JPDA were really directed by elder party
111
members, with their orientation and directives dictated from the top.
In any case, although FEANF was very outspoken and active in Guinea as 
well as elsewhere in the overseas territories, evidence suggests that 
the position held by the students did not have a significant impact on
109
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the voting choice of African political leaders. In Guinea the students 
encouraged the masses by their display of fervent nationalism; however,
the influence they had on the omnipotent Toure was, at most, very
slight.
The matter of UGTAN, however, was a different story. As Secretary- 
General, Tour6 could hardly ignore the workers and leaders of the inter­
territorial labour movement who (albeit in Tours's absence) had adopted 
a resolution calling for independence and rejection of the Constitution 
at the UGTAN conference of 10-11 September in Bamako. As it turned out, 
the loyalty Tourd felt towards his trade union background, and the
organisation which more clearly reflected his own ideas, was stronger
than his attachment to the political movement of the PDA.
Presenting the EDA position to General de Gaulle (which differed 
from his personal convictions) on 5 August was Toure's final act of 
capitulation to EDA President and elder statesman Houphouet-Boigny. From 
this point onwards Toure began distancing himself not only from IDA 
orientation but also from fellow members of the Coordinating Committee.
Upon his return from Dakar on 29 August, Toure held a mass public
meeting. The speech Tour§ gave on this occasion reflected an obvious
112
"hardening" of his position regarding the forthcoming referendum. 
Addressing a large crowd, Tour§ focused on the lack of internal 
autonomy prescribed in the text of the new Constitution. In outlining 
the shortcomings of the proposal, Toure presented the dilemma of the 
vote as a moral issue, explaining:
Rest assured that in this state of slavery we will continue
to fight to destroy what is being built on our backs. It is
112
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better to continue in this way than to have from us a "yes" 
to a Constitution by which we will freely consecrate our 
state of perpetual dependency, our state of indignity, our 
state of subordination, continuing to sacrifice our origi­
nality and nationality. (113)
In conclusion Toure stated that if the demands integral to African
unity and dignity were not included in the Constitution, then Guinea
would take "independence with its consequences" on 28 September. As
Toure saw it, the choice was now up to the French government, the
conditions of African acceptance were clear.
Ignoring Toure's pleas for constitutional reform and denying
Cornut-Gentille another chance to negotiate, de Gaulle decided it was
best to let Houphouet deal with the unruly PDG leader. Houphouet, in
turn, was reportedly relying on his deputy Ouezzin Coulibaly to persuade
114
Toure into accepting the proposed French Community. A meeting of the
IDA Coordinating Committee was scheduled to take place in Ouagadougou on
4 September. In protest against an EDA circular dated 31 August,
criticising his recent public declarations and signed by Coulibaly,
115
Toure intended to boycott the gathering. Meanwhile in Paris Coulibaly 
was found to be seriously ill, and the Coordinating Committee was 
summoned to his hospital bedside. Despite the close friendship Tour£ had 
shared with Coulibaly, he sent two representatives in his place. On 5 
September Coulibaly dictated his final communique, confirming that the 
FDA was satisfied with the promises made by General de Gaulle and conse­
quently would vote "yes" on 28 September. In a final note seemingly
113
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directed at Toure, Coulibaly warned:
It is inadmissible that a territory, due to local considera- 
tions, would fail to fulfill its obligations. Democracy 
begins with submission, not with domination. (116)
Ouezzin Coulibaly died from liver cancer on 7 September 1958 at the age
of 51. Funeral services were set to take place in his birthplace Bobo-
Dioulasso in Upper Volta; the entire PDA Coordinating Committee was
expected to attend. According to Governor Mauberna, Toure was "touched
117
very profoundly" by the death of his close friend and confidant. 
Mauberna reported that Toure planned on making the trip to Bobo- 
Dioulasso, suggesting that it would be very difficult for him to remain 
in opposition to FDA leaders and Coulibaly's last wish for unity within 
the movement. Toure scheduled an extraordinary PDG congress to finalise 
a decision of the referendum vote on 14 September, later (he claimed) 
learning that Coulibaly's burial would take place the same day. 
Although it seemed probable that Toure would delay the congress for two 
days, he decided at the last minute not to attend Coulibaly's funeral.
Toure's decision to remain in Conakry and hold the congress was 
interpreted as a definite sign that he intended to pursue a "no" vote. 
Indeed while PDA leaders gathered in Upper Volta to mourn the passing 
of Coulibaly, Toure made the following announcement to the Guinean 
masses:
We will vote "no" to a Community which is nothing but a 
rebaptised French Union, old merchandise with only a changed 
label. We will vote "no" to irresponsibility. As from 29
116
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September, we will be an independent state. We will take 
total responsibility for our affairs. A new nation will be 
added to the list of free countries. (118)
Stopping in Conakry on his way to Bobo-Dioulasso, EDA Vice-
President Gabriel Lisette headed a delegation to attend the PDG
congress. Following the request of Lisette, a paragraph was added to the
political resolution mandating the PDG Political Bureau to:
make immediate contact with the EDA Coordinating Committee 
and territorial sections in view of safeguarding African 
unity. (119)
In this vein Lisette accompanied a PDG delegation to Coulibaly!s
funeral. His intention was to call an urgent meeting of the H)A Coord-
120
inating Committee, preferably to take place in Conakry. Lisette’s
proposition was utterly rejected by the FDA leaders attending the
services in Bobo-Dioulasso, as noted by High-Commissioner Messmer:
Minister Houphouet was very incensed by the position adopted 
by Sekou Toure. He told me that Tour£ absolutely must be 
beaten, by depriving him of all metropolitan aid from 29 
September, and leading a vigour ous propaganda campaign 
against him in Guinea. (121)
Thus Houphouet ordered that all efforts to bring Toure back into the
fold be abandoned. After countless past incidents in which Houphouet
forgave Toure’s rebellious diversions and indiscipline, the H)A leader
had finally reached his breaking point, beyond which there would be no
reconciliation.
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At this point Toure was hardly paying attention to EDA opinions of
him. The 14 September was a marked day in Guinean history, when the
masses seemingly took their destiny in their hands. The PDG congress
took place in a carnival atmosphere; people from all over the territory
122
flocked to Conakry for the momentous occasion. The euphoria, lasting 
several days, intensified after a meeting between PDG officials and PEA 
leaders Barry Diawadou and Barry III led to a joint communique announ­
cing a united campaign for an all out mobilisation of the masses to vote 
123
"no."
The PRA Coordinating Committee, meeting on 14 September, had given
their territorial sections the right to choose between a "yes" and "no"
124
vote depending upon the "local political context." Cognizant that 
UGTAN and FEANF were pressing for independence, Bakary Djibo was 
rallying for a "no" vote in Niger, and Senegal was expected to reject 
the Constitution, Guineans were fearless in their anticipation of inde­
pendence and African unity. When Mamadou Dia (of Senegal) informed Toure 
that Senghor had reconsidered his position and persuaded the territorial 
section to vote "yes" to the French Community, this was deemed only a
122
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125
minor and inconsequential setback.
It appears that neither the PDG leadership, nor the Guinean masses,
truly believed that they would suffer serious "consequences" following a
"no" vote. Governor Mauberna sent numerous telegrams alerting higher
authorities of this phenomenon, for example:
As already signalled time and again, Sekou continues to 
believe, despite contrary assurances on my part, that the 
day after the negative referendum vote he will be able to 
negotiate an association agreement with France. Moreover all 
his actions are seemingly inspired by this belief. (126)
Oblivious to repeated warnings from the Governor, on 24 Septenber a PDG
delegation led by Toure asked Mauberna to transmit a message to the
French government stating that the day after independence Guinea
intended to send a delegation to Paris to work out accords conforming to
article 88 of the Constitution which stipulated:
The Republic or Community may conclude agreements with 
states desiring association in order to develop their civi­
lisations. (127)
The Governor accordingly sent word to Paris, and without receiving a
0
response, was ordered to leave the territory two days later. As Mauberna 
left Guinea, a squadron of military parachutists arrived from Dakar to 
"ensure order" on voting day, 28 September.
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The Referendum and Subsequent Consequences
Except perhaps to intimidate the population, in which case the effort
was entirely in vain, there was no cause whatsoever for a show of force
to maintain order on polling day in Guinea. The PDG government had
scrupulously organised the elections, setting up 1,692 voting stations
across the territory. As of 27 Septenber, all bars, caf<§s, cinemas, and
markets in Guinea were closed to ensure peace and orderly conduct
throughout the voting hours of the following day. Demonstrations, public
meetings, and even the tom-tom drum were banned by government order.
Masses began queueing at polling stations from the early hours of
the morning; by noon on 28 Septenber the majority of votes had already
been cast. As reported by Victor D. DuBois:
The efficient PDG organisation, which over the past few 
years had meticulously built up an inpressive system of 
communications with the bush, proved its worth. (128)
Discipline and calm reigned throughout Guinea. Returning to their homes,
the population waited for the signal from the government to let the
celebrat ion beg in.
To gauge the result of the vote, Le Monde special envoy Andre
Blanchet, who visited forty polling stations, concluded that one needed
only consider the spectacle of the voting booths. Rejected white "yes"
ballots were strewn all over the floor, as voters had deposited only the
129
yellow "no" cards in the ballot boxes. Similar reports from numerous 
voting stations confirmed that the election was conducted in a fair 
manner without government or outside interference.
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The result of the referendum vote in Guinea was entirely as
expected: 95 per cent of the votes cast on 28 September returned a "no"
130
ballot. The abstention rate of 15 per cent was the lowest ever
131
recorded in Guinea. In the Coastal districts, "no" votes registered
between 94 per cent in Conakry and 99 per cent in Bok§, Boffa, and
Forbeariah (see Table 6). The negative vote in Upper Guinea and Forest
districts ranged between 95.8 per cent in Kankan and 99.9 per cent in
Faranah. As anticipated, the majority of the "yes" votes, as well as
132
abstentions, were found in the Fouta region. More than half of the 
total "yes" votes in the territory came from Labe, which also had the
highest abstention rate (over 50 per cent). Incidentally, the re­
implantation of the H)A in Mamou proved remarkably successful, where 98 
per cent, of the voters returned "no" ballots. In all over one million 
Guineans flocked to the polls on 28 September to claim their right to 
independence. The triumph of the masses was complete: on 2 October 1958 
Guinea became a sovereign nation.
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Table 6: Referendum Results in Guinea, 28 Septeirber 1958.
Districts Registered
Voters
Votes
Cast
Yes No
Bey la 73,401 71,973 37 71,764
Boffa 33,422 31,544 133 31,368
Boke 40,476 31,070 99 30,951
Conakry 44,389 41,513 991 39,232
Dabola 20,349 19,247 8 19,225
Dalaba 45,128 31,523 6,903 24,676
Dinguiraye 26,537 23,537 76 23,438
Dubreka 45,479 44,109 23 44,049
Faranah 35,595 33,835 0 33,124
Forecariah 42,206 40,309 30 39,632
Gaoual 31,551 26,711 73 26,634
Gueckedou 59,771 57,089 1 57,070
Kankan 79,869 66,358 693 63,590
Kind ia 55,213 53,928 1,021 49,904
Kissidougou 71,039 64,017 70 63,626
Kouroussa 43,476 31,940 643 31,200
Labe 113,349 68,471 27,440 40,143
Macenta 90,622 85,963 97 85,808
Mamou 54,562 44,288 455 43,453
Mali 53,328 41,779 5,701 33,824
N ’Zerekore 104,510 85,312 2,158 83,001
Pita 52,586 52,300 3,117 48,634
Siguiri 80,488 71,841 377 71,514
Tougue 29,256 21,024 3,905 17,006
Telimele 52,426 37,584 2,907 84,527
Youkounkoun 26,958 22,906 1 22,899
Total 1,405,986 1,200,171 56,959 1,130,292
Source: S. Toure, Experience Gnlneenne eh Unite Africaina, p. 200.
Arriving on referendum day, Governor Jean Risterucci was sent by 
the metropolitan government to oversee the French withdrawal from 
Guinea. Through Risterucci, Guinea was informed that the French 
government intended to transfer all French civil servants out of the 
former territory within a period of two months, and that all budgetary 
and economic assistance was terminated. A group of 80 French teachers 
returning to Guinea from holiday were ordered off their ship in Dakar 
and notified that their contracts had been cancelled. Investments by 
FIDES were immediately halted, while future projects were annulled.
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Banks cut credit; most of them hurriedly left the country. The pensions 
of Guinean war veterans were suspended. Guinean exports ceased to be 
admitted to France under the favoured-nation policy. Administrative 
files were emptied, those that could not be carried were burned. In 
offices all over Conakry furniture was destroyed and telephones ripped 
from the walls. The military barracks were burned. The departure of the 
army included all medical personnel, who reportedly took their medicines 
and supplies along with them. Finally, in taking possession of the 
Governor’s palace, Tour& entered a scene of desolation: all furnishings 
had been removed, kitchenware smashed, cellars emptied, and telephones 
gone. Such proved to be the initial "consequences" of the Guinean "no" 
vote. The forced isolation of the former French colony, the only one to 
reject the French Community by opting for immediate independence, had 
begun.
Repeated Guinean appeals for association agreements with France 
were ignored. Delayed correspondence from the French government often 
was sent un-signed on blank paper bearing no letter-head. De Gaulle was 
determined to make an example out of Guinea (while giving a warning to 
others), inflicting a harsh punishment which undoubtedly had a consider­
able impact on the growth and development of the new nation.
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CONCLUSIONS
Authors have been at odds in discussing the causes of the rupture
between France and Guinea. Two of the most common arguments are that the
conflict stemmed from 1) missed opportunity and 2) psychological error.
Both theories are employed by Chaffard and Lacouture. Chaffard claims
that if Toure had not been kept out of the Constitutional Committee, and
if de Gaulle had read Tours's speech of 25 August in advance, things
1
would have turned out differently. Lacouture also regrets that de
Gaulle apparently failed to read the text of Toure’s address, pointing
out that the content was really not surprising to anyone who was
2
familiar with the mannerisms of the PDG leader. Both authors stress
that the actual wording of the speech was not as influential as the
tone in which it was delivered. R.W. Johnson also traces the split to
the confrontation in Conakry, seeing Tourd's actions as a "tactical
error," and independence almost as an accident, "won by a reluctant
revolutionary in a state of psychological trauma brought on by
3
compulsive resort to rhetoric." According to Johnson, after realising
what he had done, Toure "sought to retrieve the situation and
4
apolog ise."
These arguments are rejected by Guinean authors Camara and Kaba. 
Carrara holds that Toure knew exactly what he was doing, the wording of
1
G. Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, vol II, pp. 200-4.
2
J. Lacouture, Cinq hnmmes ei. la. France, p. 349.
3
R.W. Johnson, "Guinea," in John Dunn, ed., West African States* 
Failure, and. Promise, Cantoridge, 1978, pp. 38-40.
4
Ibid., p. 40.
362
the address was intentional, and that the decision to opt for immediate
5
independence had already been made. Camara further suggests that Tour6
was deliberately offending de Gaulle in order not to take responsibility
for the impending rupture in Franco-Guinean relations. Overall both
Camara and Kaba argue that the conflict was irreducible, stemming from a
long struggle against colonialism and inferior status, thus a matter of 
6
sinple pride.
All of the above cited authors agree that the Guineans truly did
not believe that France would brutally cut off her former colony and
inpose the threatened "consequences" of secession. Finally, Hamon claims
that in the beginning of September Toure was still wary of independence,
not knowing exactly where he was going. Nevertheless, according to
Hamon, the split was somewhat fatal in view of the personalities
7
involved and the political mobilisation of the masses.
It was, in fact, exactly this "mobilisation" that was the 
propelling force behind the Guinean "no" vote and subsequent 
independence. This thesis has traced post-war political development in 
Guinea with particular emphasis on the relationship between France and 
the PDG. The French impact on politics in the overseas territories was 
preponderant. As explained in Chapter II, African political organisation 
in the Federation of French West Africa was largely the result of post­
war political reform. The colonial power contributed to the shaping of 
local African politics in a variety of ways, examples including
5
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electoral tampering, supporting or suppressing political parties, 
coercing administrative chiefs and civil servants, transferring 
political activists around the Federation, and imprisoning party 
militants. Meanwhile in Paris the French influence on African 
parliamentarians was more subtle, taking the form of alliances, 
negotiations, and tacit agreements.
It was the French Communist Party which initially welcomed the 
African deputies to Paris, and was instrumental in the organisation of 
the PDA. The repression of the IDA following the ousting of the 
Communists from power in France led to a re-evaluation of the movement’s 
orientation. The new hard-line administration made it perfectly clear to 
the IDA that the costs of continued alliance with the Communists far 
outweighed the benefits. Facing outright dissolution, in 1950 the FDA 
leadership adjusted their policies and reconciled with the French 
authorities.
In Guinea the adjustment process proved to be lagging. The FDA 
section in Guinea developed alongside the Communist study groups, where 
most of the activists received their political training. Moreover, the 
case of Guinea was particular in that the party was also intrinsically 
tied to the trade union movement. During the time when the FDA was being 
suppressed, political action in Guinea was redirected through the local 
branch of the Communist-oriented CGT, the success of which made Sekou 
Tour§ the most, celebrated union leader in the Federation. Adept at 
organising mass strikes pressing for various reforms, Tour6 remained 
suspect in the eyes of the French longer than any other FDA leader. 
Defeated in several election cairpaigns due to administrative interfer­
ence, Toure was caught in a difficult position of accepting FDA
364
disaffiliation from the Communist Party and reconciliation with the 
French government, while maintaining his position as Secretary-General 
of the CGT in West Africa. Hence for the time being Tour6 adopted an 
ambiguous attitude, keeping the authorities guessing until he decided 
upon his next move.
After losing the election to the National Assembly in 1954, Tour6 
led a campaign to reorganise the PDG from the grass-roots level, 
implanting party cells throughout the territory modelled after the PCF. 
Strict hierarchy and party discipline were enforced, while parallel 
administrations acted as screens between the local government and the 
Guinean masses. Highly indoctrinated with party rhetoric and anti­
colonial sentiment, the masses were mobilised and unleashed into open 
conflict with PDG opponents and colonial forces. The violent incidents 
of 1954-1955 were PDG inspired and orchestrated, intended as a show of 
force. The mobilisation campaign proved remarkably successful, as 
administrative reports confirmed that the PDG village lives, works, and 
r ises up en. blon.
Desperate for elected office and confirmation of his eminent 
position on the Guinean political scene, Tour§ finally chose to appease 
both the H)A leadership and the French government by publicly announcing 
in 1955 the severing of ties between the PDG and the PCF, as well as the 
creation of an independent African trade union movement. For Toure this 
was a tactical manoeuvre, well calculated as soon afterwards he was 
elected deputy to the National Assembly and then was heading the terri­
torial government.
At this point it can be said that France lost the upper hand in 
controlling political events in Guinea. Although the French authorities
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"allowed" Tour6 to rise to power at this time, essentially they had 
little choice. Clearly the French government was counting on Houphouet 
to keep Tour6 in line with the HDA policy of collaboration. Nevertheless 
it was evident that the French administration in Guinea had little 
remaining authority, and in fact order in the territory was at the 
behest of Toure alone. For in Guinea the FDA "Sily" was synonymous with 
Toure, the "myth" surrounding his persona was powerful.
The same conclusion applies to the abolition of the chieftaincy. 
While the French government had the power to annul such an act, 
no intervention was forthcoming. Under the circumstances, namely the 
long-established campaign to degrade the chieftaincy and the PDG 
government now in power, the suppression of the institution was accepted 
as inevitable. For the PDG, the end of the chieftaincy not only 
eliminated a historically potent force of opposition to the party, but 
symbolised the destruction of a main pillar of colonialism.
The anti-colonial struggle was a recurrent theme throughout PDG 
history. To what extent, then, did such rhetoric influence the Guinean 
decision to opt for immediate independence in the referendum of 28 
September? To attribute a decision of such magnitude to simple mistake, 
accident, or personality conflict is surely inadequate. To trace the 
rupture in Franco-Guinean relations to Tours's speech in front of de 
Gaulle is also overstated.
The address which Tour§ made before the Guinean National Assembly
in the presence of de Gaulle was not impromptu. It has been claimed that
Toure was not even the author of the famous harangue, but that a commit-
8
tee was responsible for its contents. In any case, certainly the text 
-
L. Kaba, Le "non" dc> la Gmn£e a de Gaulle?, p. 105.
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reflected Tours’s views at the time, as much of it had been heard
before. In fact the much cited remark: "We prefer poverty in liberty to
wealth in slavery" was a proverb often quoted by PDG propagandists; in a
speech on 2 February 1958 Tour6 stated: "we will find that it is prefer-
9
able to live unhappily in liberty than happily in slavery." As for the
proclamation that "we will never renounce our natural and legitimate
right to independence," the key word here is "right." Up to this point
Toure had not campaigned for independence, however he had countless
times insisted on the "inalienable right" to it. Toure was making a
deliberate stand, for African dignity in demanding the right to
independence, and for African unity in creating a confederal Republic.
Evidence suggests that at this time Toure had not. yet decided which
way to vote. As in the past, the PDG leader had kept the PDA leadership
as well as the French government wondering which direction he would
take. His hesitations prove that the final decision was not accidental
but rather carefully deliberated. It seems that Tour6 was leaning toward
a "no" vote, and was either testing de Gaulle for a last minute
compromise or concession, or drumming up extra support from the Guinean
masses for the difficult path that lay ahead.
Among the West African politicians, Tour6 has been characterised as
belonging to the third generation (along with cohorts such as Bakary
10
Djibo), that of trade unionism and revolution. The second generation 
politicians were the Ponty intellectuals, having usually served in the
9
CPDA 9/br.3, Text of a speech of Sekou Toure entitled "Le FDA et 
1'Action Syndicate," given at a trade union conference in Conakry on 2 
February 1958, p. 14.
10
J. Lacouture, Cinq hommes et. la France, p. 328.
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French administration or federal civil service. Houphouet, a trained
medical doctor and 20 years Tours’s senior, belonged to the first
generation of African leaders, beside elder highly-educated politicians
such as Lamine Gueye and Mamadou Konate. The conflict of generations was
11
visible in all the African political groupings. Tour§ led the younger, 
nationalist federalists, who also filled the ranks of UGTAN. It must be 
remembered that the uneducated men like Toure retained a great deal of 
their formative training received by the Communist study groups in the 
beginning of their political careers. Particularly in the case of the 
PDG, Communist organisation, propaganda, and indoctrination strategies 
were meticulously applied from the Directing Committee to the grass­
roots level of the party.
Official reports depict the Guinean masses ready and eager to take 
"independence with its consequences," while the leadership remained 
somewhat reluctant to accept de Gaulle’s dare. In the week preceding the 
referendum, an observer described Toure’s behaviour accordingly:
At no time during this historic week was it possible to 
detect the least glimmer of triumph or exultation in the 
somber regard of "Sily": rather a controlled anxiety. (12)
PDG indoctrination and rhetoric over the years had prepared the masses 
for the "revolutionary struggle" to bring about the downfall of colon­
ialism. Nevertheless although this massive mobilisation and overflow of 
enthusiasm for the prospect of independence undoubtedly had an influence 
on Tour6, the PDG leader could be certain that whatever his decision, 
most of his people would be behind him.
—
R. Schachter Morgenthau, Political Partiesf p. 116.
12
Andre Blanchet, "Guinee: Comment est nee la Republique," Jenna
Afrique, 1447, 28 September 1988.
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Tour6 certainly also considered the aspirations of the trade union­
ists he represented, as UGTAN was decidedly campaigning for a "no" vote. 
Additionally, the call for independence had been heralded by Djibo of 
Niger, the PRA, PAI, and FEANF, and thus it is likely that Tour6 
expected that he would not be alone in such a decision. The PRA leaders 
in Guinea, Barry Diawadou and Barry III, had adopted their movement's 
position on the referendum and decided to call for the rejection of the 
Constitution. It would have been very difficult for Tour6 to accept 
being outdone by his political rivals. Finally, as a matter of African 
dignity, there was only one choice, the consequences for which 
unfortunately brought Guinea "poverty in liberty," albeit, with pride.
369
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